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Colombia’s protracted civil war between Marxist insurgencies and the state has 
brought grave consequences for the civilian population and the prospects for 
constructing a viable political community in the country. With up to 5 million 
internally displaced people, rampant impunity for perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity and human rights and International Humanitarian Law violations, 
dozens of politicians and countless members of the armed forces linked to 
paramilitary organizations, along with increasing social injustices and 
inequalities, Colombia presents a troubling social-political panorama that has 
led to what is often referred to as a profound social and institutional “moral 
crisis”. Much discussion has centred on the question of achieving some degree 
of minimal moral and political consensus and “collective conscience” to 
humanize and slowly transform the conflict at local, regional and national levels. 
However, the philosophical and political parameters of this discussion have 
been and continue to be set firmly within variants of the liberal tradition which, it 
is argued, does not provide the necessary resources for adequately 
conceptualizing the problem and conceiving the task of addressing conflict, 
constructing moral consensus, and seeking social and political coexistence. The 
thesis argues that the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre can provide such 
resources. MacIntyre provides a convincing account of the philosophical 
problems that underlie ongoing intractable disagreement and the conflicts it 
breeds, offering a philosophy that can inform and underpin efforts at social 
transformation, resistance, and coexistence as well as aiding the necessary 
task of social scientific research and analysis of the conflict. The thesis analyses 
the moral dimensions of the conflict in light of MacIntyre’s philosophy but also 
critically explores the adequacy of his politics of local community for the 
Colombian context. MacIntyre argues that a rational political community can 
only be constructed through the praxis of local communities engaging in shared 
moral-political deliberation. Through an empirical case study of a Constituent 
Assembly process in a rural community that has suffered the impacts of armed 
conflict for decades, the thesis explores an attempt at constructing peaceful 
social and political coexistence in light of MacIntyre’s moral-sociological 
framework.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the moral dimensions of conflict and the search for peace 
in Colombia from the perspective of the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre. I 
argue that MacIntyre’s work provides a rich and illuminating theoretical 
framework for analysing various aspects of Colombia’s deep “moral crisis” 
(Arango 2002; Gómez-Müller 2008; López 2005) and the ongoing problem of 
radical disagreement (see Giraldo 2003; MacIntyre 1988; Ramsbotham 2010), 
both of which are partly cause and effect of ongoing social and political conflict 
in the country.1 In studying the moral dimensions of the Colombian conflict 
through the work of MacIntyre I aim to problematise certain theoretical, 
philosophical and political stances in relation to constructing peace in 
Colombia, and to clarify some of the issues and dynamics involved. I also aim 
to make a more general contribution to the normative dimension of peace 
studies. As Bill McSweeney has argued, “Peace studies...rests on the claim 
that there are alternatives to any existing social order and that human agency 
and moral choice are fundamental...to their realization” (cited in Atack 2009). I 
                                                 
1 In the Colombian philosophical literature the “moral crisis” variously refers to: the question of 
violence as a profound ethical problem (Tovar 2002); the crisis of state legitimacy (Arango 
2002; Uribe 1993); the fracturing of the social fabric and the failure of social and political 
coexistence (Gómez-Müller 2008; López 2005; Pearce 1998); the linguistic dimensions of 
conflict (López 2005; López 2007; González 2009; Torres 1962; Uribe and López 2006); the 
challenge of reaching some degree of social and political consensus around the requirements 
of peace and coexistence (Giraldo 2003; Mejía 2004); the problem of “transitional justice” and 
“reconciliation” (Hoyos 2007; Orozco 2005). It also extends to the role of the social sciences in 
addressing or perpetuating conflict (García Durán 2008; González et al. 2002). It is therefore 
clear that what is referred to as “the” moral crisis encompasses a diverse albeit interrelated set 
of issues and problems. For the purposes of this thesis I use the term to denote the 
conjunction of four associated issues: the failure in Colombia to construct an inclusive state 
project and political community; the problem of radical disagreement in respect of politics, 
morality, characterizations of the conflict, and the linguistic failure to resolve conflicts due to 
the degradation and hyper-moralization and politicization of language; the problematic 
dimensions of social and political resistance associated with the armed left; and the normative 
dimensions of the social sciences in relation to conflict analysis and policy prescriptions for 
peace. 
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claim that MacIntyre’s philosophy is particularly relevant (and critically 
challenging) for peace theorists and practitioners in its critique of existing 
socio-economic arrangements combined with its emphasis on human agency. 
MacIntyre also illuminates the way moral concerns cut across, and are 
intertwined with, the social and political conflicts that are the subject matter of 
peace studies, and the theoretical level of conflict analysis and social scientific 
research that theorists engage in.  
MacIntyre is an entirely neglected thinker in the Colombian 
philosophical discussion, therefore I aim to demonstrate the relevance of 
MacIntyre’s philosophy for theory and practice in relation to the Colombian 
conflict and the search for peace. MacIntyre’s work can help us to better 
understand the nature of continuing moral and political disagreement in 
Colombia (and of course in more general terms) as well as illuminating how 
human agency can be rationally effective and sidestep the vicious circle of 
conflict dynamics. However, it also offers a controversial social-political 
proposal for enabling such agency and overcoming moral-political 
disagreement and the conflicts it breeds.2 Whilst arguing for the relevance of 
MacIntyre’s diagnosis of the contemporary state of moral-political 
disagreement and moral philosophy to the Colombian context, I critically 
explore, through empirical fieldwork, his call for an Aristotelian “politics of local 
community” and “resistance” as the only means for restoring rationality to 
moral and political commitments and arguments and for building political 
community and rationally grounded coexistence (MacIntyre 1985a; 1998d; 
2001; 2006d).   
                                                 
2 See Harman, 2009 for a critique of MacIntyre’s political proposals. 
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MacIntyre himself has called for empirical work to be done in order to 
build up a corpus of comparative studies on different forms of local community 
that embody what he calls “networks of giving and receiving” (MacIntyre 2001, 
p. 143). In such communities moral and political virtues (and vices) are 
‘discovered’ in the pursuit of a politics of the common good. We need to find 
“examples of such communities at their best and at their worst, and most of all 
examples of communities that have been or are open to alternative 
possibilities and that sometimes move towards the better and sometimes 
towards the worse” (MacIntyre 2001, p. 143). What comparative study can 
provide us with is a picture of “the variety of social forms within which networks 
of giving and receiving can be institutionalized and the variety of ways in which 
such networks can be sustained and strengthened or weakened and 
destroyed” (ibid., p. 143). My empirical work aims to contribute to this task, but 
through it I also intend to critically assess the politics of local community as 
such. I want to enquire as to the adequacy of MacIntyre’s politics both to the 
philosophical problems MacIntyre himself diagnoses, and to the particular 
manifestations of these problems in the Colombian context.3 I shall elaborate 
in greater detail further on about the nature and challenges of my empirical 
work and the theoretical basis of MacIntyre’s politics of local community. 
Beforehand, however, I need to elucidate my overall argument with reference 
to the title of my thesis. 
 MacIntyre argues that modern liberal politics is “civil war carried on by 
other means” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 253), which serves to mask the depths of 
                                                 
3 I raise questions about the link between MacIntyre’s political-cum-sociological proposals for 
rationally addressing conflict via local communities and his proposals for channelling the 
macro moral, philosophical and sociological conflict of traditions that constitutes the theoretical 
level problem of radical disagreement (MacIntyre 1991). 
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conflict in peaceful societies and to conceal the extent of manipulation, co-
optation and domination exercised by the state and sectoral interests. 
MacIntyre’s rejection of liberalism is based on his view that, contrary to its 
initial philosophical and political aspirations, it has failed to provide a coherent 
framework for reconciling different interests and conceptions of the good that 
can compel the rational assent of all. Liberalism merely suppresses conflict, 
whilst also covertly imposing a particular and contestable conception of the 
good (MacIntyre 1988). Therefore, for MacIntyre, liberal citizenship as a form 
of political coexistence serves an ideological function (Knight 2007, p. 170). As 
Kelvin Knight notes, for MacIntyre “one should refuse that minimal amount of 
participation which the state allows its subjects in the name of citizenship” 
(Knight 2007, p. 179). Hence MacIntyre’s call for “resistance” and a “politics of 
self-defense” (MacIntyre 2006d, p. 155) against the depredations of the 
‘neutral’ liberal state and its normative framework.  
Thus MacIntyre provides a framework with which to understand the 
depths of modern moral-political conflict, the need for resistance to the state, 
and the challenges of constructing coexistence, which, as I shall substantiate 
further on, is what makes MacIntyre’s philosophy so relevant to the Colombian 
problematic: Deep-rooted social and moral conflict, state terror and 
authoritarianism, left-wing armed resistance to the state, right-wing armed 
counter-resistance to the guerrillas, and civil society attempts at constructing 
civilized coexistence, all point to the ostensible relevance of MacIntyre’s 
philosophical concerns and categories. Further, as I shall endeavour to show, 
MacIntyre also proposes concomitant political prescriptions that to some 
degree resonate with existing alternative social-political processes in 
Colombia. I shall presently turn to an initial elaboration of MacIntyre’s position, 
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but before that it is necessary to point out that MacIntyre’s philosophical 
diagnoses and political proposals are at odds with the general direction of 
philosophical analysis of the conflict and normative prescriptions in the 
Colombian discussion.  
Colombian scholars are all too aware of the realities of civil war and the 
social fragmentation and fracturing it brings (Mejía et al. 2004; Safford and 
Palacios 2002; Uribe 1999; Uribe and López 2006), yet almost uniformly there 
is a consensus that some form of liberalism and liberal democratic state 
politics offer the required philosophical and political resources for addressing 
conflict and reconstructing “convivencia” (Duncan 2008; López 2005; Romero 
2003; Uribe 1996). Conflict analysts, sociologists, philosophers and political 
scientists are agreed on the complex roots of the conflict, the way state 
construction in Colombia has encountered various forms of resistance (Bolívar 
2006; González et al. 2002; Romero 2003; Uribe 1993, 1999; Uribe and López 
2006), and on the need to rebuild political community and coexistence (Botero 
2002; Gómez-Müller 2008; López 2005; Mejía et al. 2004), but they would be 
reluctant to advocate a politics of resistance and local community as the 
answer. For most Colombian scholars, liberalism, if properly understood and 
implemented via the modern state, can provide a framework for conducting 
civil war by other means. This was indeed the hope engendered in the early 
1990s with the redaction of a new political charter and the decentralization of 
Colombia’s political system, which promoted and facilitated greater political 
participation. Yet despite the widely acknowledged limitations and failings of 
this political settlement, even relatively radical scholars maintain that some 
form of liberalism is the only means of addressing conflict and establishing a 
political community in Colombia (see Mejía et al. 2004).   
 6
My concern is to strongly question this assumption. I argue, following 
MacIntyre, that the dominant liberal paradigm does not sufficiently recognize 
the depths of contemporary moral and political disagreements, and that in 
continuing to advocate liberalism theorists and grassroots activists cannot 
adequately understand conflict or hope to chart ways out of it. Following my 
detailed exposition of MacIntyre’s philosophical project in chapter one, chapter 
two demonstrates several problems with various liberal approaches in the 
Colombian literature in light of MacIntyre’s central theses. One of the key 
weaknesses relates to the linguistic dimension of conflict and the search for 
consensus, which is deemed to be central to overcoming violent conflict (Mejía 
et al. 2004). As sociologist María Teresa Uribe argues, the ubiquity of violence 
in the Colombian context can be related to the loss of consensus and political 
legitimacy (Uribe 1990, p. 23). Colombian conflict analyst Javier Giraldo has 
written,  
 
If we propose the exercise of seeking consensus about that which connects us 
as members of the same nation, we are talking about something essential for 
constructing possibilities of humanized coexistence, which up to now has been 
destructive. We need to find the most adequate means for ensuring that the 
search for consensus can authentically occur (Giraldo 2003, pp. 85-86). 
 
The lack of state institutional presence and the emergence of guerrilla and 
paramilitary organizations have blocked the formation of a minimal form of 
consensus in respect of state legitimacy, national identity and political 
community (Uribe 1999, p. 263). De facto political consensuses have been 
established where state, guerrilla or paramilitary forces have been able to 
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represent certain collective interests, yet these have ostensibly been non-
rational consensuses constructed more through coercion and fear than rational 
assent (ibid., p. 263).  
Language is central to the task of constructing an “authentic” consensus 
(Giraldo 2003, pp 85-86). However, the languages used to express 
disagreements, to put forward political prescriptions, and to work towards 
agreed upon solutions are, on MacIntyre’s view, intimately bound up with rival 
philosophical traditions that are often “incommensurable” (MacIntyre 1985a, 
1988). In light of this, if, as philosopher Gray Cox argues, peacebuilding 
means “cultivating the process of agreeing” (Cox 1986, p. 12), then liberalism 
as a paradigm for seeking peace is highly problematic from a MacIntyrean 
standpoint. Yet liberalism is also the paradigm in which Colombian civil society 
operates. In the early 1990s, as widespread fatigue with the grind of ongoing 
war set in and the collapse of the Soviet Union sparked a liberal renaissance 
with what we might refer to as an “option for civil society”, Colombian civil 
society appeared to place its hopes for addressing conflict through discussion 
and argumentation from the national to the local level (from the National 
Constituent Assembly that drew up the 1991 Constitution to regional and local 
assemblies).  
Turning to different contractualist ethical theories, Colombian activists, 
philosophers and political theorists sought to elucidate a foundation of ethical 
norms for coexistence and a shared language based on the (Habermasian) 
presuppositions of intersubjective dialogue and a “shared rationality” 
(Fernández et al. 1996; Peña 1996; Uribe 1992). Colombian intellectuals once 
sympathetic to the armed left issued public moral critiques and denunciations 
of the armed struggle, expressing hope that the political opening they deemed 
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to be represented by the National Assembly and 1991 Constitution could serve 
to engender a discussion, and ultimately a consensus, on the ethical referents 
of Colombian society. Yet this panacea of open discussion, based on the 
various philosophical assumptions of liberalism, ignored what former 
Colombian priest and ELN4 guerrilla Camilo Torres pointed out in the 1960s 
(the decade in which Colombia’s principal guerrilla movements emerged):  
 
It is possible that in Colombia there are two incipient subcultures that are 
gradually becoming more independent, dissimilar, and antagonistic…Each has 
its own system of values, behavior, and attitudes, which are now becoming 
antagonistic. Whatever communication there is between these two classes is 
breaking down. (Torres 1964, p. 193) 
 
In relation to the use of political and moral language Torres observed: 
 
The same expressions have different meanings for each class.…The systems 
of communication between the two classes become ever more precarious, 
because the absence of common expressions makes dialogue impossible, and 
the lack of dialogue engenders incomprehension. When a cultural barrier of 
this kind arises, simple common sense is not sufficient to overcome it. Real 
contacts must be made in order to re-establish a dialogue. (Ibid., pp. 193-194) 
 
This implicitly points to MacIntyre’s perspective. MacIntyre argues that the loss 
of a teleological perspective in ethics and politics, through the rejection of 
Aristotelianism at the threshold of the modern era, has left morality and moral-
political language as an unintelligible, arbitrary melange of fragmented 
                                                 
4The  Cuban-inspired guerrilla movement known as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional 
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concepts and injunctions that prohibits rational engagement in conflict and the 
possibility of reaching consensus (MacIntyre 1985a). As a result, 
contemporary moral and political debates cannot be rationally resolved, only 
arbitrarily settled by the imposition of power or non-rational suasion (MacIntyre 
1985a). In the contemporary social world, morality has become an instrument 
of emotivist manipulation. On the emotivist view, morality does not imply a 
realm of objective criteria to which our arguments make appeal in order to 
rationally convince others of the appropriateness or not of some action, but is 
merely a technique of emotional persuasion dressed up in the terms of an 
appeal to impersonal standards. The key to the social content of emotivism “is 
the fact that emotivism entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction 
between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations” (MacIntyre 
1985a, p. 23). I argue that this diagnosis of emotivism as central to the 
problematic nature of moral conflict usefully illuminates important aspects of 
the Colombian conflict in relation to its linguistic and political dimensions. For 
example, the increasingly shrill discourses and “parallel delegitimizations” 
(Giraldo 2003) of rival conflict actors and the “pathology” of moral and political 
language in Colombia, which has degenerated into “The use of terms that no 
longer convince anyone as they begin to be rendered meaningless by their 
abuse, misuse and dull repetition” (López 2005, p. 196), can be partly 
explained and elucidated by MacIntyre’s diagnosis of emotivism. It also 
problematises the various liberal positions in respect of seeking a shared 
ethical language and minimal set of norms for coexistence. 
MacIntyre’s central thesis is that moral consensus is impossible in 
modern cultures because of the fragmentation of previous moral frameworks 
and modes of reasoning. According to MacIntyre, 
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[R]ational consensus upon central moral questions and a fortiori on central 
political questions has proved impossible within the framework provided by the 
dominant conception of rationality in modern cultures and…therefore in the 
arena of rational discussion there is radical dissensus. (MacIntyre 1985b, p. 
238) 
 
The failure to address radical incommensurability is a weakness of various 
neo-Kantian/Habermasian approaches to dialogue and conflict resolution in 
which free and open discussion is held to be the answer to radical conflict. 
These approaches appear to view ethics as ahistorical, as ultimately detached 
from particular interests and desires. Consensus is deemed to be possible 
under idealized conditions of communication and argumentation because of 
this ahistorical conception of morality. However, even if we assume that this 
might prove to be the case, the fact is that in order to even approach the 
creation of these conditions we have to get beyond and address the fact of 
rival moral-political standpoints that have partially led to and informed and 
justified the current state of affairs. Those in control of the media, of land, of 
the means of production and so forth hold to particular moral-political 
standpoints that are radically at odds with the standpoints of those from 
different strata of society. Part of the strength of MacIntyre’s thesis is that it 
directly faces up to this reality of endemic linguistic and social conflict. As 
MacIntyre notes, “it has been precisely at the level of language that the moral 
inadequacies and corruptions of our age have been evident, and certainly no 
less so by those with ideological stances than by others” (MacIntyre 1971d, p. 
94). 
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MacIntyre’s insistence on the depths of linguistic and conceptual conflict 
recalls the recognition by Marxist and other radical scholars in the 1960s and 
1970s that moral-political language could not be neutral or divorced from 
economic and social structures (Dussel 1973; Freire 1970; Gutiérrez 1973; 
Harvey 1973 (1988); Petras 1978). Within the Latin American context of the 
Cold War and National Security Doctrine, rival interpretations of human rights 
language abounded, with sharp differences between Western and US-aligned 
sectors and Latin American popular movements (Assman 1978). Ethical 
language was highly politicized (Comblin 1979), liberation theologians argued 
for a non-neutral “option for the poor” (Gutierrez 1973), and liberationist 
philosophers criticized the “Eurocentrism” of hegemonic philosophical 
categories (Dussel 1973, 1977). The shift by many intellectuals to the 
philosophical and political optimism of post-Soviet Union liberalism and civil 
society, however, simply left behind and did not address the philosophical 
problems of moral-political language that Marxists, liberation theologians and 
philosophers had highlighted. I argue that MacIntyre’s work returns us to these 
unresolved problems and posits a way of resolving them, whilst also offering 
an important critique of the ethical theories and approaches associated with 
liberationism, Marxism and other forms of political radicalism.  
In the Colombian context, this radicalism led to the emergence of left-
wing insurgencies that either appealed directly to Marxist notions of justice or 
to an amalgam of radical Christianity, Just War Theory and Marxism, amongst 
other permutations. When Camilo Torres joined the ELN guerrillas he was as 
convinced of the moral basis for his decision as were those who criticized him 
on the left and the right. Yet it is this moral certainty and conviction that has 
arguably contributed to conflict dynamics in Colombia. As philosopher Rodolfo 
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Arango observes, “Herein lies precisely the bankruptcy of Colombian political 
culture: an appreciable number of people and social groups are persuaded of 
the justice of their cause and therefore they believe the means they use to 
achieve their objectives are legitimate” (Arango 2002, pp. 18-19). Where 
everything is seen to be legitimate there is a moral crisis of distinctions that 
urgently requires the formulation of an agreement about what is and is not 
publicly legitimate (Gómez-Müller 2008, p. 59). However, trapped between the 
so-called “ethics of conviction” and the “ethics of responsibility” (Giraldo 2003), 
rival moral positions and arguments in relation to legitimacy and the 
requirements for peace and coexistence are apparently irreconcilable.5 I 
suggest that MacIntyre’s diagnosis of emotivism and incommensurability 
illuminates the underlying philosophical dynamics of this phenomenon.  
Torres’ views on morality and the possibilities of rational communication 
between different classes were, of course, Marxist views. Marx observed that 
in a class divided society it was pointless for workers to appeal to moral 
arguments in order to convince the capitalist class of the need for justice 
(MacIntyre 2002, p. 205).  As one Marxist theorist has written,  
 
A class which fights to preserve existing society has one set of notions about 
what is necessary to keep society going, and attempts to impose on people 
the moral notions that correspond to this. It has to portray the values it 
propagates as the values necessary for society as a whole, what is good for 
itself as absolutely ‘good’. By contrast, a class which feels its needs are not 
met and presses for society to be reconstituted on a different basis necessarily 
                                                 
5 See J. Giraldo (2003) on the “parallel delegitimizations” of conflict discourses and the moral 
argument between Francisco de Roux and Javier Giraldo in relation to the question of 
characterising the armed struggle as a “just war”. 
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begins to advance different interpretations of moral notions. (Harman 2007- 
unpaginated) 
 
Yet it is precisely this kind of imposition that is the problem. If there can be no 
rational agreement on moral norms and the presuppositions of moral and 
political community, then there can only be imposition of one moral scheme 
and political vision of society over another. Instead of Marxist or other 
impositions of moral notions, instead of power or violence as the arbiter of 
political disagreement, Colombia needs to find, in the words of one Colombian 
philosopher, “a juridical-moral language that demands of and engenders within 
individuals, groups and institutions a sense of social responsibility, respect for 
the ‘polis’, a sense of the ‘public’ and the common good” (Calderón 1996, p. 
24). 
However, such a language cannot simply be formulated in abstraction 
by “experts” or anyone else. On a MacIntyrean view, a condition for the 
discovery and formulation of such a language is shared social and political 
practice in local communities in which Aristotelian concepts can be embodied 
and reconstituted in contemporary forms. Yet it is not solely a question of 
developing a shared language in such spaces: shared discursive terms and 
dialogue also imply shared practical-material terms (Dussel 1999; MacIntyre 
2006f, p. 39) and the importance of developing what MacIntyre calls the 
virtues. Moral language of itself cannot engender a sense of social 
responsibility or a respect for the public sphere. What is required is the right 
kind of motivation, the requisite link between discourse and practice, which for 
MacIntyre means the development of moral and political virtues in dialectical 
relationship to a conception of the good and a concomitant emerging ethical 
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theory (see Solomon 2003). As Kelvin Knight notes, abstract invocations of the 
“common good” are made from a variety of ideological standpoints (Knight 
2007, p. 177). Therefore, as MacIntyre is well aware, simply formulating one 
more prescriptive theory and unmasking the incoherence of other theories and 
ideologies cannot achieve very much. The rational justification of any such 
theory and political prescription can only be demonstrated in practice. Debate 
about the best forms of political practice ultimately has to be debate between 
rival institutions as much as between rival theories (MacIntyre 1990a, p. 360).  
Before elaborating further on MacIntyre’s politics of local community 
and my empirical investigation, I first need to outline an important, related 
component of my overall argument that connects empirical study, moral 
philosophy, sociology and conflict analysis. In chapter three I argue that study 
of the Colombian or any other conflict always implies some normative position 
that enters into our modes of analysis (cf. Jabri 2006). Further, in the 
Colombian case, social scientists have expressed the view that the aim is not 
merely to interpret the conflict, but to transform it (García Durán 2008). This 
takes us onto the contested terrain of social change, which is in significant part 
what has driven and continues to drive the Colombian conflict. The social 
sciences therefore cannot avoid participating in the very conflict they seek to 
analyse and transform. They are inextricably bound up with the problem of 
seeking some kind of moral consensus. In Colombia, the very characterization 
and analysis of the conflict “risks becoming yet another site of conflict” 
(González et al. 2002, p. 19), adding to the already complex nature of 
Colombia’s ongoing war. The politicization and moralization of the concrete 
conflict on the ground has fed into, and is often now subtly or not so subtly 
reflected in, social scientific analyses and prescriptions in relation to the 
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conflict and the attainment of “peace”. On a MacIntyrean view, due to the 
liberal philosophical assumptions of modern social science, this is inevitable.  
MacIntyre’s central intervention in moral philosophy in his seminal work 
After Virtue offers more than a diagnosis of the parlous and incoherent state of 
modern morality and moral theory, extending to a historically informed 
philosophical analysis of social and philosophical thought that also 
encompasses a powerful critique of prevailing social science methodology and 
presuppositions. Starting from the Marxist premise that social and moral 
conflict is inherent to the social structure of modernity, MacIntyre shows how 
rival conceptual and theoretical frameworks for interpreting and analysing the 
social world provided by different philosophical schools of thought, political 
ideologies and social theories all presuppose a moral philosophy. Conversely, 
any moral philosophy presupposes a sociology and a philosophical psychology 
that can explain the basis and nature of human action. For MacIntyre, different 
accounts of human action and diverse conceptions of justice imply rival 
accounts of rationality in general and of practical rationality in particular 
(MacIntyre 1988), which constitutes the problem of radical disagreement in 
moral and political matters and the failure to rationally resolve conflicts at the 
concrete social level as well as at the level of theory.  
MacIntyre shows how different accounts of rationality are located within 
broad “traditions” of moral and philosophical/social enquiry, with liberalism 
constituting merely one tradition amongst others despite its claims to have 
provided a neutral account of rationality and morality that could claim the 
allegiance of any rational person qua individual embedded or not within some 
form of social or theoretical tradition. In MacIntyre’s view, the Aristotelian 
tradition provides the most intellectually compelling account of rationality, 
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morality and politics, as well as implying a superior modality of conducting 
social science. In After Virtue MacIntyre identifies the central intellectual and 
moral conflict of the age as that between Nietzsche and Aristotle, between the 
rival traditions that embody the central theses and presuppositions of these 
giants of philosophy. As he explains, “The differences between the two run 
very deep. They extend beyond ethics and morality to the understanding of 
human action, so that rival conceptions of the social sciences, of their limits 
and their possibilities, are intimately bound up with the antagonistic 
confrontation of these two alternative ways of viewing the human world” 
(MacIntyre 1985a, p. 259). Thus any description of the conflict and the “facts” 
in relation to it is inevitably theory-laden and therefore implies some 
contestable philosophical, epistemological, and normative account of the 
social world (cf. MacIntyre 1988, pp. 332-333).  
In modern ethics, the separation of facts from values and the 
subsequent view that questions of moral truth cannot be rationally investigated 
are partly what have led to the relegation of moral philosophy to the margins of 
academic enquiry (MacIntyre 1985a, 1991), with important implications for 
those who aim to understand the nature of contemporary social and political 
conflicts. The separation of facts from values embodied in prevailing 
conceptions of social science (MacIntyre 1998a; Sayer 2003) has contributed 
to a positivist notion of conflict resolution as a “toolkit” approach (Jabri 2006). 
Because normative judgements have ostensibly been removed from sociology 
and the social sciences (Sayer 2003), in the Colombian case I argue this has 
led to the covert imposition of particular normative standpoints in the guise of 
value neutrality, and to a lack of awareness of the way the social sciences and 
conflict analysis therefore offer contestable accounts of conflict and 
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prescriptions for social transformation and peace, thereby actually 
perpetuating conflict rather than transforming it. The modern prescriptions of 
policymakers and their consultants in the social sciences have broken free of 
any shared normative and discursive framework and are justified through the 
various modern modes of manipulative moral and managerialist discourse 
(see MacIntyre 1998a, 1973b).  
In social scientific analysis of the conflict, its causes, consequences, 
and prospects, different moral positions are clearly present (see Chaparro 
2007; Hoyos 2007; Mockus and Corzo 2003; Orozco 2005; Posada 2008). 
Diverse theoretical frameworks lead to rival conclusions and policy 
prescriptions in respect of the legitimacy or not of political violence, state-
building, land reform, and other issues (see Guáqueta 2006). For example, 
regarding insurgent violence and the armed struggle, rational choice theory 
has been used to discredit insurgent motives, leading to theories about the civil 
war that entail strong prescriptive conclusions and which implicitly relegate the 
importance of negotiation and addressing social injustices (see Collier and 
Hoeffler 2001). Just War Theory has been used to justify insurgent claims, 
which runs the risk of painting an equally one-sided picture of reality, 
overlooking the many “grey areas” in relation to violence and motives (see De 
Roux 2001; Giraldo 2003). Hobbesian readings of the conflict imply a particular 
framework for interpreting social action, leading to strong (and controversial) 
policy prescriptions in relation to “state-building” (Sandoval 2004; Giraldo 
2008), whilst Marxist readings tend to accentuate the structural dimensions of 
the conflict, justifying insurgent actions but downplaying the problematic moral 
dimensions of their use of violence (see Petras 1997).  
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In chapter three I explore these philosophical issues raised by a 
MacIntyrean perspective on morality, which include the question of the 
relationship of morality to the social sciences, the implications this has for 
studying the moral dimensions of the conflict, and the role of social science in 
analysing, perpetuating and transforming conflict. I also argue that MacIntyre’s 
philosophical project suggests an important research programme for those of 
us interested both in understanding contemporary intra-societal conflicts and 
seeking to transform them through some agenda of social change. From a 
MacIntyrean perspective, these two agendas are conceptually, theoretically 
and practically linked. I go on to suggest that MacIntyre’s project has affinities 
with the liberationist pedagogy and ethical approach of Paulo Freire (1970), 
which insists on the need to link theory and practice and thereby posits a 
radical challenge to mainstream social science and conflict analysis.  
 In chapter four I turn to an analysis of the Colombian conflict through a 
MacIntyrean lens. From the moral corruption and “schizophrenic” nature of the 
Colombian state (Giraldo 1999), to the process of “state construction” and the 
ambiguities of human rights discourse, I demonstrate the moral problems with 
Colombian politics and the state, as well as the challenges for effecting 
revolutionary social change and the transformation of politics in an ethical and 
rational way. MacIntyre calls for resistance to capitalism and the modern state 
but argues that the classic Marxist approach to such resistance and the 
revolutionary “road to socialism” shares the moral and epistemological failings 
of liberal modernity (MacIntyre 2008). He links this to his critique of social 
science, arguing that Marxist revolutionary theorists share the manipulative, 
managerialist assumptions of the “ideology of bureaucratic authority” with 
mainstream social scientists (MacIntyre 1973b, 1998a). Therefore, the 
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problematic moral dimension of armed left resistance lies not merely in the 
widely denounced terroristic acts of the guerrillas (denunciations which often 
rest on an uncertain moral basis), but is related to their theories of social 
transformation and their underlying conceptions of morality and human action.  
I claim that MacIntyre’s philosophy points to the need for slow, creative, 
and often frustrating processes of social, cultural and political encounters in 
which moral bonds and shared political visions can be constructed, something 
that practitioners of peacebuilding and grassroots conflict transformation have 
also underlined (Lederach 2005). I postulate the hypothesis that MacIntyre’s 
philosophy is already partly implicit in certain practices of social organizations 
and communities of resistance in Colombia, and propose MacIntyre’s moral-
sociological framework as a model for empirically exploring the peacebuilding 
process of a small Colombian community that has spent ten years attempting 
to transform local conflict through public participation and deliberation. Arguing 
that what is required is a form of MacIntyrean ethnographic fieldwork, I 
conclude the chapter with a justification of my case study and a brief excursus 
on my methodology.  
The importance of an adequate account of morality for politics and the 
search for consensus and coexistence should now be clear. If morality is only 
a reflex of pre-given individual and collective interests, then peace and social 
justice in Colombia can only be imposed through power via the victory of one 
group of social forces over another. “Dialogue” will continue to take the form of 
emotivist assertion and counter-assertion and, if it is not rooted in alternative 
social and political practices, will amount only to rhetoric and fail to address the 
crucial issues of character, motivation, and the re-orienting of desires and 
attitudes. Alternatively, if morality is more than this, as MacIntyre argues it is, 
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then for it to have social power it requires, on MacIntyre’s view, smaller-scale 
politics and closer, participatory social and political interaction and debate. 
Thus I was led to explore the potential and the pitfalls of the politics of local 
community in a Colombian municipality.  
Chapters five and six present my empirical case study of a local 
community process that has sought to build local peace and to transform 
dominant political practices through such political participation and debate. 
Picking up MacIntyre’s prescription of “local community” as the locus of moral 
rationality and a politics of the common good, I study a Municipal Constituent 
Assembly (AMC) in a rural Colombian municipality (Tarso) as a possible site 
for social change and the rebuilding of social and political coexistence through 
the reconstruction (and reconnection) of ethics and politics. Colombia’s 
Municipal Constituent Assemblies first emerged in the late 1990s as 
community responses to the pressures of armed groups, corrupt political 
practices, and local development needs (Marulanda 2004; Sanabria 2006). 
Politically and philosophically they found their justification in the 1991 
Constitution that mandated public participation and asserted the sovereignty of 
the people. Based on the principle of social inclusion, the Assemblies aimed to 
facilitate social dialogue and the construction of consensuses on development 
priorities, and to bypass corrupt political networks based on clientelist 
practices.6 Due to the Assemblies’ emergence in the context of an ongoing 
armed conflict, they also had to somehow take into account the issue of radical 
disagreement based on deep ideological, political and moral differences 
                                                 
6 Luís Orjuela defines clientelism as “a pyramidal system of political relations in which regional 
and local political bosses act as a substitute for the State by way of satisfying the individual 
needs of their clientele in exchange for votes.” This has “encouraged the private appropriation 
of public resources to pay for commitments made on the basis of personal loyalties, thereby 
preventing the orientation of these resources towards public objectives and collective benefits” 
(Orjuela 2008, p. 217). 
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between members of the same community. In this way the Assemblies were 
and are more than an attempt to render local government more efficient as in 
the neoliberal “good governance” framework.7 They seek to address social and 
political conflict through dialogue and debate linked to a more active 
conception of citizenship, a critique of the state, and the construction of an 
ethical political culture that prioritizes the good of the “community” over private 
interests (Sanabria 2006). 
However, my aim in the empirical work was not to go in search of an 
ideal MacIntyrean community. Rather, I took MacIntyre’s philosophy and 
politics as a guide to the kinds of spaces that might partially embody 
MacIntyrean assumptions and which had the potential for being sites in which 
rationality could be restored to politics and ethics. MacIntyre’s advocacy of 
local community politics as the only worthwhile and coherent politics that can 
aspire to rational justification is not based on a love of the local for its own 
sake. Rather, as Kelvin Knight observes, because the modern liberal state is 
“structurally incapable of admitting its subjects to the kind of shared reasoning 
that would be necessary for the formation of a veritably ‘shared purpose’ and 
‘political community’” (Knight 2007, p. 170), local communities offer the only 
possible arenas for enabling the necessary forms of communal reasoning. For 
MacIntyre, politics in the Aristotelian sense is a “practice” that aims to integrate 
the various “social practices” within a given community into an overarching 
conception of the good and the best as such (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 194). 
MacIntyre contrasts what he calls the goods “internal” to practices (such as 
architecture or farming), which are achieved for their own sake and for the 
                                                 
7 See “The IMF's Approach to Promoting Good Governance and Combating Corruption — A 
Guide.” http://www.imf.org/external/np/gov/guide/eng/index.htm 
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sake of furthering the practice and taking it to higher standards of 
craftsmanship, with those “external” goods that are contingent on the end 
result (a school or a crop) such as money, status and power. For MacIntyre, 
modern liberal politics is based on the “compartmentalization” of life into 
separate spheres that are ultimately ordered to the achievement of external 
goods, which turns the modern citizen into a mere instrument of capital 
formation (MacIntyre 2006c, 2006d). The loss of a teleological perspective is 
thus key to what MacIntyre deems to be the modern deformation of politics and 
ethics. As Kelvin Knight explains,  
 
MacIntyre’s sociology entails that goods and standards of excellence internal 
to practices may be internal, also, to a veritably political community. Such an 
institutional extension of the practical rationality of moral and intellectual 
excellence throughout society is possible only if two conditions are met: first, 
that practices are rationally and cooperatively ordered; secondly, that all 
individuals actively participate as citizens. Citizenship in this sense is not 
simply the abstractly and legally equal status that its name is now taken to 
denote. Rather, it is an activity of learning and of teaching, and of discussing, 
judging, executing decisions and- if, when and as necessary- of defending 
one’s community. It is also an activity that is not compartmentalized from 
participation in other practices. Rather, one participates in political community 
by participating in reasoning about the good served by one’s particular practice 
within the structure of goods internal to the entire political community. (Knight 
2007, p. 179) 
 
Whilst suggesting resonances between MacIntyre’s proposals and the social-
political process of the Municipal Assemblies, I aim to critically explore the 
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relevance of the politics of local community for the Colombian context. Is it 
appropriate for a radically divided society in which the conflict has partly 
centred on deep ideological and conceptual differences between “capitalism” 
and “communism”, between liberalism and Catholicism? Can it be a vehicle for 
much needed radical social transformation?  
Through in-depth interviews with the key protagonists of Tarso AMC 
carried out over a six month period in 2008, I sought to elicit the ethical-
political assumptions and views of those engaged in a concrete, “bottom-up” 
political process of peacebuilding and social change. The morally and 
politically charged atmosphere of the Colombian conflict and the often 
emotivist, shrill nature of moral-political argument within it, as well as the 
imputation of beliefs, motives, and normative/ideological stances by external 
observers to different groups and constituencies, calls out for empirical study 
of real processes of change involving actual subjectivities conditioned by their 
own histories and narratives. I wanted to understand how individual and 
collective moral-political agency could emerge in a context in which it is widely 
acknowledged that moral authority, in fact morality, has in large part broken 
down as the social fabric has seriously fractured and deteriorated (Gómez-
Müller 2008; López 2005; Pearce 1998). Through participant observation and 
general observation of the social and political context of Tarso, I aimed to 
make connections between moral discourse, perceptions, and the social 
structure, as well as to assess the degree to which the politics of local 
community as practised in Tarso could contribute to wider social-political 
change.  
In the final chapter, chapter seven, I analyse the fieldwork and attempt 
to bring the different threads of the argument together. I conclude that whilst 
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the kind of politics practised in Tarso can be said to be based to some degree 
on a politics of the common good and certain MacIntyrean assumptions, there 
are serious failings and question marks over its continued viability in the 
absence of deeper structural changes to Colombia’s macro political, social and 
economic system. I suggest that by itself the politics of local community is not 
adequate to the task of facilitating essential wider social change, and therefore 
to contributing to national not just local peacebuilding. I finish with a call to 
combine local community politics with a nationally oriented politics of social 
movements that can respectively avoid the dangers of emotivism and 
parochialism. Despite these criticisms, I argue that MacIntyre’s philosophy and 
politics are on the whole extremely illuminating and relevant to the Colombian 
context and, by implication, to other contexts of overt social and political 
conflict.  
In this final part of the Introduction I now turn to a brief overview of the 
Colombian conflict in order to put my overall argument into context. 
 
The Colombian conflict 
Characterizing the Colombian conflict is neither an easy nor uncontroversial 
task. The very framing of the conflict, whether it is to be classified as a civil war 
(Ramírez 2003), a “war against society” (Pecáut 2001), or a question of a 
terrorist threat to a “besieged democracy” (Pizarro 2004), implies some set of 
normative, philosophical and ideological assumptions. I share the analysis of 
those who classify the conflict as a civil war, whilst recognizing that we cannot 
simply speak of an unbroken continuity of a singular mode of conflict and war 
throughout Colombia’s post-Independence history. However, I argue that the 
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contemporary mode of the Colombian conflict can be understood as to some 
extent a continuation of Colombia’s 19th century civil wars inasmuch as they 
were wars for the political, moral and cultural definition of the nation and state-
society relations (Uribe and López 2006). Today, Colombia is still attempting to 
move from social, political and cultural fragmentation to the construction of the 
state (González et al. 2002). The so-called “weakness” of the Colombian state, 
by which is generally meant its uneven presence throughout the national 
territory, is one explanation for the emergence and persistence of both left-
wing insurgencies and right-wing paramilitaries (Pizarro 2004). However, this 
is a contestable explanation that nevertheless contains elements of truth. 
Since the official inception of the contemporary guerrilla movements in the 
1960s the FARC8 guerrillas have gained increasing territorial control, 
culminating in their being conceded in 1999 a huge demilitarized zone in their 
traditional stronghold in the south of the country for the purposes of peace 
negotiations. For decades the FARC have acted like a de facto state in the 
more peripheral zones of the country, building infrastructure, administering 
justice, imposing taxes, and forging close links with local populations (Brittain 
2009). This demonstrates the problem of “disputed sovereignties” and the 
contested legitimacy of the Colombian state (Uribe 1998, pp. 277-278).  
The close links that the state has with extreme right-wing paramilitary 
organizations (Human Rights Watch 1996) problematises the weak state 
thesis in some respects, although there is evidence to suggest that the 
paramilitary phenomenon grew above and beyond what the state had 
imagined, becoming a threat to the very structure that had helped engender 
                                                 
8 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. In 1982, following the guerrilla 
organization’s Seventh Conference of the Guerrilla Movement, the initials EP standing for 
Ejército del Pueblo were added to their name.  
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and incubate the paramilitary project (Romero 2003). The paramilitaries 
managed to gain significant military, political and social control over large 
areas of the country (Rojas and Cepeda 2008; Romero 2007), pushing back 
the guerrillas but imposing their own forms of control based on the threat and 
use of brutal violence.  
Despite substantial differences in terms of their visions of society and 
the responsibility for atrocities9, the guerrillas and paramilitaries both share 
forms of authoritarianism (Peñate 1997; Romero 2003; Uribe 2001), they both 
claim to justify their means through the ends they seek, and they attempt to 
impose on the wider society, through violence, their particular moral and 
political notions and ideologies backed by a total belief in their own 
righteousness. Colombian social movements and civil society are therefore 
employing alternative forms of resistance to state depredations as well as to 
the armed “resistances” of the left and right. As I have pointed out, MacIntyre 
calls for an ethical politics of resistance to coercive, irrational and illegitimate 
manipulation whether of the state, capitalism or self-proclaimed 
revolutionaries. 
Both the guerrillas and the paramilitaries claim social legitimacy for their 
actions and ostensibly represent a threat to the state. However, in the case of 
the paramilitaries they have consistently reiterated their support for the state, 
claiming that its failure to exert its presence in many regions left populations at 
the mercy of guerrilla attacks, whilst the guerrillas have consistently sought to 
overthrow the state (Romero 2003; Brittain 2009), despite a shift in emphasis 
                                                 
9 See the Permanent Committee for the Defence of Human Rights and the Noche y Niebla 
database for statistics on the ratio of atrocities and violations of human rights committed by the 
paramilitaries and the guerrillas: http://www.nocheyniebla.org/ 
http://www.comitepermanente.org/. In general terms there is a significant disparity with the 
guerrillas responsible for roughly 30-35% of abuses and the paramilitaries for roughly 65-70%.  
 27
towards taking, maintaining and increasing local state power through clientelist 
networks (Rangel 1996). Despite these important differences, the fact remains 
that the Colombian state does not have full control over the national territory, 
and its legitimacy is put in question by different sectors of the population, 
including those who tacitly or openly support the guerrillas. The constant threat 
to social order by drug-traffickers in alliance with paramilitary structures also 
represents a challenge to state control.  
This problem of fractured territorial and administrative control and the 
presence of armed insurgencies and drug-lord controlled private armies has 
led some theorists to consider Colombia to be in a Hobbesian “state of nature” 
(Sandoval 2004; Giraldo 2008). The problem is how the state, with its 
structural links to paramilitaries and drug-traffickers, can claim the legitimate 
authority to attempt to gain the monopoly of force and administer “justice”. This 
is where political and moral philosophy have played and continue to play 
important roles in analysing the problem and elaborating ways out of the 
impasse (Giraldo 2008; Mejía 2007, 2004; Orozco 2005). The current vogue is 
Hobbesian political theory (Giraldo 2008; Orozco 2005; Sandoval 2004), yet 
the rational justification for this is elusive. Rival accounts of political legitimacy 
and prescriptions for building political community and peace point to the 
problem of incommensurability that MacIntyre highlights. 
Despite dramatic reductions in levels of violence according to some 
indicators over the last few years (see Aguirre et al. 2006), there is still plenty 
of evidence to suggest that Colombia continues to be a society moving “away 
from building unifying ethical bonds and moral norms of ‘civility’ and the rule of 
law, to one where groups of individuals merely aggregate their particular 
interests and pursue them through the murder, torture, ‘disappearance’ of 
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Others,” as Jenny Pearce remarked of the country in the late 1990s (Pearce 
1998, p. xv). Colombia is still immersed in social and political conflict, is still 
suffering from the impacts of diametrically opposed forms of armed 
“resistance”, and yet is also the site of remarkable if not entirely coherent 
collective efforts at resisting violence and constructing coexistence. It remains 
in urgent need of finding an ethical and political formula by which to conduct 
“civil war by other means”. The aim of this thesis is to philosophically explore 
the presuppositions and conditions of this.  
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CHAPTER 1 
MacIntyre and the moral-political disorder of 
modernity 
 
This chapter explores Alasdair MacIntyre’s philosophical critique of modern 
moral philosophy and politics, and outlines his alternative moral-political 
framework and proposals. I aim to demonstrate the richness and complexity of 
MacIntyre’s thought and the way it can illuminate the Colombian problematic. I 
argue that MacIntyre’s linking of moral theory and sociology is of particular 
relevance to the Colombian situation, and claim that MacIntyre’s is a critical 
philosophy that points to radical political proposals that avoid the pitfalls of 
emotivism of some radical political theory. I conclude that certain criticisms of 
MacIntyre’s politics are misguided but recognise that there is a question mark 
over his political proposals that calls for empirical exploration. 
 
A voice in the moral wilderness 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s preoccupation with the moral dimensions of human 
existence and, more particularly, the moral dimensions of social 
transformation, is evident in his first book published in 1953, Marxism: An 
Interpretation. Then as a Marxist and a Christian (a conjunction that MacIntyre 
would later realise he could not intellectually hold to) MacIntyre began to 
question what he would later describe as an important lacuna in Marx’s work: 
the failure to provide a philosophically adequate account of the moral basis of 
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the critique of capitalism and the path to communism. For MacIntyre, Marxism 
and Christianity are unities of theory and practice, praxes, which integrate 
normative accounts of the way the world should be with an analysis of how the 
world is. However, MacIntyre began to perceive a tension between Marxism as 
a predictive science and Marxism as a moral theory and conception of the 
human good. As Peter McMylor notes, “MacIntyre is claiming at this point that 
Marx is now giving up the moral perspective on capitalism and communism in 
favour of science” (McMylor 1994, p. 14). In MacIntyre’s words, “Marx does not 
uphold communism as what ought to be, but simply as what will be” (cited in 
McMylor op. cit., p. 14). MacIntyre later revises this critique in his attempt to 
theorise a philosophically adequate Marxist morality (MacIntyre 1958-1959) 
but will eventually conclude that Marxism too ultimately lacks the necessary 
resources for developing a rational, philosophically cogent moral alternative to 
capitalism and liberalism (MacIntyre 1985a). The “scientific” claims of Marxism 
create a problem for any philosophy that claims to be a philosophy that aims 
not merely to interpret but to change the world. As McMylor notes, “How can a 
philosophy designed to motivate behaviour fail to involve moral criteria of 
choice and judgment[?] A theory deprived of a compelling moral imperative will 
become one more tentative empirical hypothesis capable of a fickle rejection” 
(McMylor 1994, p. 14).  
 In Notes from the Moral Wilderness MacIntyre develops the essential 
outlines of his later arguments about the philosophical incoherence of 
liberalism as a moral and political theory and practice, claiming that liberal 
morality is merely a “photographic negative” of Stalinist morality (MacIntyre 
1958-1959, p. 91). At this point, however, MacIntyre was himself uncertain of 
the standpoint from which he was making this critique. Whilst here MacIntyre 
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seeks to ground a philosophically cogent Marxist morality that suffers from 
none of the defects attributed to liberalism or Stalinism, he eventually turns the 
arguments developed in this piece against Marxism tout court, something that 
has not surprisingly led to criticism from contemporary Marxists (Blackledge 
2009; Harman 2009). MacIntyre’s central contention is that ex-Stalinists’ 
principled, Kantian-like moral condemnation of the distortions and depravities 
of the Stalinist system is in philosophical terms weakly based and deceptively 
fragile as a position that can command authority and rational assent and 
respect from others. The fragility of the appeal to moral principle “lies in the 
apparently arbitrary nature of that appeal” (MacIntyre 1958-1959, p. 91).  
The liberal moral critic of Stalinism effectively inverts the form of moral 
judgement and moral agency within Stalinism. As MacIntyre puts it, “The 
Stalinist identifies what is morally right with what is actually going to be the 
outcome of historical development” (ibid., p. 91). Moral judgments and 
therefore moral agency are effectively determined by the horizon of historical 
necessity, hence their ultimately unfree nature: “The ‘ought’ of principle is 
swallowed up in the ‘is’ of history” (ibid., p. 91). In contrast, the converted 
liberal moral critic of Stalinism who has claimed his independence of the 
Stalinist machine appeals to moral principles that stand wholly outside of 
history. The principles are invoked as valid independently of the course of 
historical events, and every issue is to be and can be judged on its “moral” 
merits: “The ‘ought’ of principle is completely external to the ‘is’ of history” 
(ibid., p. 91). For MacIntyre, these amount to fundamental philosophical 
incoherences in the liberal and Stalinist accounts of morality. This matters for 
MacIntyre because he fears that without the ability to rationally persuade 
people on matters of values and wider social and political evaluations, modern 
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societies can only continue down their road of asserting and implementing 
power through manipulation and distortion. People will be left at the mercy of 
pseudo argumentation and moral rhetoric because they have, unknowingly, 
been deprived of the resources for understanding their situation and of 
authoritatively and rationally critiquing the social order: “Thus the isolation of 
the moral from the factual, the emphasis on choice, the arbitrariness 
introduced into moral matters, all these play into the hands of the defenders of 
the established order” (ibid., p. 94).  
Whereas moral agency is clearly compromised if not rendered obsolete 
by Stalinism, in liberalism what appears as moral agency is in fact moral 
impotence in the guise of individual moral heroism. In the case of liberalism 
this arbitrariness of moral judgment stems from the philosophical view 
expounded in its classic form by Kant that moral judgments can have no non-
moral basis. That is, they can only be supported by other moral judgments, 
principles or propositions. They cannot be grounded on or derived from facts, 
from some material account of the world or from inclination. No ‘is’ can entail 
an ‘ought’. But MacIntyre argues that this leaves morality as an unintelligible 
facet of human behaviour and interaction. It is as if moral judgments were 
taboos, linguistic residues of some long disappeared culture that modern 
individuals have the habit of retaining without understanding or enquiring into 
their original and proper use. “It is to turn ‘ought’ into a kind of nervous cough 
with which we accompany what we hope will be the more impressive of our 
injunctions” (MacIntyre 1959, p. 90).  
 MacIntyre in this early text implicitly diagnoses the problem as partly 
one of a lack of a teleological perspective in which moral rules and principles 
and human inclinations and desires are intimately connected (he does not use 
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the word telos or its cognates as he is later to do). For this early MacIntyre, the 
discovery of shared desires in the form of class consciousness forged in the 
context of class organizations and struggles, which confront the individualistic 
and anarchic desires unleashed by capitalism, provides the key to restoring a 
rational, non-arbitrary basis to morality. It therefore addresses a key issue for 
Marxists who are rightly suspicious of bourgeois moralizing. For MacIntyre, 
what this Marxist morality amounts to is, against the Stalinist, an assertion of 
absolutes; against the liberal critic, an assertion of desire and of history (ibid., 
p. 96). MacIntyre here wants to reclaim moral agency as part of the reassertion 
of human agency in the face of determinist, historicist accounts of Marxism 
and the “road to socialism”. He sees that any moral theory and normative goal 
of radical social transformation has to reckon with and take into account the 
agency of those in whose name such theory and transformation is aimed. But 
what he also sees is that such agency is equally compromised, if not cancelled 
out, by jumping ship to, or simply adding to a Stalinist account of historical 
development, a liberal morality because, despite the liberating feeling of 
independence and moral heroism this induces, it is ultimately to conform to the 
dominant conception of morality in the liberal West, a conception that is utterly 
ineffective as a form of rational suasion that can convince others to make the 
transformations in society that the ex-Stalinist still, presumably, sees as 
necessary. Because under liberalism there are no shared, authoritative criteria 
of moral argument and judgment, the only authority moral rules and arguments 
can have (beyond the minimal requirements of logic) is that which individuals 
decide they are to have. When confronted with rival moral claims and 
arguments this lack of shared criteria entails that individuals can only choose 
rather than rationally adjudicate between them. What this implies is the ability 
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of power and interest to maintain the inertia of the status quo by psychological, 
intellectual and other forms of manipulation.  
For MacIntyre, morality- practical reason- is the essential rational 
connector between what is the case and what one wants to be the case. He 
seeks to understand the relation between “what I am, what I can be, what I 
want to be and what I ought to be” (MacIntyre 1958-1959, p. 100). One of the 
key concepts in relation to this, which connects moral agency, moral rules and 
human desires, is that of motivation. As MacIntyre observes in Marxism of the 
Will, “Marx himself never raises explicitly the question of the motives of those 
who seek to achieve socialism” (MacIntyre 1971a, p. 74). The motivation that 
is generated by Kantian introspective discovery of moral imperatives is too 
arbitrary. The motivation generated by the deterministic account of the end 
goal of “socialism” (Stalinism) is entirely externally imposed and therefore is 
not moral agency. This calls into question the moral justification of both 
liberalism and Stalinist socialism, and also threatens to leave us in the 
situation of having to arbitrarily impose our preferred values on the rest of 
society and to generate motivation in others through non-rational, emotive 
means.  
But if the motivation to build socialism cannot be rationally grounded on 
anything but individual choice, or if it can only be externally imposed, then, for 
MacIntyre, it lacks justification. Therefore, the question of motivation for those 
seeking radical social change, as Marxists do, is central to the rational 
supportability of the objectives sought. MacIntyre provides Che Guevara as an 
example of someone who, along with his fellow comrades, had to address the 
problem of motivating people to support and follow the goals and aims of 
radical social transformation. A new motivation springing from the new nature 
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of socialist man was to replace the deformed bourgeois, capitalist motivations 
of material incentives. For Guevara, “moral” incentives had to replace these 
material incentives. However, according to MacIntyre, the same philosophical 
problem applied. MacIntyre’s point seems to be that the decisions taken by 
Guevara in relation to the way the material and social basis of the Revolution 
was to unfold failed in respect of their theoretical moral justification and 
because they effectively overrode the moral agency of those in whose name 
the Revolution was carried out. In MacIntyre’s view, Che’s Kantian conception 
of morality “was the tragic flaw which finally destroyed him in Bolivia” 
(MacIntyre 1971a, p. 75). For MacIntyre, Che’s conception of morality led to a 
flawed character, despite the undeniable selflessness and dedication with 
which he strived to serve others. This strikes an Aristotelian posture that 
MacIntyre will fully develop in his later writings. It is a position that links 
intellectual virtues with the moral virtues required for good character, 
something that MacIntyre sees as crucial for those who would direct others 
towards particular ends. For MacIntyre, the individual moral heroism of Che 
with his Kantian motivation and exhortations to others “is not enough” as an 
ethical justification and basis for revolutionary, working-class struggle (ibid., p. 
75).  
Ultimately, what MacIntyre is arguing is that the arbitrariness of modern 
morality diagnosed in Notes from the Moral Wilderness affects both liberalism 
and Marxism in equal measure. There is a fundamental incomprehension of 
morality affecting both liberal critics of Stalinism (or the Cuban Revolution) and 
Marxist revolutionaries like Guevara. Morality is what provides rational 
justification or not to either reform or revolution. In the absence of a functioning 
morality, the distorting masks of liberalism are also worn by those Marxists 
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who in their negative arguments critique liberalism and capitalism, and in their 
positive arguments seek to justify alternative policies and goals. As MacIntyre 
concludes, “We therefore cannot escape asking the question: what is morality? 
and what is its power in the world?... [I]f we are to criticize effectively the 
uncontrolled, destructive progress of advanced societies in the name of an 
alternative vision of human liberation- if, that is, we are to create a genuinely 
post-Marxist ideology of liberation, then we have to avoid the snares which 
Marxism did not, for all its great achievement, avoid”10 (MacIntyre 1971e, p. 
93). One significant part of these snares was the failure to address the 
question “of the nature of morality and the conditions under which morality can 
have power in the world” (ibid., p. 93).  
It is evident that MacIntyre’s earlier attempt to develop a Marxist 
morality, an answer to the inadequacies of liberal morality, is undermined by 
his later arguments. The philosophical afflictions of modern, liberal morality are 
now seen to plague Marxism. The hope that class-based organizations can 
develop within them the resources for overcoming the moral lacunae and 
irrationalities of liberalism and Stalinism has been abandoned. MacIntyre no 
longer believed that “the only way to overcome the corruption of our culture is 
through the achievement of working class power” (cited in Knight 1998, p. 2). 
Why? MacIntyre’s answer in his landmark work, After Virtue, is that “secreted 
within Marxism from the outset is a certain radical individualism” (MacIntyre 
1985a, p. 261). MacIntyre points out that Marx fails to tell us upon what basis 
                                                 
r
10 The most recent attempt to address this problem from a Marxist perspective argues for a 
“dialogue” between Marxism and Rawlsian liberal theory (Callinicos 2006). Alex Callinicos 
appears to adopt a Kantian moral perspective. He writes, “a theoretically consequent Marxist 
critique of capitalism requires…ethical principles in terms of which capitalism is condemned as 
unjust. How else can it succeed as c itique?” (Callinicos 2006, p. 220). Callinicos wants to 
explore how to construct “a new proletarian collectivity, a new revolutionary subject” that can 
“confront and break the power of existing states and…create forms of popular power that can 
govern the world and its resources according to radically different priorities” (ibid., p. 256). 
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individuals are to enter into the free, common association that is the post-
capitalist Marxist vision: “At this key point in Marxism there is a lacuna which 
no later Marxist has adequately supplied. It is unsurprising that abstract moral 
principle and utility have in fact been the principles of association which 
Marxists have appealed to, and that in their practice Marxists have exemplified 
precisely the kind of moral attitude which they condemn in others as 
ideological” (ibid., p. 261). MacIntyre also argued that Marxists in power 
tended to become Weberian in their separating of means from ends and facts 
from values (ibid. p. 109). In a recent reply to a Marxist critique of his project 
MacIntyre responds that “The most important thought that Marxist theorists 
have been unable to entertain is that the rational self-determination of workers, 
peasants, and others might not lead to socialism and that ‘the road to 
socialism’ (itself an unfortunate metaphor) leads neither to rational self-
determination nor indeed to socialism. This inability is not unrelated to a 
conceptual failure, the failure to understand adequately what rational self-
determination involves” (MacIntyre 2008, p. 271).  
This critique is related to MacIntyre’s earlier realization that Marxism 
and liberalism tended towards the ideology of bureaucratic authority that he 
saw as following from the rejection of teleological modes of thought and 
practice. Marxist theorists and the “neutral” social scientists the former 
criticized both ultimately relied upon an elitist philosophical dichotomy that 
radically separated themselves from the subjects of their enquiries, converting 
these into the objects of revolutionary activity or policy.  They both claimed to 
be somehow above the infected realm of ideology in which “ordinary agents” 
were epistemologically limited, but were themselves adhering to the “ideology 
of expertise”, which “embodies a claim to privilege with respect to power” 
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(MacIntyre 1973b, p. 342).  This is what leads MacIntyre to reject modern 
ideologies of the left and the right in favour of a commitment to virtue. For 
MacIntyre, it is morality properly understood in terms of the tradition of the 
virtues and reconstituted in contemporary forms that can provide a coherent, 
rationally supportable basis for radical social transformation.  
Despite MacIntyre’s ongoing respect for Marxism, his conclusion is that 
“Marxism’s moral defects and failures arise from the extent to which it, like 
liberal individualism, embodies the ethos of the distinctively modern and 
modernizing world, and that nothing less than a rejection of a large part of that 
ethos will provide us with a rationally and morally defensible standpoint from 
which to judge and to act- and in terms of which to evaluate various rival and 
heterogeneous moral schemes which compete for our allegiance” (MacIntyre 
1985a, p. x). In the original essay that provoked the critique to which MacIntyre 
responds above, MacIntyre writes that Marx “failed to understand that while 
proletarianization makes it necessary for workers to resist, it also tends to 
deprive workers of those forms of practice through which they can discover 
conceptions of a good and of virtues adequate to the moral needs of 
resistance” (MacIntyre 1998b, p. 232). MacIntyre points out that if the moral 
impoverishment of capitalism is what so many Marxists say it is, then we are 
led to the question of where the moral resources for transforming society are to 
come from.  
The working-class is no longer seen as the agency and political subject 
to push for an emancipated and non-alienating social order because it is 
inevitably constrained by the dominant capitalist modes of thought and 
practice, which induce workers to conceptualize workplace struggles and 
conflicts within the terms of instrumental rationality in which means are 
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divorced from ends (see MacIntyre 1998a).  The moral-political consciousness 
of the worker therefore remains alienated and divided. MacIntyre argued that 
faced with the moral impoverishment of capitalism and the problems this 
brought for envisaging and engendering the kind of revolutionary agency 
required to transform it, Marxists reverted to constructing their own 
“Nietzschean fantasies” in “versions of the Ubermensch” that could overcome 
the problems of moral motivation and justification: “Lukács’s ideal proletarian” 
and “Leninism’s ideal revolutionary” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 262). As Paul 
Blackledge points out, whereas Marx located the proletariat as potentially the 
universal class in the modern world, “MacIntyre’s defence of local communities 
is rooted…in a more ‘pessimistic’, and he would argue more realistic, 
assessment of the socialist potential of the working class” (Blackledge 2009, p. 
871). MacIntyre thus avoids the idealization of the moral capacities and virtues 
of the working and peasant classes, which leads him also to avoid the 
temptation to make “false absolutist claims” (MacIntyre 2002, p. 261) about the 
subjectivity and agency of the oppressed classes.  
This all leads to MacIntyre’s assertion at the end of After Virtue that 
“Marxism is exhausted as a political tradition, a claim borne out by the almost 
indefinitely numerous and conflicting range of political allegiances which now 
carry Marxist banners,” which is something “shared by every other political 
tradition within our culture” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 262). Thus what lies behind 
the moral impoverishment of liberalism has also contaminated Marxism 
amongst every modern form of politics. In After Virtue MacIntyre barely hints at 
the kind of politics required, but has gone on to call for a “politics of self-
defense” for local “participatory practice-based communit[ies]”  (2006d, p. 
155). 
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Morality and social science 
MacIntyre came to recognize that “the competing moral idioms in which 
contemporary ideological claims…are made…were the result of a fragmentation 
of practical and evaluative discourse” (MacIntyre 2006d, p. 156). This helped 
him to understand “what had to be rejected in the moral, social, and economic 
theory and practice of liberalism and individualism” (ibid) and would lead him 
to his radical critique of the dominant modes of social science. He would also 
come to see that Marxism as a social scientific theoretical framework with “its 
claims to understand the iron laws of history were but masks for another 
incommensurable moral framework” (Blackledge 2009, p. 872).  
MacIntyre argues that the social sciences conceive the social world in 
such a way that conflict and contestability are concealed (MacIntyre 1998a, p. 
60). Their methodology purports to provide an objective set of analytic tools for 
social analysis and policy prescription that remove all reference to values and 
beliefs. Only by doing this, it is held, can social data be made sufficiently 
uniform for statistical analysis, comparison and the construction of genuine 
law-like generalizations akin to the mode of enquiry of the natural sciences. 
Yet, as MacIntyre points out, the very act of analysing the social world into 
independent “variables” already presupposes one particular conceptualization 
of the social world. As MacIntyre puts it, “the conceptualization of the subject 
matter studied is a task for the social scientist in which what governs his 
conceptualization is not a relationship to the rival conceptualizations of the 
society which is being studied, but his own convenience” (MacIntyre 1998a, p. 
63). Further, social relations and institutions are partially defined and sustained 
by the intentions, values and beliefs of those whom they serve and with whom 
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they interact (MacIntyre 1971b). However, social and political enquiry is 
generally committed to the view that analyses and explanations are value-free. 
It is this that is held to provide such enquiries with authority because they have 
extricated themselves from the contaminated world of partial beliefs and 
ideologies. Yet the insistence on excising all value judgements and evaluative 
references from social and political inquiry and explanation actually “involves 
the most extreme of value commitments” (MacIntyre 1971b, p. 278) because it 
means we cannot use clauses such as “because it was unjust” or “because it 
was illegitimate” in explaining certain social and political outcomes. Instead, 
explanation will make reference to hitherto hidden, impersonal social laws, 
processes and structures that the social scientist has been able to perceive 
and understand in a way that ordinary agents cannot. The social scientist 
therefore claims insight into the genuine causes of individual and social action, 
not accepting agents’ own accounts of the reasons for their actions.  
In effect, sociological analysis and explanation ignores the putative 
moral dimensions of the social world and disregards agents’ claims that behind 
their actions are moral reasons and motives. As Andrew Sayer points out,  
 
In much of recent social theory, action is assumed to be either merely interest-
driven, or habitual, or a product of wider discourses and institutions. Often it 
adopts a sociologically-reductionist account of actors’ motives and actions, in 
effect, saying ‘they would say/do that, wouldn’t they, given their social 
position’, which is in contradiction with the first person accounts which actors 
(including social scientists) offer for their own behaviour, which involve 
jus ifica ion rather than sociological explanation. (Sayer 2003, p. 1) t t
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This is related to what MacIntyre noted in After Virtue when he pointed out that 
with the rejection of Aristotelianism the explanation of action was increasingly 
held to be a matter of laying bare the physiological and physical mechanisms 
behind it. With such a philosophical view of action the next step was the 
excision of all normative accounts of an agent’s action (facts became radically 
divorced from values) and, subsequently, the emergence of the notion that the 
social world and with it social agents could be manipulated according to the 
canons of neutral scientific knowledge by the relevant experts. Yet the social 
scientist who provides this manipulative knowledge to governments or 
corporations does not view his or her own behaviour as itself explicable by 
reference to mere physical, physiological or socio-structural mechanisms: “For 
the behavior of the manipulated is being contrived in accordance with his 
intentions, reasons and purposes; intentions, reasons and purposes which he 
is treating, at least while he is engaged in such manipulation, as exempt from 
the laws which govern the behavior of the manipulated” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 
84). 
Of course, this does not mean that social scientists must necessarily 
take at face value people’s self-reported accounts of their actions and 
behaviour. What it does mean is that explanation must initially take such 
accounts seriously and then if a discrepancy between stated beliefs and action 
arises, an independent explanation will be required. Yet such an “independent” 
explanation will have to depart from the structure of rationality within the 
particular social order and phenomenon under scrutiny. The imputation of 
irrationality to such discrepancies is not made in relation to some external 
rational standpoint but in terms of the implicit or explicit rationality of that social 
order (MacIntyre 1971c, p. 256). What this ultimately means is that the concept 
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of rationality is not something free-floating and neutral in respect of social 
analyses and inquiries, but is an “inescapable sociological category” (ibid., p. 
258). This kind of social science would have to recognize that beliefs can be a 
genuine cause of certain social and political outcomes. In the case of political 
science (which in Colombia is of particular prominence in terms of analyses 
and prescriptions in relation to the conflict) it “would become in a true sense a 
moral science” (MacIntyre 1971b, p. 277), taking seriously the possibility of 
ascriptions of illegitimacy or injustice (or their converse) to institutions or 
policies as possible causes for their failure or success.  
 
The claims of After Virtue 
From MacIntyre’s standpoint there is a relation between our loss of 
comprehension of morality and the dominant, manipulative mode of politics in 
modern societies. After Virtue narrates the philosophical history of this 
problem. The central claim of After Virtue is that the contemporary moral-
political debates of modern societies are peculiarly unsettlable ultimately 
because of the rejection of the Aristotelian tradition of ethics and politics at the 
threshold of the modern world. The rejection of Aristotelianism led to the 
Enlightenment attempt to elaborate rational moral principles that could be 
assented to by all individuals qua rational individuals. MacIntyre argues that 
this project failed and had to fail. In order to restore intelligibility and rationality 
to morality, to our moral stances and moral arguments, we need to revive the 
Aristotelian theory and practice of ethics and politics in contemporary forms. If 
morality is to have power in the world, then we need to understand the 
necessary conditions for its rational expression and embodiment.  
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 MacIntyre observes that “The most striking feature of contemporary 
moral utterance is that so much of it is used to express disagreements; and the 
most striking feature of the debates in which those disagreements are 
expressed is their interminable character…there seems to be no rational way of 
securing agreement in our culture” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 6). This is because of 
the historical fragmentation of moral discourses and schemas caused by the 
disappearance of previously more integrated forms of social and political life, 
and the deep social dislocations brought about by the rise of capitalist markets, 
the modern nation state, and the subsequent philosophical theorising of the 
Enlightenment. Where once moral argument presupposed a large measure of 
agreement on first premises based on some generally shared substantive and 
teleological conception of the human good, the form of moral argument in the 
Enlightenment in its various theoretical guises presupposed the opposite. 
Substantive conceptions of the good were now ruled out of the framework of 
moral argument.  
However, the older moral frameworks still haunted the Enlightenment 
mode, which led to a discrepancy between the accepted conventional moral 
norms of the day and the forms of moral argument used to justify and support 
them. For there was no longer any connecting route between “is” and “ought” 
based on a wider substantive conception of the human good and human 
nature. Despite the air of rational authority bestowed upon moral reasoning 
and theory by its distinguished philosophical proponents, MacIntyre argues 
that the Enlightenment project of discovering a set of rational principles 
capable of authoritatively persuading and guiding all rational individuals could 
only fail, splintering as it did into a range of different theories based on rights, 
utility, virtues, and passions, each of which were based on incommensurable 
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first principles or premises. The Enlightenment philosophers “inherited 
incoherent fragments of a once coherent scheme of thought and action and, 
since they did not recognize their own peculiar historical and cultural situation, 
they could not recognize the impossible and quixotic character of their self-
appointed task” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 55). Moral argument thus lost the ability 
to engender rational agreement across society. What the Enlightenment 
project also did was “release into the culture at large a set of moral concepts 
which derive from their philosophical ancestry an appearance of rational 
determinateness and justification which they do not in fact possess” (MacIntyre 
1984, p. 4).  
Public debate therefore becomes a struggle for power, not a search for 
truth. This is what leads MacIntyre to characterise contemporary moral 
argument as “emotivist”. Whereas philosophers like C. L. Stevenson argued 
that moral argument is essentially a means for emotionally persuading people 
to adopt one’s own moral preferences, MacIntyre denies this but accepts it as 
a more than apposite characterization of what moral argument has become in 
modern society. He points out that “in saying this I am not merely contending 
that morality is not what it once was, but also and more importantly that what 
once was morality has to some large degree disappeared- and this marks a 
degeneration, a grave cultural loss” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 22).  
For MacIntyre, it is the displacement of the classic teleological moral 
scheme that is at the heart of this problem. The structure of moral reasoning 
within the classical tradition is centred upon factual premises that lead 
eventually to evaluative conclusions. According to MacIntyre, the ethical life in 
the classical period is characterised not by rules but by virtues. Virtues were 
dispositions that enabled people to participate in practices and move towards 
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certain goods. These goods were intimately related to a wider conception of 
the “good life” that informed social life and imbued its various structures and 
roles with meaning and purpose. Evaluations were of the form “X has not been 
courageous”, or “that behaviour is not good”, where “good” is understandable 
only by reference to a presupposed order that includes the explicit or implicit 
narrative-like understandings of how people should live and behave in relation 
to this wider purpose or “good for man.” In this moral and social scheme there 
is a conception of the proper and most fulfilling end for a human life, on the 
one hand, and a conception of human nature as it actually is, on the other. 
Ethics was the discipline through which one could learn how to pass from 
humankind-as-it-is to humankind-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos or proper 
end (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 53). MacIntyre observes,  
 
The acceptance of this kind of social life as the norm by which actions are 
judged is not something asserted within the moral system. It is the 
presupposition of there being moral judgments at all…But that breakup of the 
traditional forms of social life which was produced by the rise of individualism, 
begotten partly by Protestantism and capitalism, made the reality of social life 
so divergent from the norms implied in the traditional vocabulary that all the 
links between duty and happiness were gradually broken. The consequence 
was a redefinition of the moral terms. (MacIntyre 2002, p. 161) 
 
The very nature of moral judgment in the modern era is thus transformed with 
the rejection of teleology (and the concomitant rejection of teleological 
philosophical accounts of human action and the transition to mechanistic 
theories of action.) To call something good in the classical era is to 
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presuppose that it has a particular function and purpose and therefore is to 
make a factual statement. And this holds of human beings as much as objects. 
Thus, to call a particular action just or right is to say that it is what a good 
human being would do in such a situation, and it is equally a factual statement. 
With the eschewal of any teleological conception of the good for man this kind 
of moral judgment is no longer possible and the modern situation of 
interminable moral argument appears. What we currently possess are the 
“fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from 
which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we 
continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have- very largely, if not 
entirely- lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality” 
(MacIntyre 1985a, p. 2).  
As MacIntyre points out, in the present day we retain the habit of 
speaking of moral judgments as true or false but we have lost the essential 
notion of what it is in virtue of which something is so judged. This is not only 
the case at the level of day-to-day morality but also on the level of moral 
philosophy itself. Indeed, the problem of day-to-day morality and moral 
discourse is inextricably connected to the problems in the realm of moral 
theory. It is in the choosing of first principles or premises that there enters an 
inescapable element of incommensurability between rival theories. Each 
proponent reasons in a logical and more or less sophisticated way from his or 
her first premises to their respective conclusions, but “the rival premises are 
such that we possess no rational way of weighing the claims of one against 
another. For each premise employs some quite different normative or 
evaluative concept from the others, so that the claims made upon us are of 
quite different kinds” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 8). John Rawls (1973) and Robert 
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Nozick (1974), for example, agree that justice is an important facet of any 
society but begin their arguments for assent to their particular theories of 
justice from completely different, incommensurable premises; Nozick from 
premises assuming the importance of individual rights and entitlements and 
the limiting of redistributive justice, and Rawls from premises assuming the 
importance of equality and the limiting of acquisitions:  
 
It is precisely because there is in our society no established way of deciding 
between these claims that moral argument appears to be necessarily 
interminable. From our rival conclusions we can argue back to our rival 
premises; but when we do arrive at our premises argument ceases and the 
invocation of one premise against another becomes a matter of pure assertion 
and counter-assertion. (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 8) 
 
Moral arguments in our culture nevertheless have the characteristic of 
appealing to impersonal and independent criteria that are more than the 
expressions of personal, subjective preference. Behind the surface 
arbitrariness and interminability of modern moral discourse there still beats a 
pulse of rationality, which suggests that the use of moral argument in our 
culture “expresses at least an aspiration to be or to become rational in this 
area of our lives” (ibid., p. 9). However, with what MacIntyre sees as the failure 
of the Enlightenment project, modern morality finds itself in a quandary in 
which rational suasion is replaced by manipulation. The modern autonomous 
moral agent who now finds herself freed from the perceived constraints of 
teleology, tradition and authority actually has a very unstable and confusing 
kind of freedom and autonomy: 
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Contemporary moral experience as a consequence has a paradoxical 
character. For each of us is taught to see himself or herself as an autonomous 
moral agent; but each also becomes engaged by modes of practice, aesthetic 
or bureaucratic, which involve us in manipulative relationships with others. 
Seeking to protect the autonomy that we have learned to prize, we aspire 
ourselves not to be manipulated by others; seeking to incarnate our own 
principles and standpoint in the world of practice, we find no way open to us to 
do so except by directing towards others those very manipulative modes of 
relationship which each of us aspires to resist in our own case. The 
incoherence of our attitudes and our experiences arises from the incoherent 
conceptual scheme which we have inherited. (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 68) 
 
With the loss of the teleological framework for understanding human action, 
politics was also transformed. Whereas in the Aristotelian scheme ethics was 
integral to politics, in the modern scheme the rejection of Aristotelianism tout 
court due to its clear metaphysical and scientific inadequacies led to the, for 
MacIntyre, grave error of radically divorcing ethics from politics. MacIntyre 
traces this partly to the emergence of capitalist social relations and the 
theology of the Reformation in which the newly constructed individual 
confronts the “self-justifying rules of the political and economic order” 
(MacIntyre 2002, p. 120). The state becomes distinct from society with its own 
set of norms and justifications, and the market becomes an autonomous 
economic sphere also with its own norms and regulations. The individual moral 
agent is now theoretically stripped of social particularity. “A man is related to 
the state not via a web of social relations binding superiors and inferiors in all 
sorts of ways, but just as subject. A man is related to the economic order not 
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via a well-defined status in a set of linked associations and guilds, but just as 
one who has the legal power to make contracts” (ibid., p. 120). As a result of 
this the individual now finds there are no, or more correctly too many, criteria 
for deciding what one ought to do, how one ought to act in this new social, 
political and economic scenario. Everything now depends on individual choice. 
The Lutheran theology of the time also sees the individual as 
fundamentally corrupted, with anarchic wants and needs that cannot provide 
the basis for moral decision-making. Hobbes will come to provide a secular 
counterpart to this theology in which the prerogatives of political and economic 
power cannot be rationally called into question because there are no longer 
any shared criteria and assumptions as there were under pre-capitalist social 
and economic relations. The doctrine of the social contract formalises this view 
of human nature and the nature and purpose of political and economic 
institutions. It is the precursor to the modern liberal conception of politics as 
fundamentally divorced from any wider conception of the good. Modern politics 
has become radically separated from practical reason. Whereas “In 
Aristotelian ethics, as in the less explicitly formulated moralities of traditional 
societies, human needs and wants, understood in various ways, provide the 
criteria for judging human actions” (ibid., p. 122), under Protestant theology 
and Hobbesian philosophy these cannot provide such criteria because wants 
and needs are deemed to be fundamentally corrupt. Yet in some sense these 
individual wants and needs do provide the criteria but it is just that that there is 
no longer any integrated conception of human needs and wants within some 
overall account of the human good that sets limits to and orders these needs 
and wants. These cannot provide rationally justifiable criteria.  
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The fiction of the self-regulating market in the interests of “society” in 
which unconstrained private consumption can paradoxically provide public 
benefits is the political economic counterpart to this philosophy of human 
nature and the divorce between ethics and politics (cf. Mandeville 1989). The 
individual now has “interests” that are philosophically separate from the 
interests of society. The political economists attempt to make these converge 
but they speak in the name of a stratum of society that attempts to pass off a 
social order that benefits a minority of elites as one that benefits all. It is first 
Marx and then Nietzsche who see through this. For Marx, bourgeois moralizing 
merely masks the ideological interests of the dominant classes; conflict cannot 
hope to be settled through appeal to morality, to justice, for each class has 
radically different conceptions of the requirements of morality in respect of 
justice. Nevertheless, Marx’s political and economic vision implied a strong 
moral dimension (see Dussel 1981, p. 55), although as we have seen it 
suffered from the same philosophical problems of all modern moral thinking. 
For Nietzsche, such moralizing masks the resentment and rancour of the 
suppressed will to power. Individual will has to assert itself and devise its own 
entirely “new tables of what is good” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 114). However, 
MacIntyre argues that the political implications of both Marx’s and Nietzsche’s 
thought lead to “irrationalisms of the Left as well as of the Right” (ibid., p. 114), 
which results from the breakdown of the teleological moral-political framework. 
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Political implications 
As the Enlightenment moral theories and concepts were also used to frame 
and inform political arguments, discourses and ideologies modern politics has 
also become an arena of essentially interminable conflict:  
 
[R]ational consensus upon central moral questions and a fortiori on central 
political questions has proved impossible within the framework provided by the 
dominant conception of rationality in modern cultures and…therefore in the 
arena of rational discussion there is radical dissensus. (MacIntyre 1985b, p. 
238) 
 
Political debates framed on the one hand in terms of some form of 
individualism that appeals to individual rights, and on the other hand in terms 
of some form of collectivism that appeals to the concept of utility cannot find 
some rational point of mediation when these at some point inevitably clash. As 
MacIntyre points out, the common idiom of weighing up such considerations 
obscures a salient fact: there are no scales (MacIntyre 2006e, p. 212). Further, 
“if the concept of rights and that of utility are a matching pair of 
incommensurable fictions, it will be the case that the moral idiom employed 
can at best provide a semblance of rationality for the modern political process, 
but not its reality. The mock rationality of the debate conceals the arbitrariness 
of the will and power at work in its resolution” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 71). Yet the 
Weberian arena of modern politics conceals this and the depth of our conflicts 
by furnishing them with a pluralist rhetoric and a discourse of consensus (see 
MacIntyre 1999). However, for MacIntyre, “Modern politics cannot be a matter 
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of genuine moral consensus. And it is not. Modern politics is civil war carried 
on by other means” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 253).  
Given that modern politics in most Western societies is carried out 
without violent conflict, it might be suggested that at least the Enlightenment 
has bequeathed to us a political system the implementation of which could 
play a significant role in resolving conflicts and, more importantly, avoid the 
use of violence in their resolution. Civil war by other means is arguably 
precisely what is required in certain contexts of overt civil war such as 
Colombia. As I shall demonstrate, the concern to bring an end to decades of 
civil war in Colombia has led philosophers and political analysts to turn to 
variants of liberal moral and political theory as the basis for peaceful political 
coexistence. However, if the conflict itself is based on deeper underlying 
conflicts that are also manifest in the “advanced” societies of the West and 
which are leading to increasing social, political and economic crises in those 
countries, conflicts which are partly the result of the modern state-building 
process and its philosophizing, then the answer lies elsewhere.  
The agreement to disagree characteristic of modern political orders is in 
reality the outcome of a process of forced settlements that have been 
retrospectively rationalised as the outcome of a rational debate. As MacIntyre 
points out, the history of the modern state and its political modality is a 
contingent history of arbitrary power, not rational suasion. Therefore, if the 
roots of conflict and their discursive manifestations lie partly in the inability to 
rationally move others towards one’s own or group’s position, then the 
imposition or even relatively consensual implementation of such a political 
framework as the modern liberal state and a modern liberal constitution does 
not entail that a rational as opposed to a coercive consensus has been 
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established. Further, the requirement that the state forcibly assume the 
monopoly of violence with which to implement the liberal state goes hand in 
hand with a particular conception of society and the good that from many 
standpoints is morally unacceptable. It might be argued that if such an 
outcome were achieved it would at least be a better state of affairs, but this too 
relies on a moral argument and form of evaluation that is itself in need of 
rational justification. 
 MacIntyre’s concern is not to bring about some homogenous social 
order in which conflict does not or cannot arise, but to restore rationality to our 
moral and political enquiries and disagreements such that what conflicts we do 
have can be approached in a more fruitful way and in which “shifting coalitions 
of interest and power” (MacIntyre 1998c, p. 245) are not the arbiter of such 
disagreements. For MacIntyre, conflict lies at the heart of modern social 
structure and modern political disagreement has no hope of reaching a rational 
terminus. Contrary to the advocates of liberalism as the political system 
through which conflict can be rationally resolved, or at least managed in a way 
that is rationally binding upon and acceptable to all rational individuals, 
MacIntyre argues that liberalism is itself a contestable social, political and 
intellectual tradition of moral-political enquiry which presupposes a particular 
account of human society and the human good such that it cannot lay claim to 
being a neutral system for the rational resolution of conflict.11 The veneer of 
consensus in liberal social and political orders is skin deep, but the illusion of 
deeper consensus enables them to appear to address radical disagreement in 
                                                 
t
11 See Timothy Chappell’s defence of liberalism in this mode in “Radical Disagreement: 
utopias and the art of the possible.” In K. Knight and P. Blackledge (eds.) Revolutionary 
Aristotelianism: Ethics, Resistance and Utopia, Analyse und Kritik, June 2008. For MacIntyre’s 
argument see chapter 17 of Whose Justice? Which Rationali y? University of Notre Dame 
Press, Indiana, 1988. 
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a rational way when in reality genuine conflict is suppressed (MacIntyre 1988, 
pp. 2-3).  
 The incoherent and emotivist characteristics of modern morality and 
politics also impact on the phenomenon of social protest and, therefore, on 
arguments for social change. The fragmented morality of modern social orders 
ensures that such protest and the various resistances and movements for 
change it engenders inevitably lack a rational moral dimension. Protest can be 
effective, just not rationally so (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 71). This explains why 
radical movements for social change often become manipulative, self-
righteous and increasingly prone to preaching to the converted or imposing 
their positions on others.  
The emotivist character of such protest and its political dimension is 
evident in some recent radical political theory that advocates a “politics of 
prescription” (Hallward 2005). This posits a given “axiom” such as equality and 
attempts to instantiate it in the world irrespective of the mediations of 
community and power. According to Alan Badiou, “The political subject acts or 
resists as a matter of course, and not thanks to a reasoned affiliation with a 
particular group, class, or opinion. He resists, not as a result of communication 
or consensus, but all at once, to the exclusion of any ‘third way’” (cited in 
Hallward 2000, p.1). Badiou states that this political act of black and white, 
either-or choice does not pit two political antagonists against each other in a 
zero-sum struggle, for there is only one political actor, “the we that comes out 
or demonstrates in the real of fraternity” (cited in Hallward 2000, p. 2). Yet this 
fraternity seems to be of such an abstract kind that it is difficult to see how 
such a “we” can emerge on the basis of political thought and action that is 
utterly divorced from social, historical context. As Badiou writes,  
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We have too often wanted justice to establish the consistency of social bonds, 
whereas it can only name the most extreme moments of inconsistency. For the 
effect of the egalitarian axiom is to undo the bonds, to desocialise thought, to 
affirm the rights of the infinite and the immortal against the calculation of 
interests. Justice is a wager on the immortal over finitude, against ‘being-for-
death’. For in the subjective dimension of the equality we declare, nothing now 
is of any interest other than the universality of this declaration, and the active 
consequences which follow from it. (Cited in ibid., p. 3) 
 
From a MacIntyrean perspective this is emotivism par excellence. Pure 
abstract thought disengaged from any account of human desire, of need, of 
community. Moreover, there appears to be no room for working out the 
particular social, economic and political interpretation of the “egalitarian 
axiom”; it appears to be simply assumed as already-interpreted and validly 
implementable.  
 Peter Hallward calls for a “reformulation of a prescriptive practice of 
politics. A prescription involves the direct and divisive application of a universal 
principle (or axiom). For instance: if we uphold the axiom of equality, we can 
prescribe the rejection of slavery, and with it the organization of a force 
capable of transforming the relations that sustain the plantation economy. If we 
uphold the axiom of the worker, we can prescribe the restriction of corporate 
power, that is, the organization of forces capable of reversing the 
subordination of politics to profit. If we uphold the axiom of territorial integrity, 
we can prescribe a relation of resistance to foreign aggression, and with it the 
mobilization of a force capable of repelling invasion” (Hallward 2005, p. 771). 
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Hallward does not tell us who the “we” is that is to make the prescriptions and 
organize the necessary actions, although he tells us that a prescriptive politics 
sidesteps the “authorized mediation of public inquiries, sociological studies, or 
NGOs” (ibid., p. 771). For Hallward, a “Prescription is divisive because its 
application divides adherents from opponents, but universal insofar as its 
assertion depends on a properly axiomatic principle” (Hallward 2005, p. 771). 
Hallward states that such principles come from Kant and clearly demonstrates 
the emotivist nature of the politics he is advocating: “the politics of prescription 
retains an indifference to difference, interest, consensus, adaptation, or 
welfare” (ibid., p. 771). Hallward then adds that, against Kant, such 
prescription is relational and thereby apparently overcomes the limitations of 
Kant’s call to abstract duty. Thus for all Hallward and Badiou critique 
Habermas and like approaches their own approach appears extremely similar. 
The normative, prescriptive principles to guide political action are divorced 
from any material content or mediation and are understood to be formulated in 
relation to abstract, presuppositionless others. Hallward also states: 
 
A political subject prescribes its own boundaries. The prescriptive subject 
exists in its militant and emergent interface with the world rather than in any 
specified psychological (let alone cultural or biological) location. Prescriptive 
autonomy, in other words, necessarily presumes some kind of qualitative leap 
in the constitution of the subject, a leap adequate to enable its relative 
freedom from causal or presubjective determination. (Hallward 2005, p. 781) 
 
This is starkly emotivist and is highly resonant of the arbitrariness and 
philosophical incoherence that MacIntyre diagnosed of ex-Stalinist critics of 
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Stalinism. According to Hallward, a prescriptive political practice “undertakes 
the concrete transformation of those relations that sustain inequality, 
exploitation, or oppression” (ibid., p. 772). Yet presumably such transformation 
can only proceed through imposition, not argument or rational persuasion. 
Those who adhere to the axiom and prescription are presumably convinced of 
the validity of their right to engage in the required transformation. Those who 
do not adhere to it presumably need to be coerced. The point of appealing to 
abstract “universal” principles is, I take it, that they provide some kind of 
ultimately moral backing for the prescription inasmuch as they are perceived to 
have an impersonal authority, despite Hallward’s assertion that “Upheld as a 
strategic imperative, a prescription says shall rather than ought. Prescription is 
not a matter of abstract moral reflection, of aspecific obligation, of ‘objective’ 
rights and wrongs: it is a matter, under the constraints of a given situation, of 
practical consequence and material invention, of relational struggle, of 
mobilization and countermobilization” (ibid., p. 783). But such practical 
consequence, material invention and social mobilization must either implicitly 
proceed in light of some normative framework that enables consequences to 
be assessed and judged and material inventions and mobilizations to be 
evaluated, or it amounts to no more than an assertion of arbitrary choice and 
power. In the Colombian context in which the conflict has, so I argue, followed 
a sectarian, emotivist dynamic of self-certainty and moral-political imposition, 
such a politics of prescription is problematic. 
As we have seen, MacIntyre’s powerful diagnosis of the arbitrariness of 
appeal to abstract moral principle calls into question the rational justification of 
the kind of appeal to universal principles that Hallward and Badiou make. The 
authority of an alleged universal principle that is ultimately chosen, prescribed 
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by individuals through isolated (or in neo-Kantian form, relational) introspection 
is a simulacrum of genuine authority. In the politics of prescription the moral 
and motivational basis of social transformation is simply urged upon workers 
and the oppressed: “As Badiou reminds us…the ‘anticipatory certitude’ that 
alone can guide any extraordinary ‘process of becoming’ itself depends on the 
courage and confidence that a decisive intervention, in the element of present 
uncertainty, demands of its subject” (Hallward 2005, p. 776). This is indeed the 
kind of “Marxism of the will” that MacIntyre argues is ultimately arbitrary, 
incoherent and inadequate. As we shall see below, the notion of a prescriptive 
practice of politics is therefore quite at odds with MacIntyre’s notion of politics 
as a practice in which shared evaluative criteria are discovered that can 
provide the moral basis for wider social critique and transformation.  
 
The concept of a practice 
The concept of a practice is central to MacIntyre’s moral-political theory. 
Practices are the key concept and structure through which moral and 
evaluative criteria regain rational justification and authority while avoiding the 
problem caused by a determinist understanding of structure and agency as in 
Stalinist ethics. Further, as MacIntyre points out, “In the ancient and medieval 
worlds the creation and sustaining of human communities- of households, 
cities, nations- is generally taken to be a practice” (MacIntyre 1985a, pp. 187-
188). This is what (in part) establishes the connection between ethics and 
politics; for MacIntyre, practices are what necessarily make up morally rational 
communities and societies, but the ordering of these practices is the specific 
task of the politics of such communities and societies. Politics is a master 
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practice that involves systematic deliberation about how best to order the 
variety of individual and common goods available to people in the interest of 
an overarching conception of the community’s common good.  
By the term “practice” MacIntyre means “any coherent and complex 
form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive 
of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 187). So farming is a practice, 
as is architecture, the life of a fishing crew, etc. The goods internal to practices 
are sought independently from contingent, external goods such as money and 
power that might happen to also be attained through participation in practices. 
It is through participation in such practices that we come to discover the 
peculiar, impersonal authority of evaluative standards that are independent of 
our own desires and interests (ibid., p. 190; MacIntyre 1982, p. 301). However, 
because this impersonality is located within social practices it is necessarily 
connected to desires and interests in the sense that it is only within shared 
practices we care about that such impersonal moral authority becomes 
rational, which stands in complete contrast to the Kantian notion that 
individuals must obey the abstract impersonal demands of the categorical 
imperative irrespective of their social relationships and inclinations.  
Through his social theory of practices MacIntyre reconnects facts and 
values; evaluative criteria are discovered to be independent of our choices and 
we thereby also make factual statements in judging practitioners in relation to 
their performance in social practices. MacIntyre has since emended a 
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biological basis to his scheme where now human nature also provides part of a 
standard for moral and political evaluation (MacIntyre 2001), although a 
standard that is historically conditioned within social practices with internal 
goods and standards of achievement and evaluation. This synthesis enables 
MacIntyre to avoid the problems associated with “ethical” evaluations and 
prescriptions centring on “development” and indicators of “human well-being”, 
which are held to be “apolitical” or implicitly or explicitly assume liberalism and 
capitalism as their modes of embodiment (e.g. Kliksberg 2005).  
Because practices have a history their standards are not immune from 
criticism, but in order to learn the standards for adequate, rational criticism one 
must first accept the received, authoritative standards. These standards 
embodied within practices operate “in such a way as to rule out all subjective 
and emotivist analyses of judgment” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 190). A key 
distinction is between internal and external goods:  
 
It is a characteristic of what I have called external goods that when achieved 
they are always some individual’s property and possession. Moreover 
characteristically they are such that the more that someone has of them, the 
less there is for other people…External goods are therefore characteristically 
objects of competition in which there must be losers as well as winners. 
Internal goods are indeed the outcome of competition to excel, but it is 
characteristic of them that their achievement is a good for the whole 
community who participate in the practice. (Ibid., pp. 190-191)  
 
In light of this understanding of practices and internal and external goods 
MacIntyre defines a virtue as “an acquired human quality the possession and 
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exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal 
to practices and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any 
such goods” (ibid., p. 191). Practices require a certain kind of relationship 
between participants, and the virtues define our relationships to people with 
whom we share the purposes and standards that inform practices. Thus the 
individual exercises moral agency through a discovery of shared moral criteria 
and motivations in necessary practical relationships with others.  
As MacIntyre points out, practices require institutional embodiment if 
they are to obtain the resources required to further them (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 
194). This relationship therefore generates an inherent tension between 
practices and institutions, and requires the constant exercise of the virtues if 
practices are not to be deformed by the bureaucratic normativity of their 
institutional framework. Because institutions have corrupting power, “the 
making and sustaining of forms of human community- and therefore of 
institutions- itself has all the characteristics of a practice, and moreover of a 
practice which stands in a peculiarly close relationship to the exercise of the 
virtues” (ibid., p. 194).  
 
The politics of local community and the common good 
Political agency is also exercised by individuals as they inevitably have to 
come together to order the various practices. Because individuals through 
practices have (re)discovered that their individual goods are necessarily 
constitutive of and constituted by shared goods held in common with others, 
the goods of practices, the kind of politics required (and presupposed) is a 
politics of the common good to which the different practices are ultimately 
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subordinate. This is a conception of the common good that is much stronger 
than the individualist and minimalist conception of the common good that is 
often appealed to by liberal political orders to justify allegiance to them 
(MacIntyre 1998c, pp. 239-240). MacIntyre argues that the minimalist 
conception of the common good fails to provide the necessary political 
justification for liberal polities because it amounts to no more than an 
aggregation of individual interests. Thus if an individual’s particular good is not 
furthered by allegiance to this aggregated conception of the common good, 
then that individual lacks any rational reason for continuing to give resources 
towards and allegiance to that common good. Therefore, political justifications 
that rely on such a concept of the common good break down and with it run the 
risk eventually of socially and ethically unravelling (MacIntyre 1998c, p. 242). 
Political justification and allegiance, and by implication social and moral 
cohesion, require a stronger connection between the goods of individuals and 
the common good. However, for MacIntyre 
 
We must not picture this connection between individual goods and the 
common good as something that might exist apart from and independently of 
the rational activity of the members of that society in enquiring and arguing 
about the nature of their goods. For it is a connection constituted by practically 
rational activity. Practical rationality is a property of individuals-in-their-social-
relationships rather than of individuals-as-such. To be practically rational I 
must learn what my good is in different types of situation and I can only 
achieve that through interaction with others in which I learn from those others 
and they from me. Our primary shared and common good is found in that 
activity of communal learning through which we together become able to order 
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goods, both in our individual lives and in the political society. (MacIntyre 
1998c, pp. 242-243) 
 
The kind of deliberative politics of the common good that MacIntyre calls for 
will necessarily have to be undertaken in small-scale local communities where 
people can call each other to account in respect of their deliberative standards. 
As Mark Murphy points out, this is not based on some love of the local as 
such: “It is simply a brute truth that the conditions under which common 
deliberation can take place require a small community. The very size of the 
typical modern state precludes state politics from being a matter of common 
deliberation” (Murphy 2003, p. 165; see also MacIntyre 2001, p. 142). Such a 
politics will have to depart from some set of shared agreements, practices and 
cultures and “will have to avoid those destructive conflicts of interest that arise 
from too great inequalities of wealth and power” (MacIntyre 2006f, p. 39). 
Furthermore, the rational resolution of agreement requires some measure of 
prior agreement.  
Yet this might sound like MacIntyre is begging the question and, 
moreover, might appear to make such a politics irrelevant to societies like 
Colombia where destructive conflicts of interest have long since permeated 
society and led to the moral crisis of coexistence (Gómez-Müller 2008; Torres 
1964). However, as Kelvin Knight points out, “MacIntyre has always held that 
conflict rather than community must be the starting point for any Aristotelian 
politics within capitalism” (Knight 1998, p. 21). What MacIntyre is outlining are 
the basic presuppositions of the kind of politics required to begin to move 
forward towards a more rational, coherent and socially viable form of ethical-
political contestation and coexistence. MacIntyre says we need to look within 
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our own societies and communities for the kinds of already-existing practices 
and milieus within which we can build a more complex and integrated politics 
of the common good. On this basis we can hopefully begin to ameliorate what 
social fracturing and deformation might have already occurred in the 
community and wider society. For example, the required kinds of practical 
rationality “are exemplified to significant extent in the forms of various local 
enterprises: households, fishing crews, farming cooperatives, schools, clinics, 
neighborhoods, small towns” (MacIntyre 2006f, p. 39). This resonates with 
Raúl López’s call for an ethics of encounter in Colombia in which we look not 
to abstract ideals, models or theories for an ethical response to the crisis but to 
the often implicit codes of interaction that can be found in local 
neighbourhoods and forms of community life (López 2005). It also resonates 
with Sergio De Zubiría’s point that any ethics adequate to the Colombian crisis 
will need to be closely linked to local cultures (De Zubiría 1998).  
MacIntyre also points out that the presupposed shared standards of 
rational justification in the kinds of political communities he calls for will be 
independent of the de facto interests and preferences of their members. These 
standards will define the community’s common good “and the fundamental 
bond between their members will be allegiance to that common good. This 
means that the self-understanding of members of such communities has to be 
incompatible with substituting for that fundamental bond any notion of civic 
unity as arising either from some shared ethnic or religious or other cultural 
inheritance- important as these may be- or from the shared interests and 
preferences of its members” (MacIntyre 2006f, p. 39). In the Colombian 
context such a political understanding will inevitably challenge political 
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identities linked to the sectarianism of the traditional political parties and the 
deep-rooted phenomenon of clientelist political relations.  
 Authentic moral and political agency are elicited by and exhibited in 
participation in communal practices- and deliberation about these and their 
interrelation- not through abstract reasoning, individual choice, ideological or 
class affiliation, or obedience to law. Moreover, these practices, and the 
communities in which such practices are embedded, “require a shared 
recognition of their common good as a political bond, a type of bond very 
different from that provided in local societies by ethnic or religious or other 
prejudice” (2006g, p. 63). MacIntyre is advocating a contemporary politics of 
the polis, not a Volk. As he puts it, “A polis is always, potentially or actually, a 
society of rational enquiry, of self-scrutiny. The bonds of a Volk by contrast are 
prerational and nonrational. The philosophers of the Volk are Herder and 
Heidegger, not Aristotle” (MacIntyre 1998c, p. 241). The kind of politics 
MacIntyre envisages is a politics of resistance and “self-defense” against the 
depredations of state and other forms of power, both political and economic 
(MacIntyre 2006d, p. 155). This will necessarily be a participatory politics of 
deliberation in which “no one is excluded” (MacIntyre 1998c, p. 248) without 
debate and challenge. However, particular exclusions might be necessary on 
the basis that certain participants might have interests that are at odds with the 
overall good of a community. For MacIntyre, these kinds of local, practice-
based, participatory arenas “are now the only places where political community 
can be constructed, a political community very much at odds with the politics of 
the nation-state” (ibid., p. 248). In these spaces productive, domestic and other 
practices would be ordered for the sake of internal rather than external goods, 
and these would all be oriented towards the rationally agreed upon common 
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good. As Kelvin Knight argues, “This is not a conservative conception of 
politics. On the contrary, it is a revolutionary conception” (Knight 1998, p. 21).  
It is revolutionary in that such a politics of local community subverts the 
alienating forms of practical rationality and political reasoning of dominant 
state-centred politics, whether liberal or radical, by fostering critical human 
agency that will require the abolition of alienating social, political and economic 
structures and institutions. I suggest it is also revolutionary inasmuch as it 
subverts the tendency to invoke abstract principles as the basis for radical 
social change. Its rootedness also demands an attention to the development of 
moral character and the virtues. As Knight observes, “The more we are able to 
integrate and order the different goods that we pursue in our lives, the greater 
will be our personal integrity” (Knight 2007, p. 182). MacIntyre’s politics thus 
addresses issues relating to individual morality and character, which under 
conservative ideologies within dominant political forms are used to divert 
attention from structural, systemic problems and explanations in favour of 
moralizing about ‘individual responsibility’; whilst also addressing the question 
of social structures, which on the political left under dominant political (state-
centred) forms have, most obviously and egregiously in the case of Stalinism, 
led to a lack of concern for the personal (and collective) moral dimensions of 
politics and social change (Adamovsky 2006). MacIntyre’s politics thereby 
connects the personal and the structural, the subjective and the objective. By 
doing so, such a politics avoids treating individuals as abstract categories and, 
in Freirean spirit, rejects vanguardist movements that override the moral and 
political agency of those they claim to defend (Freire 1970, 2001). It is a 
difficult, demanding but concrete politics.  
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MacIntyre argues that through local projects such as building a school, 
a hospital or an art gallery, for example, the cultivation and exercise of the 
virtues is required if a project is to succeed. This can only authentically occur, 
however, if a project is devised and implemented in pursuit of a genuinely 
common interest and not in the interests of external capital formation or 
politicking. Where the latter is the case, those involved will reason 
instrumentally in terms of “efficiency” or profitability whilst also contributing to 
ongoing rationalizations of dominant alienating economic and political 
modalities. In contrast, under the very different conditions of conceiving and 
implementing projects in terms of practices, technocratic and individualistic 
reasoning will be subverted by the Aristotelian reasoning necessarily involved. 
To participate openly in such projects is “a distinctively philosophical 
enterprise…insofar as the conception of human flourishing that it expresses is 
articulated, so that it can become a subject for enquiry and debate by those 
whose practice has committed them to it” (MacIntyre cited in Knight 2007, p. 
182). It is clear how such projects have revolutionary potential inasmuch as 
they open up new moral and political horizons for those involved: 
managerialist and neoliberal assumptions will be undermined as individuals 
come to evaluate projects- both their means and ends- in terms of wider 
communal and more tangibly political goals. Such a politics necessitates 
resistance to the modern state and its inherent capitalist normativity. As Knight 
points out, “For such a project as a neighbourhood school to be pursued, 
resources may have to be obtained from the state….What is crucial is that such 
means not corrupt the end, and [MacIntyre] warns against any compromise of 
the rationally cooperative self-activity of practitioners with state or corporate 
power” (Knight 2007, p. 183). MacIntyre thus outlines a radical politics that 
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aims to subvert the socially damaging and distorting effects of dominant 
institutional power. For this to occur mere “resistance” might not be enough. It 
might be necessary to actively seek to abolish institutions that systematically 
generate injustice (MacIntyre 2006d, p. 146). However, MacIntyre’s politics 
would reject any form of revolutionary activity that simply replaced one form of 
domination with another.  Like Paulo Freire, MacIntyre impresses upon us the 
importance and value of individual agency and self-determination. 
One condition for the exercise of the powers of moral agency is that 
they can only be exercised by those who are able to justify rational confidence 
in their judgments about the goodness and badness of human beings. As 
MacIntyre points out, this ability necessarily requires participation in social 
relationships and in types of activity in which people’s reflective judgments 
emerge from systematic dialogue with others and are therefore subject to 
critical scrutiny. He argues that “Without milieus within which such 
relationships and activities are effectively sustained the possibility of the 
exercise of the powers of moral agency will be undermined” (MacIntyre 2006c, 
p.196). MacIntyre also explicitly states that moral agency requires that 
individuals can step back from their social roles in order to be able to critique 
them: “the powers of moral agency can only be exercised by those who 
understand themselves as moral agents, and, that is to say, by those who 
understand their moral identity as to some degree distinct from and 
independent of their social roles” (MacIntyre 2006c, p. 195). In this respect 
moral agents enter into conflict with the established social order.  
 MacIntyre argues that modern social orders impose normative 
frameworks on individuals in different spheres of life and provide an illusion of 
moral agency and rational determinateness in moral argument. As a result the 
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modern self is divided and confused. Modern social structure adds to the 
confusion and indeterminateness through what MacIntyre calls 
compartmentalization in which different social roles and occupations provide 
us with a variety of normative frameworks and constraints to which we must 
conform: those of the various workplaces and professions, as well as of the 
household, the market, the agencies of the state and a variety of other 
organizations and associations. For the inhabitants of modern social orders 
“there is no milieu available to them in which they are able, together with 
others, to step back from those roles and those requirements and to scrutinize 
themselves and the structure of their society from some external standpoint 
with any practical effect” (ibid., p. 197). MacIntyre claims that such milieus 
would provide agents with an understanding of themselves as having 
responsibilities and a substantive identity independent of their roles. Such an 
understanding would overcome divisions within the self imposed by 
compartmentalization and set the scene for conflicts that such 
compartmentalization suppresses. Lacking such milieus and the necessary 
virtues of integrity and constancy these foster, “there is nothing about the self 
thus divided that is liable to generate conflict with what are taken to be the 
requirements of morality within the established order” (ibid., p. 200).  
It is therefore clear that MacIntyre’s philosophy is a socially critical 
philosophy that, like liberalism, is concerned to distinguish arbitrary power and 
authority from that which is morally legitimate. The difference is that, for 
MacIntyre, liberalism is an entirely negative philosophy that offers no positive 
guidance as to how to live (MacIntyre 1971d, p. 282). Moreover, liberalism has 
itself become an ideological mask for arbitrary power and authority in the guise 
of a neutral theoretical framework and political practice. Further, for MacIntyre,  
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Liberalism in the name of freedom imposes a certain kind of unacknowledged 
domination, and one which in the long run tends to dissolve traditional human 
ties and to impoverish social and cultural relationships. Liberalism, while 
imposing through state power regimes that declare everyone free to pursue 
whatever they take to be their own good, deprives most people of the 
possibility of understanding their lives as a quest for the discovery and 
achievement of the good, especially by the way in which it attempts to 
discredit those traditional forms of human community within which this project 
has to be embodied. (MacIntyre 1998d, p. 258) 
 
Coexistence, rules and the good 
One of MacIntyre’s central arguments is that in ruling out conceptions of the 
good from the realm of public debate regarding legislation on social norms and 
policies liberalism enforces an inability to deal determinately and therefore 
adequately with important and complex moral problems (MacIntyre 1990a). In 
effect liberalism abdicates from addressing the question of the morality of 
certain practices in the name of individual freedom of choice. Coexistence is 
therefore concerned with the issue of regulating agreement to disagree and of 
establishing temporary and partial settlements with particular groups who hold 
to particular conceptions of the good or rival accounts of what justice requires 
on a specific issue (MacIntyre 1998c, p. 245). Ultimately, under liberalism 
conceptions of the good are  
 
to be assigned to and restricted to the sphere of the private life of individuals, 
while concerns about obedience to what are taken to be the moral rules 
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required of every rational person can be legitimately pursued in the public 
realm. So appeals to particular moral rules always provide relevant, although 
not necessarily sufficient grounds for advocating legislation of various kinds, 
while appeal to particular conceptions of the human good never do. Insofar as 
it is this liberal view which has been embodied in social practice in 
contemporary advanced societies, the good has been privatized. (MacIntyre 
1990a, pp. 346-347)  
 
The liberal response to this is that because people inevitably disagree on 
conceptions of the good, what is required for coexistence is agreement on 
certain basic moral rules to which appeal can be made in the course of 
addressing conflicts when they arise. However, MacIntyre argues that this 
merely shifts the problem of seeking rational consensus. He points out that 
disagreement on the kinds of argument appropriate for justifying particular 
moral rules as well as disagreement on the actual substantive content of such 
rules is endemic in liberal theory. Different kinds of Kantianism, utilitarianism, 
intuitionism and contractarianism claim to provide the ultimate principles by 
which to resolve disputes in this area, thus “Radical and de facto ineliminable 
disagreement confronts us” (ibid., p. 348). A liberal reply to this might be that if 
this is the case in terms of finding agreement on the justification and content of 
moral rules, it is equally if not more the case in terms of conceptions of the 
good. Therefore, what is required for coexistence is some weaker set of 
assumptions and more abstract principles such that a certain level of rational 
agreement is at least more likely.  
Jürgen Habermas has attempted to supply a philosophical theory of 
discourse ethics that ostensibly aims to address this kind of problem whilst 
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avoiding the deficiencies of monological theories such as Kant’s. For 
Habermas, “Moral argumentation…serves to settle conflicts of action by 
consensual means. Conflicts in the domain of norm-guided interactions can be 
traced directly to some disruption of a normative consensus” (Habermas 1990, 
p. 67). For MacIntyre, however, there is no such consensus to begin with.12 
Habermas allows that traditions and particular forms of life in community can 
and do inform evaluative judgments, but his separating of ethical thought into 
two components, the strictly normative and the evaluative, prioritises the right 
over the good and therefore disallows conceptions of the good from informing 
debates on justice, the “strictly normative”. What Habermas calls the lifeworld 
of individuals may generate a variety of duties, obligations, virtues and 
conceptions of justice but these can and ought to be challenged by the purely 
normative concerns of justice. “For the hypothesis-testing participant in a 
discourse, the relevance of the experiential context of his lifeworld tends to 
pale. To him, the normativity of existing institutions seems just as open to 
question as the objectivity of things and events…Facts and norms that had 
previously gone unquestioned can now be true or false, valid or invalid” (ibid., 
p. 107). However, in a MacIntyrean view this is a sociologically and 
psychologically implausible picture of moral experience and moral agency. It is 
a picture, perhaps, of the kind of moral experience and agency of a certain 
kind of individual in a certain kind of social order in liberal societies. For 
MacIntyre, the “moral point of view” that can be distilled from such a 
hypothetical discursive community is a fiction that assumes a tradition- and 
context-independent moral standpoint. The difficulty with seeking this 
                                                 
12  For MacIntyre there is no rational consensus in the modern world- or in fact in the ancient 
world. In the latter, however, there were significantly shared presuppositions about  social, 
political and moral life. 
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standpoint is that “those conceptions of universality and impersonality which 
survive this kind of abstraction from the concreteness of traditional or even 
non-traditional conventional modes of moral thought and action are far too thin 
and meagre to supply what is needed” (MacIntyre 1988, p. 334). The picture of 
moral agency implied by Habermas’s theory is therefore empty and ghost-like 
(see MacIntyre 1982).  
Habermas not only assumes a sociologically implausible scenario for 
the discussion of moral and social norms and the resolution of conflicts, but the 
abstraction involved is such that complex moral issues simply cannot be 
adequately addressed. The relational aspect of Habermas’s discourse ethics 
remains as empty as its Kantian ancestor. Instead of the monological 
introspection of an isolated individual, we now have the dialogical, shared 
introspection of isolated discussants. MacIntyre concedes that there are cross-
tradition virtues and norms of human behaviour qua human behaviour but 
observes that these might be quite wrongly held to provide a kind of 
transcendental deduction of norms for all times and all places irrespective of 
the nature of the society in which people find themselves: 
 
Just because human society as such either has to have or will usually have 
certain norms as part of the ineliminable logical framework of its actions and 
its discourse, so all choices of different evaluative possibilities arise within this 
framework and within the context of the norms in question. It follows that these 
norms cannot provide us with reasons for choosing one out of the set of 
possibilities rather than another. (MacIntyre 2002, p. 92) 
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MacIntyre points out that there has been no systematic engagement between 
rival moral traditions with substantive conceptions of the good. Liberalism 
merely assumes and dictates that in this area radical disagreement is 
inevitable and ineliminable. If systematic debate and discourse were to occur 
in the way MacIntyre envisages we would at least have the possibility to see 
what might happen and, moreover, begin to adequately engage with complex 
moral questions in ways that could lead to genuine progress in enquiry 
(MacIntyre 1991).  
However, MacIntyre also insists that such debate and engagement at 
the level of theory alone cannot expect to make any progress in terms of 
rational enquiry. MacIntyre insists that any moral theory is only a genuine 
theory if it is or can be embodied in social practices. MacIntyre came to see 
that the competing moral idioms in which contemporary ideological claims 
were framed, whether liberal or conservative, “were to be understood as the 
outcome of a history in which different aspects of the life of practice had first 
been abstracted from the practical and theoretical contexts in which they were 
at home and then transformed into a set of rival theories, available for 
ideological deployment” (MacIntyre 2006d, p. 156).  
As just one more theory, Thomistic Aristotelianism would be as 
incapable as its theoretical rivals of proving its rational superiority. The 
difference between liberal theory and Aristotelian theory is essentially the 
difference between a theory that is free-floating, disconnected from any 
particular concrete and coherent social practice, and a theory that is the 
expression of such concrete social practice. However, whilst MacIntyre sees 
liberal theory as a theory for everywhere and nowhere, it is nonetheless the 
ideological mask of what for him is a deformed and irrational mode of social 
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and political life and practice- that of advanced modernity. For MacIntyre, 
engagement between rival theories, traditions and conceptions of the good 
must ultimately occur at the level of lived practice. Genuine debate between 
rival conceptions of the human good “only occurs when the actualities of one 
mode of social life, embodying one such conception, are matched against the 
actualities of its rivals. It is as it is concretely lived out that one fundamental 
standpoint is or is not vindicated against its rivals” (MacIntyre 1990a, p. 355).  
Thus MacIntyre implies that liberalism fails as a mode of social life and 
practice. However, this itself points to a shift in the position MacIntyre takes in 
respect of liberalism between After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? For now it seems that MacIntyre is arguing that liberalism is a 
tradition and a coherent mode of social practice. As Stephen Mulhall points 
out, MacIntyre appears to have abandoned his earlier claim “that liberalism 
lacks the conceptual resources to make sense of human agency and the 
rationality of political argument, and is accordingly incapable of generating a 
coherent moral and political system; instead, he is acknowledging that 
liberalism is a fully fledged tradition, and so possessed of just the resources he 
originally suspected it of lacking” (Mulhall 1994, p. 221). MacIntyre’s response 
is essentially the following: Liberalism as a social tradition is distinct from 
although partially constituted by a range of intellectual enquires and moral 
theories that were initially formulated as a rejection of the 
Aristotelian/Thomistic worldview. The various intellectual and moral enquiries 
that depart from one or other of these theoretical frameworks, be they Kantian 
or utilitarian, intuitionist or contractualist can be internally coherent as 
traditions of enquiry but taken in isolation are wholly inadequate to the 
problems caused, so MacIntyre argues, by the rejection of the classical moral-
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political scheme and have conjointly contributed to the incoherence of 
liberalism as a social and cultural tradition (see MacIntyre 1994, pp. 290-293). 
The morality of liberalism is incoherent because it is an amalgam of, and 
oscillates between, the different moral traditions of enquiry that partially 
constitute it. Therefore, on MacIntyre’s view, an incoherent morality leads to an 
incoherent social and political order. As MacIntyre points out in response to 
Mulhall, “It is not that the pervasive and dominant morality cannot function as a 
morality, but that it cannot function as a coherent morality. And that 
incoherence is perhaps exhibited most clearly in the moral dimension of the 
politics of the nation-states of the West” (MacIntyre 1994, p. 293).  
So for MacIntyre, debates in moral theory and at the level of day-to-day 
morality can only hope to be fruitfully engaged in and resolved through a 
conjunction of theory and practice in which moral criteria regain determinacy 
and rational purchase. In MacIntyre’s perspective, the compartmentalization of 
modern political and social orders ensures that social, economic and political 
activities are not carried out as practices with internal goods and criteria of 
evaluation but in terms of the achievement of external goods, such as those of 
power and wealth. The fragmented and confused theorizing of liberal social 
orders is the philosophical expression of a fragmented and irrational social 
order. MacIntyre’s political proposals aim to overcome this moral philosophical 
and social fragmentation and irrationality. 
 
Critiquing MacIntyre’s Politics 
MacIntyre’s work has been critiqued from many different perspectives (see 
Horton and Mendus 1994; MacIntyre 1985b; Knight and Blackledge 2008). I 
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concentrate here only on a small selection of criticisms in relation to the 
political dimensions of MacIntyre’s philosophy. 
 Argentine liberation philosopher and theologian Enrique Dussel has 
written, “Nor does Alisdair Mclntyre’s [sic] After Virtue overcome the 
impossibility of propounding a social ethics, this work remaining stuck on an 
abstract level” (Dussel 1988, p. 237). For Dussel, “McIntyre’s [sic] keen critique 
of earlier moralists is tarnished by his return to Aristotle, and his taking a 
position between Aristotle and Nietzsche. Neither of the two, obviously, can be 
ethicians of liberation” (Dussel 1988, p. 248). This is all Dussel has to say on 
MacIntyre’s centrally important contribution to moral philosophy. Firstly, the 
notion that After Virtue is stuck on an abstract level is a strange criticism. It is a 
deeply historical philosophical argument that attempts to demonstrate and 
overcome precisely the abstract conception of moral philosophy as addressing 
the same timeless and ahistorical moral concepts. Secondly, MacIntyre’s 
“keen critique of earlier moralists” is undertaken from the standpoint of a neo-
Aristotelian position, hence his return to Aristotle. Thirdly, Dussel says that 
Aristotle and Nietzsche cannot be “ethicians of liberation” and implicitly 
dismisses MacIntyre’s moral philosophy for the same reasons. Yet as Dussel 
also points out, MacIntyre takes a position between Aristotle and Nietzsche. 
MacIntyre is fully aware of the defects of both positions but argues for a 
contemporary restatement of Aristotle’s ethics and politics in order to develop 
a “post-Marxist ideology of liberation” (MacIntyre 1971a, p. 93). Contra Dussel, 
I suggest that MacIntyre’s project provides the philosophical basis for an ethics 
of liberation. Moreover, Dussel’s own philosophical project of elaborating an 
ethics of liberation can be critiqued from MacIntyre’s perspective. Dussel’s own 
formulation of an ethics of liberation is heavily indebted to Marx, whose 
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thought MacIntyre has critiqued in terms of its moral philosophical 
incoherence, as we have seen. Whilst Dussel’s own ethics of community 
praxis is in some respects resonant with MacIntyre’s approach (see Dussel 
1988, p. 186), I contend that he remains prey to the deformities in Marx’s and 
subsequent Marxism’s approach to moral issues. For example, Dussel 
validates the ethical approach of certain vanguardist movements and leaders 
in a definite Kantian register: “The hero organizes the oppressed to the end 
that they may throw themselves into a process that includes struggle” (Dussel 
1988, p. 90). Further, Dussel appears to separate ethics from politics and to 
adhere to the kind of reasoning MacIntyre saw as characteristic of Stalinism. 
Discussing Colombian priest, political organizer and guerrilla fighter Camilo 
Torres, he writes: “The political legi imacy of the actions of citizen Camilo will 
be judged by the future liberated state, not by theology or the church” (Dussel 
1988, p. 178).  
t
However, contra MacIntyre, Dussel suggests that Marx does provide a 
cogent moral basis for working-class militancy and activity: 
 
In the Grundrisse (1857-8), Marx puts forward certain propositions with a 
decidedly non-Stalinist ring:   
 
Free individuality founded on the universal development of individuals 
in the subordination of their communal productivity ...as social 
patrimony, constitutes the third stage. ...Communal production ...is 
subordinate to individuals, and controlled in community fashion by 
them as a patrimony [of their own]. ...[It is a] free exchange among 
individuals, associating on the basis of community appropriation and 
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control of the means of production. This last association has nothing of 
the arbitrary about it. It presupposes the development of material and 
spiritual conditions [Grundrisse, 1974, pp.75-7].  
 
Marx speaks not of a ‘collectivity’ (Kollek vität) but of a ‘community’ 
(Gemeinschaft). (Dussel 1988, pp. 185-186) 
ti
 
Thus Dussel appears to provide evidence that the basis for association in Marx 
is community-controlled production. However, in “The Theses on Feuerbach: A 
Road Not Taken” MacIntyre (1998b) contends that Marx could not discern the 
praxis, the conjunction of theory and practice based on the precedence of a 
particular kind of practice over theory, that such community production 
presupposed, a practice outside the, for Marx, problematic practical-theoretical 
standpoint of civil society.  According to MacIntyre, “in the theses on 
Feuerbach Marx came very close to formulating just the distinctions which 
might have enabled him to understand this. But to have expressed those 
distinctions clearly and to have developed their implications would perhaps 
have left Marx unable to define his relationship to the large-scale revolutionary 
changes which he had identified as imminent, tied instead to what he took to 
be already defeated forms of past life” (MacIntyre 1998b, p. 232). The kind of 
practice MacIntyre highlights as presupposing the necessary relationship of 
theory to practice is one that is militantly against the modern ethos, an ethos 
which later Marxist movements have succumbed to and helped propagate. 
This itself points to Marx’s failure to pursue the philosophical problem of the 
theory-practice relationship, which has led to Marxism becoming just one more 
arbitrary theory.  
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 Paul Blackledge (2009) has critiqued MacIntyre’s concept of a practice, 
arguing that one of the examples he cites as instances of local communities 
which have virtuously resisted in the face of capital and the state include 
Welsh mining communities that were underpinned by forms of trade unionism 
not classifiable as MacIntyrean practices, “which by his account of 
proletarianization…should have been forever trapped in an alienated means-
ends morality characteristic of capitalism” (Blackledge 2009, p. 880). It might 
be argued in response that such trade union activity was ultimately undertaken 
in light of the virtues governing other properly MacIntyrean practices in the 
communities, which provided a necessary check on the instrumental nature of 
such militancy; that is, they kept the workers conscious that the struggle for 
better pay and conditions only made sense in the context of an integrated 
community life of shared practices. However, Blackledge points out that it was 
in fact the activity of trade union militancy that effectively made communities 
out of initial aggregations of domestic and foreign workers. In line with this I 
don’t see why MacIntyre’s politics of local community cannot successfully 
mediate and counterbalance the kinds of problems MacIntyre highlights with 
ideologically based associations like trade unions, and vice versa.  
Chris Harman writes that MacIntyre’s political proposal  
 
reads to me like a call for hippie communes without hippies. If MacIntyre 
means by ‘morality’ what he used to mean by it, such communities cannot be a 
moral response to what the system is doing to humanity in the 21st century, 
however personally satisfying they might be. We are faced with the 
depredations of a system of alienated labour that has escaped from all control. 
The global economic crisis, the “war on terror”, the periodic pillaging of the 
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poorest countries, the “world of slums” and climate change are all expressions 
of this. There is a race between barbarism and socialism in which, at the 
moment, the odds are on barbarism. Cultivating your own garden with a few 
other people may be more pleasant than slaving for capital, but to identify it as 
a moral choice is to fall back precisely into the arbitrariness that the early 
MacIntyre once castigated. (Harman 2009- unpaginated) 
 
This ignores the complexity and rigour of the argument that leads to 
MacIntyre’s political conclusions and caricatures the kind of politics and 
milieus that MacIntyre calls for. In MacIntyre’s view, the “socialism” that 
Harman pits against barbarism is imbued with the same modern ethos 
underpinning capitalism, which in contemporary manifestations is rife with 
contradictions. Further, MacIntyre does not advocate a local politics of 
resistance as a “moral choice” but as the basic presupposition of a coherent, 
rational morality and basis for social critique and transformation. It is Harman’s 
position that appears arbitrary (why a race only between “socialism” and 
barbarism?) Nevertheless, the immense, global scale of the crises facing 
humanity that Harman rightly draws attention to raises the question of the 
necessary moral-political response. To large scale problems, large scale 
solutions; an ethics and politics of the local can sound like withdrawal from the 
world. In the Colombian context the sheer scale of forced displacement, 
political and social violence, inequality and poverty also urges decisive, 
principled political action, perhaps along the lines of Peter Hallward’s “politics 
of prescription”.  
However, the assumption here is that MacIntyre is urging us to turn 
away from seriously addressing these urgent human, social problems. This is 
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not the case. Despite his infamous call for a “new St. Benedict” at the end of 
After Virtue and his view that the point is not to overthrow capitalism but to 
“withdraw from it and not get involved in its disasters” (cited in Blackledge 
2009, p. 869), MacIntyre explicitly states that any politics of local community 
will inevitably have to align itself at times with the large-scale politics of nation-
states in order to defeat particular, large-scale threats (MacIntyre 1998c, p. 
252). The difference for such a local politics, however, is that it is concerned 
with generating and maintaining a coherent, rational, ethical politics in which 
the dominant politics of individual and collective interests is subverted and, 
crucially, moral character and morally structured forms of political subjectivity 
are developed. The dominant, irrational political orders of modernity prey and 
thrive upon divided selves and subjects. Just as “capitalism…provides 
systematic incentives to develop a type of character that has a propensity to 
injustice” (MacIntyre 2006d, p. 149), so modern, especially liberal, political 
orders induce confusion and inconsistency amongst citizens, which is both a 
result of and a prerequisite for the sustaining of the contradictory demands and 
values of liberal market democracies (see MacIntyre 1990b, p. 5). However, 
there is in my view a question mark over the kind of politics MacIntyre 
envisages, which needs to be empirically explored for its adequacy as a 
vehicle for the restoration of a rational morality and radical social 
transformation.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have set out MacIntyre’s philosophical project, which provides 
the theoretical and conceptual framework for my overall argument. It is my 
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contention that MacIntyre’s diagnosis of the philosophical deficiencies of 
modern morality and politics can illuminate the convoluted nature of the moral 
dimensions of the Colombian conflict, whilst also providing better resources for 
conceiving the task of constructing coexistence and an ethical politics and 
political community than those emanating from liberalism. MacIntyre’s complex 
account of moral conflict, which encompasses theories of rationality and social 
action, and which demonstrates the connection between rationality and desire 
and the always theory-laden nature of our social analyses and explanations, is 
of particular relevance to situations of entrenched conflict such as in Colombia. 
In the following chapter I attempt to substantiate these claims through a critical 
exploration of the Colombian philosophical literature that addresses the conflict 
and the question of reconstructing coexistence and political community.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Philosophy and the Colombian crisis13 
 
This chapter reviews a sample of the Colombian literature that addresses the 
“moral crisis” and which theorizes the problem of coexistence and the search 
for an “ethical response” (López 2005) to the Colombian conflict. My criteria for 
selecting this literature are the significance of the authors and the arguments 
they advance. For example, I range from the important Colombian sociologist 
María Teresa Uribe, who has written extensively on the topics of politics, 
ethics, and conflict in Colombia, to the peace activist and theorist Luís 
Sandoval who merits attention because of his prominence and stature within 
the peace movement. Between these are a selection of writers who have made 
what I deem to be important or highly relevant interventions on the topic(s) of 
ethics, politics, coexistence and the conflict. Literature on the specifically 
ethical dimensions of the Colombian conflict, Colombian politics and the 
question of coexistence is not abundant. In contrast to the abundance of 
literature dedicated to analysing the nature and extension of violence in 
Colombia (see González et al. 2002 for an extensive review of the literature) 
and the growing literature on peace initiatives of civil society, research 
addressing the specifically ethical dimensions of conflict and peace is scarce. I 
argue that the liberal paradigm within which this literature is situated is 
problematic in light of MacIntyre’s thesis and that MacIntyre provides more 
                                                 
13 I borrow this chapter title from the title of an important book published in Colombia edited by 
R. Sierra Mejía and A. Gómez-Müller called “La filosofía y la crisis Colombiana”, which 
addresses the conflict from various philosophical perspectives (Taurus: Bogotá 2002). 
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adequate philosophical resources for conceiving the task of overcoming 
conflict and constructing social-political coexistence and an ethical politics. 
 
Civic Ethics/the ethics of minimums 
 
As María Teresa Uribe and Liliana López (2006) demonstrate, Colombia’s 19th 
century civil wars centred upon ethical-political conflicts in relation to the 
nature of the state, conceptions of citizenship, justice and political community. 
Despite what I argue were to become fully emotivist moral-political discourses, 
James Sanders (2004) has shown how in the 19th century there was originally 
much less social and political distance between elites and subalterns as a 
result of the fragmentation and weakness of the central state, which enabled a 
basic moral-political consensus to emerge in the form of “republican 
bargaining” based on a more or less shared moral-political language. The 
eventual fracturing of this moral-political framework was ultimately related to 
deeper radical disagreements about political economy and the increasingly 
abstract moral idioms appealed to by elites (Palacios and Safford 2002; 
Sanders 2004; Uribe and López 2006). Following the 1886 conservative 
“Regeneration”- a reaction to the hegemony of radical liberal republicanism- no 
longer republican bargaining but power would ultimately become the arbiter of 
political disagreements and determine the nature of the political constitutions 
that would hold sway and serve as imposed national normative referents 
(Henao and Rodríguez 2006; Sanders 2004). 
The 1991 Constitution arguably marked a shift in this pattern as a range 
of insurgent groups demobilized and a National Constituent Assembly debated 
the clauses of the new charter that would enshrine important new rights and 
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inspire hope that Colombia was on the path to resolving its decades long 
conflict and finding some new ethical basis for shared political life. As Rubén 
Fernández (1996) put it in an important book titled “Ethics for Better Times”, 
originally published shortly after this significant political event, “Today the 
debate about the ethical referents of our society is open once again” 
(Fernández 1996, p. 7). Fernández, director of one of Medellín’s most 
important NGOs/think tanks, expressed his hope that all Colombia’s social 
actors would embrace this debate and help in the reconstruction of ethical 
referents that would “become a new consensus that in the form of a pact of 
coexistence will enable us with greater collective and mutual security to 
address the tasks- arduous ones, but much more interesting than eliminating 
opponents- of eradicating poverty, constructing democracy and social justice” 
(ibid., p. 8). The different essays that make up this text concur in the view that 
the way out of the conflict is through a new kind of politics, an ethical politics 
that avoids the demagoguery and dogmatism of institutionalized politics and 
the politics of those armed groups in resistance against the exclusionary 
political system and the social injustices it breeds. What is called for in this text 
is a “civic ethics” or “citizen ethics” that transcends the dogmatism and 
intolerance of the dominant form of politics through the elaboration of an 
“ethics of minimums.”14 
For Carlos Calderón, such an ethics of minimums refers to “the 
acceptance of a core of values around which all citizens can agree, whatever 
our political or religious creeds. Primary and fundamental elements of this 
minimum ethos would evidently be the valuing of and respect for life and the 
                                                 
 
i
14 See Adela Cortina’s (2001) discussion and defence of the “ethics of minimums” in Ética
Aplicada y Democrac a Radical. Madrid: Editorial Tecnos. 
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dignity of the human person, both presuppositions of an authentic coexistence 
of citizens” (Calderón 1996, p. 22). Based on the foundation of a “shared 
rationality”, Calderón sees this consensus as “gradually constructed through 
interdisciplinary, inter-institutional and inter-religious dialogue” (ibid., p. 22). 
What is needed is an “urgent formulation of a juridical-moral language that 
demands of, and engenders within individuals, groups and institutions a sense 
of social responsibility, respect for the ‘polis’, a sense of the ‘public’ and the 
common good” (ibid., p. 24).  
The connection between the moral crisis and moral language is 
therefore seen to be central. As Calderón puts it, “it would seem that we have 
learned to resolve our conflicts only through irony, mutual verbal delegitimizing 
or by resorting to violence” (ibid., p. 24). Calderón is hopeful that a shared 
moral language can emerge through dialogue on the basis of a shared 
rationality, following Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action and 
“discourse ethics”. Calderón’s conception of ethics is therefore cast in the 
classic Enlightenment mould as essentially ahistorical, as a question of 
discovering binding ethical precepts and principles on the basis of reason and 
discourse alone in abstraction from social contexts and practices. Calderón 
does not address the problem of embedded, contradictory and fragmented 
normative standpoints in society or the issue of motivation- why it is that 
individuals will have the desire to follow the norms elaborated through 
dialogue-, which leads to a utopian and sociologically implausible scenario: 
“free of mutual prejudices and above all free of ambitions of power, all 
institutions would have to hear and accept the call to agree to seek what we 
might call the elaboration of a civil pedagogy of morality and ethics. This would 
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be what others denominate as the formulation of a citizenship ethics” (ibid., p. 
21).  
Calderón’s proposal also points to a general theoretical incoherence 
that is prevalent to greater or lesser extents throughout the Colombian 
discussion. For example, the concepts of social responsibility, the Greek polis, 
the modern public realm, and the common good that Calderón mentions imply 
very different accounts of moral language, of the meaning of moral terms and 
judgements, and the relationship of these to politics. For example, the common 
good in the Romantic tradition implies a conception of society that is more 
“organic” and communitarian than the Aristotelian conception centred on the 
polis as interpreted by MacIntyre. The modern public sphere, comprised of civil 
society conceived in terms of an aggregation of individual interests, implies an 
account of practical rationality according to which to be practically rational is to 
act on the basis of the costs and benefits to oneself of different courses of 
action. In contrast, within the practical and theoretical context of the Greek 
polis, to be practically rational is to act in such a way as to achieve the ultimate 
and true good of human beings. The mistake Calderón makes is to assume 
that morality and practical rationality refer to a single phenomenon common to 
all social and cultural contexts whereby the Greeks, Hume, and Kant, amongst 
others, are all seen as attempting to analyse morality and practical rationality 
as such. As I showed in chapter one, MacIntyre argues that the confusion and 
incoherence of modern morality and moral philosophy, and the subsequent 
inability to reach rational consensus and to render moral reasoning coherent, 
is partly a result of the failure to understand this. Therefore, the idea that on 
the minimal basis of the norms of rational argumentation alone we can 
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formulate a moral language that has rational purchase on individuals and 
social institutions is deeply implausible.  
Yet this notion of developing a public morality (Rojas 2007, p. 14) in 
which all substantive moral positions are to be respected and held together by 
the discursive constraints of some procedural ethical model is prevalent 
throughout the Colombian discussion, but no less problematic for that. For 
example, Vicente Durán writes, “Rationally speaking, it is clear that a citizen 
ethics cannot a priori exclude anyone. Both the military officer who 
professionally defends the institutions of the state, and the landless peasant 
who fights to transform those institutions, must be capable of being integrated 
within the community of citizens. Both must be able to aspire to have their 
ethical principles and actions approved of by the community” (Durán 1992, p. 
80). However, this fails to take into account the incommensurability involved in 
radical moral disagreement and the diverse institutions and forms of social life 
in relation to which each individual’s ethical principles are partly formed. It 
does not see the moral crisis in terms of rival and incompatible forms of social 
practice, but primarily in terms of conflicting moral discourses (see Rojas 2007, 
p. 16). Moreover, it posits an ethical realm above the fray of social or 
institutional mediation. It also ignores the problematic nature of the state and 
its central role in the Colombian moral crisis.  
As Carlos Rojas points out, moral philosophy is used both to analyse 
and comprehend the social-political crisis in Colombia as well as seeking to 
transform it (Rojas 2007, p. 13). However, the general philosophical approach 
is liberal (of Kantian and Habermasian variants), which I contend is 
problematic. I claim that MacIntyre’s philosophy provides both a more 
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plausible account of the moral crisis as well as more adequate resources for 
conceiving an ethical response.  
 
Citizenship and the public sphere 
A more philosophically and sociologically sophisticated account of the need for 
a new political ethics and its content is provided by María Teresa Uribe, one of 
Colombia’s leading scholars who has written sophisticated analyses of the 
historical, political and ethical dimensions of Colombian society and its 
ongoing conflicts. In “Notas Coloquiales Sobre la Ética y la Política” (1996) 
(“Colloquial Notes on Ethics and Politics”) Uribe, like Calderón, argues for the 
necessity of an ethics of minimums that can guide social coexistence in 
Colombia. In her view, a central part of the Colombian crisis lies in the fact that 
a shared notion of the public sphere has never been constructed (Uribe 1996, 
p. 36). Instead, Colombia and Latin America more generally have 
economically modernized and urbanized, while at the level of the state and 
social identities and referents have struggled to overcome what she calls, 
following Hannah Arendt, “pre-political” forms of association and normativity. 
As Uribe puts it,  
 
In reality the drama of Latin America is that we have not constructed a public 
sphere, and because of this we do not have common ethical or cultural 
referents or a common social identity. We are an aggregate, a collection in 
which a multiplicity of values, ways of life, powers and mentalities circulate, 
reproduce and confront one another. (Uribe 1996, p. 36) 
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This is what leads Uribe to the conclusion that the problem of state legitimacy 
is acute; the multiple and rival normative frameworks in Colombian society 
mean that there are competing accounts of what is legitimate. From the 
standpoint of these various normative schemes the Colombian state lacks 
moral-political legitimacy. As Uribe puts it, in an argument strongly resonant 
with a point MacIntyre makes in After Virtue, “If national identity is weak, if it is 
fractured or constituted by great socio-cultural heterogeneity then it will be all 
the more difficult for the State to gain legitimacy” (Uribe 1993, p. 44). Uribe 
points out that the socio-cultural ethos of Colombian society in the 19th century 
was one that clashed with the abstract “meta-discourses” of universal rights 
and citizenship emanating from modern Europe, discourses that were 
promoted by a small sector of the Colombian elite. This, Uribe contends, is 
true of contemporary Colombian society, which has 
 
an excellent Constitution, a ream of legislation, a complete normative 
framework, yet unfortunately people in their collective and social day to day 
life, in their personal or political relations, do not take this normative meta-
discourse as a collective reference point. Instead they guide their social life by 
other pre-political, familial or traditional schemes. (Uribe 1996, p. 38) 
 
For Uribe, part of the solution to the moral-political crisis in Colombia lies in the 
internalisation across Colombian society of the abstract notion of the individual 
citizen in direct relationship to the state. This is the clear normative element in 
Uribe’s proposal. However, from a MacIntyrean standpoint the notion of a 
direct relation between the individual and the state is an undesirable fiction. In 
reality this relationship is mediated by the bureaucratic normativity of the state 
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that is the domain of experts in whose hands individual citizens have to put 
themselves in a way that compromises their moral agency (see Uribe 1999, p. 
187; MacIntyre 2006b, p. 115). As Kelvin Knight remarks, “MacIntyre, like 
Marx, regards the idea of citizenship as an ideological mask, worn by an 
institution that is structurally incapable of admitting its subjects to the kind of 
shared reasoning that would be necessary for the formation of a veritable 
‘shared purpose’ and ‘political community’” (Knight 2007, p. 170). Moreover, 
historically, despite the formal declarations of rights and inclusion by the 
Liberal and Conservative elites, as Alfredo Gómez-Müller (2008) points out, 
such declarations were ultimately intended to support the actual economic 
interests and practices of the elites. Abstract equality was fine, material 
equality and the idea that the state should intervene in the market to guarantee 
this were anathema.  
However, this idea of the abstract citizen whose identity centres not on 
local forms of particularity but on the “universal” form of the citizen-state 
relationship is seen to supply part of the answer to the problem of intolerance 
that is perceived to lie at the root of violence. Uribe sees the strong sense of 
identity and attachment engendered in Colombia’s multiple localisms and 
cultures with their substantive conceptions of the good as part of the reason for 
political violence and the inability to resolve conflicts rationally. As Uribe points 
out, as Colombia moved from colonialism to Independence what appeared on 
the scene were collectivities, towns, cities, provinces and ethnicities: 
 
The inhabitant/member-citizen was, then, a concrete subject, territorialized, 
rooted. One was a member of this or that locality, but not of the nation as a 
whole. This presented a profoundly differentiated image of the new political 
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subject inasmuch as a general statute of membership did not exist, and this 
condition depended on the jurisdiction and privileges of the community to 
which one belonged. (Uribe 1999, p. 201) 
 
According to Uribe, the characteristics of such membership “were opposed, in 
fact, to those attributes that defined the modern citizen: universality, 
individuality, equality and abstraction” (ibid., p. 201). As Uribe points out,  
 
Identities and feelings of belonging generated very particular cultural forms 
that survive to this day in Colombia; peasant and village cultures, traditional 
values associated with localism as an original form of social identity that are 
constantly reproduced in different contexts. (Uribe 1990, p. 30) 
 
Hence Uribe’s search for an ethics of minimums based not on the substantive 
commitments and conceptions of the good emanating from these communal 
forms of membership with their “mestizo” notions of citizenship, but on the 
presuppositions of intersubjective discourse, following Habermas. In Uribe’s 
view, this ethics of minimums based solely on the abstract and formal precepts 
of the presuppositions of communicative reason is necessary to generate 
consensus. As Uribe puts it, “To arrive at a rational consensus is to let 
ourselves be convinced by the argument of another, the only active force 
would be that of argumentation, the force by which another convinces me, in 
which I cede some of my interests and appetites as I recognize the interests 
and appetites of another” (Uribe 1996, p. 43). For MacIntyre, in contrast, such 
abstract argumentation is inadequate to the heavy work it is asked to do for 
political society.  
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Nevertheless, Uribe’s is a powerful argument and analytical framework 
in a society in which local and regional power has often turned inwards, 
concerned to defend its own domains and seeking rationales for the use of 
power and violence in “traditional” conceptions of society and morality. Uribe’s 
outline of a civic ethics is aimed at weakening the hold of the traditional ethos 
(whilst still respecting some of its key moral and cultural expressions and 
referents, such as Catholicism), and encouraging a more critical reflection on 
the presuppositions of political community in a society prone to the violent 
resolution of conflicts, which because of the dominant socio-cultural ethos 
have been over-politicized and reduced to zero-sum struggles. Given this, it is 
not difficult to see why the search for an ethical politics in Colombia has turned 
to neo-Kantian theories such as those of Habermas and Adela Cortina, an 
important Spanish philosopher whose work has also been used to analyse and 
theorize the Colombian moral-political problematic (see Peña 1996 for a 
defence of Cortina’s theoretical grounding of an ethical politics). Moreover, it is 
possible to misread MacIntyre as valorizing the kind of “traditional” society and 
social relations that Uribe rightly critiques in Colombia, especially given his 
own allegiance to the Catholic tradition. However, it is my contention that 
MacIntyre’s theory not only seriously problematises the discourse ethics and 
ethics of minimums approaches of Habermas and Cortina, but that it also 
provides more adequate resources for understanding how an ethical politics 
might be developed.  
Despite Uribe’s profound insights and analyses there are significant 
problems with some of her arguments and assumptions. Firstly, she appears 
to have a somewhat prejudiced and stereotypical view of “traditional” societies 
as totalizing spaces in which myth and irrationality structure the normative 
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dimension of identities and social relations. This too readily assumes that 
members of traditional societies do not have the moral or cognitive resources 
for critiquing their own society/community. On Uribe’s view, individuals in such 
communities are prisoners of their culture. They guide themselves according to 
the givens and received wisdom and doctrines of their 
culture/community/tradition, not by the “post-conventional” and abstract norms 
of reason. As Uribe puts it, only the elites guided themselves by what she 
refers to as “lo pensado” (“abstract thought”- see Uribe 1993, pp. 56-57). 
Moreover, her critique of historical “traditional” forms of local political society 
and community seems to me to assume that the hierarchical structure of these 
with their “notables” (political overlords who dispensed rights and favours in 
exchange for loyalty) is a mark of community per se. Further, Uribe’s 
contention that in such traditional communities notions of equality were absent 
in contrast to the abstract discourses of the liberal elites simply does not 
square with her own account of the artisans in the 1854 war, for example (see 
Uribe and López 2006). The artisans represented a form of “traditional” 
community/way of life based on small-scale artisanal production from which 
notions of equality certainly emerged. However, these were more substantive 
and “particular” notions of equality that differed from the abstract proclamations 
of equality made by the Liberal and Conservative elites.  
In places Uribe reads the problem of ethics in Colombia in a very similar 
way to how MacIntyre reads the broad, problematic history of ethics generally, 
but her solution moves in the opposite direction (see Uribe 1992, p. 161). Her 
proposed remedy is based on the acceptance of the inevitability of the social 
and moral dislocations produced by modernity and the modernization of 
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society.15 In Uribe’s view, Colombia needs to keep moving forward and attempt 
to instill the “spirit of modernity” into the complex patchwork of Colombian 
society. By contrast, in MacIntyre’s view the moral reality of modernity is a 
confused, incoherent mess that threatens to pull us into a new dark ages 
where rational collective restraint on the depredations of state power, 
corporate globalization and political violence is no longer possible because we 
lack the moral resources for reaching urgent moral consensus on central moral 
and political questions. Uribe, however, is more positive about the “spirit of 
modernity”. Where MacIntyre, some suggest somewhat apocalyptically 
(Hinchman 1989), urges local, semi-traditional communities (and also modern 
individuals) to turn away from seeking new socio-moral referents within the 
melange of modernity, Uribe bids them to find in it alternative modes of self-
understanding and moral-political identity (see MacIntyre 1985a, p. 252; Uribe 
1992, p. 164). As we have seen, MacIntyre thinks we can only move forward 
by reconstituting in contemporary forms something akin to the Aristotelian 
theory and practice of morality and politics. Modern liberal conceptions of 
politics can only perpetuate emotivist self-understanding and therefore conflict. 
Uribe herself links Aristotle with Habermas as a philosopher of the 
public sphere, but I argue that she is mistaken in her contention that what the 
Greeks saw as necessary for political life- praxis and lexis – “is none other than 
the communicative action of which Habermas speaks” (Uribe 1996, p. 33). 
Discourse and dialogue were of course central to Greek politics but, certainly 
at least in MacIntyre’s account of Aristotle’s ethics and politics, this was 
                                                 
15 As Sergio de Zubiría notes, “The genesis of the profound lack of correspondence between 
ethics, law and culture or the absence/deficit of a secular or “civic” ethics and the tendency to 
authoritarianism is in the majority of analyses connected to the incapacity, incomprehension or 
postponement of modernity in Colombian society” (De Zubiría 1998). 
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combined with the view that discursive political criteria emerged from a 
substantive, teleological conception of the human good, which included politics 
as the “master practice” that ordered the other subordinate practices that 
comprised a well-ordered human life and that were ultimately directed to a 
conception of the good. Political life was integrally structured around the 
ethical life, and vice versa. For Aristotle, ethics was the science of how to 
move man’s untutored human nature towards what it could be in its alignment 
with the substantive conception of the human good. For Habermas, in contrast, 
ethics is understood as establishing the minimal presuppositions of 
coexistence in the face of heterogeneous conceptions of the good. Because 
for Habermas there is no such thing as the good, ethics is a question of 
prioritizing justice- what is right- over the good, which as MacIntyre 
demonstrates is problematic on various levels.  
I suggest that Uribe misreads Aristotle through her reading of Hannah 
Arendt; in particular in claiming that the political life is openly counterposed to 
the domestic and private realm, that political life is in “direct opposition” to 
domestic, family life.16 I suggest it is this misreading that partly accounts for 
Uribe’s own view that the political sphere has to be sharply differentiated from 
the private realm and based on purely “rational” activity (Uribe 1996, p. 33), 
which implies that economics (oikonomía) cannot be subject to normative, 
which is to say political, evaluation (see A. Kogl 2007). Indeed, the discourse 
ethics of Habermas and Karl Otto Apel has been criticized precisely for 
insisting that material, economic questions cannot factor in to moral reasoning, 
holding that morally valid norms of coexistence have to be worked out at the 
                                                 
16 See A. Kogl (2007) who argues that Arendt misreads Aristotle on the connection between 
the economic-domestic realm and the public political sphere. 
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purely formal level of abstract argument without considering how such formal 
validity requires some substantive and material basis in order to get going 
(Dussel 1999).  
 Uribe’s liberal moral-political standpoint also means that she conceives 
politics as not based on any notion of shared interests and a common good, 
but as departing from radically divergent, individual interests (Uribe 1996, p. 
40). Uribe’s conception of the ethical-political self/subject is of one who has 
their own interests prior to engagement with others, even though these 
interests might be first discovered within a corporate structure such as a 
business federation or trade union. As Uribe puts it, “it is very important that 
these movements exist because it is the principal way…of constructing identity, 
of knowing where I am in the world and my position in the face of others, of 
what my interests are and what the interests of others are” (Uribe 1996, pp. 40-
41). What is clear is that Uribe assumes what MacIntyre calls the 
“compartmentalization” of modern, social and economic life (MacIntyre 2006c). 
In the political sphere these rival interests come together to bargain, not to 
construct a shared project. These interests are therefore given; there is no 
conceptual room for modifying interests and transforming desires through a 
common political project. Rather, individual interests have to be ceded. Moral-
political argument therefore does not begin from some notion of a consensus 
of interest but from the fact of pre-given individual interests.17 Uribe recognizes 
that shared ethical referents and “generalizable interests” cannot emerge from 
a mere aggregation of these different interests, pointing out that a distinct 
                                                 
17 Although Habermas says that conflict is the result of a disruption of a prior consensus, it is 
clear that he, or at least those who follow his approach, conceive the social-political world in 
terms of the priority of individual interests. Moreover, for MacIntyre this claim about consensus 
masks the reality of deeper conflict within society- see MacIntyre 1998a. 
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“alchemy” will need to emerge out of them (Uribe 1996, p. 41). However, I 
argue that such a distillation will only permit a fragile, temporary and ultimately 
irrational consensus. Because of its failure to recognize the fragmentation of 
moral concepts and discourse it does not (as with all liberal ethics) address the 
question of how a genuinely rational consensus can emerge. What minimalist 
set of agreements might emerge out of the discursive procedure will also 
surely be too thin to do the work of facilitating and enabling shared political life 
and coexistence. It also fails to address the problem of radical disagreement. 
As Mark Kingwell remarks, Habermasian discourse between ideally rational 
participants “cannot address the deep political differences that motivate such 
conversation in the first place” (Kingwell 1993, p. 116). It is also an ethical-
political framework that neglects motivation and character and which therefore, 
I argue, renders it too abstract and idealistic. The theory says nothing about 
why people should be motivated to follow the norms that have emerged from 
dialogue.  
Ultimately Uribe’s theoretical approach to the formulation of a civic 
ethics of minimums is philosophically incoherent.18 On the one hand she 
outlines a nuanced (Habermasian) liberal individualist model of an ethics for 
coexistence that fundamentally calls into question “traditional” and local forms 
of community with non-liberal presuppositions and social bonds, yet on the 
other hand elsewhere she argues that “The alternative to the ethical vacuum in 
Colombia will have to be sought in the collective public realm rather than in the 
                                                 
18 From a MacIntyrean standpoint Uribe is philosophically incoherent in her view that the 
normative legitimizations corresponding to European models of the nation state and social 
contract were “valid in themselves” whilst “totally illegitimate” because of the context in which 
they were applied (Uribe 1993, p. 57). This represents the view of philosophical and moral-
political arguments as free-floating and capable of validity outside of concrete social contexts 
and practices. 
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private, individual sphere; in social practices rather than in private morality and 
the law; in the vast and problematic realm of socio-cultural ethoses and 
political culture rather than in formal principles and rhetoric” (Uribe 1992, pp. 
176-177). This is more MacIntyrean and goes against the formal, rationalistic 
approach of Habermas that Uribe also endorses. Other Colombian 
philosophers who appeal to this Habermasian ethical theoretical approach 
include Guillermo Hoyos (2008), John Manuel Peña (1996) and Angela Uribe 
(2002), but they do not link this in the same way to Colombia’s political and 
cultural history.  
 
A Habermasian model of dialogue 
Ángela Uribe, however, makes an interesting attempt to apply Habermas’s 
theory to a contemporary social and political conflict in Colombia that can 
perhaps help us to see more clearly some of the problems discussed above. 
Uribe outlines a Habermasian model of conflict resolution in the case of the 
conflict between the U’wa indigenous people, the Occidental Oil Company, 
and the Colombian state (Uribe 2002). The Habermasian approach abstracts 
away from social particularity and radically different conceptual frameworks in 
the hope of engendering agreement on norms and resolving conflict on the 
basis of shared, universal communicative presuppositions. However, it is 
problematic for two main reasons: first, it sees conflict as emanating from a 
disruption of a prior normative consensus (Habermas 1990, p. 67), which is 
part of the liberal philosophical and ideological operation that MacIntyre argues 
suppresses radical conflict and, when it is recognized, tends to frame it in 
terms of an underlying order of regularity and consensus (MacIntyre 1998a). 
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Second, it does not take into account radical disagreement or the possibility of 
calling into question its own ultimately liberal social, political and ethical 
conceptual framework and associated way of life (see MacIntyre 1998c).  
In Uribe’s model the incommensurable conceptual scheme and idiom of 
the Other is ultimately neutralised by the discursive procedure whereby the 
Other is effectively coerced into conceiving conflict generally, and the specific 
conflict in question, in a particular way. Firstly, Uribe reduces the demands of 
the U’wa regarding the disruption of their way of life and cultural system by oil 
exploration in their territories to the liberal discourse of “interests”. Secondly, 
she caricatures the way in which the U’wa spokespeople would actually 
engage in discourse with the state and oil company representatives as 
amounting to no more than descriptions of their customs and way of life. 
Thirdly, from the outset the imagined interlocutor that represents Habermas 
begins by asserting that what is at stake in the conflict over the borders of the 
U’wa territory is “a matter of justice”. Thus, as with most liberal moral theories, 
the right is prior to the good. The norms of justice have to be formulated in 
abstraction from conceptions of the good. In this way what is intended as a 
philosophical model for rationally and non-coercively addressing conflict in a 
way that genuinely takes account of individuals and collective cultures in their 
Otherness ultimately “includes” the Other through a coercive assault on their 
very identity as Other.  
Habermas is then imagined as pointing out to the U’wa that the idea of 
the discussion is to reach an agreement between the State, the oil company 
and the U’wa that is the “best for all” and that does not “protect particular or 
privileged interests” (Uribe 2002, p. 258). When the U’wa spokesperson 
responds to this by elaborating the outlines of a historical narrative of injustice 
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against their people the imagined Habermas retorts: “What you have just said 
does not seem to me to be a good way to begin….If we want to be successful in 
our attempt to establish the ground rules that will facilitate a just agreement, it 
is not pertinent that you expound the memory of grievances regarding the 
history of power relations between the indigenous communities and the 
governments of Latin America” (Uribe 2002, p. 258). This starkly demonstrates 
the fact that the neutrality, objectivity and validity of moral reasoning that are 
alleged to arise from the presuppositions of linguistic communication alone 
clearly presuppose, at least in this case, the validity of liberal ideology. The 
historical contingency and contestability of the liberal state is also obscured by 
this philosophical sleight of hand.  It rules out the possibility of calling liberal 
ideology and conceptions of the good into question by disregarding as 
illegitimate historical narratives of European imperialism that for the U’wa very 
possibly factor in to their sense of justice. This is done in the guise of purely 
formal morality.  
This liberal start point thus autocratically rules out historical, not just 
“mythical” narrative from the dialogue and the process of argumentation.19 
MacIntyre argues that this is the dominant characteristic of liberalism in 
contrast to “tradition”. What MacIntyre refers to as “traditions” are complex, 
interweaving bodies of moral enquiry, theory and social practice in which forms 
and standards of practical rationality emerge (MacIntyre 1988, 1991).  These 
are exemplified in the “big” intellectual and theological traditions of 
                                                 
19 Uribe says in a somewhat condescending tone after once again relating the U’wa story of 
how the world “rests on a rock that first is red, then blue and then a greeny blue”, “How can 
one demand that the borders of a territory be decided on the basis of such confused 
expressions?” (Uribe 2002, p. 263) Yet from the outset of this imagined dialogue the U’wa do 
not refer to this myth but to a narrative of historical grievance that is unilaterally disregarded! 
 104
Aristotelianism, Thomism, Judaism, Buddhism, etc. but also in counter-cultural 
movements such as the Amish and indigenous cultures. MacIntyre writes: 
 
Where the standpoint of a tradition requires a recognition of the different types 
of language-in-use through which different types of argument will have to be 
carried on, the standpoint of the forums of modern liberal culture presupposes 
the possibility of a common language for all speakers or at the very least of the 
translatability of any one language into any other. Where the standpoint of a 
tradition involves an acknowledgment that fundamental debate is between 
competing and conflicting understandings of rationality, the standpoint of the 
forums of modern liberal culture presupposes the fiction of shared, even if 
unformulable, universal standards of rationality. Where the standpoint of a 
tradition cannot be presented except in a way which takes account of the 
history and the historical situatedness, both of the traditions themselves and of 
those individuals who engage in dialogue with them, the standpoint of the 
forums of modern liberal culture presupposes the irrelevance of one’s history 
to one’s status as a participant in debate. (MacIntyre 1988, p. 400) 
 
This is also consistent with the liberal philosophical anthropology underlying 
Rawls’s theory of justice that I perceive also underlies Habermas’s theory. 
What this philosophical anthropology implies is a conception of the moral self 
as fundamentally detached from its ends and deprived of understanding its 
identity as constituted by its historical cultural, communal and personal 
relationships (see Michael Sandel’s critique of Rawls in Mulhall and Swift 
1996). Furthermore, through insisting that the U’wa see themselves as a 
“constitutive part of public institutions” (Uribe 2002, p. 258) within the 
“democratic project” (ibid., p. 259) the Habermasian interlocutor also thereby 
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imposes the ground rules in the same way that Rawls’s theory does, as well as 
a particular way of conceiving their identity. Thus instead of really addressing 
the problem of an incommensurable conceptual scheme and idiom, the 
Habermasian model as reconstructed by Uribe utterly fails in what Habermas 
calls “hermeneutic sensibility” and makes no serious attempt to get inside the 
Other’s idiom, to attempt to learn what MacIntyre calls “a second language-in-
use as a second first language” (MacIntyre 1988, p. 387) so that we might be 
able to judge whether such an idiom and conceptual scheme can indeed be 
translated into our own.  As MacIntyre points out, “The thought which 
modernity, whether conservative or radical, rejects is that there may be 
traditional modes of social, cultural, and intellectual life which are as such 
inaccessible to it and to its translators” (MacIntyre 1988, p. 387). Moreover, in 
attempting to seriously engage with such an Other through an effort to learn its 
idiom as a second first language we might discover that our own tradition lacks 
resources for addressing certain problems internal to it, resources that might 
only be provided by the as yet alien tradition encountered. As MacIntyre 
argues, “Only those whose tradition allows for the possibility of its hegemony 
being put in question can have rational warrant for asserting such a 
hegemony. And only those traditions whose adherents recognize the 
possibility of untranslatability into their own language-in-use are able to reckon 
adequately with that possibility” (ibid., p. 388). In setting the terms of debate in 
the way she does, Uribe rules out the possibility of fundamentally calling into 
question the dominant, modern social, cultural and economic model. As 
MacIntyre argues, liberal theories as embodied in the political systems of 
modern societies provide few possibilities for putting liberalism itself to the 
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question (ibid., p. 392). Uribe’s application of Habermasian theory is thus 
highly problematic as a framework for conflict resolution and coexistence.  
 
Law, morality and culture 
An alternative to the Habermasian model of rationally grounding political 
coexistence is provided by neo-Hobbesian accounts of morality and law. 
Former mayor of Bogotá and university professor Antanas Mockus has 
addressed the problem of coexistence with fellow academic Jimmy Corzo. In 
their paper “Dos Caras de la Convivencia. Cumplir Acuerdos y Normas y no 
Usar ni Sufrir la Violencia” (2003) (“Two Faces of Coexistence. Respecting 
Agreements and Norms and Not Using or Suffering Violence”) Mockus and 
Corzo draw conclusions from an extensive study conducted in Bogotá 
amongst a representative sample of Bogotá’s youth population. They argue 
that the problem of coexistence in Colombia lies in the divorce between law, 
morality and culture. The ideal for coexistence is that there be a harmony 
between these three: 
 
The harmony between law, morality and culture can be defined with precision 
as the conjunction of (1) the moral and cultural disapproval of illegal conduct, 
(2) moral and cultural approval of legal obligations, and (3) cultural and moral 
pluralism. (Mockus and Corzo 2003, p. 4) 
 
The authors add that the harmony between points (1) and (2) does not mean 
there is an identification between law, morality and culture, which would be 
“fundamentalism” and therefore incompatible with moral and cultural 
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“pluralism”. In their view, “general subjection to the law is precisely the basis of 
pluralist guarantees” (ibid., p. 4). After analysing their empirical data Mockus 
and Corzo defined five “indicators” of coexistence: agreements, anomie, 
aversion to norms, pluralism, and omission (acuerdos, anomia, aversión a 
normas, pluralismo y descuido). They then classified individuals into groups in 
relation to their attitudes to law, morality and culture and their associated 
competences in the following way: committed, semi-committed, and anomic 
(cumplidos, cuasi-cumplidos, anomicos). Their principal conclusion is that,  
 
In sum, coexistence would be characterized by the capacity to make and to 
keep agreements; the absence of anomie, that is, respect for the law…; 
unconditional obedience to the law, a desire to adhere to norms, and optimism 
about the law in Colombia, perceiving it as a guarantor of rights; tolerance of 
people with different moral views or cultures; a like of norms including legal 
ones, accompanied by a respect for agreements. (Mockus and Corzo 2003, p. 
9- italics in original; my underlining.) 
 
However, there are various problems with this conclusion that derive from their 
general philosophical assumptions about morality. First, their approach 
assumes what appears to be a relativist view of morality that Cristina Villegas 
(2003) argues is prescriptive and not merely descriptive. They define morality 
as “those informal rules by which individuals govern themselves” (Mockus and 
Corzo 2003, p. 4). However, this view might actually derive from their empirical 
studies- as the authors point out, they derived their indicators from an analysis 
of the data. I suggest that it is more likely that Mockus and Corzo do not so 
much prescribe relativism in morality as simply describe the dominant liberal 
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individualist assumptions about morality that are embedded in the dominant 
forms of social life in modern societies. As they observe, “It could be said that 
the members of each of the three groups see themselves as radically 
governed by their conscience. ‘The law is for others but I am guided above all 
by my conscience’ turns out to be a good summary of the ecology of 
interactions, alliances and justifications espoused. The committed, semi-
committed and the anomic share the characteristic of being guided by their 
conscience” (Mockus and Corzo 2003, p. 15). This does not necessarily imply 
a relativist conception of morality (although it could lead that way with added 
qualifications or conditions) but it does indicate the problem for coexistence. If 
individuals govern themselves by their own chosen moral criteria then how can 
a shared set of criteria for coexistence be agreed upon? The implication is that 
this cannot be done on the basis of morality, so a different basis for 
coexistence is required. The answer for Mockus and Corzo lies in submission 
to law. However, this has clear authoritarian implications and does not address 
the philosophical question of how the law itself can claim legitimacy if not on 
the basis of moral principles. It also assumes the current, contestable moral-
political framework of society. Citizens are effectively told they have to conform 
to the implicit conception of the good embodied within the law and the taken 
for granted political-economic institutions that are implicit in this account of 
coexistence. Mockus and Corzo also leave no room for any notion of legitimate 
dissent despite their caveats about moral pluralism.  
Further, Cristina Villegas suggests that Mockus and Corzo suppose that 
individuals are moved to obey the law by the threat of external sanctions rather 
than through internal regulation, which Villegas argues ignores the sense of 
autonomy as an achievement of human beings. However, the sense of 
 109
autonomy as an achievement of human beings is arguably very different to the 
modern notion of autonomy as the ability to arbitrarily choose by what moral 
principles one will be bound (MacIntyre 1958-59). It is this concept of 
autonomy that arguably appears in Mockus and Corzo’s data. I suggest that 
Mockus and Corzo acknowledge this autonomy of individuals in respect of 
morality but that they simply see no other way of resolving the problem of 
finding a rational, authoritative basis for consensus other than their Hobbesian-
like appeal to law. If Mockus and Corzo are also working with the assumptions 
of modern, liberal morality it is understandable they should reach such a 
conclusion. Thus Mockus and Corzo’s approach and solution simply does not 
work and points to the deeper problem of finding a rational moral basis for 
consensus and coexistence given the moral fragmentation and atomism (what 
they perhaps mean by the term “pluralism”) and individualism they 
diagnose/assume.  
In contrast, Cristina Villegas sees the solution in uncovering an 
impersonal, universal moral basis for adherence to law that in her view is 
necessary for social cohesion. She concludes her criticism of Mockus and 
Corzo’s approach with the claim that “what should be promoted is moral 
development in order to achieve obedience to the law” (Villegas 2003, p. 86.) 
Yet this still begs the question in relation to the justification of the law and 
appears to assume that the aim of moral development is to get people to 
conform to the law rather than to develop the capacity to rationally critique and 
evaluate it.  
Villegas points out that on a Kohlbergian interpretation of Mockus and 
Corzo’s own data it is the most educated (i.e. the most socially privileged in 
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Colombia) who are the most morally competent.20 However, this is a highly 
questionable and abstract conception of morality and moral development that 
is also problematic as a basis for coexistence and an ethical politics. Firstly, 
the fact that Colombian elites, i.e. some of the most educated sectors of 
Colombian society, are responsible for heinous human rights abuses (see 
Guzmán et al. 2005; Restrepo 2001; López 2005) seriously calls into question 
the notion that education and abstract reasoning abilities lead to morally more 
advanced people. Secondly, the abstract conception of moral development 
implies a ghost-like account of moral agency that also rests on a problematic 
notion of choice that appears deeply arbitrary. Moral agency is understood as 
a set of abstract, formal reasoning competences divorced from social and 
historical presuppositions and commitments (see MacIntyre 1982). Thirdly, it 
does not address the political problem of the legitimacy of the state (or the law) 
and the question of rationally deciding which of the rival moral standpoints in 
Colombia to adopt or, instead, of how to find an “alchemy” or minimum 
consensus from a distillation of these multiple normative frameworks. The 
Kohlbergian idea of morality and moral development defended by Villegas also 
assumes that the problem of deducing valid norms for coexistence can be 
stated independently of any social structure (see MacIntyre 2002, p. 93). But 
the kind of moral education aimed specifically at the problem of political ethics 
and coexistence envisaged by Villegas and others necessarily implies some 
evaluative stance towards the social and political structure in which such 
education occurs. Further, as Michael Gross points out, so-called principled, 
post-conventional reasoners can be found in radically opposed political and 
                                                 
20 Lawrence Kohlberg developed a six stage theory of moral development in individuals in 
which the different stages give way to and are a pre-requisite of reaching the next stage. See 
Kohlberg 1983. Kohlberg’s model has been criticised most famously by Carol Gilligan (1982). 
 111
religious groups, which reveals the problem of finding an authoritative, 
impersonal and rationally supportable, shared moral basis for regulating 
coexistence (Gross 1997, p. 79).  
 
A new social contract 
Some analysts and philosophers have turned to the idea of the social contract 
as a theoretical framework for addressing the problem of conflict, resistance 
and coexistence in Colombia. Peace activist and theorist Luís Sandoval 
observes: 
 
The logical consequence of recognizing that Colombia still lives in or has 
regressed to a state of nature...is a further recognition: the inescapable 
necessity of a new social and political pact that will only be possible on the 
basis of the recreation or radical change of politics. Colombia needs a 
renewed application of modern contractualism that is the political form that 
processes of reconciliation take in fragmented societies. (Sandoval 2004, p. 
42) 
 
Sandoval implicitly points to Thomas Hobbes’ theory of the social contract, 
which is built on Hobbes’ questionable concept of human nature. Yet 
Sandoval’s own writings on the need for a new “ethical-political subject” to 
transform Colombian politics and society would appear to assume Rousseau’s 
much less negative and more subtle account of human nature (Sandoval 1998, 
p. 71ff.). Sandoval’s vision of how a new ethical-political subject can effect 
social transformation in Colombia is, in my view, correct in emphasizing its 
processual, incremental nature, but problematic in terms of its implicit account 
 112
of motivation and the issue of generating rational consensus on the basis of 
this social project. Sandoval’s theory of social change is important for 
emphasizing the centrality of the ethical dimension and especially its focus on 
the ethical subject, the unity of means and ends, and the fact that social and 
political institutions are comprised of individual human agents. As Sandoval 
puts it, “In terms of the development of the ethical-political subject, whose 
identity is constructed as it grows, the idea is that what is today a small 
nucleus of people will conquer spaces in the associations of civil society, then 
in the political arena and, eventually, will gain positions inside state institutions 
and could then come to direct them” (Sandoval 1998, p. 76). Sandoval warns 
that “in the state lies its maximum possibility but also its maximum risk” (ibid., 
p. 76) although he doesn’t specify what this risk is. As we have seen, for 
MacIntyre the danger of the state is that it has its own, compartmentalized and 
manipulative normative framework that is resistant to and subversive of 
alternative, more coherent normative frameworks. Sandoval rightly observes 
that discourse alone is not enough to turn competitors and individuals with rival 
interests into friends and colleagues with common goals- “the invitation to 
dream together is not enough to change things”- but then goes on to argue that 
what is required is a minimalist approach “capable of generating the widest 
possible movement for transformation and change in the history of Colombia” 
(Sandoval 1998, p. 77).  
The weakness of Sandoval’s approach ultimately lies in its liberal 
philosophical assumptions. Despite the insight that social actors have to be 
“coherent and consequent with what they propose” (ibid., p. 75) and need to 
align their practice with their ethical enunciations, the philosophical problem 
remains of how to rationally justify and agree on such proposals and ethical 
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pronouncements, and on what basis people are to enter into the agreement to 
work towards the very broadly defined goal of social change. The problem is 
that Sandoval ultimately adheres to a typically modern conception of morality 
and moral agency as insulated from any connection to shared social practices 
that alone can provide rational coherence to moral rules (on a MacIntyrean 
view). The broad vision of social change cannot itself generate an ethics to 
guide the transition- any vision articulated from the perspective of abstract 
liberal ethics must necessarily suffer from the normative fragmentation of 
modern morality; and the ethics proposed to orientate the transition must 
equally lack rational justification and coherence. In Sandoval’s view, “To 
sustain an ethical project is to create for oneself the demand to act ethically, 
which constitutes the best argument to convince others and attract new 
elements to the ranks of those who promote it” (ibid., p. 75). This implies the 
classic modern account of moral agency stemming from Kant and passing 
through Kierkegaard and Sartre (see MacIntyre 1982). The problem is the 
arbitrariness of the choice involved in giving to oneself the moral rules by 
which oneself is to be bound (MacIntyre 1958-59, p. 92). As MacIntyre points 
out, a fundamental characteristic of moral rules is that they are impersonal, 
gaining their authority over us through their objectivity and distance from our 
own choices. This understanding is shared by liberal moral philosophers like 
Kant and Mill. However, as MacIntyre demonstrates, in modern liberal moral 
philosophy, moral rules and moral agency then became divorced from any 
substantive, teleological conception of the good, of any account of essential 
human need, which was a significant step towards the notion of arbitrary, free-
floating moral rules. This, so MacIntyre argues, has led to the decay of moral 
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reasoning (MacIntyre 1983, p. 590) and eroded our comprehension of moral 
argument and morality.  
The problem for seeking ethical social change is, then, that the abstract 
general vision of “social justice”, “peace”, “human rights”, etc. that is part of 
Colombian civil society’s and the peace movement’s vision cannot engender 
socially shared ethical standards for evaluation of ends and means. We have 
the vision(s) but we lack the comprehension of morality to enable us to reach 
agreements on strategy, settle internal differences, and rationally convince 
others, which is not peripheral to the goal of social change but central to its 
being ethical, rational and sustainable. The progressive goals and visions of 
civil society are accompanied by a variety of contradictory moral standpoints in 
relation to personal choices and strategies for social change- for example, in 
relation to the use of violence as a means to social change there is widespread 
disagreement, as well as in relation to working with the state in its programmes 
of “reparation and reconciliation”, amongst other issues. Sandoval’s own 
invocation of a non-violent ethic is, moreover, in terms of the modern moral 
disorder, an arbitrary preference that despite possibly being justified on many 
grounds is nonetheless no more ethically justified than alternative strategies 
precisely because of the failure of rational moral argument and consensus.  
Further, and as a result of this, the broad vision of social change is 
inevitably comprised of an aggregate of individual visions and conceptions of 
its constituent terms- i.e. what justice means in the term “social justice”, what 
human rights mean and imply, what peace entails, etc. Sandoval’s list of 
desired attributes, virtues and concerns/goals that are required by the initial 
nucleus of people suffers from this fragmentation and arbitrariness (see 
Sandoval 1998, pp. 77-78), which is related to the problem of the lack of 
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shared criteria for interpreting these attributes, virtues and concerns/goals. 
Despite the essential insight that the ethical question and the problem of 
ultimately generating some shared ethical basis for social change has to be 
central, his theory of social change suffers from the incoherence of its moral 
philosophical assumptions. The minimalist civic ethics approach that Sandoval 
ultimately calls for is inadequate to the problem because of its assumptions 
about moral agency as essentially a question of finding acceptable limits to 
one’s pre-given interests. As Barragán et al. point out in an empirical study on 
coexistence, in the logic of what they call the “postmodern” society “the 
common good is interpreted as the limit that individuals and groups must 
confront in the pursuit of their legitimate interests” (Barragán et al. 2007, p. 
39). This expresses well the modern liberal conception- the common good is 
merely a limit to individual interests; it is something individuals “confront”, not 
something that might be constitutive of their own good.  
Sandoval also implicitly signals the problem for the state and the state-
building approach built on Hobbesian justification when he points out that 
“none of the armed actors of political violence has sufficient 
legitimacy…Legitimacy emerges from an unequivocal manifestation of the 
popular will” (Sandoval 1998, p. 29). Therefore, I argue, this also has to hold 
for the state, which is a principal actor in the political violence that afflicts 
Colombian society. However, the mere fact that a majority might happen to 
support the state does not, at least on a MacIntyrean view, entail its moral or 
political legitimacy. As rational moral argument has broken down, the 
justification of the current state-building project based on very high approval 
ratings is ultimately emotivistic, a manifestation of irrational manipulation and 
successful power, not rational, reasoned argument. Other Hobbesian 
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approaches attempt to address this problem but ultimately fail to provide a 
compelling, rational justification for viewing the state-building project in these 
terms.  
Political philosopher Fabio Giraldo (2008) suggests that Hobbesian 
theory is relevant to the contemporary Colombian crisis in which rival powers, 
sovereignties and authorities abound that attempt to impose their interests 
through force. For Giraldo, the merit of Hobbesian theory is its notion of an 
overarching power that all others agree to submit to and which can therefore 
render social and political life susceptible to predictability and order that can 
facilitate coexistence. However, the problem with the Hobbesian argument 
from a MacIntyrean standpoint is its incoherence. The Hobbesian contract is 
the foundation of social life in the sense that prior to the contract there are no 
shared rules or standards; the story of the contract offers an account of how 
individuals come to share social norms. The problem is that in order for the 
notion of a contract to be cogent it requires, and presupposes, a pre-existing 
set of standards and criteria by which the contract can be understood to be 
binding. Without such standards and criteria there can be nothing that can be 
correctly called a contract. As MacIntyre points out, “There could perhaps be 
expressions of intention; but in a Hobbesian state of nature there would be 
every reason to suspect that these were designed to mislead. The only 
available standards for interpreting the utterances of others would prevent any 
conception of agreement” (MacIntyre 2002, p. 132). The expressions of 
intention of advocates of the state and its agencies in the Colombian context 
are certainly understood by many as designed to mislead, to dupe people into 
thinking that it will honour its duties to citizens by defending and enforcing 
rights. Further, as Giraldo points out, the alleged voluntary assent to the “social 
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contract” ostensibly offered by the current Uribe administration is, within the 
reigning ideology, based on elections and public opinion. The manipulation of 
public opinion by the mass media, compartmentalization, social atomization, 
and the increasing bureaucratization of the state militate against the possibility 
of rationally formed views, opinions and moral standpoints (Habermas 1974; 
MacIntyre 2006c; Marcuse 1964). The significant surges of social protest in 
2008 by victims of state terror, indigenous movements, trade unions, teachers, 
landless peasants, and even the entire judiciary against the current 
government also clearly call into question its legitimacy and therefore the 
notion that Colombian society has entered into a valid social contract with the 
state that can command assent to its state-building project.  
Colombian law professor Iván Orozco (2005) has also turned to Hobbes 
as a framework for addressing the problem of the state and coexistence. 
However, Orozco’s argument highlights the problem of rationally justifying and 
adjudicating between different moral frameworks and conceptions of the basis 
for coexistence. He writes, 
 
To say, for example, that Colombia finds itself...in certain respects in the early 
stages of modernity in regards to the process of state construction, and that 
therefore the democratic security policy of the Uribe administration must be 
understood as a policy of affirming interior sovereignty, is only [seen as] 
acceptable if tolerance towards impunity is not a normative implication derived 
from it. Those from the periphery and the semi-periphery, but above all those 
within internecine internal wars who remind the morally more advanced 
inhabitants of the humanitarian postmodernity that in Europe and in the centre 
more generally, throughout various centuries, the Leviathan was built with fire 
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and brimstone without much of a glance towards the common people, and 
points out the difficulties that this entails for the construction (upon the 
footprints of colonialism) of a nation state in other latitudes, tends to be 
stigmatized as an accomplice of tyrants and war criminals that certainly 
abound in the banana, coffee and coca republics. (Orozco 2005, p. 289) 
 
Clearly, Orozco adopts a particular and highly questionable moral standpoint 
in relation to politics and the conditions for coexistence. A contrasting moral 
standpoint in respect of these issues is represented by the Colombian human 
rights movement “Nunca Más”. Orozco criticizes this organization for making 
too many demands in relation to standards of transitional justice, which he 
argues need to be more “flexible” and lenient, less about retributive justice and 
oriented more towards “reconciliation”. These demands are seen to be related 
to the “moral epistemology” of Nunca Más which, according to Orozco, “is 
burdened with the platonic idea that moral principles are atemporal “essences” 
that we “discover”…and not contingent historical constructions” (Orozco 2005, 
p. 285). This is deemed to be “an error that can have grave implications for a 
country like Colombia, which may make impossible in the short term, or at 
least too costly, the transition to peace and towards the re-liberalization of 
democracy” (ibid., p. 285). But we may legitimately ask then: What is the 
status of Orozco’s own moral appeal? Moreover, if morality is no more than a 
series of contingent historical constructions then we can of course simply 
construct a set of moral principles to justify any political project. The notion of 
morality as setting limits to political or any other human activity then becomes 
unintelligible. In which case, why continue to use the impersonal idiom of 
morality? Perhaps Orozco means that moral principles are agreed upon and 
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gain authority over us only insofar as they are “constructed” through 
intersubjective debate. However, this Rortyean conception of morality (Rorty 
1994) would appear to mean that as long as a set of moral principles for 
political policies are formulated on the basis of intersubjective agreement, then 
any political outcome is moral, which is counterintuitive to say the least and, of 
course, deeply troubling. Further, Orozco problematises the universality of 
human rights (and their validity for the Colombian situation) whilst accepting 
the normative validity of the European process of state-building, which was 
hugely violent, as Orozco himself acknowledges (although this need not mean 
having to commit the “errors” of this process). But on what moral basis does 
Orozco question the demands of human rights in relation to transitional justice 
and accept the idea of an absolutist state that disregards these? Orozco’s 
position simply reveals the arbitrariness of modern morality and moral 
philosophy and highlights the problem of finding a rationally supportable 
ethical basis for coexistence in Colombia. 
Philosopher Oscar Mejía (2008) also suggests the need for a new social 
contract but in a different, non-Hobbesian register. As Mejía observes, 
Colombia has 
 
a complex totality of collective subjects from that mortally wounded traditional 
society, with divergent cultural, social and political symbols, values and 
traditions, and a panorama of incompatible practical rationalities that do not 
find in formal law nor in our particular form of liberal democracy the instrument 
for conciliation and post-conventional integration that is necessary to re-
establish the disintegrated social links and to lay the foundations for a 
symmetrical participatory democracy in which every one has the same 
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opportunities, possibilities to intervene and, on the basis of such conditions, 
can propose a new, wider and more plural social contract. (Mejía 2008, pp. 85-
86) 
 
The “dilemma”, as Mejía puts it, is the issue of constructing consensus. In their 
study “Élites, Eticidades y Constitución en Colombia” (“Elites, Ethicities and 
Constitution in Colombia) Mejía et al. (2004) attempt to address this problem, 
arguing that the 1991 Constitution was ultimately a hegemonic project of 
Colombian elites with some opening for alternative, non-traditional sectors 
such as the M-19 guerrilla group. As they put it, “in 1991 Colombia’s elites 
once again (but this time through the imposition of the neoliberal development 
model) were able to institutionalize deception and disguise their historic 
hegemonic domination in the seductive trappings of a Social State of Law and 
a participatory democracy” (Mejía et al. 2004, p. 7). Thirteen years later, in 
2004, it was obvious, Mejía et al. observe, that the Constitution had failed to 
consolidate the conditions for the possibility of national reconciliation and for 
the respect of fundamental rights. They argue that a new constituent process 
is required to bridge the chasm between institutions and what they refer to as 
“ethicities” (“eticidades”), which appears to denote the ethical principles and 
positions of different sectors of Colombian society such as indigenous groups, 
women’s organizations, students, etc. This process would have to be based on 
“a logic of consensus rather than a logic of negotiation” (ibid., p. 7). The 
principal problem of Colombian political culture is described in the following 
way:  
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the difficulty of finding points of encounter between the diverse, substantive 
ethicities on the foundations of democracy and deliberation. Amongst these 
difficulties are the problems of reaching consensus in a fragmented society 
like Colombia, the crisis of legitimacy derived from the failure to enact the 
promises made in the 1991 Constitution, and the lack of a civic culture which, 
grounded on the respect for the other as an equal interlocutor, promotes the 
bases for social solidarity and democratic participation. (Ibid., p. 8) 
 
Mejía et al. highlight the legitimacy crisis of Colombian institutions as 
fundamental and signal the importance of recovering the concept of “ethicity” 
and its role in the construction of politics and its institutions. The solution they 
propose is for these institutions to find resonance and support “in the values of 
the community that give it shape” (ibid., p. 84). Yet an element of incoherence 
appears due to their particular construal of the term “ethicity” and its difference 
from the term community. For example, in their “map” of Colombia’s multiple 
“ethicities” Mejía et al. run through a list that includes ethnic peoples, trade 
unions, students, women’s movements, guerrillas, and paramilitaries. 
However, it is questionable to say that these different groups and movements 
constitute substantive “ethicities” or moral communities. Whereas some, such 
as indigenous communities, can correctly be deemed to be substantive moral 
communities or ethicities, others like students or the paramilitaries can hardly 
be said to constitute a moral community or even organizations with a 
substantive moral interest. They might of course make moral claims or dress 
their interests up in moral language, but this is very different to being a moral 
community or “ethicity” proper, which on a MacIntyrean view must be based on 
social practices, a shared conception of the good, and a rejection of the 
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“modern ethos” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. x). This has implications for Mejía et al.’s 
notion that political legitimacy can be restored by state institutions finding 
normative resonance and justification within the terms of particular 
communities, and vice versa. For these different interest groups are not such 
communities and, moreover, what resonance has been found between these 
interest groups and Colombia’s political institutions has been firmly based on 
the logic of aggregated individual interests under capitalist normativity (cf. 
Pearce 1998).21  
On MacIntyre’s view this is inevitable. Hence the conundrum of 
consensus that Mejía et al. pose cannot be solved with the philosophical 
resources they propose. Their proposal is very much along the lines of the 
Habermasian notion of open, participatory dialogue and deliberation in which 
some minimum consensus can be reached that is more than the mere 
aggregation of what these different sectors want. Yet, as I suggested above in 
the case of María Teresa Uribe’s proposal, the philosophical assumptions of 
such an approach cannot address the issue of radical disagreement or the fact 
of incommensurable standpoints. As Mejía et al. point out, Colombia’s ethical 
and political terrain is populated not merely by rival interests but rival forms of 
practical rationality. In this case, so I argue, the kind of philosophy needed to 
understand the problem and begin to envisage a way forward is not 
Habermasian but MacIntyrean. The fact of rival practical rationalities implies 
rival and perhaps incommensurable ways of life and social practice (see 
MacIntyre 1998c, p. 238), which makes the possibility of constructing a wider 
political consensus problematic.  
                                                 
21 Some of these groups have found a greater degree of resonance with the state than others, 
for example the paramilitaries- see Hylton 2006, p. 135. 
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As Mejía et al. put it, “The important challenge imposed by a system 
that recognizes diverse ethicities is how the different particularities converge 
into a universal political consensus, or how to ensure that such a universal 
political consensus does not destroy these social particularities” (Mejía et al. 
2004, p. 74). The confusion is evident in the elision of “ethicities” with social 
particularities. If the paramilitaries are an ethicity then it is surely the case that 
a universal political consensus has to exclude them inasmuch as their project 
and the values that underpin it are destructive of the common good. It is 
perhaps the underlying liberal, Habermasian assumptions that lead to this 
apparent confusion. The construction of what Mejía et al. call a “democratic 
ethicity” is seen to require the contribution and inclusion of everyone. However, 
not only is this to bestow questionable legitimacy on particular social actors 
responsible for gross human rights and other moral abuses, but it is far from 
clear how a rational consensus can emerge through the unconstrained 
participation of everybody (cf. MacIntyre 2006e, p. 215) amidst the ethical-
political cacophony and confusion of Colombian society that the authors 
diagnose.  
This implicit urging of tolerance is perhaps understandable in the 
Colombian context, but if it is not understood within the terms of an appropriate 
philosophical theory and practice it can only, I argue, lead to the continued 
manipulation and imposition of those with more power. For example, Francisco 
de Roux’s notion of constructing a region that is “open to all projects”22 (de 
Roux 2007) implicitly cedes too much to the liberal restriction on evaluating 
substantive conceptions of the good but at the same time inadvertently allows 
                                                 
22 Father Francisco de Roux is the director of the Peace Laboratory project in the Magdalena 
Medio region, which is historically one of the most violent and conflictual areas of the country. 
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the covert imposition of particular such conceptions over others in the guise of 
formal, “equal” participation and “dialogue” in the name of tolerance and 
democratic participation. 
Mejía et al. point to the need to establish “social integration” and 
“networks of communication” in which “affective links” can be built between 
people, which stems from their recognition of the communitarian critique of 
liberalism. But their advocacy of Albrecht Wellmer’s attempt to link 
communitarian and liberal theory takes the strong points of both and cancels 
them out by the incoherence their attempted amalgamation leads to. They 
want to “narrow the breach between ethos and institutions through the 
cultivation of a democratic ethicity” (Mejía et al. 2004, p. 84), which in their 
view constitutes the conjoining of communitarian and liberal theory. However, 
from a MacIntyrean standpoint this cannot be rationally achieved on any liberal 
assumptions (or on communitarian assumptions- MacIntyre has explicitly 
criticized and distanced himself from communitarianism on a number of 
grounds) because of the normative nature of modern state institutions and the 
clash between these and the conditions for rational moral-political enquiry that 
MacIntyre sees available only in local communities. The communitarian 
requirement that the norms of justice and the grounds of democratic society 
and political institutions have to be devised with reference to substantive 
conceptions of the good clashes with the liberal requirement that these 
conceptions of the good have to be ruled out of such foundational discussion 
and the realm of public political dialogue. Therefore, I argue that the 
construction of an ethical democratic culture (which is arguably different to a 
“democratic ethicity”) cannot proceed on the theoretical basis of a union 
between communitarian and liberal theory. What is required, as MacIntyre 
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argues, is the emergence of theory from practice, but a practice that sets itself 
against the incoherence and confusion of dominant political practice that is the 
counterpart to the incoherence of liberal moral theory (MacIntyre 1990a, 
1998b). The attempt to reconcile the communitarian motivation with liberalism 
is what implicitly underlies most of the above approaches, which arguably 
springs from an implicit recognition of the inadequacies of both taken in 
isolation. However, their conjunction simply compounds their separate 
weaknesses. Thus the fundamental problem of consensus that Mejía et al. 
highlight cannot be resolved with these philosophical-theoretical resources.  
 The conjunction of communitarianism and liberalism is also evident in 
Adela Cortina’s work (Cortina 2001, 2002). Cortina is one of the principal 
exponents of the “ethics of minimums” approach that attempts to address the 
need for a wider, “universal” political consensus in democratic societies in 
which rival substantive conceptions of the good abound; what Cortina refers to 
as “ethics of maximums” (Cortina 2002). In Colombia her work is referred to by 
Guillermo Hoyos (2008), John Manuel Peña (1996- who argues that Cortina’s 
ethics of minimums framework can serve as the foundation for morals and 
politics in Colombian society) and Ángela Uribe (2002), amongst others. 
Despite Cortina’s nuanced approach, which shows an appreciation of the 
communitarian critique of liberalism, it is susceptible to most if not all of the 
criticisms of the liberal philosophical assumptions of the above schemes. For 
Cortina, autonomy is seen to be the defining element of morality, which is 
understood as the ability to choose one’s own moral criteria and/or to be free 
of the particular desires of corporeality and social life (see Cortina 2001, p. 34; 
Peña 1996, p. 69). This autonomy is seen as being constructed socially but it 
still leaves a strangely ephemeral character to moral agency and the moral life. 
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Because on Cortina’s view the core of shared morality cannot be anything 
deriving from substantive human goals and desires, the discussion on social 
norms, the politics of such an ethics, is effectively empty. We can dialogue with 
others intersubjectively but only on the most minimal presuppositions. The 
conception of the public political realm is as ghost-like as the account of moral 
agency underlying it (see MacIntyre 1982). The real substance of political 
discussion and dialogue is missing.  
However, Cortina’s starting point is of course a liberal starting point. In 
other words, it is not and cannot be neutral. Cortina’s explicit defence of a 
moderated form of capitalism testifies to this. Capitalism assumes a particular 
view of human nature, the self and its relationship to moral norms that factors 
in to liberal justifications for it and for liberalism as the most appropriate form of 
politics and morality. In other words, the liberal theory that Cortina defends 
turns out to be another form of moral tradition with its own particular accounts 
of practical rationality and the good. As we have seen, this is one of 
MacIntyre’s many arguments against liberalism.  
A different argument against liberal theory is that its conception of a 
shared rationality and minimal moral consensus both masks the fact of deeper 
conflict- i.e. it has an ideological function- and lacks the resources and 
necessary purchase to adequately address the serious moral-political issues 
of complex modern societies (MacIntyre 1990a). Even if the alleged shared 
minimal intersubjective consensus in modern societies existed, as Cortina 
claims it does (Cortina 2001, p. 264), it would, according to MacIntyre, be 
incapable of giving proper consideration to weighty moral issues and of 
formulating determinate moral norms. This is brought out clearly in the moral 
debate on euthanasia. Cortina asserts that only on the basis of a shared ethics 
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of minimums that prioritizes justice/right over the good can the challenge of 
euthanasia and other such moral issues be rationally addressed (Cortina 2002, 
p. 48). Yet on a topic as profound as euthanasia it seems difficult to imagine 
reaching a consensus based on the kind of minimal ethical presuppositions 
that Cortina says are needed to regulate substantive moralities. Further, to ask 
those within such moral traditions to put aside their substantive conceptions of 
the good is to ask them to stop being moral agents: for such traditions 
euthanasia cannot simply be treated as a matter of justice (i.e. of the right as 
divorced from the good) because it is ultimately about the meaning of life and 
the good (MacIntyre 1990a). Those within such moral traditions understand 
rules about the prohibition of euthanasia as part of a more complex structure 
that gives point and purpose to those rules. This is what undermines Cortina’s 
attempt to have it both ways in terms of seeing substantive moralities as 
necessarily open to public debate and scrutiny whilst at the same time limiting 
these in the name of an unspecified set of precepts that make up the shared 
minimal public morality Cortina claims exists in modern Western liberal 
societies (Cortina 2002, pp. 50-51, 55). In reality the liberal priority of the right 
over the good that constitutes the ethics of minimums sets the terms of debate 
in favour of one particular way of conceiving moral argument and moral 
concern, i.e. in terms of divorcing them from deeper, more complex accounts 
of the good and therefore also in terms of equal “interests” that have to bargain 
with other interests. 
The further problem remains of discovering what the basic norms of the 
ethics of minimums are. On Cortina’s view these norms cannot be derived 
from conceptions of the good, although she asserts that in fact these norms 
will be supportable from within such conceptions. Yet as MacIntyre points out, 
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there is widespread dissensus amongst liberal theorists on the basic precepts 
of a liberal moral framework (MacIntyre 1990a). In part this dissensus is 
related to the appeal to different moral concepts such as utility, rights, and duty 
that have been torn from their original teleological social-moral contexts and 
put to use to solve the problems of morality that since the Enlightenment has 
been conceived as an ahistorical, purely formal domain. Moral theory as much 
as contemporary everyday moral argument oscillates between these concepts. 
Cortina’s own defence of an ethics of minimums eclectically appeals to a 
melange of moral concepts such as autonomy, community, communitarianism, 
post-conventional, common good, human rights, and applied ethics, and 
therefore oscillates between the different concepts and conceptions of morality 
and practical rationality that are characteristic of what MacIntyre diagnoses as 
the incoherent, fragmented and contradictory conception and practice of 
modern morality (see Cortina 2001).  
Further, both Cortina’s and Guillermo Hoyos’ ethics end up as a 
defence of business ethics and “corporate social responsibility”, which Hoyos 
elides with the discourse of human rights. In Hoyos’ view, “Today the 
discourse on human rights from the perspective of civil society tends to be 
articulated in terms of corporate social responsibility” (Hoyos 2008, p. 165). It 
would be more accurate to say that this is just one particular way of using and 
interpreting the discourse of human rights by some particular sectors of civil 
society. Hence what this also points to is the fragmented and confused moral 
discourse of civil society in which discourses on human rights, democracy, and 
social justice are highly contestable and framed in often radically different 
ways. Cortina’s advocacy of applied ethics as constituting the basis of a 
general citizen ethics does not address this problem, indeed is part of this 
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problem, and leaves the fundamental assumptions of the capitalist world order 
in place under a charter of different ethical conventions that apply to different 
spheres of life- ecological, biological, legal, and political (see Cortina 2002, pp. 
115-116).  
 
Social contact, not social contract? An “ethics of encounter.” 
Philosophers Raúl López (2005), Alfredo Gómez-Müller (2008) and Sergio de 
Zubiría (1998) take a different approach to the ethical problem of coexistence, 
critiquing the formal, rationalistic ethical theories associated with Habermas 
and the ethics of minimums and arguing for an ethics that is more rooted in 
Colombia’s local and regional cultures.  
In his book, La Respuesta Ética: Una Necesidad Impostergable (The 
Ethical Response: An Urgent Necessity), Raúl López takes a critical view of 
the modernization process in Colombia, and in contrast to María Teresa Uribe 
he challenges the idea of deepening this process as part of the solution. For 
López, 
 
modernity did not embed itself amongst us in a peaceful way but rather 
forcefully integrated the multiple cultural expressions and diversity of beliefs 
into instrumental utilitarian rationality, causing the dissolution of various forms 
of production, ways of life and sensibilities; imposing at one and the same time 
a market economy and certain cultural values whose supreme expression is 
money, progress and capital accumulation. Inoculated in this way, the 
destructive virus will thus make it impossible to prepare the ground for an 
ethical approach. (López 2005, p. 44) 
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López argues that whilst modernity brought certain gains and liberations it also 
provided aspirations and hopes that were either impossible to realize or were 
themselves dangerous- e.g. the emphasis on monetary wealth and “progress”. 
This, argues López, is what detonated particular forms of “cultural violence”. 
In places López’s approach is distinctly Aristotelian and it is partly from 
this perspective that he explicitly criticizes the Hobbesian theory of human 
nature and society that in his view underlies the capitalist worldview and its 
ethical justification. Discussing the emergence of credit in the 18th century, 
López observes how “the defenders of commercial society, in admitting the 
identification between financial credit and public confidence, will come to 
accept as a primary source of conduct the Hobbesian presuppositions of 
natural man” (ibid., p. 70). López narrates how in this scheme ethics and 
politics come to be sharply differentiated in the sense that politics does not 
concern itself with normatively evaluating the economic sphere; this takes on 
an ideological dimension when the dominant economic behaviour of profit-
seeking is assumed to be the first principle of political life. The philosophical 
divorce between ethics and politics marks the unconscious rationalization of a 
particular mode of socio-economic life. In contrast, the Aristotelian conception 
of politics assumes its integration with ethics, which is to say the economic 
sphere comes under the normative scrutiny of collective decision-making that 
shares a conception of the good life in terms of a life lived well, rather than one 
simply lived in pursuit of material gain. As López points out, the virtues of 
character associated with this kind of integrated ethical-political life no longer 
have application once that relation and framework are broken. Thus, “This 
displacement of virtue to the interiority of the individual marks an interesting 
rupture between the public and the private. Ethics is converted into a private 
 131
affair, interiorized, reduced to a form of honour in exchanges or in 
interpersonal relations, leaving the public realm unprotected” (ibid., p. 70).  
López’s proposal is what he calls an ethics of connection and 
encounter, “a craftsman’s labour that goes in search of new bonds, of all that 
builds bridges…we therefore need new…networks of connection, of common 
learning about new forms of life and civilization: here is the ethical and political 
task!” (ibid., p. 208). Like Sandoval, López stresses the importance of 
developing a new ethical-political subject (ibid., p. 212 ff.) but his diagnosis of 
the problem and his Aristotelian conception of the integral link between ethics 
and practice, and between ethics and politics, bring him closer to a 
MacIntyrean approach. López critically charts a path between the abstract, 
arbitrary autonomy of liberalism and the equally abstract collective identities of 
cultural nationalisms, religious fundamentalisms, political ideologies, 
hegemonic parties, and totalitarianisms. For López, the defining characteristics 
of an ethics of encounter are autonomy and responsibility; the individual is not 
subsumed into his or her culture and community, but their autonomy is only 
realized through such communal, concrete social forms. The ethical-political 
self discovers its ethical horizons and precepts through engagement with 
others in particular forms of life. As López puts it, “On assuming this condition 
of an ethico-political subject the individual opens herself onto the historical 
moment’s horizon that demands that she constitute herself as a concrete 
subject” (ibid., p. 213). In López’s view, this concrete ethical-political subject 
stands in stark contrast to the denuded, merely economic subject of 
neoliberalism and is less vulnerable to control and domestication by the 
dominant forms of power in society (ibid., p. 216), which has strong 
resonances with MacIntyre’s perspective. 
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López argues that what is needed is the “political will” to achieve the 
“fundamental structural transformations” required in Colombia. Then “we would 
achieve the considerable advance towards the actualization of an ethics that 
respects human rights” (ibid., p. 235). But if ethical consciousness in Colombia 
has been structured by the anti-ethics of capitalism and its Hobbesian 
presuppositions (especially, as López points out, amongst the political elites) 
whence is the political will for such radical change to emerge? López then 
lapses into the dominant idiom of the individualism he has so cogently 
criticized, contradicting his earlier subtle charting of the required ethical path 
between autonomy and concrete social practice: “From what I have said above 
we can deduce an immediate task: to recover the ethical dignity of every 
human being that consists in each one of us, from our inner depths, governing 
our own existence and deciding what our individual good is that we are 
prepared to follow” (ibid., p. 235). As an aside I suggest this apparent 
inconsistency and contradiction is related to MacIntyre’s overall diagnosis: the 
fragmentation of morality and moral philosophy and the liberal view that 
morality names a unified, if complex, domain means that modern moral 
philosophers see no theoretical problem in appealing to a range of moral 
concepts and arguments drawn from an array of thinkers and frameworks in 
order to conduct analyses and construct theories. López’s argument appeals 
to a wide range of moral philosophers and others who write on ethics (but who 
are not moral philosophers as such) as well as to a subsequent range of 
ethical concepts and arguments that are ultimately incompatible; concepts and 
arguments that are embedded within rival traditions of enquiry with their own 
accounts of practical rationality, truth, and the good. As MacIntyre has argued, 
modern moral philosophy conceives morality as a single subject matter in 
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which all moral philosophers from the classical tradition to modern analytic 
philosophy are engaged in contributing to understanding (MacIntyre 1991, p. 
28). Morality on this conception is essentially a timeless, ahistorical domain of 
human reasoning and enquiry. Hence López can appeal to Foucault’s 
conception of ethics as “care of the self”, to Adela Cortina, Hannah Arendt, 
Richard Rorty and Aristotle in order to develop an argument about the need for 
an “ethical response” to the Colombian situation. It is not of course only López 
who makes eclectic use of the resources of rival moral philosophies. Indeed, 
such eclecticism is to be generally expected if the state of modern moral 
philosophy is what MacIntyre says it is. Hence, there is an important question 
mark over the coherence and rational supportability of the constructive 
theories and arguments philosophers make given the condition of modern 
moral philosophy and normative enquiry.  
 Like López, in his book La Reconstrucc ón de Colombia (The 
Reconstruction of Colombia) Alfredo Gómez-Müller (2008) argues that the 
imposition of modernity in Colombia accounts for the ethical confusion and 
fragmentation that underlies the contemporary conflict and social crisis. In 
MacIntyrean vein, Gómez-Müller shows that the political and moral culture of 
liberal individualism informed the discourses of both liberals and conservatives 
as well as the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. In this, Colombia is at 
one with other modern nations who suffer the “same crisis of being able to 
affirm in common” (Gómez-Müller 2008, p. 66). However, in Colombia the fact 
that, as María Teresa Uribe has also pointed out, citizenship as a genuinely 
universal political link has never really existed meant that alternative forms of 
social bonds, which either did not exist in Europe or disappeared, have been 
conserved based on “a diversity of cultural, ethical and religious traditions” 
i
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(ibid., p. 66). Unlike María Teresa Uribe, however, Gómez-Müller does not 
view such traditional forms of social and cultural life negatively but as 
constituting the basis for a recreation of social-political coexistence. “This form 
of coexistence, which could be designated ethical-concrete coexistence to 
distinguish it from liberal coexistence, signals something essential that could 
form the nucleus of a public ethical response to the problem of universal 
citizenship” (ibid., pp. 66-67). Gómez-Müller is scathing in his criticism of the 
atomistic liberal individualist model of coexistence that he argues has 
dominated Colombian political thought and culture for over two hundred years: 
“The rule of this culture that restricts the affirmation of values to the private 
sphere has left a worrying vacuum in the public realm, which is regularly 
exploited by religious and political fundamentalisms of an ultra nationalist and 
racist kind” (ibid., pp. 65-66). In complete contrast to María Teresa Uribe’s 
analysis, Gómez-Müller sees precisely the modern, liberal model of 
coexistence as a fundamental part of the Colombian ethical-political crisis. For 
Uribe, the inability to “affirm in common” is related to the lack of the 
generalized and internalized notion of the individual citizen; for Gómez-Müller, 
this inability resides in the fact that the liberal individualist anthropology and 
conception of morality has always underlain and informed Colombian politics. 
In this Gómez-Müller is close to MacIntyre’s arguments about the nature of 
modern politics and ethics.  
 Finally, Sergio de Zubiría (1998) argues, 
 
We Colombians will not be able to confront the great challenges of the new 
century if we do not construct a creative link between law, culture and ethicity. 
Many of the causes of our collective tragedy can be found in these areas and 
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in their interrelations. Purely legal frameworks are inadequate. Only a strong 
although differentiated connection between these dimensions will create the 
necessary conditions for that longed for peace. (De Zubiría 1998) 
 
Like López and Gómez-Müller, De Zubiría suggests that a renewed ethics has 
to depart from concrete cultures and communities in which “moral sentiments” 
are produced. This goes beyond the tendency to rely on purely legal 
mechanisms as the basis for a rational, ethically grounded coexistence and 
hints at the importance of moral motivation and character lacking in other 
approaches. The link between law, culture and morality is understood 
differently to how Mockus and Corzo understand it and suggests some affinity 
to a MacIntyrean approach.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has critiqued literature that addresses the ethical problem in 
Colombia and which proposes theoretical approaches for resolving the 
problem of coexistence and the search for an ethical politics. I have shown that 
the assumptions of most of these approaches are broadly within the paradigm 
of liberal theory, critiquing them in light of MacIntyre’s standpoint. This critique 
has centred on five main issues:  
 the failure to address radical disagreement 
 the lack of attention to motivation and the social mediation of morality 
 the problem of arbitrariness  
 inadequate accounts of moral agency 
 general philosophical incoherence 
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Nevertheless, some philosophers are critical of liberal theory and suggest 
affinities with some of MacIntyre’s criticisms and constructive ideas. However, 
an underlying assumption that I have not brought out sufficiently is the fact that 
all of the above approaches at least implicitly assume the horizon of modern 
systematic, state-centred politics, which MacIntyre fundamentally calls into 
question.  
What I have argued is that the problems in moral philosophy and actual 
morality that MacIntyre diagnoses affect both those who on ethical-theoretical 
grounds defend or generally assume the given system as well as those who 
criticize it and attempt to change it. I have also claimed that MacIntyre provides 
more adequate philosophical resources for conceiving the task of coexistence 
and constructing an ethical politics. These resources are also important for the 
social scientific task of analysing the conflict and producing knowledge that 
can provide the basis for effecting positive transformation of the conflict. As we 
saw in chapter one, MacIntyre’s diagnosis also profoundly calls into question 
dominant conceptions of the social sciences, which raises important questions 
for those of us who seek to analyse conflict whilst also aiming to transform it. In 
the case of the Colombian conflict, the social sciences are deeply enmeshed in 
its contestatory dynamics. The next chapter explores this issue and the 
potentially radical implications for social scientific study of the conflict.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Social science and the Colombian conflict: a 
MacIntyrean perspective 
 
This chapter explores what it means to investigate the moral dimensions of the 
Colombian crisis and the implications of and for the social scientific study of 
the conflict in light of MacIntyre’s radical critique. It is necessary to explore the 
philosophical issues raised by a MacIntyrean perspective on morality, which 
include the question of the relationship of morality to the social sciences, the 
implications this has for studying the moral dimensions of the conflict, and the 
role of social science in analysing, perpetuating, and transforming conflict.  
I also argue that MacIntyre’s philosophical project suggests an 
important research programme for those of us interested both in understanding 
contemporary intra-societal conflicts and seeking to transform them through 
some agenda of social change. In a MacIntyrean perspective these two 
agendas are conceptually, theoretically and practically linked. In the case of 
the Colombian civil war, analyses of the conflict and prescriptions for its 
amelioration and ultimate resolution are inevitably linked to the first-order 
social and moral-political conflicts within Colombian society that comprise the 
overarching conflict and “Colombian crisis”. I suggest MacIntyre’s account of 
the inherent connections between social science and moral theory illuminates 
this problem. (MacIntyre 1985a, pp. 77, 82, 84, 116; 1998a; Knight 2007, p. 
4ff.) 
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If social scientific and political study of the conflict is inevitably bound up 
with normative conceptual schemes, with implicit theories of practical 
rationality and conceptions of the good, then such study therefore necessarily 
takes part in the overall conflict and is not neutral. As we saw in chapter one, 
on MacIntyre’s view moral conflict is interminable under the conditions of 
modern social structure and modern moral philosophy, and this necessarily 
affects politics and the social sciences. Because the social sciences have an 
inescapable normative dimension, which is often implicit and contrary to their 
aspiration to value neutrality and the separation of facts from values, they must 
necessarily be affected by MacIntyre’s diagnosis of the state of modern 
morality and moral theory. The question is how the social sciences can avoid 
becoming “yet another site of conflict” (González et al. 2002, p. 19) and 
contribute at the same time to social transformation in Colombia. These 
problems arise most particularly for those researchers and theorists who seek 
to understand and make proposals towards the social, moral, political and 
economic dimensions of conflict transformation and peace. It is the connection 
between producing social scientific knowledge and making prescriptions or 
recommendations for public policy that brings to the fore the problematic 
normative dimension.  
__________________________________________ 
Social science, conflict analysis and morality 
The inherent normative/moral dimension to social scientific study of the conflict 
is noted by Mauricio García Durán, head of Colombia’s most prestigious 
conflict research institute (CINEP). For García, the collaborative efforts of 
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social scientists, analysts and many other academics from different intellectual 
schools are not only aimed “at comprehending the diverse and conflictual 
reality of our country, but above all at finding an adequate response and the 
strategies of transformation necessary to achieving a just, sustainable and 
peaceful coexistence amongst us” (García Durán 2008, p. 359). This therefore 
implies that the social sciences need to connect up with moral philosophy. Yet, 
as I discuss further on, the social sciences are already inevitably theoretically 
bound up with moral philosophy, with moral/normative conceptual frameworks 
that imply theories of practical rationality, explanations of human action, and 
conceptions of the good.  
García notes that more dialogue is required between those who provide 
analyses of violence and those working to build peace, which points to the 
problem of linking implicitly normative analysis/theory with the explicitly 
normative goal of constructing peace. García also highlights the problem of the 
normative dimensions of social scientific study and analysis of the conflict: “A 
third challenge for the social sciences in Colombia is to provide a critical 
account of the principles and normative foundations that underlie the 
categories and concepts used in analyzing conflict situations and efforts at 
building peace. The crisis of paradigms overshadowed the relation between 
our analytic categories and the conditions of social change” (ibid., p. 361).  It is 
necessary to return to that debate, García adds, because “in studies of the 
conflict the normative horizon that informs some of our analyses is not always 
clear” (ibid., p. 361). This speaks directly to the philosophical questions that 
MacIntyre poses in relation to morality and social science.  
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Social science methodology, so MacIntyre contends, presupposes a 
particular conceptualization of the social world and its conflicts that is 
ideological in its effect:  
 
When we have reached the level at which we are engaged in handling social 
life as a collection of discrete empirical variables, then all the work of 
interpretation and conceptualization is already behind us. We are already 
dealing with a fully interpreted world. One conceptualization rather than 
another is already presupposed. In the world thus understood, the beliefs held 
by individuals or by groups…may well function as just one more variable factor. 
But the beliefs, the interpretations, which constitute the ordering of the world to 
be investigated, which make the available range of variables what it is, these 
underlying constitutive beliefs, concepts and interpretations will have 
disappeared from view. With them all too often there will also have 
disappeared from view argument, conflict, contestability and unpredictability 
as fundamental phenomena. (MacIntyre 1998a, p. 60) 
 
What conventional social science methodology does, therefore, is covertly 
take sides in the conflict of rival conceptualizations within what I call the first-
order conflicts in a society. That is, it often implicitly takes a normative stance 
in relation to the dominant social-political structures of society, structures 
which are in the case of the Colombian conflict strongly contested and 
resisted. I suggest a similar phenomenon occurs in the analyses of the 
Colombian conflict by economists like Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Michael 
Spagat and Jorge Restrepo (see Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Restrepo and 
Spagat 2004). They all analyse conflict within the terms of general social 
science methodology, seeking causal generalizations through statistical 
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analysis of independent variables that lead to particular policy prescriptions 
and guides to both public and private decision-making. This is not a merely 
abstract issue. For example, one team of UK-based conflict analysts 
recommended continued support for president Uribe’s “democratic security” 
project based on data about civilian casualties and general conflict dynamics 
drawn in significant part from CINEP’s database (Restrepo and Spagat 2004; 
Restrepo, Spagat and Vargas 2004); yet based on this same data one 
prominent CINEP researcher drew a diametrically opposed conclusion and 
subsequent prescription for how to achieve peace (Giraldo 2003).  
As Jenny Pearce points out in a critique, according to the neoclassical 
economic framework used by the aforementioned analysts, “Civil wars can be 
best explained in terms of the economic motivations of individual actors…rather 
than the discourses of grievance which armed actors often use to justify their 
behaviour. This construction of armed rebellion suits containment or military 
solutions” (Pearce 2005, p. 153). Of course, this framework supposes that we 
can recognize the “economic” motivations of particular agents. However, this 
economic construction is rooted in a particular intellectual and social tradition 
that implies a particular, contestable way of viewing the social world, one 
based on covert normative assumptions (cf. MacIntyre 1973a, pp. 7-9).  
As I have previously pointed out, Fernán González et al. (2002) have 
noted how the analysis of the Colombian conflict risks becoming “yet another 
site of conflict.” This has clearly been the case with arguments about the 
causes of conflict in Colombia and with the rival claims and policy 
recommendations in respect of human rights made by certain human rights 
organizations and the state. I argue that this ‘conflict about the conflict’ goes 
beyond arguments about the mere instrumental and ideological use of human 
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rights and the effect of ideological frameworks on interpretation of data 
(although this is no doubt relevant- see Restrepo 2001) and is, more 
complexly, related to the use of different conceptual frameworks for the 
analysis of conflict that are inextricably bound up with normative frameworks. 
Debate about the causes of the conflict and the structural factors behind the 
violence is inevitably bound up with normative issues and stances, which leads 
to a further, second site of conflict about the first-order conflicts within 
Colombia. As Fernán González et al. observe: 
 
This often occurs with the discussion about objective and subjective factors of 
violence and the relation between violence, poverty and inequality. Analyses 
that emphasize structural problems like social and economic inequality, the 
weakness and lack of presence of state institutions, and social and political 
exclusion as origins of violence tend to be discredited by some analysts as an 
attempt to justify the option for violence in terms of a “just war”, in which the 
birth and consolidation of the insurgent movement is seen as a response to 
the “structural violence” of a profoundly unjust and exclusionary society. On 
the other side, analyses centred on subjective aspects relating to rational 
choice and the voluntary actions of organized agents, who systematically 
develop a long term strategy inspired and supported by foreign or national 
agents- “professional revolutionaries”- have been seen by some as an attempt 
to criminalize the insurgents by portraying them as totally lacking political 
objectives and ideological motivations. This focus on rational choice tends to 
place emphasis on their undeniable criminal practices, such as kidnapping, 
extortion and drug trafficking, and connects violence with the inefficiency and 
leniency of justice, insisting that the growth and expansion of the guerrillas is 
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stimulated by generalized impunity, which leads such people to advocate a 
hard-line position and repressive measures. (González et al. 2002, p. 19) 
 
This ultimately relates to the sociological explanation of particular social 
actions, which cannot be separated from theoretical or moral concerns. 
MacIntyre argues that “a moral philosophy…characteristically presupposes a 
sociology” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 23). Thus, conversely, the way we understand 
and explain social action is inevitably bound up with moral philosophy, with 
implicit accounts of practical rationality, what it is that drives people to act in 
particular ways. As Kelvin Knight points out, if a moral philosophy presupposes 
a sociology “then such a sociology must include a philosophical psychology 
capable of explaining action. Practical reasoning, in its syllogistic form, 
concerns concrete wants and consequent actions, and concrete wants 
contrast with abstract ‘oughts’” (Knight 2007, p. 131). This also links up with 
how those who wish to effect social transformation conceive the actions, and 
therefore the agency, of others.  
The above is also symptomatic of how the intellectual and ideological 
debate in Colombia about the conflict long ago descended to the shrill level of 
assertion and counter-assertion that MacIntyre has diagnosed as a core 
characteristic of modern moral and political debate. The tragedy of this in the 
Colombian case is that the debate over the causes of the conflict has serious 
social implications. As Alexandra Guáqueta points out, “There is much at stake 
in the debate since it raises political questions such as whether policies of 
fundamental redistribution – for example, of land – should be implemented to 
address the source of conflict, and how to treat guerrillas if it is true that they 
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had ‘legitimate’ reasons for fighting” (Guáqueta 2006, p. 295). But who decides 
the legitimacy of the guerrillas’ actions, and how is this decided?  
Iván Orozco (2005) pinpoints the philosophical problem highlighted by 
MacIntyre in terms of reaching rational consensus that can guide decision-
making in respect of policies in relation to coexistence, justice and peace, in 
this case within the arena of civil society:  
 
The fact that the new peace and human rights networks are complex networks 
that not only include members of NGOs but also public functionaries at the 
state and supra-state levels, etc. and who are therefore restricted to their 
respective ‘roles’ determines that they debate amongst multiple moral and 
amoral logics regarding the definitions of the situations and dilemmas they 
must address. (Orozco 2005, p. 336) 
 
These rival and often contradictory moral logics partly inform the conceptual 
frameworks that are used to analyse social and political conflicts. This is 
evident in the way Orozco himself and others have turned to Hobbesian 
political theory both to analyse the Colombian conflict and as a normative 
framework for aiding decision-making in respect of the many complex 
decisions that both the government and private entities have to make in 
Colombia in relation to justice, coexistence and the future of political 
community in the country (see Orozco 2005; Giraldo 2008). Of course, this 
neo-Hobbesian normative theory conceives political community in terms of a 
particular notion of social contract (different in important respects from 
Rousseau’s notion) and also thereby presupposes one particular way of 
analysing social and political conflicts centring on an atomistic social ontology 
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and an inherently conflictual social order of rival interests (see Young 1990, p. 
28). In terms of decision-making, such an analytic and normative framework 
can lead to the conclusion that “there are legitimate political acts that, 
however, can seem abominable from the perspective of social morality” (López 
2007, p. 114). This is therefore clearly a conclusion with strong moral 
implications, which in the modern condition of moral disorder as diagnosed by 
MacIntyre amounts merely to an arbitrary choice. The theoretical and 
philosophical assumptions of such an approach include the separation of 
ethics and politics, which on a MacIntyrean view makes the use of the word 
“legitimate” in the above statement difficult to render intelligible (cf. MacIntyre 
1983, pp. 124-125). 
In the case of Colombia, multiple think tanks and NGOs compete with 
social movements and other civil society groups to get their interpretation of 
the conflict accepted and to influence public policies in relation to its resolution. 
Social movements seek consultants who support their goals and try to 
convince the government and the public of the justification of their analyses 
and demands. Many social movements and grassroots organizations contest 
the legitimacy of public decision-making processes both in terms of their 
exclusionary nature and their normative and ideological presuppositions. This 
contestation more often than not takes the form of social protest, which from a 
MacIntyrean standpoint cannot be rationally effective as it often involves the 
clash of incommensurable positions (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 71).  
 As Winifred Tate (2007) points out, the so-called “international helping 
operations” which include humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, nation building, 
conflict resolution and political advocacy “involve the production of knowledge 
and the categorization of violence, making suffering socially legible in 
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particular ways in order to generate specific kinds of social obligations” (Tate 
2007, p. 65). One of the principal issues from a MacIntyrean standpoint in 
relation to the Colombian crisis is therefore the connection between the first-
order social and political conflicts within the overarching armed conflict and the 
second-order conflict about how to characterize and resolve both particular 
first-order conflicts and the wider conflict.  
Through a MacIntyrean lens the moral dimension of this wider conflict, 
the “moral crisis”, relates to the philosophical problem of how to reach rational 
consensus on fundamental moral and political issues, and how to reconstruct a 
fragmented, divided society in a non-arbitrary, rationally justifiable way. At one 
level this is a problem of language, of discovering a shared set of terms and 
criteria for characterizing the problem and engendering rational discussion and 
enquiry; at another interconnected level it is a problem of rival modes of social 
practice. The discursive, linguistic-communicative dimension of the conflict is 
central to the moral crisis in Colombia and, as we shall see, is intimately 
connected to the problem of practice. As one Colombian civil society activist 
has commented, “War and authoritarianism have completely divided us; they 
have plunged us into deafness. That is one of the most serious political 
problems that we have. In my opinion, it has been about 20 years during which 
we have not listened to each other’s political views, in which it has been very 
difficult to listen to other points of view” (cited in García Durán 2006, p. 265).  
As MacIntyre notes, “it has been precisely at the level of language that the 
moral inadequacies and corruptions of our age have been evident, and 
certainly no less so by those with ideological stances than by others” 
(MacIntyre 1971d, p. 94).  
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I argue that the Colombian context demonstrates MacIntyre’s thesis 
about the connection between the degeneration of moral argument/language 
and the degradation of politics. However, as I argued in chapter two, the calls 
for a new moral-juridical language and the emphasis on the need to engender 
some common idiom with which to channel social and political conflicts in 
Colombia are themselves rooted in assumptions that can only ensure 
continued failure to reach rational agreements, bridge differences, and 
rationally justify policy proposals. The search for some form of common 
language for interpreting, analysing and prescribing in relation to the conflict is 
a central task, but one that necessarily has radical implications. As Peter 
McMylor notes, MacIntyre holds that individuals need “to share a language 
which is acquired before our capacity to criticize. To share a language is to 
share criteria for making distinctions and making judgements” (McMylor 1994, 
p. 170). In Colombia, as elsewhere, the modern analyses and prescriptions of 
policymakers and their consultants in the social sciences have broken free of 
any shared normative and discursive framework and are justified through the 
various modern modes of moral discourse and argument.  
 
Normative implications for study of the conflict 
Given the rival, often incommensurable justifications, characterizations and 
discourses in the conflict, and the lack of a shared language and domain of 
meaning that includes social actors and theorists, the question is how those of 
us concerned to achieve peace and, therefore, a significant degree of social 
transformation, can justify theoretical stances and interpretations in relation to 
these and the subsequent policy recommendations that often follow from them. 
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As Vivenne Jabri puts it, from a Foucauldian, genealogical perspective: “When 
we recognise that [conflict] analysis is itself implicated in the construction of 
the world, we begin to recognise that analysis is part and parcel of the 
signifying practices that come to constitute the discursive frames that confer 
content to a seemingly contentless classifying process” (Jabri 2006, p. 6). For 
Jabri, the analysis of social and political conflicts, and interventions in them 
that seek to guide decision-making processes, necessarily have to be  
understood “in political and ethical terms and not simply in terms that seek to 
divorce the procedural from the substantive” (Jabri 2006, p. 10). However, 
Jabri appears to contradict this when she argues for a Habermasian, discourse 
ethics approach for analysing conflict discourses that are often locked in 
radical disagreement. The appeal to discourse ethics aims to enable conflict 
analysts and conflict actors to abstract from the substantive issues involved in 
order to find a critical point of encounter where the hold of substantive 
discourses can be weakened, enabling them to be put into question. For Jabri, 
Habermas’s discourse ethical theory provides a mechanism and standpoint 
from which to analyse and critique dominant conflict discourses based on 
radical disagreements. Yet, as Oliver Ramsbotham (2010) points out, Jabri is 
not really interested in addressing the phenomenon of radical disagreement- 
whether a particular war is just or not, for example. Jabri sees different 
discourses in relation to such disagreements about just or unjust wars as tied 
to particular interests, as conditioned by unarticulated structures that 
determine participants’ discourses. On Jabri’s view, taking these discourses at 
face value is to concede the ground to dogmatic postures that need to be 
subverted rather than engaged with as such. However, this itself smuggles in a 
particular normative/epistemological position- one that devalues agents’ truth 
 149
claims. In this, as I shall elaborate further on, Jabri is at one with those social 
scientists who relegate the importance of agents’ moral claims and discourses, 
dismissing them as mere rationalizations of interests and strategic positions 
(Sayer 2003). As Oliver Ramsbotham observes, “The appeal is entirely away 
from first-order analysis seen to be confined to agents’ articulations of their 
own conduct, and in the direction of second-order analyses conducted by third-
party social scientists” (Ramsbotham 2010, p. 89). As Jabri explains, the aim is 
to “study aspects of the constitution of social life which cannot be grasped 
through concepts and tacit forms of knowledge to which agents have access in 
their day-to-day lives…Second-order analyses, therefore, involve a language or 
a discourse that is situated within the domain of the social sciences” (cited in 
ibid., p. 89).23 However, as social theorist David Harvey observes, “Social 
science formulates concepts, categories, relationships and methods which are 
not independent of the existing social relationships” (Harvey 1973, p. 125; cf. 
Meszáros 1972), which highlights the problem of extricating conflict analysis 
from participation in the conflicts it seeks to analyse.  
 Jabri explicitly recognizes that her Habermasian approach is normative, 
that is, ethical and political, yet appears to lack rational grounds for 
establishing this approach as more valid than others. Further, as we have 
seen, the Habermasian approach is not and cannot be neutral and also 
surreptitiously stipulates the ground rules and the political framework within 
which social conflict and rival discourses are to be analysed and ultimately 
evaluated. Notwithstanding Jabri’s claim that “Discourse ethics as process is a 
locale of emancipation from the constraints of tradition, prejudice and myth” 
                                                 
23 This assumes that social scientists can gain access to aspects of social life that ordinary 
agents cannot. Cf. MacIntyre 1973b.  
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(Jabri 1996. p. 166), the discourse ethics procedure itself imposes an 
unacknowledged set of constraints and ultimately side steps the hard 
philosophical task of engaging rival, incommensurable discourses and 
traditions. The discourse ethics approach as much as any other implies a set 
of philosophical assumptions in relation to truth, reality, and justice. Therefore, 
Jabri’s insight that any mode of conflict analysis implies some ethical and 
political framework still leaves us with the problem of justifying particular 
modes of analysis and theoretical stances.  
The categories we use in analyses of the conflict, those like “state”, 
“citizenship”, “clientelism”, etc. all imply some normative dimension. They are 
examples of what MacIntyre calls “essentially contestable concepts” 
(MacIntyre 1973a). For some the category of “state” means the modern 
European state and embodies the notion of a radical separation between the 
public and the private, between law and morality, between reason and 
“interests”, “passions” and virtues (Escalante 2008, p. 298). “Citizenship” can 
refer to the “ideal citizen” who enacts an “immediate and unconditional 
obedience to the law” (Escalante 2008, p. 290; cf. Mockus and Corzo 2003); it 
can also refer to autonomy and the claiming of individual rights (Pécaut 2008) 
as well as the conceptualization of a political subject that is “capable of 
incarnating a universally valid rationality from which the public interest 
emerges” (González 2008, p. 50). Thus when we analyse the conflict through 
or in terms of such categories we cannot but presuppose some normative 
understanding of what should be the case; that is, we cannot avoid 
participating in moral conflict. Some analyses imply such moral interventions 
more strongly than others. As political scientist Gustavo Duncan points out, 
there is a general consensus amongst Colombia analysts that in Colombia the 
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“creation of the modern liberal state is today the only viable option” (Duncan 
2008, p. 346).  
Further, as noted above, such categories also imply a theoretical 
account of how we are to explain social action. For example, the concept of 
citizenship appealed to implies an account of individual agency/human action 
in terms of a particular conception of practical rationality. As MacIntyre points 
out, a Humean conception holds that reason can be nothing but the slave of 
the passions, whereas for Aristotle and Aquinas reason can direct the 
passions. The question is how to decide which account is correct. As 
MacIntyre observes, we could consider a range of examples of human action 
in which reasoning and passion are present and in the light of these attempt to 
reach a judgement. However, “The problem is: how to describe the relevant 
examples. When individuals articulate to and for themselves the processes 
through which they proceed to action or when observers describe those 
processes in others, they cannot do so except by employing some particular 
theory-informed or theory-presupposing scheme of concepts, by 
conceptualizing that which they do or undergo or observe in a way which 
accords with one theory rather than another” (MacIntyre 1988, pp. 332-333).  
Sociologist Daniel Pécaut discusses various modes of analysing the 
conflict, including those that begin from an analysis of the strategies of the 
armed actors and those that study the relations between them and the civilian 
population. He makes some important observations about the inherent 
theoretical pitfalls of such analyses, yet the title of his article, “Citizenship and 
institutions in conflict situations”, itself implies a strong normative-theoretical 
dimension of the kind discussed above. Moreover, Pécaut’s caveats about 
analysing the relation between the civilian population and the armed actors 
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rely on particular assumptions about the alleged “lack of ideology” of the 
guerrillas, leading him to conclude that populations’ adhesion to the guerrillas 
(despite having just before acknowledged, for example, that many populations 
have welcomed guerrilla presence) cannot be based on “solid convictions” nor 
that such convictions “can have a deep impact on the evolution of the conflict” 
(Pécaut 2008, p. 318; cf. Cramer 2002, p. 1850).  
Here we enter the complex terrain of the relationship between 
sociological explanation of social action and moral theory. The theory of 
ideology is implicitly and explicitly referred to by sociologists who attempt to 
explain the causes and real reasons of agents’ actions in the conflict. In the 
Colombian case the view that the guerrillas have “lost their ideology” implies 
that what they believe to be guiding their action is in fact something else, 
hence their actual lack of ideology is unbeknown to them and their claim to be 
driven by ideological motivation is itself an effect of ideological distortion. 
Social scientists and sociologists who claim to discern the real reasons for 
their actions in terms of individual economic motives and strategic or other 
interests are also implicitly claiming that they themselves are free of 
ideological distortion. Nevertheless, the caveat that we need to get beyond 
mere appearances and actors’ own characterizations of their actions and the 
reasons for their actions is important if we are to attempt to achieve genuine 
understanding. However, as MacIntyre points out, the generality of the theory 
of ideology “derived precisely from its attempted embodiment…in a set of law-
like generalizations which link the material conditions and class structures of 
societies as kinds of cause to ideologically informed beliefs as kinds of effect” 
(MacIntyre 1985a, p. 110). In attempting to explain social actors’ actions solely 
in terms of deeper underlying structures that effectively act as causes, we are 
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relegating the role of agency, of social actors’ beliefs, reasons and intentions 
as causes of action.  
Pécaut argues that “the politics of the [armed] groups have to be 
analysed…not through their declarations, but by what they do” (Pécaut 2008, p. 
318). Yet in order to understand what it is they do, we need to know something 
of their intentions, reasons, motives and beliefs (MacIntyre 1973b, p. 323). In 
the case of certain armed actors, for example, their “kidnapping” of people is 
referred to by themselves as the “retention” of people for strategic reasons of 
war. Their assault on a local government institution is “an attack on democratic 
institutions” or, in the terms of the guerrillas, an “attack on paramilitary-
dominated structures.” The blowing up of an oil pipeline is “wanton 
environmental vandalism” or “a means of preventing the continued exploitation 
of Colombia’s resources”, etc. As MacIntyre points out, a bodily movement can 
fall under a range of descriptions that render it a particular kind of action, 
therefore “For the agent and others to see his actions in the same light, a 
certain community of shared beliefs is a prerequisite” (ibid., p. 324). I return to 
this issue below. 
There is also the problem that in implicitly or explicitly adhering to some 
particular conception of citizenship we are inevitably also implying a moral 
judgement about the relative virtues of the ideal, rational citizen in contrast to 
the vices of the irrational client. As political scientist Ingrid J. Bolívar points out,  
 
How many of us, when we are involved in processes of political formation, only 
see people who are uneducated, ignorant and manipulated by political parties 
or local political bosses? This should make us revise the forms of knowledge 
we produce that inform the reports we provide to different agencies, the forms 
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of knowledge that inform our own relations as members of NGOs or 
universities. (Bolívar 2008, p. 345) 
 
Bolívar here highlights a problem recognized by Marx and emphasized by 
MacIntyre in relation to the way theorists, social scientists and revolutionaries 
conceive themselves in contradistinction to ordinary agents who are the 
subjects of enquires and the objects of particular strategies and policies (see 
MacIntyre 1973b, 1998b).  
 
Theory and practice: civil society, social science and revolution 
From a MacIntyrean perspective there is a relation between the fragmentation 
of social and philosophical ethics, the autonomy and therefore increasing 
arbitrariness of social and political theory, and the institutionalized social 
relations and practices of modern societies. In MacIntyre’s view, modern civil 
society embodies this disjunction of theory and practice and the subsequent 
problem of linking the individual to the social. In the framework of civil society, 
individuals are regarded as distinct and apart from their social relationships, 
which is “a mistake of theory, but not only a theoretical mistake. It is a mistake 
embodied in institutionalized social life. And it is therefore a mistake which 
cannot be corrected merely by better theoretical analysis…What is clear is that 
human beings who genuinely understand what they essentially are will have to 
understand themselves in terms of their actual and potential social 
relationships and embody that understanding in their actions as well as in their 
theories” (MacIntyre 1998b, pp. 228-229). Theorists, social scientists and 
revolutionaries also need to conceive themselves in this respect, which will 
 155
necessarily affect the way they conceptualize the relationship of their theory to 
social practice.  
In the case of the social sciences, they cannot be conceived as 
elaborating “pure” knowledge that is then to be “applied” to the problems of 
society. They will need to emerge in an ongoing dialectical relationship to 
concrete social practices, practices that are, however, not based on the ethos 
of modernity. What this means, therefore, is abandoning “the standpoint of civil 
society”, which is characterized by its abstract individualism and “by a 
particular way of envisaging the relationship between all theory, including 
social theory, and practice” (MacIntyre 1998b, p. 229). The alternative form of 
social practice that does not embody the theoretical and normative 
assumptions of the standpoint of civil society is one in which “conceptions of 
the human good, of virtues, of duties to each other and of the subordinate 
place of technical skills in human life” are integrally connected (MacIntyre 
1998b, pp. 231-232). MacIntyre highlights E. P. Thompson’s account of the 
hand-loom weavers in 18th and 19th century England as providing an example 
of a kind of revolutionary practice from which alone adequate theory about the 
relationship of theory to practice can emerge. What made the hand-loom 
weavers’ practice revolutionary “was the degree to which, in order to sustain 
their mode of life, they had to reject what those who spoke and acted from the 
standpoint of civil society regarded as the economic and technological 
triumphs of the age” (MacIntyre 1998b, p. 232).  
 MacIntyre observes that from the point of view of what Marx calls 
Feuerbach’s ‘contemplative materialism’ analysis of the social world reveals 
the existence of ‘single individuals’ and their agglomeration in civil society (the 
ninth thesis). Theoretical investigation leads to the conclusion that individuals 
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are what they are because of their circumstances and upbringing. As 
MacIntyre notes, “Human beings are then taken to be a product of causal 
agencies over which they have had no control” (ibid., p. 229). He points out 
how in elaborating this kind of theory of the social world and human beings’ 
agency in respect of it theorists have 
 
characteristically without recognizing it, made the sharpest of distinctions 
between how they understand themselves and how they understand those 
who are the subjects of their enquiries. They understand those whose actions 
and experiences are to be explained by their theory as the wholly determined 
products of circumstance and upbringing. Their biological and social 
inheritance makes them what they are, independently of and antecedently to 
their own reasoning and willing, which are no more than products of 
inheritance. By contrast such theorists understand themselves as rational 
agents, able to and aspiring to embody their intentions in the natural and 
social world. (Ibid., pp. 229-230) 
 
For MacIntyre, what we need to learn from this is that there is no merely 
theoretical solution. It is only from the standpoint of social practice of a very 
different kind to modern forms of social practice, which envision the autonomy 
of theory from practice, that a solution will be possible. MacIntyre notes that 
this cannot be the kind of practice envisaged by those concerned to reform the 
institutions of civil society without abandoning its basic beliefs. He observes 
that “those who without abandoning the standpoint of civil society take 
themselves to know in advance what needs to be done to effect needed 
change are those who take themselves to be therefore entitled to manage that 
change. Others are to be the passive recipients of what they as managers 
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effect” (MacIntyre 1998b, p. 231). This results in educators and managers 
supposing that they are entitled to impose their conception of the good on 
others. This general attitude is characteristic of modernity, embodied as it is in 
modern state bureaucracies and such typically modern civil society 
organizations as think tanks, institutes, and NGOs. However, MacIntyre also 
points out that this attitude is embodied within many so-called revolutionaries. 
Marxist revolutionaries have frequently claimed to know better than ‘the 
masses’ what is required to achieve radical social transformation. 
“Intellectually, at the most fundamental level, the orthodox social scientist and 
revolutionary theorist thus turn out to be one and the same person” (MacIntyre 
1973b, p. 342). Their “parallel elitism” issues from the same intellectual 
assumptions (ibid., p. 342).  
MacIntyre argues that social science methodology serves as the 
“ideology of bureaucratic authority”, which has become the idiom for justifying 
decision-making in the modern state and which is used by managers and other 
“experts”. The ideology of expertise “embodies a claim to privilege with respect 
to power” (MacIntyre 1973b, p. 342). The rise of the claim to managerial 
expertise also embodies the aspirations to value neutrality and manipulative 
power. The first aspiration derives from the philosophical error of separating 
facts from values, which is the result of a complex philosophical history; the 
second from the false belief that the social sciences can provide genuine law-
like generalizations akin to the natural sciences that can justify their claims to 
deserve a privileged position in respect of influencing and being consulted by 
governments. Further, “The expert’s claim always takes this form: his 
taxonomic ordering represents a set of structures that determine the form of 
social and political life in ways that ordinary agents do not perceive; and his 
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predictions represent the determinativeness of a future not available to 
ordinary agents. He thus legitimates the treatment of the surface phenomena 
of social life in one way rather than another by invoking the notion of deeper 
structures” (MacIntyre 1973b, p. 339).24  
However, for MacIntyre the claims to authority embodied in the 
knowledge produced by social scientists, which is then offered to states or 
corporations to bring about certain outcomes, lack rational grounding. Social 
scientists and managers purport to possess superior reasoning to ordinary 
agents, but this is undermined by the fact that in order to assert this social 
scientists and managers would need to be able to demonstrate that they can 
formulate genuine law-like generalizations that can bestow on their findings 
the rational authority of the natural sciences. In After Virtue MacIntyre shows 
how this is not possible. He points out how in the social sciences the alleged 
general laws governing certain social phenomena sit alongside recognized 
counter-examples, which in the case of the natural sciences would affect the 
standing of the generalizations. Thus, “The expert’s claim to status and reward 
is fatally undermined when we recognize that he possesses no sound stock of 
law-like generalizations and when we realize how weak the predictive power 
available to him is” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 106). Therefore, the 
recommendations of social and political scientists lack rational justification in 
their own terms of social scientific expertise and superior knowledge, but they 
also lack rational justification inasmuch as they implicitly embody rationally 
unsettlable moral arguments in the guise of value neutrality. MacIntyre 
acknowledges the “modest claims” of social scientists to be called experts in 
                                                 
24 This is a lucid description of what appears to occur in the discourse ethics approach to 
conflict analysis. See above, pp. 147-149. 
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their respective areas inasmuch as they are indeed aware of the limitations of 
social scientific generalizations. However, he states that his aim is not to 
dispute these limited claims but to undermine the claims of bureaucratic 
institutions to legitimacy in the wielding of the power they exercise in society, 
and to highlight the corrosive effect he deems them to have on our ability to 
think and act morally. 
 
Human agency, social structure and the explanation of action 
A MacIntyrean approach insists we take seriously the role of human agency in 
conflict and social and political shifts and transformations. In studying the 
specifically moral dimensions of the Colombian conflict this concern for agency 
implies a shift in the way we as researchers conceptualize this dimension of 
the social world. Kelvin Knight notes that MacIntyre “opposes sociological 
functionalism’s positivist way of explaining action ‘in terms of social structure’ 
rather than ‘of the agent’s reasons’” (Knight 2007, p. 139). In the study of the 
Colombian conflict this relates to analyses that have sought to explain violence 
and conflict wholly in terms of “objective” social structures, and those which 
attempt to explain them mainly in terms of “subjective” factors and agents’ 
individual or collective reasons, motivations and choices, which in many cases 
have tended to assume these are not what agents say they are. Rather, the 
focus has often been on discovering agents’ “real” reasons albeit sometimes in 
terms of some particular and contestable theoretical standpoint such as 
rational choice theory.  
In this way the non-Marxist approach that has been criticized for 
“criminalizing” the guerrillas adopts the Marxist theory of ideology in seeking to 
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distinguish what really drives action from that which agents think or claim it is 
that drives their actions. As Ricardo García Duarte (2006) points out, faced 
with these dichotomous forms of analysis, both of which have yielded 
important insights into the nature of violence and conflict, alternative proposals 
have been made for integrating these two approaches. García also observes 
how the dichotomy of the objective/subjective analytical frameworks is 
connected to the normative dimension of social scientific study of the conflict, 
which is brought to the fore when we connect conflict and notions of 
citizenship. He points out, “Structural theoretical frameworks, by neglecting the 
rational will of social actors, tend to suppose that both conflict and citizenship 
depend solely on structural forces. The possibilities for citizenship and social 
contradictions depend on such structures” (García Duarte 2006, p. 249). 
Conversely, individualist/subjective theoretical frameworks, which neglect 
social structures, tend to suppose that the conflict is better explained in terms 
of “existential horizons” (ibid., p. 249). García notes that these two 
perspectives led equally to negative and optimistic affirmations about the 
possibilities of citizenship. The scepticism was based on the assignment of 
priority to structural explanations of conflict that effectively negated the 
initiative of social actors. The optimism was based on the conviction that the 
“organizational possibilities of conflict and citizenship proceeded from the very 
strategies of social actors” (ibid., p. 249), which is to say that it was based on 
the assumption of the priority of individual agency in respect of generating and 
shaping social structures. What is required, therefore, is the integration of 
these two approaches that can enable us to highlight both individual agency 
and social structure, and to understand how agency is inevitably bound up with 
social structures and vice versa (ibid., pp. 249-250).  
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MacIntyre’s comments on the problems of agency and structure as 
noted and debated by Lukács, Engels and Plekhanov can be related to this. 
He writes,  
 
The partisans of the younger Lukács understood very well that if human 
beings were the products of circumstance and upbringing, in the terms 
propounded by Engels and Plekhanov, then the kind of revolutionary agency 
through which the limitations of circumstance and upbringing could be 
transcended became unintelligible. The partisans of Engels and Plekhanov 
understood equally well that if the possibilities of revolutionary agency were 
what the Lukács of History and Class Consciousness and of Lenin took them 
to be, then the nature of the historical determination of social and economic 
orders became quite unclear. (MacIntyre 1998b, p. 233) 
 
For MacIntyre, this becomes an issue about specifically moral agency, of how 
moral critique can translate into non-arbitrary, practically effective action. The 
means-ends morality of Stalinism partly derived from a theoretical view of the 
social world as governed entirely by immutable structures and laws. The 
autonomous, arbitrary morality of liberalism partly derived from a reaction to 
this deterministic “Marxist” view of the social world and, earlier, from a reaction 
to the static, hierarchical world view that had been mystified by reactionary 
ideologues in terms of a “natural” and “traditional” order. In MacIntyre’s view, 
both these moralities and their underlying theoretical positions misunderstand 
the nature of rational self-determination. Therefore, from a MacIntyrean 
perspective, we need to understand how agency can become rationally 
effective in the world. 
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This connects up with the problem of social scientific study and 
explanation of social action, in particular the explanation of the moral 
dimensions of social life. In characterizing certain social actions as “pre-
modern” (Mejía et al. 2004, p. 84), “pre-political” (Uribe 1996, p. 38), 
“clientelistic”, “ideological”, etc. we are making a value judgement in relation to 
the actions and agency of those we study. Moreover, Andrew Sayer observes 
that there is  
 
a common but often unnoticed inconsistency between third person accounts of 
behaviour which explain it wholly in sociological terms (‘they would say/do 
that, given their social position’), and first person accounts of behaviour which 
use jus ifica ion (‘I do that not because of my social position but because I 
believe - and am willing to argue - that it is the best thing to do, given the 
nature of the situation.’) Ironically, there is a complicity here between 
sociologically-reductionist accounts of the effectivity of discourse and the 
belief of populist politicians and media that political argument reduces to a 
matter of confidence, style and conviction. (Sayer 2003, p. 10) 
t t
 
In other words, this points to the “close relationship between moral philosophy 
and sociology” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 116) and to the problem discussed above 
of the gap between theory and practice, between theorists and social actors. 
The question is, therefore, how we can study the moral dimensions of the 
social world, which on a MacIntyrean view are central to understanding 
conflict, and at the same time not avoid the inevitable involvement in the 
moral-political conflicts of the society we study, but rather participate in them in 
an open, rational and systematic way. Further, if we want to understand the 
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moral dimensions of conflict and contribute to social transformation in terms of 
achieving a “just, sustainable and peaceful coexistence” in Colombia (García 
Durán 2008, p. 359), then we need an adequate account of morality. Andrew 
Sayer points out, 
 
From a positive or explanatory point of view, the obvious realist question about 
the moral dimension of social life would be: what is it about humans and 
human society that makes us have moral concerns? Any good answer to such 
a question would have to go beyond invoking our capacity for language and 
meaning making and deal with what it is that makes us care about anything. 
Thus, an adequate account of the moral dimension of social life needs an 
understanding of the nature of the subjective experience of it. (Sayer 2003, p. 
3) 
 
Thus sociology also presupposes a moral philosophy.25 However, as Sayer 
also points out, analytic moral philosophy tends to neglect social contexts: 
“The standard questions in practical ethics tend to concern what individuals 
should do, not what kinds of social organisation should exist” (ibid., p. 11). This 
is a result of the philosophical history of morality that MacIntyre narrates, in 
which morality came to be conceived as a purely individual matter. As 
MacIntyre notes, modern moral philosophers, be they Kantians or utilitarians, 
“share a disregard for the place in morality of particular social structures and 
relationships and notably of the structures, relationships, and forms of activity 
which constitute what I have called practices here and elsewhere. They share 
                                                 
25 MacIntyre notes that the sociologist Erving Goffman’s works “presuppose a moral 
philosophy” because they offer an “account of forms of behaviour within a particular society 
which itself incorporates a moral theory in its characteristic modes of action and practice;” 
(MacIntyre 1985a, pp. 116-117). 
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a moral universe without social or institutional mediation” (MacIntyre 1983, pp. 
119-120). So-called applied ethics embodies this as it tends to focus on the 
dilemmas confronting individuals in certain institutionalized settings and 
situations rather than on the structures that determine the character of those 
situations (MacIntyre 2006b, p. 118). 
Sayer’s interest is in working out how we can rescue the moral 
dimensions of social life from their neglect by the social sciences. He points 
out that the (ostensible) excision of normative thought from the modern social 
sciences means that the normative force of moral concerns is simply not 
analysed, which reduces them to seemingly arbitrary conventions or mere 
rhetorical forms. In this way modern social science effectively adheres to the 
emotivist view of ethics as a manipulative discourse whose purpose is to non-
rationally persuade people to adopt certain views or perform certain actions. 
There can be no question of taking seriously the rival claims to truth embodied 
in moral arguments because it is assumed that values are irredeemably 
subjective. Such an emotivist view therefore presupposes a moral 
epistemology, a particular account of practical rationality, and a psychology of 
individual action. Individuals guided by emotivism are ultimately assumed to be 
driven by pre-given wants, preferences and interests that they attempt to 
satisfy, which in encounter with others will necessarily take the form of 
manipulation, not rational suasion. Morality on the emotivist view does not 
entail an impersonal realm of objective moral criteria to which our arguments 
make appeal in order to rationally convince others of the appropriateness or 
not of some action, but is merely a technique of persuasion dressed up in the 
terms of an appeal to impersonal standards. As MacIntyre puts it, the key to 
the social content of emotivism “is the fact that emotivism entails the 
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obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-
manipulative social relations” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 23). Assuming the emotivist 
account of morality means, for example, that insurgent claims that injustice 
drives their armed struggle can simply be ignored in elaborating properly 
“scientific” policy prescriptions in relation to the conflict. However, social 
scientists and theorists who disregard the moral claims of social actors as 
nothing but expressions of underlying interests and manipulative power 
nonetheless surreptitiously employ a different account of morality inasmuch as 
their policy recommendations have normative implications, which presumably 
are not seen as manipulative but rather as objectively valid.  
The view of the social world implied by the social sciences’ conception 
of morality is one in which individuals have pre-given interests and wants. 
Subjective values are first and foremost my values; they are not derived from 
the social world and social relationships, even though they might find 
coincidental resonance within the social world. There can be no rational 
agreement, no discovery of shared values, only forced or fortuitous 
coincidence of interests and wills. MacIntyre argues that emotivism effectively 
characterizes the moral dimension of modern social orders; therefore we 
should not be surprised that the social science that has arisen within the 
modern moral disorder reflects this emotivism in its theoretical stances and 
methodological assumptions. It is also not surprising that the relegation of the 
moral dimensions of social life to the margins of social scientific explanation of 
the social world has occurred, or that its explanations both implicitly embody a 
significant degree of arbitrariness, “epistemological self-righteousness” 
(MacIntyre 1973b) and the kind of dichotomous analytic and explanatory 
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frameworks of objective structures versus subjective factors and ideological 
distortion that have partly characterized study of the Colombian conflict.  
If we are to take seriously the notion of a “moral crisis” (Arango 2002) 
and “ethical vacuum” (Rojas 2007; Remolina 1992) as partly behind the 
ongoing degradation of the conflict, then we will need to overturn this dominant 
social scientific view of morality. The Colombian moral crisis can be 
understood in various interconnecting ways (see p.1, footnote 1). We can 
focus on the linguistic dimension of it in terms of the inability to reach moral-
political consensus that can be seen as an important driver of conflict, and we 
can also focus on particular substantive manifestations of what are generally 
taken to be barbarous, immoral acts such as the incredible levels of savagery 
and revenge descended to in the period known as La Violencia or, indeed, in 
more recent times with the brutal massacres by the paramilitaries and the 
kidnappings or “retentions” of the guerrillas. We can also look at the moral 
dimensions of politics in terms of clientelism, corruption, intolerance and so 
forth. In attempting to theorize and bring about peace and social 
transformation we inevitably take some position in respect of these moral 
issues as well as some account of the explanation of human action. MacIntyre 
writes that “every moral philosophy offers explicitly or implicitly at least a partial 
conceptual analysis of the relationship of an agent to his or her reasons, 
motives, intentions and actions, and in so doing generally presupposes some 
claim that these concepts are embodied or at least can be in the real social 
world” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 23). Thus when we analyse the Colombian conflict 
in terms of the above moral dimensions we presuppose such a conceptual 
analysis of agents’ reasons and intentions, which is necessary for adequately 
understanding the moral dimensions of the conflict and avoiding the pitfalls of 
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analysis and explanation in terms solely of either external social, “objective” 
structures or internal individual or collective, “subjective” factors. With Sayer 
we want to rescue the moral dimensions of the social world in terms of 
sociological explanation and, with García Durán, work out a rationally 
justifiable normative position in respect of helping to bring about a “just, 
sustainable and peaceful coexistence.”  
However, before this we need to focus on the question of explaining 
human action that is crucial for empirical work. MacIntyre points out that the 
distinction between what really moves men to act in certain ways and what the 
same men themselves believe to have moved them to act lies at the heart of 
the Marxist theory of ideology. However, 
 
Marx and Engels also asserted that men could find reasons for action in the 
modern world which would not only enable them to act effectively, but which 
would be such that what they believed to be moving them to action would 
indeed be what was in fact moving them to action. The empirical investigation 
of these questions cannot proceed successfully unless it is preceded and 
accompanied by a philosophical account of the relationship between the kind 
of explanation of human action in terms of intentions, reasons, and purposes 
which is native to human life itself and the kind of causal explanation which is 
familiar in the natural sciences. (MacIntyre 1971e, p. 94) 
 
MacIntyre notes that “If moral considerations are important…then we shall have 
to understand what part reasoning and deliberation play in bringing about one 
sort of action rather than another” (ibid., p. 94). This is what the study of how 
peaceful coexistence and justice can be achieved needs to understand.   
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MacIntyre points out that we must begin by characterizing a given 
society or community in its own terms if we are to be able to identify the matter 
that requires explanation and if we are to be able to proffer sociological causal 
explanations. Therefore, “Attention to intentions, motives, and reasons must 
precede attention to causes; description in terms of the agent’s concepts and 
beliefs must precede description in terms of our concepts and beliefs” (ibid., p. 
223). Using the example of suicide drawn from Durkheim, MacIntyre showed 
how causal explanations of suicide necessarily had to make reference to the 
agent’s motives and reasons. The causal generalization formulated on the 
basis of a statistical correlation, “isolated living of a certain kind tends to lead 
to acts of suicide”, still requires us to ask whether it is the pressure on the 
emotions of the isolation or certain other problems that lead to suicide. 
MacIntyre then pointed out that “we cannot raise the questions about motives 
and reasons…unless we first of all understand…acts…in terms of the intentions 
of the agents and therefore in terms of their own action descriptions” 
(MacIntyre 1971f, p. 226). Therefore, in order to understand actors’ reasons for 
acting we need to understand the conceptual scheme that informs those 
beliefs.  
However, in debate with sociologist Peter Winch, MacIntyre denied that 
action could always be adequately explained in terms of agents’ own concepts 
and beliefs. Insisting that this is so leaves us unable to account for certain 
social and cultural transitions. As Kelvin Knight notes, “What he argued against 
Winch was that social science should ‘uncover’ the partial ‘mechanisms which 
blind agents to or enable them to ignore the irrationalities of their own social 
order’” (Knight 2007, p. 114), which requires a different kind of explanation 
from rational actions and beliefs. I noted previously that for MacIntyre 
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rationality is a sociological category, which if he is correct about “then once 
again the positivist account of sociology in terms of a logical dichotomy 
between facts and values must break down. For to characterize actions and 
institutionalized practices as rational or irrational is to evaluate them” 
(MacIntyre 1971c, p. 258). But this evaluation must itself, on a MacIntyrean 
view, occur from within a particular tradition with its own account of rationality, 
and will also necessitate fully comprehending the conceptual scheme and 
notion of rationality that is to be evaluated. MacIntyre points out that the social 
scientist “must be able to decide what constitutes the rationality of a scientific 
belief, or a moral belief, or a religious belief”, which is “to do philosophy” (ibid., 
p. 259). Therefore the philosopher cannot be merely “an external commentator 
on the social sciences; for philosophical arguments will actually enter into and 
forge critical links within the sociologist’s explanations” (ibid., p. 259). What 
this means is that philosophers “cannot be restricted merely to interpreting the 
social sciences; the point of their activity is to change them” (ibid., p. 259).  
In Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry MacIntyre argues for the re-
conceptualization and re-structuring of the modern liberal university around 
distinct traditions of moral enquiry in order for rational progress to be made 
and to enable systematic encounter and conflict between rival traditions to 
occur. As Peter McMylor (1994) notes, such institutions might represent or 
articulate the outlook of distinctive communities within society, and provide 
plans and criteria for those communities to realise their conception of the good 
life. The social sciences would have important roles within such universities, 
though these would differ between the contending institutions “depending on 
the place of a social science in the tradition the institution set out to embody” 
(McMylor 1994, p. 172). An Aristotelian university, for example, Thomist or 
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otherwise, “would have to share a common moral framework committed to 
constraining economic growth, and the unfettered use of the criteria of market 
efficiency as life’s framework” (ibid., pp. 172-173).  
In the case of the Colombian conflict I have argued that the connection 
between the social sciences and moral philosophy is important and needs to 
be explicitly articulated. If the social sciences are to play a role in 
understanding and transforming conflict, then they will need to move beyond 
the fact-value divide and move in the direction of MacIntyre’s proposals.  
Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Borda wrote in the classic 
sociological study of La Violencia: “The ‘total’ conflict [referring to an informal 
phase of conflict that has not passed to the formal ‘bellicose’ stage] is 
shapeless…but it has objectives that can be manifest or latent, hence the 
confusion the study of it produces. One group might organize to cruelly avenge 
its own dead in the name of a political party, killing those of rival political 
colours, but in reality it is to appropriate for itself the victims’ goods; another 
might proclaim itself a defender of the faith and expel or kill members of other 
sects, but in reality it is to defend locally created interests; and so on almost ad 
infinitum…” (Guzmán et al. 2005, p. 444). The question is how we can 
determine what is the case. For what reasons, intentions and motives were 
people acting in such ways? What was the relationship between these and the 
social structure? Were people driven by ideological distortion, that is, by a 
false consciousness about the real motives for their actions? Fals tells us that 
the conflict produced the conditions for criminal and savage violence, but what 
produced the conflict? What lay behind the “social conflict” that served as fuel 
to the violence? Fals suggests the conditions for “open” social conflict included 
“those created by impunity and other failings of justice, the deficient 
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distribution of land, illiteracy, individualism or egocentrism of the people, the 
ethnocentrism of the elites” (ibid., p. 439). In other words, a litany of 
possibilities that combine normative and empirical elements. Yet Fals also 
affirms the separation of facts from values, declaring that “The demographic, 
psychological and economic disruptions and adjustments effectuated during 
the two stages of conflict were of great significance…However, whether they 
were good or bad is not for the social scientist to say, as these concepts are 
subjective” (ibid., p. 444). Fals then suggests that the occurrence or lack of 
violence is explicitly related to social values, proffering his own value 
judgement when he suggests as a hypothesis for the relative lack of violence 
in the Caribbean coast region the “lack of intolerance”, which contrasts with the 
“closed and fanatical world of the Andean communities” (ibid., p. 448). Fals 
also tells us that the problem was accentuated by the generation of 
Durkheimian “anomie”.  
We can thus perceive the difficulty for sociology to explain such a 
complex phenomenon that combined socio-structural (objective) and individual 
(subjective and normative) elements. Fals notes that modern sociological 
analysis is based on the “neutral” premise that sees conflict as “natural” in all 
societies in order to interpret changes within them. Such analysis excises 
normative judgement from social explanation but, as we have seen, this leads 
to real problems. MacIntyre has noted that political scientists, for example, 
despite their aspiration to value neutrality have no real alternative to using the 
same explanatory or evaluative criteria of ordinary agents who will frequently 
cite evaluations of moral character in their explanations of political action and 
outcomes (MacIntyre 1971b, p. 277). This means that political science is in 
effect a “moral science” (ibid.) In the same way, sociological and political 
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scientific study and explanation of the Colombian conflict will need to become 
a moral science if it is to begin to make sense of actions in it and if it is to 
illuminate ways in which justice and peaceful coexistence might be achieved. 
But if it is to become a moral science that overcomes the theoretical and 
philosophical problems of contemporary morality and moral theory, it must on 
MacIntyre’s view have to be a science and form of social research based on 
radically different assumptions. 
 
Tradition, communities and research 
If our research unavoidably implies a moral and normative position in respect 
of the social, economic and political structures and policies of the countries we 
study or in which we study, then, as I have previously noted, we cannot avoid 
participating in moral and political conflict about how things are and how they 
should be. Yet as MacIntyre has pointed out, we cannot simply choose a 
theoretical position or framework and thereby hope to have settled the issues 
of rational justification and arbitrariness. We need to participate in communities 
of practice, to engage in praxis through which our theories and criteria can 
gain rational authority and earn the rational respect, if not the rational assent, 
of those against whom we argue. This points us in the direction of a radical 
transformation in the way we conduct our academic enquiries. But might it be 
so radical that it effectively prevents most of us from engaging in important 
academic research? I shall return to this question further on. Beforehand I 
want to explore some possible ambiguities in MacIntyre’s argument. 
MacIntyre implicitly argues that Catholic religious practice is a form of 
participation in a community of practice that provides a rational moral 
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framework in which to make judgements pertinent to living in and researching 
the social world. Within this, MacIntyre’s own philosophical position of 
Thomism provides a non-relativist epistemology, and MacIntyre holds in 
respect of this that we can indeed study other cultures in light of concepts that 
are not appealed to or known about within such cultures, but also that we must 
necessarily begin from the concepts used within such cultures. In other words, 
a MacIntyrean position rules out cultural and moral relativism but takes a 
critical stance in relation to its own claims to rational and moral superiority.  
However, is there a tension between the implicit notion of Catholicism 
as a practice with its provision of a moral theory on the one hand, and 
MacIntyre’s claim that moral theory must emerge from concrete contexts of 
local community practice, which I take to mean communities that include 
Catholics as well as others, on the other? David Solomon points out that 
“MacIntyre wants ethical theory to grow out of the ethical activity of 
communities but to aspire to make universal claims that reject any putative 
provenance from an impersonal or value-neutral perspective. Theory will be 
rooted in particular practices and the insights available only from within them, 
but will make claims that can conflict…with those of alien communities” 
(Solomon 2003, p. 146). Therefore, is it the case that MacIntyre sees the 
Catholic tradition itself as a “community”? If so, then does he see those who 
work within the tradition of Nietzschean genealogy or liberalism as a 
community? I doubt it, but it seems to me there may be an elision of tradition 
and community that is leading to (at least my) confusion. I might be entirely 
wrong in perceiving a tension or a problem here but I am slightly puzzled by 
MacIntyre’s insistence on the one hand that moral enquiry needs to occur in 
the way he describes in Three Rival Versions, which centres on, and proceeds 
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through conflict between, major intellectual-moral-political-social traditions, 
and on the other his claims that rationally justifiable moral theory can only 
emerge from certain local communities of practice. What is the relationship 
between the traditions and these local communities?  
David Solomon writes, “In Whose Justice?,…[MacIntyre] gives an 
elaborate account of how rational debate among competing communities 
about the moral rules that govern them can be carried on without any appeal to 
perspectives or points of view abstracted from the concrete life of the 
competing communities” (ibid., p. 147). However, I read Whose Justice? more 
as elaborating an account of how rational debate between competing t aditions 
can be carried on, not so much between competing communities. If we elide 
tradition with community then we can read MacIntyre as providing such an 
account, but MacIntyre clearly does not see communities as homogenous 
exponents and adherents of any one tradition. Within Greek society there were 
“competing” communities but it seems to me MacIntyre essentially narrates 
how the Aristotelian account of justice emerged from the conflicts within Greek 
society that despite their often sharp disputes still inherited from a common 
tradition going back to Homer. The rest of Whose Justice? is an account of 
how the Aristotelian tradition was transformed and its internal incoherences 
resolved by Aquinas’ synthesis, and then how rival traditions to the Aristotelian 
tradition emerged, including the incoherent morality of the liberal tradition.  
r
In today’s modern, pluralistic communities we will no doubt find 
adherents of the different traditions MacIntyre discusses (and plenty that he 
does not) and it is this fact that to my mind raises questions about the 
generation of moral frameworks and theories within such communities and the 
role of traditions within them in relation to generating such frameworks and 
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theories. It seems possible to read MacIntyre as saying that despite the 
importance of traditions, it is the practices of certain communities that 
potentially can lead to the elaboration of rationally justifiable ethical theories 
that do not necessarily have any strong relation to the particular traditions 
MacIntyre describes. MacIntyre has elsewhere argued that individuals in 
communities always begin their enquiries and engage in community life and 
debate within some perhaps unacknowledged and inchoate tradition that has 
partly made them what they are. Individuals “are not morally naked” (MacIntyre 
2002, p. 259). Yet in the context of modern, pluralistic communities, even 
those that retain strong “traditional” elements as in Latin America, for example, 
there are an array of different traditions available, and individuals might identify 
with more than one. It seems to me that MacIntyre’s later arguments have 
recognized the implicitly arbitrary position of the individual he describes in A 
Short History of Ethics and later Whose Justice? who has to choose, 
seemingly without any presuppositions, to adopt some tradition or mode of 
theoretical enquiry in order to be able to engage with others and avoid “social 
solipsism” (MacIntyre 2002, p. 259). MacIntyre has increasingly emphasized 
that it is the involvement in shared practices within local forms of community 
life that can provide individuals with the presuppositions and authoritative 
criteria with which to evaluate, critique and act- that is, to build ethical theory- 
rather than through the different versions and traditions of moral enquiry that it 
is possible for individuals (and sometimes whole communities) to locate 
themselves within. If academic enquiry were to be reconstructed along the 
lines that MacIntyre suggests, the different traditions of enquiry could engage 
with particular communities, helping to elaborate theory and aiding practice. 
But it does seem as though the emphasis on moral theory as emerging from 
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particular communities relegates (but far from eradicates) the importance of 
traditions.  
So what is the upshot of this? I am suggesting that if it is only through 
participation in local communities of practice that we can elaborate rationally 
justifiable ethical theories, then this appears also to apply for developing 
rationally justifiable normative frameworks for conducting social scientific 
research and analysis. Therefore, researchers have to be members of such 
communities or at the very least share their presuppositions and engage 
systematically with them and advocate their particular perspectives. 
Anthropologists can lay claim more than most other academics to genuinely 
participating in and learning the symbolics and idioms of different cultures and 
communities. However, anthropology’s historical commitment to cultural 
relativism (Bourgois 1990) would appear to disarm it from taking a critical and 
effective moral standpoint in relation to external threats and impositions such 
as those emanating from neoliberalism. Moreover, the participation of 
anthropologists, no matter how thoroughgoing and enduring, is always 
temporary and always coloured by prior theoretical commitments and social 
and intellectual distance that rule out viewing the community’s mode of life and 
conception of the good in non-relativist, ethnocentric terms. As MacIntyre 
points out, all cultures are ethnocentric- they do not live by relativism but imply 
their way of life is the best and most morally suitable one (MacIntyre 2006j, p. 
54).  
Further, can anthropologists and other researchers from the “first 
world”, the imperialist and colonial centres of global power, engage in research 
in contexts in which the effects of this power are most acutely and 
devastatingly felt without seriously challenging our own presuppositions and 
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allowing for the possibility of undermining our own positions and the structures 
of power that enable and perpetuate them? Such a question has been and 
continues to be a guiding insight of radical pedagogical theory and practice 
influenced by Brazilian educator and philosopher Paulo Freire. It was Freire 
who put praxis- critical reflection on practice, or the dialectical relationship of 
theory and practice- back on the agenda in the context of committed social, 
educational and political engagement with the poor in Latin America. I suggest 
that MacIntyre’s emphasis on the importance of conjoining theory with 
practice, and the implications I have drawn from MacIntyre’s work for study of 
the Colombian moral-political situation, have some important affinities with 
Freire’s work. There are resonances between MacIntyre’s philosophical work 
and that of Freire which can illuminate the relations between research and 
ethical-political commitment, which relates to the overarching problematic I 
have discussed of the relation between moral theory, social science and social 
conflict.  
The following quote from Freire reveals some of the resonance with 
MacIntyre’s concerns: 
 
The insistence that the oppressed engage in reflection on their concrete 
situation is not a call to armchair revolution. On the contrary, reflection- true 
reflection- leads to action. On the other hand, when the situation calls for 
action, that action will constitute an authentic praxis only if its consequences 
become the object of critical reflection. In this sense, the praxis is the new 
raison d’être of the oppressed…this raison d’être is not viable apart from their 
concomitant conscious involvement. Otherwise, action is pure activism…To 
achieve this praxis, however, it is necessary to trust in the oppressed and in 
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their ability to reason. Whoever lacks this trust will fail to initiate (or will 
abandon) dialogue, reflection, and communication, and will fall into using 
slogans, communiqués, monologues, and instructions. (Freire 1970, p. 48) 
 
Freire’s concern for authentic “revolutionary praxis” speaks to MacIntyre’s 
arguments about rationally justifiable revolutionary action. Further, Freire 
insists on the historically and socially mediated form of ethical consciousness: 
 
As men and women inserted in and formed by a socio-historical context of 
relations, we become capable of comparing, evaluating, intervening, deciding, 
taking new directions, and thereby constituting ourselves as ethical beings. It 
is in our becoming that we constitute our being so. Because the condition of 
becoming is the condition of being. (Freire 2001, pp. 38-39) 
 
For Freire, “Right thinking is right doing” (Freire 2001, p. 39), which strikes a 
definite Aristotelian tone. The radical challenge Freire poses to prevailing 
educational theory and practice could also be seen to constitute a wider 
challenge to all social theory and social science analogously to MacIntyre’s 
philosophical critique.  
We can now return to my question above as to whether the implied 
radicality of this effectively rules out much if not all prevailing kinds of 
academic research, including my own. Certainly, MacIntyre and Freire pose a 
radical challenge to those of us who would seek to conduct social scientific 
research with the purpose of making expert-like recommendations from a 
standpoint outside of particular traditions and communities. However, I 
suggest that because my own research is not about developing a social 
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scientific analysis of the conflict per se, or a policy prescription in relation to it, 
perhaps it is not bound by the requirement to either be a member of a 
particular community (such as the one I studied) or radically engage with and 
explicitly advocate its presuppositions and positions. It is an “observational” 
study with philosophical and theoretical aims that does not pretend to be 
normatively or theoretically neutral or impartial in respect of the overall 
Colombian situation and the political and moral dimensions of the conflict. It 
also implies a prescription in terms of seeing restated Aristotelian theory and 
practice as what communities should aspire to embody. However, I do not 
seek to impose any of this on the community I study.  
What it implies in terms of “research ethics” is that the dilemmas of 
informed consent and so forth are decided in terms of my own tradition’s 
standpoint, which does not of course rule out moral error on my part. Further, 
my research in no way aims to speak for those I studied, still less to inscribe 
my account of the community’s practice and discourse within the terms of 
“neutral”, positivist, “scientific” research. Yet I cannot avoid inscribing it within 
the terms of my own (perhaps too lightly worn) tradition or those of 
MacIntyrean enquiry, which runs the risk of misunderstanding and 
misrepresenting the community I studied. My only defence is that no study of 
this or any other community can be normatively or theoretically neutral.  
Clearly, MacIntyre thinks “we” can engage in comparative study of 
particular local communities in order to illuminate the way such communities 
actually function in respect of moral discourse, theory and practice (MacIntyre 
2001, p. 143). We can learn something philosophically relevant through the 
historical and sociological study of real communities (MacIntyre 1983, 2001) 
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and also learn from such examples important insights into the possibilities and 
pitfalls of our own communities.  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued that social scientific study of the conflict cannot avoid 
participating in the conflict. The excision of moral/normative stances from the 
social sciences has not only prevented understanding of the moral dimensions 
of social conflict, but inadvertently also led to the social sciences themselves 
reflecting, and adding a further level of conflict to, the implicit and explicit 
conflicts within Colombian society. But it must now be asked: from what 
perspective, within what kinds of moral framework and tradition can analysis of 
and prescriptions in relation to the Colombian conflict proceed? MacIntyre has 
expounded three rival versions of moral enquiry, one of which is what he refers 
to as “tradition”, which he argues provides the most rationally compelling 
“theory so far” (MacIntyre 1991, pp. 61-66; 1998d, p. 264). The other versions 
are the encyclopedic, Enlightenment mode of enquiry, and the Nietzschean 
genealogical mode. As I have pointed out, any analysis of the conflict 
necessarily presupposes an account of morality such that it can make sense of 
what are deemed to be the moral dimensions of social life and conflict. This 
thesis argues for the relevance of MacIntyre’s philosophy and therefore 
presupposes MacIntyre’s account of morality. It is in terms of this account and 
MacIntyre’s general diagnosis of the modern moral disorder that I now explore 
the empirical dimensions of the Colombian moral crisis.  
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CHAPTER 4 
The moral dimensions of the Colombian conflict 
through a MacIntyrean lens 
 
This chapter looks at various moral aspects of the Colombian conflict in light of 
MacIntyre’s framework. From the moral corruption and “schizophrenic” nature 
of the Colombian state (Giraldo 1999), to the process of “state construction” 
and the ambiguities of human rights discourse, I demonstrate the moral 
problems with politics and the state, as well as the challenges for effecting 
revolutionary social change and the transformation of politics in an ethical and 
rational way. I claim that MacIntyre’s philosophy points to the need for slow, 
creative, and often frustrating processes of social, cultural and political 
encounters in which moral bonds and shared political visions can be 
constructed, something that practitioners of peacebuilding and grassroots 
conflict transformation have also underlined. I postulate the hypothesis that 
MacIntyre’s philosophy is already partly implicit in certain practices of social 
organizations and communities of resistance in Colombia, and propose 
MacIntyre’s moral-sociological framework as a model for empirically exploring 
the peacebuilding process of a small-scale Colombian community that has 
spent ten years attempting to transform local conflict through public 
participation and deliberation. Arguing that what is required is a form of 
MacIntyrean ethnographic fieldwork, I conclude the chapter with a justification 
of my case study and a brief excursus on my methodology. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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The ethical collapse of justice 
Father Javier Giraldo, perhaps Colombia’s most important and committed 
human rights defender, recently wrote a powerfully moving letter (Giraldo 
2009) to a public prosecutor who has filed charges against him of “false 
accusation” and “slander” in light of accusations made by an army General 
implicated in a savage massacre of civilians in San José de Apartadó in 
February 2005. In the letter Giraldo explains his “conscientious moral 
objection” to presenting himself before Colombia’s judicial institutions to face 
the charges. Father Giraldo has been a tireless defender of the rights of the 
Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, and following the massacre in 
2005 he and the community accused the Colombian military of being 
coauthors with paramilitaries of the brutal murders of eight people, including 
three children. Father Giraldo and the community were immediately slandered 
and stigmatized in the media and by the government as being linked to 
guerrillas, and accused of distorting the facts about the killings as part of their 
alleged “political war” against the Colombian state.  
However, evidence soon came to light that backed up everything the 
community and Father Giraldo had said. Ten military personnel have recently 
been charged as coauthors of the massacre.26 The case brought against 
Father Giraldo, which clearly does correspond to a “political war” by the state 
against human rights activists, was shelved in 2006 but was reopened shortly 
after the charges brought against the military for the massacre. Mauricio 
García Durán, head of one of Colombia’s most prestigious conflict research 
institutes (CINEP), deplored “the investigation of those who denounced those 
                                                 
26 http://www.semana.com/noticias-justicia/fiscalia-acusa-diez-militares-masacre-san-jose-
apartado/120163.aspx 
 183
responsible for the massacre in San José de Apartadó.”27 Jorge Eliécer 
Molano, Father Giraldo’s defence lawyer, stated that the process “has the aim 
of covering up the perpetrators of the San José massacre by diverting the 
investigations and promoting impunity.”28 Given Father Giraldo’s decades long 
experience and his profound knowledge of the workings (rather, the grotesque 
failings) of Colombia’s justice system and the impact of the conflict on society, 
his decision to take “conscientious objector” status has to be seen as a highly 
significant symbol of the deeply troubling moral degradation of Colombia’s 
institutions.  
Father Giraldo points out that there has never been a single act of 
justice in any one of the multiple cases of murder, torture, and forced 
disappearance that he has brought before Colombia’s judicial institutions. 
Even in the high profile case of the Trujillo massacre in which the Colombian 
state was effectively forced to open an investigatory commission, 14 years 
later none of the recommendations of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights have been implemented, and impunity reigns. Giraldo observes that  
 
This all demonstrates that the Public Prosecutor’s Office presents a façade of 
justice to the country: it claims to adhere to the constitutional principles that 
mark it as an independent entity that acts according to universal principles of 
the administration of justice, but the crude reality is that this is not the case. Its 
“truth” is not constructed on the basis of elementary parameters of impartiality 
and independence, but on the dependence of powerful social and political 
interests. This presents a profound ethical problem for those involved, actively 
or passively, in the processes. (Giraldo 2009, p. 19) 
                                                 
27 http://www.semana.com/noticias-justicia/reabren-caso-javier-giraldo/121640.aspx 
28 Ibid. 
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According to Father Giraldo, at the heart of the “moral decomposition” of 
the judicial system and the “ethical collapse of justice” (ibid., p. 20) is the 
“mercantilization” of justice in the form of paid informants and the testimony of 
“re-integrated former guerrillas” or masked individuals who fabricate the 
required testimonies under the coaching of the military. The vicious irony of 
this is that those civilians who are signalled as guerrillas because they have 
had some form of contact with actual guerrilla members- an utter inevitability 
given their presence throughout the Colombian countryside- and which itself 
often takes the form of coercion and victimization, are themselves treated as 
subversives, not victims of the conflict. In many cases humble peasant farmers 
are threatened by the military if they do not agree to accuse particular social 
activists and community leaders of being guerrillas. The precarious economic 
situation of many peasant farmers, which is systematically worsened by 
deliberate acts of economic warfare such as the burning of crops and the 
blockading of food, ports and markets, is seen as part of a strategy to tempt 
people to “get a better life” as a paid informant or as a “witness” in the form of 
a “demobilized former guerrilla” who has decided to “collaborate freely” with 
the military. Father Giraldo has witnessed queues of young men waiting 
outside an army base in Barrancabermeja who told him they were there to 
“negotiate information” (i.e. sell their false testimony):  
 
Added to the radical moral repugnance this generated in me was a profound 
sadness and indignation at the thought of how the misery of our people is 
exploited to turn them into ‘informants’ and ‘denouncers’ against their own 
neighbours. Who can trust in the ‘truths’ obtained in this way, as if the truth 
were merchandise? This represents an inconceivable debasement of truth; its 
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total dehumanization. It is, moreover, a politics of destruction, at a very deep 
level, of the moral conscience of a people and a society. (Ibid. p. 19).  
 
The deep levels of corruption in the Colombian justice system and the military 
have led to the violation of the principle of the separation of powers. The 
military frequently takes charge of “investigations”: seeking out “witnesses”, 
illegally capturing people, taking testimonies in military installations without the 
detained having lawyers present, presentation of “evidence” that has not 
passed legal procedures, and so forth. This leads to rampant impunity and 
favours perpetrators of crimes against humanity. As Father Giraldo argues, 
“the judicial and disciplinary system of the State, induced by the reigning 
juridical positivism that has gradually cut every connection with the world of 
values, ethics, political ideals, humanism, and religion, turning itself into a 
supposedly ‘aseptic’, autonomous technique, has constructed the notion of the 
sovereignty of ‘process truth’ as the foundation of justice” (ibid., pp. 34-35), 
which has itself been completely perverted by the mercantilization of process 
and the systematic fabrication of testimony.  
The question is: what is it that has led to this profound moral crisis of 
institutions? Father Giraldo’s own diagnosis itself suggests resonances with 
MacIntyre’s argument about the autonomy and arbitrariness of liberal morality 
that have conduced to render the principles of law increasingly arbitrary and 
incoherent (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 253; 1982, p. 306). In terms of the specifics of 
the Colombian context, there are of course deep socio-historical factors 
relating to the nature of politics and paramilitarism in Colombia. From a 
MacIntyrean perspective these socio-historical factors need to be read in terms 
of a philosophical understanding of the nature of state and other institutions. 
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Father Giraldo himself has proffered an analysis of the “schizophrenic state” in 
Colombia in which one part of it is expected to investigate the involvement in 
state terror of another part. This linkage ensures that justice in relation to the 
conflict fails in most cases. As Giraldo suggests,  
 
Perhaps the contradiction is inherent to the state’s role: on the one hand, the 
state appears to be a steward of the law, from which its legitimacy derives. 
This is the rationale for the fact that only the state is allowed to maintain 
coercive instruments such as a judiciary, penal codes, and police. On the 
other hand, the state is also a social manifestation of power. Power, defined 
as dominance, embodies many kinds of oppression when it fails to represent 
the consensus of its citizens. (Giraldo 1999, p. 27) 
 
This is entirely resonant with MacIntyre’s critique of the modern state and 
suggests that any (re)construction of political community and morality cannot 
centre on “state construction” in the dominant terms in which this is understood 
today.  
Giraldo reveals another telling insight into the nature of the Colombian 
situation. In a meeting he had with the Prosecutor General in relation to 
various cases of grave human rights abuses and crimes against humanity 
Giraldo recalls that he was told he had to be clear about “which side” he was 
on (Giraldo 2009, p. 5). This points to the dangerous polarization of Colombian 
society and also raises the issue of individual moral agency in relation to social 
institutions and structures. Had the judicial official in question allowed the 
standards of the institution that defined his role to entirely govern his moral 
reasoning? As MacIntyre notes, we can always ask of someone who claims to 
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have acted solely in accordance with their role what reason they had for 
believing that the established standards governing their deliberations were the 
best standards (MacIntyre 2006c, p. 189). Yet in order to put certain moral and 
evaluative standards to the question we need the capacity to do so, to be able 
to be moral agents. To be a moral agent is to understand oneself as 
accountable to others. However, as MacIntyre points out, how human beings 
are able to understand themselves in large part depends upon and is limited 
by the nature of the social and cultural order they inhabit (ibid., p. 189). For 
MacIntyre the key question is therefore, “are there or might there be types of 
social structure that would prevent those who inhabited them from 
understanding themselves as moral agents?” (Ibid., p. 189)  
And so we can also ask to what extent moral agency is possible in the 
dominant milieus of Colombian society, and how Colombia’s social and 
political institutions have disabled and disfigured the ability to be a moral 
agent.29 On a MacIntyrean perspective, the nature and compartmentalization 
of the state, its “schizophrenic” nature, can erode moral agency but its 
obliteration depends on other factors. As MacIntyre notes,  
 
Accountability to particular others, participation in critical practical enquiry, and 
acknowledgment of the individuality both of others and of oneself are all then 
marks of the social relationships and mode of self-understanding that 
characterize the moral agent. Strip away those social relationships and that 
mode of self-understanding and what would be left would be a seriously 
diminished type of agency, one unable to transcend the limitations imposed by 
                                                 
29 This kind of analysis is missing from the majority of moral philosophical studies in relation to 
the conflict. 
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its own social and cultural order. Moral agency thus does seem to require a 
particular kind of social setting. (Ibid., p. 192)  
 
In the case of the collapse of ethics in Colombia’s judicial and other institutions 
(such as the military, the intelligence service, the Congress, etc.) we can ask, 
then, to what extent the individuals within them have lacked other social 
milieus in which they have been able to stand back and critique the evaluative 
and moral norms of the dominant social and institutional order. Increasingly in 
modern society we are deprived of such milieus, and MacIntyre has of course 
called for their (re)construction. I want to suggest, following MacIntyre, that the 
most successful forms of moral resistance in Colombia are to be found in 
relatively marginal and ‘deviant’ social movements and community 
organizations. Those outside such communities in the dominant milieus of 
modern society increasingly lack the ability to be moral agents and fall prey 
more easily to external inputs and free-floating discourses and justificatory 
frameworks and arguments.  
An added important factor in the Colombian context is the impact of 
intimidation and physical attack on people’s ability to exercise moral agency. 
Father Giraldo has argued that such intimidation and the fact that it is nearly 
always backed up has had a devastating effect on the moral consciousness of 
countless individuals and, cumulatively, on the whole of society. The ability to 
resist such intimidation requires strong community and inter-community links. 
In the Colombian context the nature of the current “state-building” 
project needs to be understood in order to see how it is constructing a certain 
kind of social and cultural order that undermines moral agency and which is 
morally corrosive in the way Father Giraldo describes. Described by some as a 
 189
“communitarian” or “mafia” state, the view from the critical wing is that former 
president Álvaro Uribe Vélez30 consolidated an authoritarian consensus 
around a charismatic-populist leader that sought to imbue the state and 
Colombian political community with a hybrid ethos of “tradition”, “order” and 
neoliberal bureaucratic rationality (see Mejía Quintana et al. 2007). Such a 
characterization cannot, of course, avoid entanglement with normative 
frameworks and judgements. Nevertheless, from a critical angle one important 
characteristic of the current state is its attempt to unify state and society, which 
has taken sinister form in the shape of certain structures like the so-called 
“informants network” in which well over a million civilians are paid to inform on 
“suspicious activities” to the military or other state agencies, which follow on 
from the infamous “Convivir” “security cooperatives” that legalized the carrying 
of weapons by civilians in support of the military, becoming the early nuclei of 
the paramilitary structures (Romero 2003).  
Added to this I suggest the “with me or against me” line of discourse 
contributes to a climate in which there is strong social, cultural and moral 
pressure to conform. Populist “community councils”, constant stigmatizing of 
political opposition, human rights activists, trade unionists, etc. and a 
combination of authoritarian, moralistic rhetoric with reference to neoliberal 
discourse against corruption, in favour of “modernization”, “security” and “state 
construction”, plus the sheer weight of overwhelming media support, combine 
to produce a heady atmosphere conducive to an authoritarian consensus and 
the justification of a means-ends morality. Add to this the economic 
                                                 
30 Whose policies are to be continued if not deepened by new president Juan Manuel Santos 
who, incidentally, was the Defence Minister at the time of the “false positives” scandal in which 
over 1000 innocent Colombians were deliberately killed by the armed forces in order to pass 
them off as guerrillas killed in combat. Soldiers received financial and other rewards for 
registering guerrillas killed- so-called “positives”.  
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vulnerability of large sectors of the population, including the middle classes, 
which makes jobs highly sought after and important to hold on to once found, 
particularly jobs in local, regional and national state bureaucracies and 
agencies; national service, inversion of facts about the conflict, widespread 
fatigue with the war and legitimate anger towards the guerrillas, etc. and we 
have some reasons for thinking that moral agency is extremely difficult to 
exercise. Historic dependence on the state for work, for ad hoc favours and 
benefits also contributes to an uncritical or conformist attitude towards the 
state and the dominant social order.  
 
Social complicity with paramilitarism 
The so-called “para-politics” scandal is another measure of the moral crisis. 
This refers to the alliance of paramilitary terrorist organizations and politicians 
that radically altered Colombia’s political landscape in the build up to the 2002 
election of president Uribe (Romero 2007). In 2001 a formal pact outlined the 
agreement between paramilitaries and about thirty politicians in the 
department of Córdoba and wider coastal region, which had the stated goal of 
“refounding the nation” and establishing “a new social contract” (Cepeda and 
Rojas 2008, p. 84). In less rhetorical terms the pact had the more pragmatic 
goal of formalizing the proxy electoral strategy of the paramilitary project. The 
ballot and the bullet would combine to sinister and dramatic effect as the 
alliance between paramilitaries and politicians radically altered Colombia’s 
political, social and economic landscape. A plethora of small political parties 
emerged, shifting the balance of power for the first time from the two traditional 
parties in a very short space of time, despite their recent emergence. The 
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paramilitaries’ military control and reputation for brutal terrorism in various 
regions was used to threaten, intimidate and discourage alternative candidates 
from running, which resulted in highly abnormal electoral outcomes (Romero 
2007). As of May 2009 179 Colombian politicians have been linked to the 
investigations.31  
The social, political and moral implications of this are hugely significant. 
In terms of social morality the “scandal” reveals the shocking extent of 
paramilitary penetration of the state and society, and the disturbing levels of 
social support for the paramilitary project. Discussing human rights reporting 
and its conceptual limitations in terms of illuminating the “why” of violence and 
human rights violations, and the production of alternative “knowledge about 
resistance and agency, [which are] critical sites for understanding how 
violence affects local populations” (Tate 2007, p. 302), Winifred Tate cites a 
Colombian activist involved in local efforts at transforming politics: 
 
Our problem was the conception of human rights. We just focused on the 
military, on state responsibility. We didn’t see that behind the faces of the 
militares were the caciques, the political bosses. We reported the facts without 
judging who makes those facts happen. It is the same now, people talk about 
the paramilitaries, denounce the military. But who talks about the mayor, the 
council, what happens with that? It has taken a long time to realize the social 
and economic support for the paramilitaries. We didn’t think it would happen, 
didn’t think about the political project beyond the denuncia of the events. 
(Cited in Tate 2007, p. 302) 
 
                                                 
31 Source: http://www.verdadabierta.com/web3/parapolitica/nacional/1230-la-ultima-ola-de-la-
parapolitica 
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The social immersion of the paramilitary project, which is at its clearest in the 
documented structures of the Convivir security cooperatives, informants 
networks and links with the armed forces, is at its murkiest at the level of 
everyday social life, in the subjectivities, mentalities and interactions of 
everyday Colombians. If we take agency seriously, then it is not enough to 
focus solely on factors like coercion and intimidation in accounting for 
paramilitary support. We need to recognize the way ostensibly moral reasons, 
intentions and motives play a role. Equally, we need to exercise caution in too 
readily referring to “interests” as a factor in such social approbation. The 
diffuse grey areas have to be the subject of any attempt to understand the 
complex of factors that constitute individual and collective relations and 
responses to paramilitarism and its social, political and moral dimensions. 
 The notions of “social contract” and “refounding the nation” in the Ralito 
pact reveal more than some paramilitary ideologue’s attempts at sophistication 
and rationalization inasmuch as they imply the sociological reality of “new 
forms of social cohesion” (Cepeda and Rojas 2008, p. 134) that partly 
correspond to shifts in social structure and the generation of new moral 
frameworks and discourses. Iván Cepeda and Jorge Rojas observe:  
 
The power that the paramilitary project achieved in terms of the control of 
society and its institutions was omnipresent and forced a collective consensus. 
Under the form of consent obedience was produced. In a controlled society, 
each individual must make a public demonstration of their support for the 
predominant state of affairs. A conformity of the masses is created. That 
pressure comes from the fear of being rejected by the group or, even, of being 
excluded from society. The progressive imposition of silence becomes a 
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mechanism of adaptation to dominant opinion. That attitude leads to the 
gradual lowering of the threshold of ethical demands and to the general 
consent to crimes and violations of the law as minor infractions or necessary 
evils. (Cepeda and Rojas 2008, p. 154) 
 
But perhaps this is too neat and places too much emphasis on the coercive 
side of the equation, which must of course be taken into account. However, if 
we focus solely on this aspect we risk misunderstanding agency and missing 
other important factors in social “support” for the paramilitaries. We also 
thereby risk misunderstanding how moral consensus can be constructed and 
social reconciliation achieved. Any serious attempt to understand the moral 
dimensions of conflict (expressed partly in radical disagreements in relation to 
attitudes towards the state, paramilitaries, and guerrillas) and to seek a 
resolution in the form of some kind of moral-political consensus needs to look 
beyond force and coercion as explanations.  
 
Constructing the state 
The violent contestation in Colombia in which different armed groups have the 
ability to control territories and populations is seen by some theorists to be 
partly the result of the failure to consolidate the state (Ortiz 2007; Romero 
2003; Uribe 1990, 1999). However, from a MacIntyrean perspective the 
Hobbesian answer to this cannot work (see F. Giraldo 2008). Or rather, it 
cannot work without the gravest of costs in terms of social morality. As political 
philosopher Fabio Giraldo points out in relation to the “dilemma” of “dirty 
hands”- whether to achieve the monopoly of force “legally” or extra-legally, or, 
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in other terms, to “pacify” and “re-institutionalize” the country at significant 
“social and ethical costs”-: “a recognizable majority of the Colombian people, 
led by the current government and directed by the mass media, fervently 
concurs with the idea that the dilemma should be definitively resolved, without 
concern for the cost, in order to avoid what has already been paid spiritually 
and materially throughout fifty years of sustained violence” (F. Giraldo 2008, p. 
16). Yet this has too many troubling assumptions. It appears to see the 
violence in ahistorical terms, abstracting it from its social context, a context in 
which the state itself is a dominant actor in the conflict. It ignores the fact that 
the “dilemma” that the state now claims the authority to “resolve” was in 
significant part created by the state itself. The question must also be asked in 
light of the above discussion of moral agency: to what extent are those who 
support such a project in a position to be able to rationally evaluate the social 
and moral costs of constructing the state in this way? Whence derives the 
moral authority for taking such a morally significant decision? 
The evidence clearly shows that the violence in Colombia has been 
asymmetrically split between the state, paramilitaries and the guerrillas, with 
the state and paramilitaries responsible for roughly 65-70% of crimes 
connected to political violence, and the guerrillas responsible for approximately 
30-35%.32 As Jairo Ramírez, executive director of Colombia’s largest human 
rights network, the Permanent Committee for the Defence of Human Rights 
(CPDH), explained to me, the guerrillas have responsibility for massacres of 
civilians and forced displacement but “it is evident that the guerrillas have 
committed these on a much lesser scale, there is simply no comparison; a 
                                                 
i32 See Human Rights Watch 2001, The Sixth Division: Military-Paramilitary Ties and US Pol cy 
in Colombia. 
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symmetry cannot be established, responsibility is not equally divided. Doing so 
does a serious disservice to humanity. The fact is the paramilitaries have 
committed the vast majority of crimes, which is not just my own view but is 
established by the courts.”33 In this case it must be asked by what moral 
authority, by which moral standards, the state can claim the right to the 
monopoly of force? A further assumption appears to be that gaining the 
monopoly of force and constructing the state/re-institutionalizing the country 
means having to act immorally and with a modus operandi in which serious 
dialogue, negotiation and deep reflection are simply ruled out.  
Those who argue for the imposition of the state in terms of some form of 
consequentialist or cost-benefit calculus clearly adhere to the modern ethos in 
which ethics and politics - social morality and politics- are radically separate. 
The assumption appears to be that a viable and morally healthy political 
community can emerge on the basis of abstract “institution building” without 
taking into account how institutions need social legitimacy and, in MacIntyrean 
terms, the support of the virtues in order for them to flourish and serve the 
human good. Political institutions might enjoy social legitimacy in terms of their 
popular support (as is constantly repeated in Colombia, the president enjoys 
vast popular support), but public opinion is clearly manipulated in modern 
societies by the power and logic of the mass media, and in any case, 
legitimacy does not entail moral legitimacy. As political theorist David Held 
observes, what counts as legitimacy is also connected to particular moral and 
evaluative stances (Held 1989, pp. 101-102.) 
The emphasis on “state construction” as a partial answer to conflict is 
further problematic as it tends to rely on a picture of the Colombian state and 
                                                 
33 Interview, Bogotá, April 2008 
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Colombian democracy as “besieged” (Pizarro 2004), trapped in the middle of 
warring factions, which is a distortion. It portrays the state as a wholly abstract 
entity above the contestation of the conflict. The profound moral crisis of 
Colombian institutions is partly connected to rival conceptions of the state, 
political community, society and economy. The arguments for state-building 
therefore necessarily participate in the incommensurable moral-political 
contestation that exists at many levels within Colombian society. These 
arguments also lack philosophical coherence and, in a MacIntyrean 
perspective, suffer from the arbitrariness of liberal moral argumentation. For 
example, Iván Orozco has argued: 
 
It is problematic that we in the periphery and semi-periphery cannot rescue 
some distinctions and fundamental dilemmas from the historical process of the 
construction of the European states. Therefore, for example, to be able to 
affirm when a country is still immersed in civil war the primacy, even if only 
temporary, of negative peace over positive peace, of procedural and majority 
democracy over ethical-material democracy, of peace over justice and 
particularly of clemency over punishment, constitute strategic alternatives that 
must remain available for the people and their governors. (Orozco 2005, p. 
290) 
 
But it is clear that Orozco speaks in the name of a particular “we”. The fact of 
serious rival contestation of this view highlights the problem of morally 
justifying particular positions in respect of constructing the state and the 
required steps for conflict transformation, let alone reaching a moral 
consensus. I showed in chapter two how Orozco had to resort to discrediting 
the moral epistemology of certain human rights organizations and social 
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movements in the attempt to rationally support his own position. It was clear, 
however, that Orozco’s position could not be rationally supported and was in 
fact merely an arbitrary expression of preference in the emotivist mode.  
There is much emphasis on “state formation” as an important part of the 
answer to conflict, both from NGOs and in the academic literature (see Bolívar 
2006; González et al. 2002; González 2008; Orozco 2005). As I have pointed 
out, arguments about state construction implicitly presuppose normative 
positions. In many cases the modern European state is the implicit or explicit 
model deemed appropriate for Colombia. However, because MacIntyre is 
writing out of and in terms of the context of the “developed” and at least 
internally stable states, there is an important argumentative burden for those 
advocating his perspective in contexts like Colombia. Nevertheless, I argue 
that MacIntyre’s approach provides a necessary critical perspective on the 
modern state as well as highlighting the inevitable normative entanglements 
that advocacy of state construction and processes of state formation entail. 
MacIntyre brings to our attention that “institution building” and “strengthening” 
has an inherent moral dimension and cannot unproblematically be prescribed 
as a solution to Colombia’s institutional and social crisis.  
Besides MacIntyre’s critique of the modern state, the problem in 
prescribing European liberal states as models includes the fact that these 
liberal states appear to be unravelling in terms of their political justification and 
the moral dimension of their politics. In my view this is evident in the 
increasingly authoritarian treatment of dissent, the increasing cynicism of 
political discourse, and the inability to address adequately and rationally the 
problems of multiculturalism, and the failure (or, if you like, “success”) of 
capitalism. Nevertheless, it might be argued that these states have 
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implemented the “civil war by other means” that in Colombia would be a huge 
advance in terms of preventing violence. However, my argument is that 
Colombia not only is in no position to build this but that doing so necessarily 
entails engaging in morally questionable acts of violence and coercion. 
Moreover, the end result of a liberal state, even if it could be achieved, can 
only lead to the suppression of conflict and therefore to the likely probability of 
future conflict and violence. Further, by taking a MacIntyrean perspective on 
the issue, activists and theorists in Colombia can better address the deep-
rooted problem of radical conflict that has plagued its past and continues to 
plague its present.  
There is a tension between the rich and nuanced body of work that 
documents the complex and contestatory process of state formation in 
Colombia, and the normative theoretical work that advocates the modern 
liberal state as the “only viable option.” As González et al. point out, “it is 
important to underline that violence is generated not because of a “lack of 
state”, nor because of an excess of it, but rather due to conflictive relations 
between the state and society” (González et al. 2002, p. 225). These 
conflictive relations constitute an essential part of the conflict and therefore 
prescriptions for state construction unavoidably enter this contested terrain. In 
relation to the current conflict, prescriptions for state presence and the 
institutionalization of the country by the state need to be looked at critically- 
what kind of state is being advocated, what conception of citizenship does it 
embody, what socio-economic model does it imply, etc?  
The roots of Colombia’s multiple conflicts are seen to lie in the history of 
the tortuous construction of the state and the citizen-state relationship. The 
social problems generated by colonization of various relatively depopulated 
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departments by landless peasants created political tensions and problems. In 
many areas there were conflicts between state domination and communitarian 
forms of social regulation (see González et al. 2002, p. 265).  As González et 
al. point out, “The attitude of communities towards the centralizing efforts of 
the state depends…on the coincidence or not between the state and the local 
community on a concrete political interest as well as on cultural conceptions 
that the same community has of itself and the state” (González et al. 2002, p. 
287). The central state offended the hierarchical structures of certain local 
communities that held a conception of social order which revolved around 
Liberal and Conservative families who regulated access to public posts and 
services. González et al. observe,  
 
The successful resistance of traditional powers has managed to block the 
efforts of the state to expand its dominion over society. This means that the 
modern, impersonal and bureaucratic institutions of the state must continually 
negotiate with the existing local and regional power structures. This obstructs 
the modernizing demands of the central state but at the same time moderates 
its excessively centralizing and homogenizing tendencies, which generally 
express the mentality of technocratic elites who are ignorant of regional and 
local diversity. (González et al. 2002, p. 293) 
 
However, we need to exercise caution in classifying resistance to the state 
solely in terms of implied “backwards”, “traditional” and “clientelist” 
communities and social forms. As Ingrid Bolívar notes, liberal political 
philosophy, political science and sociology have tended to classify forms of 
social and political relationships and formation in terms of “primary”/“modern” 
 200
and “traditional” identities. “‘Real’ politics was seen to be the arrival of 
citizenship in the dark world of traditional identities; as if such traditional 
identities were not constructed and contested”, she points out (Bolívar 2006, p. 
10. See also Sanders 2004). Bolívar explicitly highlights the normative 
problematic of viewing processes of political formation and state construction 
in light of implicitly loaded, normative categories like “modernity” and “modern 
citizenship” (Bolívar 2006,  p. 21).  
I suggest that Colombia’s historical state-building trajectory is a kind of 
photographic negative of the European state-building process that reveals the 
ultimately arbitrary and non-rational nature of that project in terms of its 
normative justifications (the myth of the social contract, etc.) The geographical 
and socio-cultural realities and complexities of Colombia have meant that no 
one central force has been able to impose the state and successfully 
retrospectively justify it in terms of the social contract myth. The discursive 
element of forging a national political community has therefore remained 
transparent and has not been mystified or pushed to the margins of collective 
consciousness as with the European state-building process. Therefore, and 
given MacIntyre’s diagnosis, an alternative moral-political philosophy is 
required for understanding how a rationally justifiable conception of political 
community can be elaborated and constructed. 
 
The ambiguities of human rights 
The radical breakdown in dialogue and shared moral referents highlighted by 
Camilo Torres in the 1960s, which was ultimately understood in terms of class 
polarization, has also come to fracture movements for human rights and social 
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change, adding a further dimension to the moral crisis. I suggest part of the 
moral degeneration of Colombian society has to be connected to the confusion 
and discrediting of human rights as a discourse and moral framework, which is 
related to MacIntyre’s diagnosis of how morality has become a free-floating 
idiom, available for ideological deployment. The devaluation of human rights is 
arguably one important reason for the lowering of individual and social moral 
thresholds. The extent of social and political polarization in Colombia has also 
contributed to the instrumentalization of human rights (Restrepo 2001), but 
more is at issue than mere ideological use. The Colombian situation simply 
more clearly reveals the way moral discourse is always somebody’s particular 
discourse. The appeal to human rights has been made within very different 
social contexts and milieus, and the incoherencies and disagreements within 
the human rights “community” reflect this and the deeper philosophical 
problems of emotivism and incommensurability. This calls into question the 
view of one Colombian philosopher who argues: 
 
Given that no agreement can exist between people without rules that fix limits 
to what is permitted and prohibited, the need for a foundational ethical code is 
made clear. In our time, human rights and International Humanitarian Law 
ostensibly serve as such a foundation and come prior to any particular content 
to the public policies that the opposing parties negotiate. The principles 
stipulated therein provide the ethical and juridical conditions for any possible 
accord and therefore adherence to them cannot remain at the discretion of the 
disputants. (Tovar González 2002, p. 50) 
 
The problem is that moral rules and norms, as MacIntyre points out, 
presuppose an important degree of prior social and moral agreement. 
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Moreover, human rights as enshrined in international declarations and charters 
are the product of particular, contestable social and political contexts and 
forms. They do not in fact come “prior” to any political content but are 
intimately connected to and emerge out of particular political contexts, 
structures and ideological standpoints. 
The first human rights organizations in Colombia emerged from 
embattled leftist political movements struggling for recognition and social 
transformation in the closed National Front political system in an era of 
aggressive U.S. imperialism. Originally wary of the discourse of human rights- 
many felt it was irredeemably compromised because of its “bourgeois” origins 
and ideological usefulness and affinity to capitalism and US interests- activists 
eventually adopted the framework but naturally interpreted and coloured it in 
terms of their political, social and cultural visions and agendas (see Assman 
1978). Many activists were initiated into the human rights framework by 
participation in consciousness-raising groups organized through the Catholic 
Church, universities and trade unions. The influence of liberation theology in 
particular left its imprint on the first human rights activists. These activists 
focused on social and economic rights as much as political and civil rights and 
were driven by an agenda of profound social change. As liberation theologian 
José Comblin noted, given the background of the horrendous repression 
experienced under the National Security regimes it was not surprising that the 
various declarations of the Church and social organizations regarding human 
rights were not “theoretical studies of an ethical doctrine conducted in a 
vacuum. They [were] public acts of confrontation with a political system” 
(Comblin 1979, p. 105). The state was naturally viewed as the enemy.  
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The liberation theologians gradually moved towards a nuanced 
appropriation of human rights that fitted with the “preferential option for the 
poor” (Engler 2000), and a partiality in human rights language was permitted 
on the basis that it was unnecessary to defend the rights of those whose rights 
were not at risk (Comblin 1990). As Winifred Tate points out, “These views 
profoundly shaped the kinds of violence on which early human rights 
campaigns focused…The ambivalence toward guerrilla violence extended from 
defending individuals accused of participation in guerrilla groups to defending 
the rights of guerrilla groups themselves, using the so-called right to rebellion” 
(Tate 2007, p. 104).  
Tate traces the development of these first politicized human rights 
groups through to the early 1990s when many became properly professional 
organizations with paid as opposed to voluntary staff, and with increasing 
connections to the also emerging state human rights agencies and 
international organizations. This amounted to a seismic shift in the landscape 
of human rights culture and activism that sparked emotional debates within. A 
particularly important debate centred on the issue of documenting and 
categorising guerrilla violence. For the newly professionalized organisations, 
guerrilla violence had to be categorised either as human rights abuses or 
violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). In contrast, for those whose 
understanding of human rights was formed in the course of engagement with 
radical politics the very idea of criticizing the guerrillas and documenting their 
violence was unthinkable. In response to suggestions by another human rights 
activist that they document guerrilla violence, instead of invoking the 
theoretical argument that only states are party to international human rights 
treaties and therefore only states can violate human rights, one human rights 
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activist in Tate’s account invoked the narrative of political persecution and 
social injustice from which the guerrillas emerged and with which early 
activists sympathised and identified. For such activists, human rights are 
inscribed and given meaning within the context and practice of political 
struggle for social transformation. As one activist commented, “What is not 
easy is to recognize that in this country when people are killed because of 
what they think, the guerrilla is legitimate [sic]. And that the state is not 
legitimate, to think that it is recognised by the international community. What 
am I basing this on? On human rights” (cited in Tate 2007, p. 166). This 
speaks to the problem of deciding what is and who are legitimate (cf. Arango 
2002, pp. 18-19) as well as indicating the kind of dichotomous moral thinking 
characteristic of the discourse about the conflict in Colombia.  
For the externally funded professional organisations like the Colombian 
Commission of Jurists, in contrast, the human rights organizations had to 
support and address the victims of all the armed actors in the conflict. This was 
partly out of a conviction that the “violent abuse of the innocent and 
defenseless [was] indicative of larger patterns of social injustice” (Tate 2007, p. 
150) and partly out of pragmatic concern for continued international diplomatic 
support and funding. For activists on this side of the debate, human rights did 
not displace their political convictions but rather provided a different framework 
for their continued political activism.  
But every concept appealed to refers us back to another dimension of 
the conflict and the discussion. So the notion of the “innocent and defenseless” 
is bound up with one way of reading the violence and the conflict as well as 
with a particular view of individual agency in relation to it. The shift in the 
1990s towards a humanitarian reading of the conflict and the urgency of 
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attending to millions of displaced people arguably contributed to a view of 
“passive” victims in need of “paternalistic” humanitarian intervention. In the 
view of one human rights lawyer, the notion of “protecting the innocent” is far 
more complicated than merely appealing for IHL to be adhered to. The reality 
of war and the nature of power mean that the abstract principles of IHL cannot 
simply be “applied” to such a context. “The war involves everyone. Who is 
outside of the conflict? How can we distinguish who is part of the war and who 
is not? In the logic of IHL, everything is untouchable” (cited in Tate 2007, p. 
166).  
For likeminded activists, adopting IHL to criticize the guerrillas would 
fuel the government’s campaign to deflect accountability and responsibility for 
political violence. Documentation of guerrilla violations and public censure by 
human rights organizations would, so it was argued, be used to shift attention 
from the state’s overwhelming responsibility for the violence. In this sense 
Colombian human rights organisations had a “political” conception of human 
rights. They have been criticised for adopting such a “political” conception of 
human rights instead of an “ethical” conception (Restrepo 2001). However, 
from a MacIntyrean perspective there can be no such thing as a purely 
“ethical” conception of human rights. Human rights, as with any moral concept 
and framework, necessarily imply or are embedded within some conception of 
the good and therefore some political conception and vision.  
But other human rights organizations took a different view. Some 
argued for the inclusion of IHL as a category for censuring the guerrillas on the 
basis that not doing so would undermine their credibility and legitimacy. When 
an important number of Colombian NGOs took the decision to integrate IHL 
into their frameworks and to condemn guerrilla “kidnappings” and forced 
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disappearances after national level discussions, “At stake were the diplomatic 
relationships. No one doubted the benefit of having the embassies on board. 
They were huge pillars of support in dark times”, as one activist recounted 
(cited in Tate 2007, p. 164). In order to keep these diplomatic ties the NGOs 
therefore had to “take a position” (ibid., p. 164). The final declaration in support 
of this move was read by a prominent activist who had suffered a forced 
disappearance in her own family, allegedly “giving her greater moral authority 
to argue the position”, as Tate puts it (ibid., p. 164). However, this implies the 
arbitrary modern notion of moral authority critiqued by MacIntyre.  
The episode reveals the moral complexities and ambiguities faced by 
social activists in Colombia but also underlines the philosophical incoherence 
of “moral” positions and evaluations in the context of international human rights 
activism. Activists are forced to divorce their moral reasoning from the 
concrete history and context of the conflict and to make moral judgements on 
the basis of pragmatic considerations. These considerations might of course 
themselves be based on further moral evaluations in terms of ultimate 
consequences, but this nevertheless risks making the internal issues less 
determinate and more abstract. The logic of international human rights 
defence inevitably moves in this direction and risks leaving social activists 
morally resourceless and ineffective within the specifically Colombian context 
of seeking social transformation. The important gains in international profile 
that can have significant impacts in impeding state violence, for example, can 
also bring significant costs in terms of establishing a precedent for the state to 
judge guerrilla actions which, for many activists, whilst deplorable in many 
ways are nonetheless deeply political and historically rooted. This can lead to 
the establishment of a moral framework that is inappropriate for addressing 
 207
and transforming the particular social, political and moral dimensions of the 
conflict and, moreover, also has important implications in terms of moral truth. 
The professionalization of human rights organizations also served to 
highlight internal class differences within the Colombian human rights 
community. Some activists complained that international funding saw once 
radically committed activists shift to ambiguous positions with different 
interests. The interests of the “international community” and the matrix of 
global institutions through which human rights activism was channelled meant, 
from the perspective of some activists, the inevitable neutering of a wider 
transformatory and oppositional agenda. “In the name of professionalism, 
activists were forced to use diplomatic, officialist language, ‘light’ language, 
and weaken their critique of the state, hiding the seriousness of the human 
rights situation and the depth of state responsibility” (Tate 2007, pp. 153-154). 
As Tate points out, the stakes are high in these debates in terms of both 
gaining domestic constituencies and international support. The proliferation of 
human rights and other NGOs has brought with it a dependency on, and a 
competition for, external funding. Beyond this though there are issues of 
personal moral-political identity. As Tate observes, “For activists, these 
debates also signal a shift in political identity and culture; they must decide 
whether or not they align themselves with radical left movements for social 
transformation or with an international movement that uses human rights 
norms to protect vulnerable citizens, establish accountability, and work for 
social transformation through the defence of the rule of law” (Tate 2007, p. 
163). These are significant, consequential issues for Colombian activists, 
which are also philosophically and practically important in terms of how the 
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kind of social transformation envisioned and worked towards is bound up with 
one or another moral framework for interpreting and using human rights. 
A decisive shift in the Colombian human rights landscape occurred in 
the years immediately following the historic change of the Constitution in 1991. 
Colombian human rights activists played a significant role in rewriting the 
charter, which dramatically expanded the kinds of rights enshrined in the 
previous Constitution as well as creating new mechanisms through which 
citizens could claim the implementation of rights denied to them. The 
experience of those activists who engaged in lobbying the members of the 
Constitutional Assembly translated into optimism about engaging with the state 
on issues of human rights and effecting social change “from within”. Perhaps 
inspired by this ostensibly more positive political climate, in 1992 an important 
group of fifty Colombian intellectuals wrote an open letter to the leadership of 
the FARC, the largest guerrilla group that was not involved in the 
demobilizations and peace talks that preceded the constitutional changes, 
condemning the armed struggle and urging them to seek change through 
political means. In line with the emerging shift in positions amongst the 
Colombian human rights organizations the intellectuals made reference to 
human rights in their letter: “Your war, understandable in the beginning, now 
goes against the tide of history. Kidnapping, coercion, forced contributions, 
which are today your most effective instruments, are all abominable violations 
of human rights…Your war, gentlemen, lost its historical relevance some time 
ago” (cited in Bergquist et al. 2001, pp. 214-215).  
Whereas human rights were once appealed to by those who justified or 
sympathized with guerrilla struggle, they were now seen to raise a moral 
barrier to the kind of actions required by such struggle. The reference to 
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history is revealing as its use here effectively implies the irrelevance of history 
to the moral evaluation of the war and to moral evaluation per se.34 “Historical 
relevance” appears to be measured by the “tide of history”, which, it is implied, 
is one of progress, rights, and civil society. I see this particular moral 
judgement as the photographic negative of the historical determinist morality of 
Stalinism that MacIntyre so cogently critiques. The “tide of history” and the 
conception of human rights appealed to are reflections of a particular social 
order. They are ultimately arbitrary notions that stand outside of history. The 
guerrillas are condemned on the basis of “human rights”, which are what are 
held to be “relevant”, and in contrast the entire social and political trajectory of 
the guerrillas is deemed historically irrelevant. Because the guerrillas are not 
marching in tune to the “relevance” of liberal morality, their actions can simply 
be morally condemned. The question is why the so-called “tide of history” is 
more relevant than the actual and particular history of guerrilla struggle in 
Colombia in relation to any moral evaluation. MacIntyre provides the answer. 
The “tide of history” is simply the historical dominance of liberal, autonomous, 
arbitrary morality in which human rights, although embodying many profound 
human moral aspirations that have been formulated and discovered through 
social struggles for modern citizenship, are an increasingly arbitrary and 
abstract set of norms that are increasingly put, purposefully or inadvertently, to 
ideological use.  
The differences within the Colombian human rights and social activist 
community over the interpretation of the scope and implications of human 
rights as a framework for analyzing and denouncing violence therefore reveal, 
                                                 
34 The argument neglects the history of the Patriotic Union, which by 1992 had seen thousands 
of its members and militants murdered. More on this below. 
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and are a reflection of, social fissures and fragmentation. The continuously 
evolving nature of the conflict means that activists are constantly forced to 
rethink and reframe the categories and classifications they use for defining and 
denouncing violent acts. The debate over the appropriate classification of state 
and guerrilla violence in terms of the two different schemes of human rights 
and IHL is intricately bound up with historical, philosophical and moral 
standpoints and frameworks.  
These can of course shift. The debate within CINEP over how their 
database on political violence is to be analytically framed has shifted over the 
years and led to different stances at different times. I spoke to current director 
Mauricio García Durán about the nature of this debate. He underlined how it 
had and would continue to have serious implications for the dynamics of the 
conflict and the discussion about the conflict. He gave the example of how 
“there was a debate…about whether the blowing up of electricity pylons could 
be considered a legitimate act of war, which would mean it could not be 
classified as a violation of IHL, or vice versa.”35 This speaks directly to the 
normative problematic of the social sciences but in this case has particularly 
clear implications for the conflict, for the kind of knowledge produced about it, 
how this will affect many different people’s views, the way the state will react, 
etc. We then spoke about the differences in view between the Colombian 
government and certain civil society organizations in relation to human rights 
and the conflict:  
 
I think that underlying the whole discussion ultimately what is at issue is the 
question of the legitimacy or lack of legitimacy of political violence. This has 
                                                 
35 Interview, Bogotá, April 2008 
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two angles: the legitimacy of the guerrillas’ armed struggle and, on the other 
side, the legitimacy of the struggle against the guerrillas. These are two 
competing narratives. There is also a third narrative in the midst of these about 
the legitimacy of opening democratic horizons without resort to violence.36 
 
I also spoke to Father Javier Giraldo of the Inter-Church Commission for 
Justice and Peace about this debate. He explained the differences in position 
between CINEP and Justice and Peace, the two organizations that 
collaborated on the “Noche y Niebla” database on political violence. At one 
point the collaboration between the two organizations stopped due to 
insuperable differences in relation to characterising and categorizing acts of 
violence. CINEP and Justice and Peace then separated their databases and 
analyzed conflict data through their respective lenses. However, a 
rapprochement occurred after the intervention of a former head of CINEP, who 
argued that this had serious implications for the victims of violence so they 
ought to work out their differences and attempt to develop a shared analytic 
framework. This was gradually achieved, with Father Giraldo doing the bulk of 
the intellectual work on the model. However, the fragility of the consensus is 
real and could shift again. As Father Giraldo told me, the decision to adopt the 
perspective in which the state is seen as the only agent that can violate human 
rights (in terms of the political violence) and the guerrillas violate IHL, “was 
very polemical. CINEP accepted it after a negotiation between the director of 
Justice and Peace and the director of CINEP, but it was imposed against the 
                                                 
36 Interview, Bogotá, April 2008 
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wishes of many researchers in CINEP who did not accept it as an appropriate 
framework.”37  
Father Giraldo told me how the issue tended to centre on the notion of 
“impartiality”. There was a strong perception amongst many in CINEP and 
other organizations that they had to take an “impartial” and “symmetrical” 
position in respect of classifying and denouncing acts of political violence. 
Father Giraldo felt strongly that this was misleading and dangerous:  
 
The recourse to symmetry is very common amongst the intellectual community 
and the Church. During the time I worked as executive secretary of Justice 
and Peace I was subjected to intense pressure by my religious superiors to 
adopt a symmetrical position in the way Bishop Rivera did in El Salvador after 
the death of Bishop Romero. The guerrillas would commit two or three violent 
acts a week and the government three hundred, but he would choose three 
acts of the government’s and three of the guerrillas’ to achieve a total balance, 
which would always give the impression that there was a symmetrical 
violence, not a greater or lesser violence in which one was more legitimate 
than the other, but in which everything was equal. This was done in an artificial 
way to force the appearance of symmetry.38 
 
The view of IHL “as universal, equalitarian and equidistant guidelines for 
judging violations and abuses of human rights of all actors in the conflict” 
(Orozco 2005, p. 354) has generated ongoing debate and controversy related 
to the characterization of the conflict and the violence. The problem is that 
these supposedly “equalitarian” guidelines are both abstracted from social and 
                                                 
37 Interview, Bogotá, May 2008 
38 Interview, Bogotá, May 2008 
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political contexts but are inevitably formulated and used within particular social 
and political contexts and structures.  
Within the terms of a MacIntyrean perspective on ethics this tendency 
might be connected to the dominant liberal notion of morality as an 
autonomous realm of pure reason, and to the liberal conception of moral 
agency as expressed in abstract reflection on the rational precepts enjoined by 
morality as such, rather than as embedded and embodied reflection in 
particular historical, social and cultural contexts and social relationships. In 
resonance with a MacIntyrean position, Father Giraldo criticized the way 
“many intellectuals” who adopt the moral position of “impartiality” and 
“symmetry” do so at a great social distance from the concrete social milieus 
and struggles of those who are the objects of such moral evaluation: “They 
have a problem of conscience in that they are far removed from the people 
who suffer and yet they consider themselves upright and just in comparison to 
the rest who are the morally bad ones, who are ubiquitous; the good ones are 
those who coolly observe and take a symmetrical position, those who do not 
do this are the morally questionable ones.”39  
This desire for “balance”, “impartiality” and “symmetry” is arguably 
connected to dominant liberal moral assumptions, which as I argued in chapter 
two are firmly embedded in the so-called ethics of minimums/citizenship ethics 
approaches. The liberal view of the state as “neutral”, and of the “democratic” 
political arena as having reached a consensus on a “moral” position that 
condemns violence impartially, whether of the left or right, is prevalent in the 
Colombian discussion (see Villegas 2008). What it ignores is not only the fact 
that this is factually and historically highly questionable, but also that the 
                                                 
39 Interview, Bogotá, May 2008 
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impartial, “moral point of view” that passes judgement on certain acts of the 
guerrillas or the paramilitaries ignores the systematic role of the state in the 
conflict and the fact that such a moral point of view inevitably presupposes a 
particular evaluative stance in relation to the dominant political and social 
order, a stance that on a MacIntyrean perspective must necessarily be called 
into question in terms of its rational justification. 
 
Ambiguities of the armed struggle 
Yet the question of morally evaluating guerrilla actions remains. As Mauricio 
García put it,  
 
I think the Left and many human rights organizations have not been sufficiently 
critical of guerrilla abuses and have lacked a critical stance in relation to the 
armed struggle generally. Let’s say that a basic assumption has been to 
accept the legitimacy of armed struggle without questioning its effects or the 
relation of its legitimacy to minimal ethical standards. I think there is a 
schizophrenia in terms of discourse; the legitimacy of the armed struggle is 
defended but there is no capacity to evaluate the kind of military and political 
acts demanded by such legitimacy. There are very complex issues and 
situations in relation to this separation of discourse and practice.40 
 
One of the most tragic and painful episodes in Colombia’s recent history was 
the annihilation of the Patriotic Union (UP) political party in the 1980s by an 
alliance of drug-traffickers, paramilitaries, and active and retired army officers 
(see Dudley 2004). Emerging from formal peace negotiations between the 
                                                 
40 Interview, Bogotá, April 2008 
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state and the FARC under the Belisario Betancur government in 1984, the 
Patriotic Union represented for the first time in Colombian history a genuinely 
independent opposition to the dominant twin-party system. In its first local, 
regional and national elections the UP made relatively significant gains, 
winning seats in Congress, mayoralties, and various regional assembly seats. 
Viewed by its enemies amongst the landowning and cattle-ranching classes as 
the armed wing of the FARC, the party’s civilian militants were ruthlessly 
hunted down, tortured and murdered. By the early 1990s some 3000 of its 
militants had been assassinated, including the party’s two presidential 
candidates, Jaime Pardo Leal and Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa (Dudley 2004).  
 The ambiguities of the FARC’s struggle for social change are 
highlighted by this tragic case. With the Colombian Communist Party having 
maintained (in contrast to the rest of the world’s Communist parties) its 
adhesion to the doctrine of “all forms of struggle” (Brittain 2009), the UP, of 
which the Communist Party was a principal component, presented an 
ambiguous face to Colombian society. Notwithstanding the ideologically 
motivated claims of its sworn enemies who were virulently “anti-Communist” 
and opposed to any challenge to the status quo, the combination of electoral 
politics with ongoing armed struggle, despite a formally declared ceasefire by 
the FARC, was enough to raise some legitimate concerns about the modus 
operandi of the FARC through the UP. The possibility of “armed clientelism” 
(cf. Peñate 1997), by which is meant the historically rooted practice of 
establishing electoral clienteles through a combination of patronage and the 
insinuated threat of violence, was real. The ambiguous meshing of armed 
struggle and legal political activity arguably contributed to a blurring of ethical 
boundaries and to the maintenance of violence as a perceived legitimate 
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option for all political forces. Under the pretext of “self-defence” against 
guerrilla violence that it was claimed used the UP as a cover, reactionary 
political forces found a useful rationalization for using violence to further their 
own political ends. As we have seen, this dynamic continues today in the case 
of the para-politics phenomenon whereby legal political parties formed 
alliances with far-right paramilitary organizations. 
Those who retain sympathy with the guerrillas’ political project 
recognize that the guerrillas have substantially changed from the initial core of 
peasants that formed “self-defence” militias in response to the violence of 
landowners and the state. Today they are a sophisticated, militarily powerful 
organization that wants to take power, which has arguably only been possible 
through engaging in activities like “kidnappings”/“retentions”, alliances with 
drug processors and traffickers, weapons smuggling, etc. The logic of 
engaging in guerrilla warfare has obliged the guerrillas to engage in these 
activities, yet at what point do these activities cross moral boundaries? Despite 
the asymmetry between the guerrillas and the paramilitaries/state, the fact is 
that responsibility for 30 percent of killings, forced displacement, etc. amounts 
to a serious level of morally transgressive activity by any moral 
framework’s/tradition’s standards. Have the guerrillas lost their moral 
compass? Do they adhere to a means-ends morality akin to the Stalinist 
morality that MacIntyre criticizes?  
The impact on moral agency of the structure of guerrilla organizations 
and the nature of their activities is surely significant. From a MacIntyrean 
perspective, the moral evaluation of the guerrillas would need to consider how 
they have embodied the modern ethos found in Marxism as well as liberalism. 
The radical shifts in social context and the nature of the guerrilla movements 
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need to be taken into account in any evaluation of guerrilla actions. MacIntyre 
argues that “Attempts to reform the political systems of modernity from within 
are always transformed into collaborations with them. Attempts to overthrow 
them always degenerate into terrorism or quasi terrorism” (MacIntyre 1998d, p. 
265). Thus from a MacIntyrean standpoint we should expect guerrilla 
movements to morally degenerate, to lose the moral resources adequate to 
resistance. In MacIntyre’s view, Marxists have misunderstood the nature of 
rational self-determination and also adhere to the ideology of bureaucratic 
authority. This leads them to misapprehend the nature of morality. As Ezequiel 
Adamovsky points out, “One of the most serious tragedies of the Left tradition 
has been (and still is) its refusal to consider the ethical dimension of political 
struggle” (Adamovsky 2008, p. 353).  
In Colombia one of the most troubling aspects of the guerrillas’ activities 
has been their imposition upon and disregard for the autonomous political and 
social processes of the indigenous movements. Their physical attacks on 
indigenous communities, who should be considered allies of the guerrillas’ 
ostensible project of defending the poor, are justified in extremely 
unsatisfactory ways. They frequently claim that indigenous leaders work for the 
paramilitaries or favour the state and the army. This not only denies the difficult 
situation that the indigenous movements find themselves in where they 
inevitably have contact with the armed forces and the paramilitaries against 
their will, but is also testimony to the guerrillas’ overly simplistic analytic and 
moral schema in terms of which indigenous negotiation and contact with the 
state is read as “collaboration”.  
The desire of the indigenous movements for social and political 
“autonomy” has been denigrated by some Marxist intellectuals. For example, 
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Jasmin Hristov writing from a Marxist perspective in the Journal of Peasant 
Studies writes:  “The contrast between the approach of the FARC and ELN 
and that of the CRIC [Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca] is obvious: while 
the CRIC is concerned merely with enhancing the well-being of the indigenous 
population living in communities under its administration, the FARC had – and 
has – a much wider programme that involved social, economic and political 
transformation at the national level” (Hristov 2005, pp. 105-106). However, the 
indigenous organizations would surely contest that they are “merely” 
concerned with their own communities and would contend, rather, that their 
project contains essential elements for any national project of social 
transformation. In this way rival conceptions of the good, of the strategies 
appropriate to, and the nature of, social transformation are in contention.  
The above comments are also blind to the way the FARC have 
undermined and openly attacked the indigenous political project and how their 
ruthless sectarian infighting with other guerrilla movements has compromised 
possibilities for radical social transformation. According to activists I spoke to 
this was notably the case in Urabá where the FARC’s attacks on the EPL 
guerrillas helped the paramilitary organizations and undermined social and 
community organizations’ work (see also Ortiz 2007; Suárez 2007).41 Hristov 
admonishes the CRIC for not siding with the FARC to build a “united rural and 
systemic opposition to neoliberalism”, yet neglects to mention how the FARC’s 
militaristic approach has outweighed serious political initiatives in recent years 
and has served as another pretext for the state to crush these important and 
promising movements.  
                                                 
41 The FARC are also engaged in an internecine war with the ELN in Arauca department, 
which has led to the deaths of several civilians in the last month (June 2010). 
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The moral onus is on the FARC to provide a justification for their actions 
and the consequences they bring. However, the FARC’s moral justifications 
have increasingly resembled emotivist assertion and simply resorted to the 
delegitimization of the obvious moral hypocrisy of the state and paramilitaries 
rather than putting forward a rationally grounded moral position of their own. I 
suggest the divorce of theory and discourse from alternative forms of social 
practice lies behind this. The increasing mimicry of the guerrillas and 
paramilitaries, and the guerrillas’ own aspirations to be a state and to supplant 
the state in the regions it controls mean that, on a MacIntyrean view, they must 
lack the moral resources for a non-arbitrary form of discourse and a 
corresponding rationally grounded moral practice.  
The link between abstract, autonomous theory and the guerrillas’ 
attitude and behaviour towards the indigenous movements is highlighted by 
Hristov’s comment that “True empowerment of the indigenous population…is 
accordingly impossible without first confronting – and then dismantling – the 
national class structure which controls the state and thus drives the policies of 
violence and force inflicted on them locally. In short, and rather obviously, 
eliminating grassroots poverty and violence requires changing the system as a 
whole, and the failure of CRIC to address this can be considered a major 
weakness” (Hristov 2005, p. 106). Here we can perceive the ideology of 
expertise that MacIntyre argues underlies both modern managers and 
revolutionaries; a Marxist intellectual presumes to know what “true 
empowerment” of the indigenous population is. Secure in this knowledge the 
guerrillas can therefore justify their actions and their means on the basis of the 
ends they seek. The indigenous communities are implicitly taken to be 
suffering from ideological distortion whereas the theorist is able to peel back 
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the masks of reality, to see what really “drives the policies of violence and 
force inflicted on them” and thereby finds a justification for bringing about the 
necessary changes, which it is implied in this case require armed struggle and 
the subsequent militarization of Indian reserves against their wishes.  
 
Towards a MacIntyrean moral ethnography 
The moral crisis in Colombia is a complex amalgam of action and discourse 
that encompasses concrete social and political actions, justifications for and 
narratives about such actions, and theoretical accounts and explanations of 
them. In many ways the Colombian conflict is a large-scale radiography of the 
moral disorder of modernity that MacIntyre diagnoses. Conflict about the 
conflict is evident in social scientific analysis of the conflict and implicitly and 
explicitly in moral philosophical reflection on it. As MacIntyre puts it, “Moral 
philosophy, as it is dominantly understood, reflects the debates and 
disagreements of the culture so faithfully that its controversies turn out to be 
unsettlable in just the way that the political and moral debates themselves are” 
(MacIntyre 1985a, p. 252).  
 MacIntyre’s proposal is for a radical re-conceptualization of the 
relationship between theory and practice such that social, political and moral 
conflicts (which on a MacIntyrean view all ultimately come under the purview of 
the moral) become more tractable. The implications of MacIntyre’s philosophy 
are radical, if not revolutionary. It points towards a participatory politics of the 
common good in which theory emerges from concrete social practice such that 
rationally grounded criteria of choice, evaluation, critique and action might be 
developed.  
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 MacIntyre’s philosophical framework and argument has empirical 
content inasmuch as it presupposes “a sociology which aspires to lay bare the 
empirical, causal connection between virtues, practices and institutions” and 
“provides an explanatory scheme which can be tested in particular cases” 
(MacIntyre 1985a, p. 196). His thesis, he points out, also has empirical content 
in another way; it entails that “without the virtues there could be a recognition 
only of what I have called external goods and not at all of internal goods in the 
context of practices” (ibid., p. 196). MacIntyre adds that any society in which 
only external goods were recognized would soon descend into Hobbes’ state 
of nature. Divorcing theory from contexts of shared practices, and divorcing 
practices from a theory of the good and of the virtues, risks allowing external 
goods to occupy our ‘existential horizons’ as well as our social horizons. In a 
MacIntyrean view, the divided and compartmentalized modern selves of our 
Western social order need to be healed through the reconstruction of moral 
character that is the cornerstone of the reconstruction of political community 
and shared social life- coexistence that does not mask conflict but which, when 
it does erupt, implements civil war by other, more rational means.  
Andy Alexis-Baker (2007) has suggested that MacIntyre’s philosophy 
presupposes a particular moral stance in relation to social change: that of non-
violence. However, MacIntyre’s own tradition of Thomistic Aristotelianism 
allows for the possibility of a just war, and some of MacIntyre’s later arguments 
about the requirements of the virtues explicitly allow for the use of 
proportionate violence in defending particular common goods from external 
threat (see MacIntyre 2006h, p. 135). Nevertheless, what MacIntyre does 
argue is that any shared project of rational enquiry into the common good 
forbids us “to endanger gratuitously each other’s life, liberty or property” 
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(MacIntyre 2006a, p. 78). The precepts necessary to and presupposed by 
shared rational enquiry “will forbid us ever to take innocent lives, to inflict other 
kinds of bodily harm on the innocent, and fail in respect for the legitimate 
property of others” (ibid., p. 79). Further, these precepts “are universal in their 
scope”: “There is no one with whom I may not find myself in the future a 
partner in deliberation concerned with some good or goods that we have in 
common. Therefore there is no one with whom my relationships can be in 
violation of these precepts” (ibid., p. 79). Moreover, these precepts are 
exceptionless in that they constitute the necessary conditions for all 
cooperative rational enquiry.  
On a MacIntyrean perspective, therefore, the social relationships within 
a shared mode of rational enquiry must be structured by these exceptionless 
norms, which for MacIntyre express the precepts of the natural law. So here 
MacIntyre makes an argument that at first sight seems not too far removed 
from the Habermasian and neo-Kantian arguments of the ethics of minimums 
and citizenship ethics approaches I critiqued in chapter two. Moreover, are not 
these allegedly universal precepts part of another contending, partial and 
situated moral perspective that is only as rationally justifiable as any other?  
To the first point the response is that, in contrast to the neo-Kantian 
perspective, MacIntyre argues that these shared, minimal norms arise from the 
presuppositions of our deliberations in respect of particular social practices. 
Such deliberation does not seek the “moral point of view” or the “strictly 
normative” in abstraction from our particular social and cultural practices. The 
minimal set of deliberative norms that we must inevitably come to see as 
universal are not meant to, nor could they, ground a consensus on justice, on 
what is right, but are what are required for philosophical enquiry and 
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deliberation into which one of our contending, often implicit, conceptions of the 
good, of our ultimate end, is the correct one. Through the realization of the 
facts of moral conflict in terms of rival conceptions of the good and human 
flourishing we are led not to enquire into what the norms of rationality tell us 
about justice/what is right (because on a MacIntyrean view these are always 
located within wider conceptions of the good), but to ask “what good reasons 
we have for taking the conception of human flourishing that has been 
embodied in our actions and relationships up to this point to be the most 
adequate conception available to us” (MacIntyre 2006a, p. 71).  
MacIntyre points out that disagreements concerning the truth of 
theoretical accounts of human flourishing and the human end first come to our 
attention indirectly in the form of practical disagreements about what we ought 
to do here and now in a given situation. In the face of these disagreements 
rationality (understood within the terms of MacIntyre’s Thomism) requires that 
we deliberate further with others about how to resolve such disagreements. 
MacIntyre says that it has not been sufficiently remarked that deliberation is by 
its nature an essentially social activity, which is required as a safeguard 
against the one-sidedness and prejudice that are a constant risk of isolated, 
individual deliberation. Yet because social deliberation can be equally 
misleading and dangerous, the virtues of objectivity are required. “So it is not 
just that deliberation will fail unless it is social, but also that the social 
relationships in question have to be governed by norms of objectivity. And we 
can only hope to resolve deliberative disagreements rationally with others who 
agree with us in respecting certain norms of objectivity” (ibid., p. 74).  
Certainly MacIntyre is assuming a social context in which deliberation is 
itself recognized as a necessary part of the transactions of social and political 
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life. Completely Hobbesian, asocial contexts must lack even the most basic 
shared assumptions necessary for conceiving what deliberation means 
beyond the isolated deliberation of assessing the best means to the ends of 
the external goods of power, wealth and “security”. But this is why MacIntyre 
insists that it is only within certain already existing contexts and forms of social 
practice and relationships that we can begin to move towards such an 
understanding of the presuppositions of deliberation and shared enquiry. This 
is what makes MacIntyre’s philosophy one for the real world of social 
mediation, not the utopian one of idealized inter-subjective communication. 
There must be something minimally shared for us to generate, to discover, the 
universal precepts that govern any form of social deliberation. This is also what 
makes MacIntyre’s work relevant to contexts of peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation in which some degree of deliberation and dialogue is 
presupposed.  
To the second question noted above, that of whether the appeal to what 
MacIntyre calls precepts of the natural law is itself just part of one more 
contending moral perspective, the answer he gives is that it is insofar as any 
one person- who holds a particular conception of the human good and 
flourishing that is at least implicit in any moral or political perspective- 
encounters other, rival standpoints that they are forced to question their own 
standpoint and the rival standpoint of others; and this can only be done in 
conjunction with those others, which presupposes and necessitates universal 
norms of shared deliberative enquiry. Hopefully, through the systematic 
deliberation that moral disagreement calls us to undertake, the bases for the 
rational, non-violent and non-coercive resolution of conflict can be laid and the 
civil war of contending moral and political positions can be continued by other 
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means. In this way deliberation is a practice that needs to be cultivated within 
which we can discover the objectivity of the binding norms that MacIntyre 
enunciates. 
However, “insofar as the social relationships between those who 
disagree are not governed by the norms of reason, they will be open to the 
solicitations of pleasure, money, and power” (ibid., p. 81). And it will be power 
that therefore decides the outcomes of these conflicts. This might 
paradoxically lead to social agreement rather than disagreement, but as 
MacIntyre notes, the “moral and social agreements arrived at only or primarily 
because of the seductions and the threats, the hopes and the fears, that are 
generated by pleasure, money, and power will exhibit failures in practical 
rationality of a sometimes more dangerous kind than disagreements generated 
by those same seductions and threats, hopes and fears” (ibid., p. 81). I 
suggest this encapsulates important aspects of the Colombian situation 
including those relating to clientelism, the influence of armed actors, and the 
state.  
These dangers are particularly prevalent in the modern spaces of civil 
society where the sheer fact of physical and social distance between 
discussants, and the inevitable seductions and solicitations that permeate the 
modern ethos, render utopian any idea of rational agreement or resolution 
through dialogue alone. The presumption that dialogue alone is sufficient for 
reaching agreements across the moral and political divide has been 
empirically disproved time and time again. This has been the case in 
encounters across the social divide within Colombian civil society, as various 
activists made clear to me.  
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MacIntyre’s philosophy implicitly points to the need for slow, patient, 
creative, and no doubt often painful processes of social, cultural and political 
encounters in which moral bonds and shared political visions can be 
constructed, something that practitioners of grassroots conflict transformation 
have also underlined (Lederach 2005). What MacIntyre adds to the 
peacebuilding framework is an emphasis on the importance of philosophy to 
“plain persons” and the theorists who engage and work with them. In terms of 
processes of political formation and social reconciliation, MacIntyre’s 
philosophical standpoint urges us to maintain a concern for the search for truth 
amidst the conflicting moral and political standpoints in society. However, this 
search does not imply dogmatism. On the contrary, it presupposes humility in 
the face of the recognition that the truth is something necessarily worked 
towards and sought after in the company of others. All of us unavoidably have 
partial perspectives that require the correction and insight of others. This is 
what differentiates MacIntyre’s philosophical approach to others that stress the 
plurality of values but which imply that an emphasis on truth can only lead to 
conflict. MacIntyre sees moral conflict as having a positive function inasmuch 
as it directs us to scrutinize our own positions in the search for more adequate 
conceptions and theories that can better approximate and lead us to truth. To 
disregard this emphasis on philosophical and moral truth is, on MacIntyre’s 
view, to perpetuate the emotivist mode of public interaction and debate, even 
though this might be done in the interests of tolerance and coexistence. It is 
the removal of the notion of truth in relation to moral and political positions, not 
its assertion, that MacIntyre contends has led to the conversion of public 
debate into a rhetorically masked struggle for power and the imposition of 
power to settle disagreements.  
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In this, MacIntyre is slightly at odds with the view of sociologist Daniel 
Pécaut who argues that the task facing Colombian society and the work of the 
National Commission for Reparation and Reconciliation (CNRR) “is not only 
about ‘reparation’ but is also about giving meaning to what happened, 
constructing narratives that permit the expression of diverse experiences and 
the acceptance of the legitimacy of multiple interpretations of the facts. 
Perhaps, ultimately, the formation of democratic sensibilities requires, at first, 
the acceptance of the multiplicity of points of view” (Pécaut 2008, p. 322). 
MacIntyre’s position is not against recognizing multiple points of view as such, 
but only against the assumption that we cannot nor must not enquire into their 
truth. This is not insignificant in a context in which the search for truth in 
relation to the devastating crimes committed in the conflict has an official seal 
to it but which is in reality obstructed and covered up. As we have seen, the 
notion of truth and the moral epistemology underlying it has been directly 
called into question in relation to the search for justice in Colombia by at least 
one intellectual, and it has been indirectly and implicitly challenged by others. 
 MacIntyre also insists that only relatively small scale communities can 
be the sites for the reconstruction of practical rationality based on practices 
and deliberation. The reconstruction of public language, the schooling of 
human desires and the virtues, the development of moral character, and the 
construction of common goods require relatively small social spaces.  
John Paul Lederach says that the challenge of transcending destructive 
relational patterns and cycles of violence whilst still living in the context that 
produced them requires the “disciplines of the moral imagination” (Lederach 
2005, p. 61). For Lederach, the moral imagination “understands relationships 
as the center and horizon of the human community. It therefore develops a 
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vocation based on an unconditional commitment to build authentic 
relationships” (ibid., p. 61). I argue that this resonates entirely with MacIntyre’s 
philosophy, which is conversely a philosophy that can, and I argue needs to, 
inform the search for peace, which has been described as the “activity of 
cultivating the process of agreeing” (Cox 1986, p. 12).  
In terms of social change I would agree with Jenny Pearce that “the 
capacity to dialogue, to enter formal spaces and to make good use of them can 
be just as important as direct action on the streets” (Pearce 2006, p. 26). A 
MacIntyrean caveat would be that much depends on how moral agents 
conceptualize such spaces, how such spaces themselves limit moral agency 
through their implicit framing of the issues, problems, solutions, etc., which in 
turn depends on the kind of social order people inhabit and the social milieus 
available to them to enable effective moral agency and the development of 
practical rationality. On a MacIntyrean view, such formal spaces cannot be 
based on the “modern ethos” otherwise they can only perpetuate irrational 
agreements and social orders. Nevertheless, I see a strong affinity between 
what MacIntyre and Lederach propose and what Pearce argues; that through 
“Intensifying our repertoire of participating actions and the ethics that sustain 
them, rethinking our power and its meaning in political life as well as our 
capacity to forge relationships across cultures, perhaps we can simultaneously 
strengthen our ability to achieve change without violence” (ibid., p. 27).  
A hypothesis I propose is that MacIntyre’s philosophy is already partly 
implicit in certain practices of social organizations and communities of 
resistance in Colombia. I employ MacIntyre’s moral-sociological model for 
empirically exploring the peacebuilding process of a particular, small-scale 
Colombian community that has spent ten years attempting to transform local 
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conflict through public participation and deliberation. In doing this I also aim to 
critically explore MacIntyre’s politics of local community and its contemporary 
relevance.  
 
Using MacIntyre’s philosophical framework 
In the Colombian case I contend that we need empirical work on the moral 
dimensions of conflict, resistance and coexistence in concrete social contexts 
so that we might better understand how debate, deliberation, and political 
participation can lead or not lead to the elaboration of new languages for 
addressing conflict and talking about politics and peace; to shared moral-
political discourses and practices; to new forms of political culture and moral-
political subjectivities. What we need is empirical work in places that are trying 
to deal with the fraught issues of conflict, resistance and coexistence in 
contexts of historical and contemporary conflict and violence. We need “moral 
ethnographies” that can illuminate the relationship between morality, social 
practices and state and non-state institutions. We could usefully compare 
examples of grassroots peacebuilding processes and also compare these to 
alternative, non-grassroots processes to throw light on the “empirical 
connections between virtues, practices and institutions” (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 
196).  
MacIntyre has explicitly called for comparative study of the politics of 
local communities (MacIntyre 2001, p. 143), which he argues are the only loci 
for the reconstruction of practical rationality and rational political community. 
The community I set out to study was in the process of attempting a significant 
degree of social transformation in light of an explicit critique of the dominant 
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way of doing politics. MacIntyre’s philosophical standpoint also adopts a 
critical stance towards the dominant norms, values and institutions of the 
contemporary social order. However, he notes, “What may seem missing is 
any statement of an alternative to that order…But it is important that the 
construction of such an alternative cannot begin from any kind of philosophical 
or theoretical statement. Where then does it begin? Only in the struggles, 
conflicts, and work of practice and in the attempt to find in and through 
dialogue with others who are engaged in such struggles, conflicts, and work an 
adequate local and particular institutional expression of our shared 
directedness towards our common goods” (MacIntyre 2006i, p. xi). There is no 
blueprint or model for what such communities must look like or achieve, 
although MacIntyre makes clear that an adequate conception of practical 
rationality based on the virtues will necessarily require certain attitudes 
towards economic and political matters and institutions.  
Therefore, adopting a MacIntyrean standpoint on which to conduct 
empirical work means we cannot avoid taking a moral stance in relation to 
what the politics of local community- a politics of resistance and “self-defense”- 
should be like to an important degree. However, MacIntyre makes clear that 
the contemporary restatement of Aristotelian ethics and politics can take many 
different social forms- we are not looking for the reincarnation of the polis but 
for different kinds of social contexts within which Aristotelian modes of thought 
and practice might and do flourish. Comparative study will also enable us to 
see how different communities fare, what led or leads them to success or 
failure. As MacIntyre observes about such communities, “even when they are 
at their best, the exercise of shared deliberative rationality is always imperfect 
and what should impress us is not so much the mistakes made and the 
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limitations upon its exercise at any particular stage as the ability through time 
and conflict to correct those mistakes and to move beyond those limitations. 
The exercise of practical relationships in communities always has a history and 
it is the direction of that history that is important” (MacIntyre 2001, p. 144).  
 There are few examples of empirical work using MacIntyre’s 
philosophical framework (Coe and Beadle 2008). Some recent work has begun 
to address this deficit and I draw on a paper by Samantha Coe and Ron 
Beadle (2008), who have both used MacIntyre’s work for empirical study, to 
outline some of the methodological issues raised by such research. Coe and 
Beadle note that there are some incontestable methodological limits to such 
research based on “what has remained almost unchanged in MacIntyre’s 
writings on epistemology and the conduct of enquiry” (ibid., p. 10). These 
would include: 
 
 Enquiries which do not relate themselves (including the possibility of critically 
relating themselves) to a tradition-constituted community of enquiry. 
 Enquiries seeking to create law-like generalisations through the testing of 
hypotheses about causation through measurement of a defined list of 
variables. 
 Enquiries which do not report their findings in a narrative form. 
 Enquiries which exclude agents’ self-understandings in attempting to account 
for their behavior. 
 Enquiries which exclude either features of institutions (structure) or the agency 
of subjects in their explanations. 
 Enquiries which do not recognise the ineliminable presence of the enquirers’ 
judgments in the accounts they present. (Ibid., p. 10) 
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In terms of my own study, the way we look at the Colombian, indeed, any 
conflict and set of problems is never neutral but theory and value laden. My 
own commitments are to what is often broadly termed “social justice”, which I 
shall define here as the concern for the equal dignity and empowerment of all 
social groups in relation to material and immaterial needs and goods. 
Influenced by liberation theologies and philosophies concerned with the 
emancipation of the oppressed and poor, my own standpoint is not, nor could 
be, politically, ethically or philosophically neutral. However, a complication 
arises from MacIntyre’s work, whose philosophical-ethical theory provides the 
overall theoretical framework for my thesis. MacIntyre’s claims about the 
problems and incoherences of modern analytic moral philosophy necessarily 
call into question the rational supportability of my own moral position and views 
in respect of social justice: 
 
For whenever an agent enters the forum of public debate he has already 
presumably, explicitly or implicitly, settled the matter in question in his own 
mind. Yet if we possess no unassailable criteria, no set of compelling reasons 
by means of which we may convince our opponents, it follows that in the 
process of making up our own minds we can have made no appeal to such 
criteria or such reasons. If I lack any good reasons to invoke against you, it 
must seem that I lack any good reasons. Hence it seems that underlying my 
own position there must be some non-rational decision to adopt that position. 
Corresponding to the interminability of public argument there is at least the 
appearance of a disquieting private arbitrariness. (MacIntyre 1985a, p. 8) 
 
MacIntyre of course argues that discussion and debate about justice and 
practical rationality have to take place from within particular traditions of moral 
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and intellectual enquiry.42 Therefore, is it possible to proceed without adopting 
some moral-political standpoint or tradition of enquiry?  
If I were to locate my own thinking about morality, as distinct from 
particular moral stances on certain issues, it would broadly fit within the 
Catholic tradition, although on its outer left wing. Brought up a Catholic, I 
gradually moved away from it, then read theology under the influence of an 
Anglican, Barthian liberation theologian. My own thinking about ethics and 
politics has shifted increasingly to the left, moving from a critique of MacIntyre 
from a Rawlsian perspective to a realization that I had not adequately 
understood the depth and power of MacIntyre’s thought, eventually coming to 
realize that MacIntyre powerfully articulated certain ideas and intuitions about 
morality and justice that I continued to hold and which led me to question the 
liberal paradigm. Whilst not a practising, “fully signed up” member of the 
Catholic Church, and despite my own huge reservations about its rigid, all-
male hierarchy and, no less important, its historical and ongoing role in 
oppression, I learnt from MacIntyre the importance of being able to separate 
the tradition from the institution. I also thereby better understood the role of 
tradition, in MacIntyre’s critical sense of the term, in my own moral thinking and 
its importance for rendering all moral discussion coherent. My own inchoate 
but strongly felt moral ideas about justice and oppression cannot be separated 
from the tradition into which I was inculcated. Although I later felt they could be 
best expressed within the liberal framework and in terms of human rights 
activism, I increasingly came to recognise that this paradigm did not in fact 
adequately express or account for my moral attitudes. I also felt that 
MacIntyre’s account of the incommensurability and emotivist nature of modern 
                                                 
42 See Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, Duckworth: London, 1991 
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moral discourse provided a compelling explanation of moral disagreement and 
its increasing tendency to self-righteous expression, both in myself and in 
others. I also came to see how the moral ideas and attitudes I had about the 
world could not but inform my own analyses and studies. MacIntyre helped me 
to realize that academic research is profoundly affected by the moral 
worldview one holds to, and therefore to recognize the importance of bringing 
this into the open. 
Therefore, I can say that my own academic enquiries are located 
broadly within the Catholic moral tradition. However, there are of course rival 
philosophies within the ongoing Catholic argument, which imply different 
epistemologies and accounts of practically rational action. Coe and Beadle 
(2008) suggest that research using MacIntyre’s work constitutes a “new 
tradition of enquiry” (ibid., p. 19) albeit one located within the wider Aristotelian 
tradition. By virtue of the fact that I am highly convinced of MacIntyre’s account 
of morality and its relationship to the social world, I inevitably presuppose the 
rational superiority of what he calls Thomistic Aristotelianism, a synthesis of 
the Augustinian and Aristotelian traditions with a (critical) realist epistemology 
and teleological (social and metaphysical) conception of the human good. 
Therefore, the framework I bring to my own analysis of the Colombian situation 
and, specifically, to the issues of conflict, resistance and coexistence inevitably 
shapes this analysis and the questions I pose. 
 
Empirically exploring the politics of local community 
The aim of this thesis is to enquire into certain dimensions of the “moral crisis” 
in Colombia and its connections to conflict, resistance and coexistence. 
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Inscribed within the terms of MacIntyre’s thesis and philosophical framework, it 
follows his claim that the rational reconstruction of practical rationality, of 
ethics and politics, can only occur in certain local community contexts. 
MacIntyre makes clear that such communities are practice-based and live and 
resist on the margins of liberal capitalist modernity. He highlights fishing crews, 
farming co-operatives, and Mayan towns as examples (MacIntyre 2001). 
However, in my view, whilst such communities are key to what MacIntyre sees 
as the only way of restoring rationality to our moral and political positions and 
actions, they are possibly too marginal and too idealized. If MacIntyre’s 
philosophy and politics are relevant to complex contexts of conflict and to 
those who are struggling to build alternatives, as I claim they are, then it is 
important to look for partial embodiments of MacIntyrean practice and politics 
where contradictions are bound to exist. Thus I sought to locate a community 
that was on the margins of prevailing political conceptions and modalities but 
which was ostensibly trying to address the problems of conflict, resistance and 
coexistence in a non-idealized context.  
There are plenty of examples of communities in Colombia that are 
struggling to resist the impacts of the conflict and/or resist certain incursions of 
the state and the armed actors whilst trying to contribute to peacebuilding and 
social and political coexistence and transformation. For example, “neutral” 
Peace Communities are desperately struggling to defend what can only be 
described as autonomous moral and political spaces where they reject the 
impositions and the pseudo-moral justifications of the various armed actors, 
including the state (see Sanford 2004). Indigenous communities are engaged 
in complex dynamics of resistance, defence of community autonomy, and 
engagement with the state in the search for peace and social justice (Galeano 
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2006). Rural social movements and organizations are attempting to defend 
peasant cultures and economies from the ravages of rapacious neoliberal 
agribusinesses and their frequent armed allies- the paramilitaries and the 
Colombian armed forces who are directly involved in forced displacement and 
intimidation of peasant communities (ACVC 2008). Small municipalities are 
trying to overcome conflict, resist authoritarian and clientelist political 
practices, and coexist peaceably through deliberative assemblies. All of these 
would make important sites of research.  
I initially explored the possibilities for conducting research into all of 
these, taking field trips to conflict zones and marginalized urban barrios as well 
as conducting interviews and observations with a radical, persecuted rural 
social movement. My main criteria were feasibility and safety. My personal 
circumstances as a researcher with a wife and two young children had an 
important bearing on my choice of case study. Having ruled out several 
options due to feasibility in terms of distance, required length of stay, and 
safety considerations in respect of internal conflict dynamics, I opted to study a 
local Municipal Constituent Assembly in the rural village of Tarso in southwest 
Antioquia, some three hours from the city of Medellín where I lived. 
Besides meeting my criteria in terms of feasibility and safety I 
discovered that Tarso Municipal Constituent Assembly offered compelling 
intellectual reasons for making it my principal case study. The Constituent 
Assembly movement emerged in the late 1990s as part of the unprecedented 
social mobilization for peace across the country (see Garcia Durán 2006). The 
concept of “territories of peace” was formulated within the main peace 
movement networks, and the municipal assemblies play pivotal roles in these 
spaces. The peace territories are understood as pedagogic processes that 
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attempt to involve all citizens in a municipality and which aim at constructing a 
“culture of peace” that overcomes the sedimented “competitive, aggressive 
and violent practices” that have dominated Colombia’s social landscape for 
decades (Redepaz- undated, p. 7). 
Tarso itself has been described as a “microcosm” of the conflict 
(Córdoba 2003) in which the main elements of Colombia’s armed social and 
political conflict have been present, including “political violence, social 
exclusion, wars, inequality, inequity, injustice, state abandonment, the 
weakness of civil society, bad governance, political and administrative 
corruption, clientelism, and extreme poverty in the midst of abundant natural 
resources” (Córdoba 2003, p. 2). Tarso has embodied conflict in terms of rival 
political ideologies and class conflict between landowners and peasant 
labourers; resistances in the form of left-wing guerrilla movements and militant 
peasant organizations; counter-resistance in the form of paramilitary 
organizations; and coexistence in the form of community efforts at addressing 
conflict and establishing the bases for social reconciliation and sustainable 
peace. In terms of the latter, the establishment of its Constituent Assembly 
represented a formal effort at reconstructing local political community through 
shared, participatory deliberation on key issues affecting the community. Luís 
Sanabria writes: 
 
Citizen projects like the Constituent Assemblies that have attempted to 
appropriate a new political reality are proposing a novel dimension of 
complementarity and feedback between participation and democracy, leading 
to a new mode of living with the state that at the same time calls into question, 
redefines and reconstructs the state. Not only to legally protect citizens’ rights, 
 238
but to guarantee the political, social, and economic inclusion of everyone, 
enabling harmonious social interaction…This new society attempts to transform 
conflicts without suppressing them, and incentivizes the development of 
virtues and a commitment to commonly identified goals and objectives that are 
based on community consensus….The democracy proposed by the Constituent 
Assemblies demonstrates that as well as being a constant and intensive effort 
this democracy has to be of a high quality, that is, of great density, based on 
knowledge and practices, committed to the marginalized and capable of 
proposing, executing, monitoring, reasoning and transforming, empowering 
the individual to appropriate a new form of citizenship that is based on the 
collective decision to work towards common objectives. (Sanabria 2006, p. 14) 
 
These are clearly Utopian standards (as well as clear MacIntyrean standards). 
As MacIntyre puts it, such standards are “not too often realized outside of 
Utopia, and only then…in flawed ways. But trying to live by Utopian standards is 
not Utopian, although it does involve a rejection of the economic goals of 
advanced capitalism” (MacIntyre 2001, p. 145). 
Thus I saw Tarso as embodying key aspects of the problem I sought to 
explore and also as touching on key MacIntyrean themes in relation to moral 
and political philosophy. It provided an opportunity to study a concrete 
community effort in light of MacIntyre’s framework that could hopefully 
illuminate the way morality, politics and efforts at social change operate and 
combine in a real life, conflictual context.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has explored various dimensions of the Colombian moral crisis in 
light of MacIntyre’s philosophy, highlighting the need for a new moral-political 
language and alternative forms of political practice and constructing political 
community. I have argued that MacIntyre illuminates how it is possible to 
develop a rationally grounded moral critique of state-building, dominant forms 
of politics, and the modality of social change associated with the revolutionary 
armed left. I have claimed that we need to empirically explore possible 
alternatives for social change, resistance, coexistence, and the construction of 
political community. I suggested that MacIntyre’s prescription of the “politics of 
local community” resonated with the Municipal Constituent Assembly project, 
and proposed the community of Tarso as a case study based on what I posited 
as a “MacIntyrean moral ethnography”. I now turn to this in the following two 
chapters where I present the narratives of the principal protagonists of Tarso’s 
Municipal Constituent Assembly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 240
CHAPTER 5 
Conflict, resistance and coexistence in a Colombian 
municipality: voices from a microcosm of the 
conflict. 
Part 1: From armed resistance to critical citizenship. 
 
This chapter aims to expound the ethical-political discourse and narrative of 
Tarso Municipal Constituent Assembly through the voices of its principal 
protagonists. Based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews and participant 
observation of the Assembly, the local state administration and the local 
community carried out in a six month period in 2008, I aim to give voice to an 
important process of “bottom up” peacebuilding and participatory politics. First, 
I briefly recap the context of Tarso’s Assembly before exploring the narrative of 
the process. 2009 is the 10th anniversary of the Tarso Assembly- as such the 
interviews represent important reflections on the successes and failures of the 
process, the difficulties faced and the challenges to come. They provide an 
insight into the construction of an ethical-political process that remains in via.
The questions I brought to the interviews were of course various. I wanted to 
know the narratives of the individuals involved, their perceptions of how the 
process began, where it is now and where they think it is going. I wanted to 
know what ethical and political terms, categories and concepts they would use 
to describe their own commitments and their perceptions of the process.  
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The Constituent Assembly process in Colombia began in Mogotes, Norte de 
Santander department in the mid-1990s as a direct response of a local 
community to the “kidnapping” of the local mayor by a front of the ELN guerrilla 
group. Whilst this was the proximate cause of the community’s decision to 
exert its “sovereignty” over its political life and destiny by convening as a 
political community in the form of a Constituent Assembly, the response has to 
be seen in the wider context of incursions and impositions upon the community 
by all the armed actors- paramilitaries, guerrillas and the official armed forces- 
as well as the corrupt, clientelist practices of the local state. In Mogotes the 
mayor was held by the ELN under allegations of corruption and misuse of 
public resources. Appealing to article three of the 1991 Constitution, the local 
community organized itself as a sovereign political community and demanded 
the release of the mayor. The allegations were addressed in the form of a 
Community Assembly hearing in which it was decided to uphold the 
allegations and to demand the resignation of the mayor. The community is 
thus seen as having exercised autonomy in the face of both armed actors and 
the state by implementing political rights and mechanisms established in the 
Constitution. Mogotes thus served as an example to other municipalities in 
Colombia. 
 
There is scarce information on Tarso in its own right and I rely principally on a 
study of governance in Tarso carried out by sociologist David Marulanda 
(2004), with supplementary information provided by an article written by peace 
movement researcher Luís Sanabria (2006), as well as a historical text on the 
villages of southwest Antioquia by historian Juan Carlos Vélez (2003). Dating 
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back to the early twentieth century, Tarso is a small rural municipality located 
in the southwest of Antioquia department overlooking the river Cauca. It is 
divided into eleven urban sectors and sixteen “veredas” (rural 
neighbourhoods). Agriculture is the main form of economic activity in the 
municipality, especially cultivation of coffee and livestock farming, both of 
which are important cultural referents in Tarso and the wider region. As David 
Marulanda writes, “The historic presence of large coffee and cattle haciendas 
on which authoritarian relations of production obtained based on the figure of 
the ‘patrón’ left their mark on the culture of Tarso” (Marulanda 2004, p. 22). 
These include the system of the “jornal” (day-contract labour), which prevented 
the establishment of modern contractual relations with basic social security 
guarantees for workers. Marulanda notes that such a form of labour and its 
monotonous nature, “prevents the development of mental structures and 
abilities for…autonomous decision-making” (ibid., p. 22). Another cultural mark 
is the prevalence of coffee monocultures and the lack of a genuine peasant 
culture characterized by small-scale family production for self-consumption. A 
third element, according to Marulanda, is the absence of leadership and 
enterprise amongst the general population, which makes it difficult to establish 
profitable productive and other collective projects. Marulanda links this to the 
historic pattern of social relations that are based on dependence on the figure 
of the “patrón”.   
In the 19th century, social order was governed by the “founders” of the 
towns of the southwest- men who enjoyed a good political and moral 
reputation amongst locals and regional elites and who were responsible for 
mediating local conflicts mainly in relation to land issues- land titles, fence 
limits etc. The “patrimonial” nature of this social control led to the direct 
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influence of private interests in local public administration. This set an 
important pattern for local politics that would easily fit into the national 
clientelistic political scheme. A conservative conception of public morality 
emerged in conjunction with this hierarchical and patrimonial social structure 
(Vélez 2003). Elite networks became real centres of “informal” power and local 
domination that effectively infiltrated local and regional institutions. They were 
successful in their aims of social orientation and managed to generate a (non-
rational) local consensus and the legitimation of an elite political project.43 As 
Vélez points out, “Obedience was...a product of extra-institutional mechanisms 
of power rather than of a consensus or an agreement on established norms” 
(Vélez 2003, p. 229).  
Yet these social relations have not gone unchallenged. There is also a 
history of resistance and organization amongst the peasantry in the region 
linked to migrants’ land struggles and to ideologies of popular democracy that 
emanated from liberation theology and the conscientization and radical 
pedagogy practised by sectors of the Church. The Christian Student Youth 
movement helped to strengthen the organizing work of the priests and nuns in 
the southwest as did the support of the National Association of Rural Workers 
(ANUC) and the Agrarian Workers’ Union (Sintagro). The political influence of 
the ELN is also a factor in shaping consciousness and ethical-political 
standpoints and referents in Tarso and the wider sub-region. Political and 
ideological formation classes were initiated and attended by ELN members, 
and many peasant leaders also attended. The ELN emerged in the 1960s in 
the context of industrial and rural social protests. Associated with anti-
                                                 
43 See M. T. Uribe and J. M. Alvarez, “El parentesco y la formación de las élites en la provincia 
de Antioquia”, in Estudios Sociales, No. 3, Medellín, FAES, Sept 1988. 
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imperialist nationalism and the search for social justice, the ELN comprised 
urban, student and intellectual sectors with a strong rural base. Dedicated to 
political work, in its early years it built a project called the United Front (Frente 
Unido), with sociologist and priest Camilo Torres its main intellectual 
protagonist. The involvement of Catholic priests meant the ELN would be open 
to liberation theology and the Freirean pedagogic processes it undertook. 
However, the death of Torres in 1966 eventually led to the  weakening of the 
United Front and to the predominance of a militaristic approach over its 
political groundwork (Palacios 1999). In 1986 the ELN redefined its ideological 
stance from a nationalist perspective to a classic Marxist-Leninist position.  
The land issue or what has become known as the “agrarian question” is 
essential for understanding and interpreting social relations in Tarso and the 
wider region. At the national level land concentration is extremely high- in 2002 
a government report estimated that 61.2 percent of cultivable land was in the 
hands of 0.4 percent of landowners44- and in Tarso it is particularly acute: In 
1997, out of a total of 464 official plots of land in the municipality, 43 of these 
contained nearly 9000 hectares, which constitutes 75 percent of total land in 
Tarso. Concentration of land ownership has increased in recent years, 
according to recent figures.45 Figures from the 2001-2003 Development Plan 
show that cattle rearing used by far the greatest extensions of land (over 8500 
hectares) with 2700 hectares dedicated to other agricultural production. Before 
the crisis in international markets during the mid-1990s coffee cultivation 
covered a fifth of the municipality and was an extremely important source of 
                                                 
44 This figure was cited by opposition senator Gustavo Petro. See 
http://www.cipcol.org/?p=353 
45 These figures were shown to me by members of CEPACT- Tarso assembly’s legal and 
administrative organization. 
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employment and general economic activity. Yet its precariousness as an 
agricultural product subject to the vagaries of global capitalism was highlighted 
by the international crisis that saw coffee prices plunge as other producers 
flooded the market. Production and employment fell, exacerbating social 
problems in the coffee regions, including Tarso. These included increased 
intra-family violence, rising levels of crime, and a general worsening of 
poverty.  
The peasant struggle revolved around gaining access to land and 
securing basic labour rights. These struggles began in the 1960s and 
continued well into the 1990s when land titles were finally awarded to a 
nucleus of peasant families that had struggled to secure land rights. 75 
families managed to secure a total of 540 hectares of land in three rural 
neighbourhoods. A key factor in this relatively small victory (given the levels of 
land concentration) was the support and advice of Father Ignacio Betancur 
who was killed by paramilitaries in 1994. This peasant struggle resulted in the 
establishment of two important social organizations: the Communitarian 
Corporation of La Arboleda (1973), and the Association of Tarso Agricultural 
Workers (1986). These organizations focused on associative production, the 
collective administration of community goods, education, and political 
formation. As Marulanda notes, these organizations “related the solution of 
internal needs to participation in the project of peasant organization in the 
municipality” (Marulanda 2004, p. 34). Although these organizations did not 
achieve all their goals in terms of socio-economic transformation, they served 
to generate new expressions of community organization, forming leaders and 
providing experience and insights into community participation. However, as 
Marulanda points out, “With the failure of some community projects 
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individualistic postures flourished and the community organisations weakened, 
which were natural niches of citizen participation” (ibid., p. 34).  
Throughout the 1990s, partly as a result of the 1991 Constitution, 
different spaces and forms of participation were created such as: the Local 
Action Committees (JALs), a small producers’ co-operative (COMUTAR), the 
Communitarian Agricultural Corporation of La Arboleda, the Women’s 
Association (Asoma), the Municipal Workers’ Union, the Municipal Coffee 
Cultivators’ Committee, the Community Participation Committee, and the Rural 
Development Council, amongst others. However, according to the diagnosis of 
the 2001-2003 Development Plan, a significant number of these organisations 
depended on the “paternalism” of the state, which limited the autonomy of their 
members and the ability to develop processes in benefit of the different 
organisations and the community as a whole.  
Traditionally, at the local level power has been concentrated in the 
figure of the mayor, with very little opening for public participation and 
decision-making. The municipal council in Tarso was not a space for 
questioning decisions, but rather a place “where the executive controls the 
legislature through the badly named coalition, which is nothing but a 
gentlemen’s agreement to concur with everything and to crush the minority 
that is only there as a token figure” (Arroyave 1999). Traditionally, the destiny 
of the municipality has been politically oriented by different groups and 
tendencies within the Liberal and Conservative Parties, although the Liberal 
Party has historically predominated. David Marulanda notes, “The model of 
production on the large haciendas, based on traditional social relations centred 
on the figure of the ‘patrón’, generated (and continues to generate) a culture of 
submission and subordination that favoured exclusionary political practices 
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that prevented the participation in public decision-making of the common 
people in the village” (Marulanda 2004, p. 31). Politics was reduced to periodic 
voting in elections.  
Besides the political exclusion and dominance of the traditional parties 
and their dynamics in Tarso there has also been political violence exacerbated 
by the social polarization between peasants and landowners. The incursion of 
the ELN into Tarso began in the mid-1980s. This group was responsible for the 
kidnapping and killing of several major landowners in the municipality. 
Paramilitaries soon followed, carrying out selective threats and assassinations 
of presumed guerrilla sympathizers and peasant leaders.  
The familiar stigmatization of being guerrillas or guerrilla sympathizers 
has been applied to certain rural sectors of the population in Tarso and the 
wider region, and distrust and political and class antagonism remain significant 
obstacles to harmonious community and political life. As Marulanda notes, 
what this amounted to at the time was “a fragmented society, which limits the 
possibility of converging in common spaces to discuss things together as well 
as impeding the organized participation of the local community in the 
administration of public affairs” (Marulanda 2004, p. 36). It is this history that 
has led some to point to Tarso as a “microcosm” of the Colombian conflict 
(Córdoba 2003). 
Tarso was the second Municipal Constituent Assembly in the country. 
Its proximate cause was the negative state of the local municipal authority’s 
public finances that had led it to financial unviability and the threat of being 
subsumed into the municipality of neighbouring Jericó and thereby losing 
political control over itself. However, this particular problem was an outcome of 
the wider conflict: corrupt political practices rooted in Colombia’s traditional 
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and clientelistic two party system, stagnant investment due to the presence of 
armed actors, poverty and lack of development related to traditional uses of 
land and unequal distribution, amongst other issues.  
The Constituent Assembly process in Tarso was initiated by a former 
guerrilla who demobilized in 1995 as part of the ELN dissident group Corriente 
Renovación Socialista. In an attempt to prevent the disappearance of Tarso as 
its own municipality Alirio Arroyave convoked a forum whose aim was for the 
first time to get the residents of Tarso to dialogue and discuss together the 
diverse problems facing the municipality. Out of this emerged the formal 
structure of the Assembly in which different political voices from various social 
sectors with divergent interests convened in a new political space.  
The interviews I conducted tell a human story of the hopes, fears and 
different outlooks and standpoints of people living in a small rural community 
all of whom have been in some way or other affected by the conflict and 
violence. The Assembly was conceived as a process of conflict resolution in 
the integral sense of addressing a variety of factors, not just the issue of 
violence, but the underlying roots of conflict. Ten years on from the inception of 
the Assembly process it is clear that violent conflict has not returned, which is 
a real achievement, yet it needs to be recognised that macro-level factors play 
a major part here. Despite the tranquility, today the question is to what extent 
the deeper level conflicts in Tarso have been rationally resolved and how the 
community has managed to address its failures and challenges in this respect. 
 
My first contact with Tarso Municipal Constituent Assembly came through a 
meeting with Alirio Arroyave. Alirio is a 48 year old former ELN guerrilla who 
demobilized in 1995. We met in the small, poky office of CEPACT 
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(Corporación de Estudios y Proyectos de la Asamblea Constituyente de Tarso) 
in Medellín out of which both Alirio and William Zapáta work.  
I first asked Alirio to talk about the aims of the Constituent Assembly 
process when it began some ten years ago: 
 
“With the Tarso project we wanted to begin a new social experiment from the 
local level in Colombia in relation to social coexistence in the country and the 
construction of development. In order to achieve this goal we had to break the 
traditional barriers erected and maintained by the traditional political parties, 
both at a local and a national level, where the municipalities have been 
governed for their own political groups, not for the people. This has had the 
consequence that one doesn’t think in terms of the community but in terms of 
benefits for the party, which led to the crisis in this municipality that generated 
social discontent.”46 
 
Politics was effectively a matter of private interests based on “gentlemen’s 
agreements”. The Assembly has attempted to slowly transform these political 
limitations through the construction of an alternative institution and form of 
political practice. 
 Social discontent was exacerbated by the financial crisis in the 
municipality and inevitably linked to the dynamics of the wider armed conflict. 
Public employees went unpaid for 18 months, and for unemployed youths the 
rival armed actors became alternative means of earning an income. “The aim 
therefore was to attempt an experiment at revindicating the notion of the public 
realm as well as generating a culture of unlearning violence that had been 
                                                 
46 Interview with Alirio Arroyave, May 2008, Medellín. 
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present for so many years; the only option was from the local level.” Alirio 
convoked a forum called “Tarso: towards a new millennium”, which was the 
first time that the diverse members and sectors of the community had come 
together to discuss local matters. The initial priority was the financial 
administration of the local municipal authority. The conclusion was reached 
that public participation in decision-making about the administration of the local 
budget was key to overcoming the problems of lack of accountability and 
corruption/clientelism. What was needed were spaces for discussing and 
planning the local budget as a community. But it was quickly understood that 
the budget al.one was not the only issue. The Assembly could be and needed 
to be a space for permanent, ongoing discussion that involved all the active 
forces of the municipality. Participation was to go beyond the initial emphasis 
on the local state budget and was inscribed within the wider political context of 
the Colombian Constitution.  
 
“We spoke about the importance of a Constituent Assembly because citizen 
participation is not just an adornment to make us look good, nor to make the 
state look good; it is for elaborating public policies. For that reason we gave 
ourselves constituent status…We took what is established in the National 
Constitution and brought it down to the local level. The National Constitution 
defines the essential ends of the state- what we are doing is applying what is 
in that document to the local municipal level.”  
 
The financial crisis of the municipality was nevertheless central and also 
intimately connected to the historic practices of clientelism in which public 
policies were often tied to the furtherance of private interests. As Alirio 
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explained, “That bureaucracy was the result of the political favours of the 
traditional parties, which created public posts that the state was in no condition 
to provide.” The heart of the whole Assembly process for Alirio “is to look for 
that point of encounter around the issue of the public sphere. I think that here 
the fundamental problem at the heart of the conflict is the bad administration of 
the public sphere in Colombia, because the public interest has simply ended 
up being equated with private interests.”  
The community in the form of the Assembly came to agreements 
around these issues. The local elections were approaching and it was decided 
that the Assembly would choose a consensus candidate for local mayor. Prior 
to the elections the objective was to first define the programme of any future 
mayor before deciding on which candidates to choose from. The Assembly 
defined the local political agenda in terms of “governance and peace” and then 
invited candidates to put their arguments to the Assembly outlining how they 
would implement the public policies defined and agreed by the Assembly. A 
single candidate was then chosen by the Assembly to represent it in the 
elections. Oscar Hurtado duly won the election for mayor. For Alirio, “This puts 
in question the electoral system in Colombia because the mayor assumes the 
post under the commitment to serve the people, to carry out the program and 
to be subject to the control of the Constituent Assembly where if in the 
judgement of the Assembly we declared the mayor incapable or if he didn’t 
carry out his mandate, he would stand down.” Whilst there are questions about 
the actual technical and practical feasibility of forcing the mayor to stand down, 
the fact that this is in principle accepted by the mayor is significant. As 
MacIntyre argues, the politics of local community has to put those who hold 
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political office to the question “in the course of extended deliberative debate in 
which there is widespread participation” (MacIntyre 1998c, p. 248). 
The Assembly was comprised of 150 elected delegates from the 
different rural neighbourhoods, civil society associations, and public and 
private sectors in Tarso. To elaborate the local Development Plan the 
Assembly was divided into different working commissions to elaborate 
proposals by sector- education, health, economic development, etc. “Those 
who are involved in and know about education formed part of the education 
commission. Those involved in and knowledgeable about agriculture and 
development fell into that commission; those of us who knew about democracy 
and peace formed another commission and so on. We gave ourselves two 
months for the discussions in each delegation and when the first round of 
discussions had ended we entered a second plenary session in which the final 
municipal Development Plan emerged from the agreements reached.” Once 
the plan had been agreed upon the budget was assessed and divided up 
between the different commissions who then agreed amongst themselves how 
to distribute the money.  
From a MacIntyrean perspective this is problematic as it is based on 
compartmentalization and implies the ideology of “expertise” that is so often 
used to stifle input and justify exclusions. Of course, the reality is that in such 
processes one has to begin with what one has. Semi-literate peasant farmers 
cannot really discuss the fineries of education or hospital administration, for 
example. However, they are more than capable of defining their needs and 
ensuring that development and other projects, whatever their particular 
technicalities, meet these needs. In a small community like Tarso it is much 
easier for people to see how particular projects cohere or not with what has 
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been agreed. It is also ostensibly easier to challenge projects that deviate from 
social agreements.  
In terms of the peace agenda the decision was to declare the different 
rural neighbourhoods “peace communities”. As Alirio put it, “The fundamental 
aim was to take control of public issues in relation to the municipality and to 
create platforms for coexistence and peace.” Peace is also understood as a 
deeply political issue: “These processes are not purely peace initiatives. 
Beyond that is a political initiative, a political proposal, not an electoral one but 
a political one because we are intervening in public affairs…Peace is not about 
simply waving a white flag because that has no effects on public life. What 
does have an effect are the decisions that citizens take in their local area.” 
This is an important distinction between the electoral and the political, which 
points to how the Assembly is perceived as part of a radical political agenda. 
This attempt to transform the system from within generated persecution 
by the insurgents against Alirio and his colleague William Zapáta. They were 
declared military targets and for a period were forced to leave Tarso and go to 
Medellín. As Alirio put it to me: “The guerrillas, our former comrades, 
considered those of us who had demobilized to be traitors because we had 
supposedly betrayed the political project.” However, the interventions made on 
their behalf by the local community to the guerrillas in the area were enough to 
prevent them from being killed. The same happened when the paramilitaries 
entered Tarso.  
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“We were against them both”: from armed struggle  to critical 
citizenship 
The shifting ethical-political currents and contestations in Colombia are 
brought into relief by the experience of former guerrilla combatants who decide 
to demobilize and seek to effect social change from within the system, while 
attempting to maintain a critical distance from it and to ultimately transform it. 
The shift from armed struggle to the arena of electoral politics has been made 
by dozens of former combatants (thousands have demobilized but perhaps 
only a fraction have been actively involved in political activity/activism), 
including Alirio and William.  
Coming from a radical left-wing ideological position,  Alirio and William 
made the decision to abandon the armed struggle to work for change at the 
local level. Their perspective is particularly important to capture as it can help 
us to understand the moral-political thinking and reasoning involved in 
negotiating Colombia’s complex ethical terrain. What leads to a shift in ethical-
political outlook from one which justifies armed struggle to one that critiques it 
and seeks to work from within the system? This section explores this and 
related questions through the accounts given to me by Alirio and William, two 
former guerrilla militants. 
 
William Zapáta Arroyave, a cousin of Alirio Arroyave, is a 42 year old former 
member of the MIR-Patria Libre [MIR-Free Homeland] guerrilla group that 
formed part of the larger ELN guerrilla organization. Born in nearby Pueblo 
Rico, William finished secondary school and went on to further education but 
was unable to continue his studies for “economic reasons”. As William 
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recounts, his family background was a formative influence on his ethical-
political orientation: 
 
“We began our foray into social issues in the 1970s, mainly due to our parents’ 
initiative in the National Association of Agricultural Workers (ANUC). There 
was a very strong peasant movement in Colombia in those days and peasant 
community organizations emerged across the country. In the southwest there 
were organizations in various municipalities and four of these peasant 
communities remained in Tarso. Our parents were strong rural leaders in 
Pueblo Rico in the southwest, encouraged strongly by the priest Ignacio 
Betancur, who was later assassinated. That kind of shapes you. You see your 
parents who are deeply involved in social issues working for their labour rights. 
So a formation process began when we very young. I remember there were 
some professionals who used to accompany the priest Ignacio Betancur- we 
had study groups, women’s groups, youth groups. You start to take a position 
of leadership in those groups. But then we started to touch upon deeper 
issues, structural issues about what was happening in the country. We got to 
know a bit more about the revolutionary experience in other countries- what 
had happened in Cuba, in Russia, they were our points of reference for 
thinking about initiating a process of social transformation in Colombia.”47 
 
These peasant organizations eventually led to the formation of a political 
organization called MIR (Integral Revolutionary Movement) that formed a 
clandestine military section which undertook small scale military operations 
against the armed forces and the police. “The MIR-Patria Libre arose out of 
that peasant movement. We functioned for several years, undertaking military 
                                                 
47 Personal interview, Medellín, August 2008 
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operations that were very weak because we didn’t have the training for that- 
our formation was more political, more about peasant militancy and social 
organization, and less about armed military militancy.” However, they thought 
that the conditions were not there to attempt to make radical, structural 
changes through the legal channels of democracy in Colombia. “We dreamt of 
social justice but we opted for clandestine activity because there were no legal 
safety guarantees for trying to obtain our rights and for seeking social 
transformation.” The aim of the military wing was to support the political 
organizing of the MIR and the peasant movements. However, in William’s view 
there were problems: 
 
“After the initiative of the guerrilla coordination movement [La Coordinadora 
Guerrillera Simón Bolívar that operated in the late 1980s], which united various 
insurgent movements, I remember that we all thought “now we’re going to take 
power”; we were no longer dispersed, we came together but I have to say also 
that looking back it had major faults. Let’s say that the agreements and 
accords came from the top, from the upper echelons and didn’t take the base 
much into account. In some way we fell into what we always criticised in 
others, in the traditional parties.” 
 
The MIR-Patria Libre then became part of the bigger ELN insurgent 
organization. However, the differences in perspective between this much 
stronger, more militaristic organization and the smaller groups like the MIR that 
affiliated with it began to surface.  
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“We initially united with the ELN through what was called the Unión Camilista 
de Liberación Nacional, which also functioned for several years, but really 
there were big differences between them and us. We came from a more 
political background and formation of social and citizen militancy, of 
community organization and not military militancy. So there was a kind of 
disconnect and the project began to distance itself a little from the 
communities. Although the guerrillas said they sought to claim people’s rights, 
you began to realize sometimes that it wasn’t necessarily always the case, for 
example when burning buses and blowing up pylons became common.” 
 
The logic of guerrilla militancy began to erode the essential connection 
between morality and concrete social practice- arguably the key to explaining 
the increasing emotivism of contemporary insurgent discourse and action. 
These differences eventually led to the splitting of the Unión Camilista. “So 
what we began to see was that there were two movements that had 
encountered each other but which had very distinct modes of operation, one 
more bellicose and military, and the other a little more political, without wanting 
to say that the ELN is not political. In fact I would say that the ELN has been 
more political than the FARC.” William and likeminded comrades were also 
aware of the seismic changes in the bipolar world order of the cold war post-
1989. For William, this had the effect of instigating a period of reflection on 
“socialism” and the model for social change within the guerrilla organizations.  
William and his comrades realized they didn’t identify with the more 
militaristic project of the larger guerrilla organization and made the decision to 
leave, knowing the personal risks were high. Having entered a clandestine 
guerrilla organization, William and his likeminded colleagues then had to 
desert it clandestinely in fear of “revolutionary justice”. This was a painful 
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experience for William and made him reflect on his own ethical-political 
commitments and reasons for having entered the guerrillas in the first place. 
“Ever since I joined the guerrillas and during the time I was part of it what kept 
me thinking I had to be there was the search for social justice. I didn’t see that 
the state was guaranteeing fundamental rights- so it was just that dream of 
social justice. The main thing was social inequality, you know, between rich 
and poor. One just couldn’t accept that there were such poor people and 
others with so much wealth.” The decision to enter the world of clandestine 
guerrilla activity was therefore based on a strong ethical-political conviction 
that derived from William’s background and lived experiences. “You start to 
understand that guaranteeing human dignity therefore means employment, 
education, housing, health, having your basic needs satisfied, which was not 
the case. That’s the real argument for deciding to get involved in clandestine 
activity, not because you like war or walking non-stop for days, or going 
without sleep or bearing the heat of the day or going hungry- it’s not for that but 
for the fact that there was a real argument for it.” As William pointed out, it was 
a strong argument that resonated deeply with many and was strong enough to 
enable people to withstand the adversities involved in the daily grind of 
guerrilla life. The desire for a new society outweighed the adversities and 
personal deprivations and dangers. However, William acknowledged that the 
logic of subordinating oneself entirely to the interests of the collectivity was 
extremely hard and ultimately led to him and others questioning aspects of 
guerrilla ideology, strategy, and its deeper efficacy: 
 
“We were always told to wear the insignia of Che Guevara to remind us that he 
was always prepared to struggle and to die at any time and any place without 
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being attached to anything in particular. But today I continue to think that it’s 
not like that. Nevertheless, the main argument was always about renouncing 
individual interests and fighting for the interests of the collective.” 
 
This highlights the abstract, Kantian moral notions that underpinned the ethical 
dimensions of the ELN. Complete detachment from social particularity is the 
hallmark of Kantian ethics, which in the concrete context William narrates is 
arguably what has contributed to the increasing dogmatism and absolutist 
claims of the armed left. William’s questioning was not based on “self-interest” 
or a concern to put one’s own interests above those of the collective or the 
“greater good”, but was connected to arguments about alternative modalities of 
social change that William was led to elaborate and reflect upon through his 
engagement with communities. As William puts it, 
 
“I went from working with communities in the cities- I was part of the urban 
guerrilla- and they transferred me to the jungle. It was always a case of going 
wherever the revolution required you to be, not where you felt yourself you 
should be. I couldn’t accept that situation- in the jungle I used to say ‘look 
comrades, here we’re only going to conscientize monkeys. I don’t see any 
people, we have to get out of here, we’re not going to make the revolution 
here, we have to be with the social base, working in the communities.’” 
 
Another element to William’s thinking which led him to critique the dominant 
modality was his concern about the ethics and efficacy of the logic of 
imposition with which the guerrillas operated: 
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“I didn’t agree with that mode of operation because it was about arriving in a 
peasant community and making our presence known, but it seemed to me it 
was about imposing ourselves. Things like the following even used to happen: 
there might be one family that didn’t like us to go to their house so therefore it 
was to that house where we had to go the most, not with the idea of 
convincing them but simply to harass them. Those who sympathized with us 
we didn’t bother at all. I thought ‘this is not the way to operate, we cannot work 
with a rifle over our shoulders.’ In fact they challenged me because once they 
sent me on a commission with twelve men. I was the ‘political’ chief and I went 
with a military chief. We got on well and I said to him, ‘let’s not do it this way. 
Let’s split into pairs and take only handguns in a rucksack so they can’t be 
seen- let’s put civilian clothes on and go into the community.’ That generated a 
discussion in the front- they used to call us the ‘cool boys’, the ‘pretty boys’ 
because we passed ourselves off as civilians to talk with people and nothing 
ever happened to us. It was a different methodology.” 
 
The idea was not to impose on people but simply to put the argument to the 
community about why they were there. However, that often combined with 
intimidation. As William pointed out, people feel intimidated when they see 
people with guns, in combat uniform. “I think people then don’t do things 
voluntarily- the mere fact of carrying a weapon and the presence of uniformed 
men generates intimidation.” William assured me that there were many people 
who sympathized with the guerrillas but who then began to resist them when 
attacks on public infrastructure like electricity towers and buses occurred with 
more regularity.  
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“People would complain: ‘they’ve blocked the transport. Those buses they 
burned aren’t used by the rich but by us, the poor.’ It’s the people who in fact 
show you the way. When we had the discourse about land struggles and 
claiming rights we were accepted but when the people begin to see a guerrilla 
that has shifted its modality…The fact was we cared more about military 
triumphs than political defeat and I always said we needed to re-evaluate that.”  
 
This is highly suggestive of the way William’s moral position was ultimately 
worked out through communication with people in the communities. The 
abstract principles of insurgent ethical-political discourse lacked persuasion 
compared to the principles learned from concrete social engagement with the 
poor.  
This also gets to the heart of much historical polemic within Colombia’s 
insurgent movements. The arguments about the priority of the armed struggle 
or a more hybrid political approach embracing electoral politics go back to the 
1960s and the split between the Russian and Chinese Communist Parties. 
This ultimately led to bitter internecine warfare, especially between the FARC 
and the EPL48, leading to multiple massacres of peasants, workers and 
perceived rival militants by these opposing left-wing guerrilla groups. As 
Andrés Suárez (2007) observes, the derogation from general social and moral 
proscriptions represented by massacres of unarmed civilians was facilitated by 
the instrumental logic of armed struggle in which rival political movements 
were seen not as adversaries, but absolute enemies. Social space was hyper-
politicized by the guerrillas and their connected trade unions, leaving little 
room for moral agency and independent reflection on the moral dimensions of 
                                                 
48 Ejército Popular de Liberación, formed in the late 1960s, later comprised of FARC 
dissidents. 
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political struggle. Painful memories of comrades killed and maimed intensified 
feelings of moral outrage and strengthened sectarian political identities, 
polarizing discourse and entrenching attitudes of resistance and struggle at all 
costs.  
I suggest that the process in Tarso can be seen as an important micro-
level effort at subverting this logic and re-centring the moral dimensions of 
conflict, resistance and coexistence.  
The logic of William’s ethical and political thinking culminated in his 
demobilization along with hundreds of others in 1995 as part of the Corriente 
Renovación Socialista. Seen as traitors by their former radical comrades and 
as “communists”, subversives and “internal enemies” by the paramilitary far-
right, William and Alirio faced persecution from both sides and saw many 
friends killed. As Alirio put it, “We were against them both.”  Despite various 
personal threats and the feeling of security that being armed provided, William 
decided against going clandestine again and engaging in the armed struggle. 
“I withdrew because I realized that the armed struggle was not really leading to 
social transformation. Everyday it isolated itself more and was becoming a 
more terroristic guerrilla movement that had lost many of its principles to which 
it had been dedicated. It was deeply involved in drug trafficking. I decided that 
wasn’t the way and that I’d better renounce it.” But what William did not 
renounce were the ideas about justice he held and the desire for a transformed 
society. The decision to negotiate and to adopt a different modality of social 
change had not changed William’s view that structural changes were 
necessary. His former comrades remained in arms, convinced of the moral 
basis for their armed struggle just as William was convinced about the moral 
basis for his own decision to go down a different path. Nevertheless, despite 
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the seeming arbitrariness, William’s decision to demobilize is arguably an 
example of the subversion of sectarian political identity and abstract moral 
thinking that was ultimately grounded on the social particularity of community 
life and experience.  
William was also led to reflect on alternative modes of social change. As 
he explained to me: “today I think the power of conviction is much stronger and 
can bring about more substantial transformations and more enduring changes 
than you can with a gun. For sure you can achieve things with a weapon, but 
not that guarantee sustainability. It was that realisation which convinced us to 
move out of clandestinity and to disarm ourselves and continue working within 
our communities.”  
It was then that William and Alirio went back to Tarso. They started a 
cooperative that marketed agricultural produce and helped develop a farmers’ 
market. They were involved in those activities when the ELN threatened them 
both. Later the paramilitaries arrived offering “protection” and charging their 
“vacunas” (extortions). But William and Alirio refused to pay and were 
subsequently threatened and forced to go into hiding. However, the community 
spoke with the guerrillas and the paramilitaries and they permitted William and 
Alirio to go back to the municipality, although they were frightened. 
 William commented that the sense of community and the political work 
and organization in it had played a role in this defence of them: 
 
“There was a very strong organization around the Constituent Assembly. 
There was a sense of civic value expressed in the decision not to cooperate 
with any armed group and there was a real recognition by the community of 
our work. It was the same community who engaged the paramilitaries in 
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discussions and managed to get them to agree to let us back into Tarso. That 
gesture committed us even more and enabled us to put up with many other 
things, many adversities…When you see that a community looks out for you 
and supports you, you feel more committed. That’s why today I am convinced 
that weapons are an obstacle to advancing in citizen formation, in the search 
for citizens’ rights. They were an obstacle because we couldn’t work calmly or 
transparently like we do here. It was more limited, there was more 
intimidation.” 
 
By going down the route of arms William and Alirio admitted that they were 
“destroying citizens”. Many people died because of the weapons of both sides. 
In their view the emphasis on a “top-down” militaristic approach to social 
change was not achieving anything fundamental and ultimately could not bring 
about the deep transformations required. As William puts it, “You become 
convinced that weapons are not the way and begin to work more on the basis 
of formation, the political subject, the citizen, and that begins to generate 
substantial transformations in municipal life, which was what we sought in 
clandestinity in the guerrillas. But we thought it was simply a case of staging a 
coup and that we would be able to change and transform everything.”  
 William and Alirio see the necessary transformations as coming about 
gradually, which for them means they will be more sustainable and deeply 
rooted. They see it as a process of “cultural transformation” that needs to take 
into account the importance of ethics for social change. “You can impose it by 
way of the armed option, you can attempt a coup but the question I ask myself 
is: if we had really managed to do that would we be governing how we should 
be and with politically conscious and formed citizens?” This has a definite 
 265
Aristotelian ring and reveals a consciousness of the importance of ethics in 
social transformation and politics. William suggests that if the guerrillas had 
taken power there would have been a question mark over their moral suitability 
and legitimacy.  
 
“Today what is illegal is legal in Colombia:” legality vs. legitimacy 
Both Alirio and William made the point that the Constituent Assemblies are 
about rebuilding the legitimacy of politics and the local, and ultimately national, 
state. For them the current clash between legality and legitimacy is central to 
understanding the conflict. In terms of local politics and participation Alirio told 
me that, 
 
“The local councillors have not wanted to participate because the Assembly 
from the juridical-political point of view is legitimate and the administrative part 
of the state is merely legal; that is, we appeal to the Constitution and they 
appeal to the law. That’s the contradiction between what is legitimate and what 
is legal.” 
 
As we have seen, MacIntyre’s argument is highly relevant to this and 
underlines the separation of law from conceptions of the good as a central part 
of the modern predicament of radical disagreement. For William and Alirio the 
Assembly is ultimately aimed at rebuilding national political community from 
the local level- only here can the conflict between legality and legitimacy be 
addressed. This is a radical position that resonates with MacIntyre’s 
philosophy. It also implicitly calls into question prevailing modes of political and 
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social science that operate on the assumption of the legitimacy of the national 
state, making abstract policy prescriptions for “more state” as part of the 
solution to the conflict.49 Furthermore, the argument and debate between the 
legal and the legitimate would ultimately become an argument and debate 
between rival institutions- between the local state and the Municipal 
Constituent Assembly.  
For Alirio, the Assembly was based on the Constitution which itself is 
based on more “universal” principles in terms of its conception of the public 
sphere. However, in Alirio’s view the law is based on the dominant narrow 
conception of the public sphere as an instrument for the furtherance of private 
interests as opposed to public political interests. In Alirio and William’s view 
politics has been seen as an extension of private business, “and that business 
is protected under the law. As we Antioquians say- “hecha la trampa, hecha la 
ley”50, so they make laws in accordance with their own interests.” The nature of 
representative democracy covers this up in the name of the interests of the 
majority, which for William is what fundamentally calls into question its 
legitimacy. “We’ve always been against representative 
governance…Representative governance has negated the role of the citizen in 
public affairs so what we propose today is a shared governance that is 
legitimized through the community”, a strong resonance with MacIntyre’s 
position.  
The tension between legality and legitimacy in Tarso has so far been 
resolved in favour of legitimacy. As Alirio observes, “The Council has approved 
                                                 
49 This is a position taken by mainstream conflict analysts and think tanks such as the 
International Crisis Group. 
50 Usually “hecha la ley, hecha la trampa.” Lit. “Made the trap, made the law”, roughly meaning 
the law is made by those whose aim is to deceive or serve their own interests. 
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everything that has come via the Assembly despite being against it. Why? 
Because they would look really bad if they said no to what has been approved 
in the Assembly as they know that it is made up of the people and it would 
mean turning the people against them.” This is where the relatively small size 
of local community politics can help to discourage unethical behaviour. As 
Kelvin Knight points out, “A local network of social relations affords little room 
for duplicity. If one is an excellent person, one will be known as such. If, 
conversely, one manipulates others, then one will have a reputation for 
manipulativeness and will not be entrusted with power” (Knight 2007, p. 180). 
According to Alirio, the governors “feel that governing with the community 
means making less mistakes, it generates greater legitimacy, more tranquility. 
I say it as a member of that institutionality, because that’s what you really feel.”  
This conception of shared governance is a deep challenge to the status 
quo and the historic, hegemonic form of politics in Colombia. It is also a 
challenge to guerrilla notions of seizing local political control. As Alirio 
comments in relation to the local administrative council,  
 
“From our point of view, with a deliberative Assembly that decides on public 
issues the Council is not really necessary, it’s superfluous. Because of that 
they say that we think we are the owners of the municipality. But it’s a waste 
for the municipality because we deliberate and we don’t cost the municipality 
anything, unlike with the Council. They deliberate and then we have to pay 
them. We are the ones who occupy ourselves with planning, being with the 
communities and seeking out resources whilst they don’t lift a finger.” 
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Here we can see the tension between rival institutions through which political 
and moral arguments are ultimately embodied and put to the test. Alirio 
evinces a somewhat MacIntyrean notion of justice in which it is through 
contributions to the common good that resources (money) should be allocated. 
Why should the community pay for a separate, specialized clique of 
professional politicians if it is through the Assembly and intra-community 
deliberation and consultation that genuine and legitimate planning and 
decision-making is carried out? Moreover, we can perceive here the way the 
Assembly in its institutional practice presents a reason, an argument, for its 
superiority to local representative politics.  
Local councillors have seen the Assembly as a threat to their traditional 
privileges and practices. In William’s view, by seeking to effect change from 
the top down the armed struggle shifted attention and energy away from the 
political arena where these privileges and practices were defended and carried 
out. “When we were militants we used to have a slogan: ‘don’t vote, fight.’ We 
didn’t want to vote because we didn’t feel represented…but we also fell into the 
error of allowing others to get away with things more easily because of that.” 
The vision was to eventually seize power and reinvent or pull down and rebuild 
the institutions of the state, effecting change all at once. As William recounted, 
“In the past when I was in clandestine activity I was against institutionality in its 
totality; we had to change institutions, replace them and reorganize them, but 
that was about destroying institutionality. Today through these processes we 
are realizing that the problem is not one of institutions but about the citizen, a 
citizenry that does not assume its role in the taking of public decisions.” The 
aim, says William, is “to transform mentalities”. For him the problem has been 
that people always blame someone else but never look at their own 
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responsibilities. This responsibility has to be exercised in vigilance over 
elected representatives and, preferably, in the vigilance and participation of the 
whole community in local political decision-making, planning and execution. “If 
we do that it makes corruption more difficult and it is more possible to take 
decisions that benefit the community.” Furthermore,  
 
“If there are bad governors it’s because we haven’t been interested in putting 
in good governors. A bad governor means bad investments, bad 
administration, corruption. But if we bring in politically formed, conscious and 
transparent governors and on top of that there is a vigilant citizenry, then 
surely things are going to be different. This is very different to the aims we had 
in the guerrillas, which were to take power and throw out everything and 
everyone there and put in a new governor. I don’t think that’s the way either.” 
 
This all implies a radically different theory of social change. It focuses on 
subjectivity and character. Clearly William does not mean that the nature of 
institutions does not matter. I take William to be saying that simply occupying 
institutions by overthrowing those who control them is not enough to generate 
sustainable, ethical change. Both William and Alirio are against representative 
democracy and its institutional embodiment, but they emphasize the need to 
cultivate alternative mentalities and characters if it is to be replaced with 
something radically different. On a MacIntyrean view these go hand in hand. 
Changes in institutions can help to shift or transform individual consciousness, 
and virtues of character, once developed, can serve to monitor and maintain 
the transformations in institutions. In Tarso, the Assembly is an alternative 
institution and practice that William and Alirio see as able to generate shifts in 
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attitude and the virtues required for political deliberation and social 
coexistence. 
Contrary to the past when William and Alirio were involved in the armed 
struggle the aim is to “occupy spaces of governance”. This is completely at 
odds with the guerrilla practice of occupying these spaces by “proxy”, which is 
to say through intimidation of current incumbents or through some form of 
clientelism. The focus is much more at the level of transforming political 
subjects who can then, so it is hoped, transform the doing of politics from 
within and from below. “The Political Constitution permits us to occupy spaces 
of governance with a differently formed political subject and that’s where we 
think it is more enduring…New councillors then come in because there is an 
interest in the public sphere. It seems to me that these changes are much 
more substantial in that we are not just combating the consequences of the 
problems- we are attacking the causes.” This shifts the classic Marxist focus 
on structural factors to an integral focus on character and institutions, on 
agency and structure.  
 The violence in Colombia is intimately connected to what Alirio refers to 
as the preceding 50 years of a state of siege rather than a “Social State of 
Law”. As Alirio told me, “The 1991 Constitution establishes Colombia as a 
Social State of Law. However, in Colombia there never was a State of Law. 
There was rather a State of Siege for 50 years.” The Constitution changed in 
1991 but: 
 
“It didn’t modify the structures of the previous state. Those who govern 
Colombia are the same ones who controlled and governed the State of Siege 
for 50 years. The Liberal and Conservative parties continued governing the 
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Constitution. The violence in Colombia has been generated by that. The 
Colombian state was incapable of transforming that reality and it permitted 
things to get worse. The tale today that the media tell about the guerrillas 
having lost their ideals is not the whole story. I recognize that the guerrillas 
have committed and continue to commit many errors, but they had their origins 
in a political project of resistance to the state- that’s the truth of it. So now they 
say that they have lost their ideals and I ask myself ‘when were they ever 
recognised?’” 
 
This is a nuanced position that to my mind demonstrates an important 
awareness of history and complexity. Alirio also talked about the destruction of 
the FARC’s political vehicle, the Unión Patriótica (UP). I suggest this is 
important because the “genocide”51 of this political movement is often entirely 
neglected or fleetingly passed over in accounts of the conflict and prescriptions 
for change based on a belief in the possibilities for democratic change in 
Colombia. Several civil society activists I spoke to never raised this crucial 
episode in Colombia’s recent political history. The fact that Alirio talks about 
this shows he is not disconnected from wider, politically sensitive concerns that 
other guerrilla groups and radicals often appeal to. The destruction of the UP is 
appealed to by some, including human rights activists and the guerrillas, as a 
justification for continued armed struggle. Alirio shows he is aware of the 
terrible, unjustified atrocities carried out against the UP but this does not lead 
him to condone armed struggle or to view processes for social transformation 
within the system as futile.  
                                                 
51 See Restrepo 2001 
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Both William and Alirio understand the Constituent Assembly process 
as one that is congruent with what they perceive to be the initial ideals of the 
guerrilla movements in Colombia. They point to the need to address people’s 
basic material needs and link this to the causes of conflict and the perpetuation 
of insurgent groups: “The State is not guaranteeing conditions for life so 
therefore people look for any alternative that an armed actor or a drug trafficker 
might offer. It’s on the basis of need that people join armed actors.” This is 
something that the guerrillas have often claimed- people join them because of 
material needs and grievances. However, the guerrillas also appear not to take 
into account the fact that people’s “needs” do not necessarily converge with 
guerrilla objectives and ideology. The guerrillas often impose their own 
ideological-ethical framework on people’s needs, thereby both 
misunderstanding and impinging on rational self-determination.  
Importantly Alirio and William differentiate the Assembly from the way 
NGOs characteristically address these issues. The Assembly process is 
radical in the way it links material needs to a political not a humanitarian or 
administrative agenda. “The Assemblies cannot become legal entities; their 
function is to provide legitimacy, to reach consensus, to support things, but 
what they must not do is become yet another NGO that administers resources. 
The day that happens the Assembly will lose its essence.” This is consonant 
with MacIntyre’s critique of the bureaucratic normativity of the state and the 
“standpoint of civil society”. However, as we shall see, the criticism that the 
Assembly has become another bureaucratic institution is one that some level 
at the Assembly, which implies a division within the community in terms of 
perceptions of the process. 
 An important characteristic of the Assembly is its openness: 
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“The key to the Assembly lies in its inclusiveness. Nobody can be left out. It 
has to be based on tolerance because there is diversity of thinking, of 
customs- cultural diversity requires a diverse political expression; it has to be 
respectful, tolerant and inclusive and about constructing in the midst of 
difference where we attempt to reach agreements on certain issues- we don’t 
have to agree on everything.” 
 
Again this resonates with MacIntyre’s conception of local community politics 
(MacIntyre 1998c, p. 248) but raises certain issues. First, it points to the 
importance of living amidst disagreement and alternative cultural and social 
visions. The Assembly is seen as part of a process of inculcating an alternative 
political culture of tolerance of diversity and dissent. Second, it also highlights 
the tensions between the need for tolerance and respect of others and the 
need for substantive consensus and agreements on important public matters, 
including those in relation to justice and development. These difficulties 
remain, which, as we shall see, currently threaten to undo many of the gains 
achieved. The question is whether these tensions can be dealt with and 
whether the community has the moral resources for addressing them. 
 
Empowerment and agency 
A crucial characteristic of the process is its emphasis on agency allied to a 
conception of seeking deeper cultural transformation in order to ultimately 
effect political and social transformation. Participation is seen as key to 
generating political agency and therefore greater legitimacy. Empowerment is 
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another term William and others refer to in relation to this. As William 
comments,  
 
“I think the best way of forming citizens is to learn by doing. It’s not about a 
bunch of academics coming down and putting the right ideas into people’s 
heads. How many people would think that to implement an initiative such as 
this- an alternative model of governance- one would have to study a lot, read 
many documents, go to I don’t know how many workshops or leadership 
courses so that people could acquire certain skills/knowledge and know how 
democratic governance works? It turns out that our practice has demonstrated 
that it is on the ground doing which is the best way- it is to learn by doing.” 
 
This strikes a definite MacIntyrean tone. It is clearly a step away from 
vanguardist forms of political conscientization and is connected to a 
recognition of the need to be aware of and sensitive to local social and cultural 
realities. As William pointed out, “We have achieved transformations in terms 
of how public municipal decisions are made but we haven’t carried out a coup 
on the state in order to make the municipal budget more just.” In their view, 
“You have to use more dynamic methods, more novel ideas that fit with 
people’s daily experiences and culture. We can’t go about imposing other 
things.”  
However, this does not translate into a validation of social and cultural 
limitations. In William’s view these include the tendency to always blame 
others for social and political problems.  
 
“But I think also that the community is beginning to comprehend what is meant 
by cultural transformation. People understand that others are not only to blame 
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but that everyone is to blame when they don’t assume their responsibilities. 
When I go from merely claiming my rights to recognising that I also have 
responsibilities- when we get that clear it generates empowerment of citizens 
in terms of the public sphere. You start to form a sense of belonging, to feel 
that the public realm does not belong to the administrator but to you; it is part 
of your rights.” 
 
The idea of participation that William and Alirio hold to aims to make these 
notions of rights and responsibilities less abstract through concrete political 
practice. It is not enough to talk about these concepts. Concrete political 
practice in the form of the Assembly thus “begins to instill a new culture of 
participation and appropriation of the public sphere…One starts to care for that 
heritage and therefore it results in social benefits and begins to combat the 
causes of conflicts and to improve the conditions of coexistence in the 
municipality. The new culture of participation begins to inscribe itself in 
people’s minds.” 
 This certainly resonates with an Aristotelian notion of ethics and politics. 
According to Alirio and William the Assembly served as a space for public 
political deliberation and the development of certain dispositions and virtues 
necessary for coexistence. By taking certain key political decisions out of the 
closed channels of clientelist elite political decision-making and “gentlemen’s 
agreements” and putting them in a public arena open to all, the Assembly took 
an important step in generating a space for the development of moral and 
political agency. It thereby also provided a framework for rationally critiquing 
the dominant forms of political practice and discovering criteria for alternative 
political practice. 
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In William’s view the process is about generating the desire to 
participate, to lead people to re-evaluate their relationship to the public political 
sphere. Instead of stultifying criticism from the sidelines that leads to the 
maintenance of the status quo or, worse, to a resignation and indifference that 
allows the public sphere to be manipulated by private interests or armed 
actors, the aim is to make participation a means for challenging this and 
developing political agency. “That’s very different to when something is done 
only through imposition- when people have to accept something because it 
has been imposed on them by an armed actor. In this case it is the will of the 
citizenry that generates social transformations. It is about autonomy, not 
impositions. It’s about feeling, desire, empowering oneself. I think that is the 
most interesting thing in all of this.”  
In William and Alirio’s view, in the process of selecting candidates for 
the local municipal elections the Assembly has had a big influence and has 
managed to put forward councillors, which has meant that councillors from the 
traditional parties have not been able to get enough votes and so have lost 
influence. For them, “What that shows is that here there is a new citizenry in an 
ongoing process of formation, that thinks differently, that participates. Because 
of this we have managed to get new councillors into the administration.” The 
Assembly therefore aims to work within the bounds of state-centred, 
representative politics but is also circumspect in its dealings with the state. 
What needs to be borne in mind is the fact that political consciousness in 
Tarso, as in many areas of Colombia, has been strongly conditioned by the 
culture of clientelism. My field research has shown how deeply rooted this is, 
and it is therefore significant that in Tarso, where clientelist relationships are 
more direct and personal and therefore more vulnerable to intimidation and 
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abuse, people have been persuaded to challenge this and to vote for 
candidates on a different basis. 
 
“I am a founder member not a secretary”: women’s voices 
Having laid out the perspectives of two of the original founder members of the 
Assembly, both of whom are male and from a radical/leftist ideological and 
ethical-political standpoint, I now turn to two female voices that represent an 
equally important perspective on the process. 
Eucaris López is a 46 year old married mother of four who has spent 18 
years living in Tarso. She completed her secondary school education through 
night classes in Tarso later on in life. Her political orientation is Conservative 
and she had been a local councillor before getting involved in the Assembly.  
Oralia Botero is a 40 year old married mother of one. She has lived in 
Tarso most of her life, finished her secondary schooling and then studied a 
specialization in agricultural technology. Her political orientation is also 
Conservative.  
 I begin with Oralia who explains how she got involved in the Assembly 
process. “I really liked the idea of the Assembly. It seemed to be something 
that filled my expectations; the political parties have never done anything for 
me or my family, we have never depended on them for anything, such as a job, 
for example. When they spoke to me about creating a community and 
organizing ourselves I decided to support it and since then I have not missed a 
meeting.” Oralia didn’t realize at first that William and Alirio were demobilized 
guerrillas, which she admits could have prejudiced her if she had known. After 
she had been in the process for a while she discovered who they were and 
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was open to discovering their stories and the history of their struggles in the 
region. Oralia told me how she understood their reasons for joining the armed 
struggle and spoke of how their decision to work as part of a community was 
“an example of life.” Participation ultimately enabled Oralia to transcend 
political and social prejudices and prior moral judgments to openly admire 
William and Alirio for who they were and what they were trying to achieve. 
Oralia was a founder member and part of the steering committee that 
went out into the rural neighbourhoods to raise awareness of the Assembly 
and to gather information about people’s lives, needs and expectations. For 
Oralia the participatory space provided by the Assembly gave her the 
confidence to begin to challenge some of the cultural norms in relation to 
women and their roles: 
 
“I formed part of the executive committee of the Assembly, I was a collegiate 
president and initially the only woman in the group. That was hard because we 
still have that machista culture and as I was the only woman. Oralia was the 
one who took the notes and compiled the minutes. But one day I said, ‘I am a 
founder member, not a secretary; any colleague is in a position to assume that 
responsibility.’ Alirio and William understood my position and delegated that 
task, which made me feel proud; because of something so minor I was able to 
make my own space within the executive group of the Constituent Assembly.” 
 
Whilst this might seem like an insignificant point, I suggest that it signals 
something important about the way not only “formal” principles espoused by 
the Assembly (based on many of the values in the Constitution) such as 
equality can be used to challenge prevailing attitudes, but also how the actual 
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practice of participation and social, face-to-face encounter can be empowering 
by bringing into the open what are often taken for granted discriminatory social 
attitudes and practices. 
Oralia unsuccessfully attempted to get on to the local council as a 
Conservative candidate but for her, like Alirio, the Assembly is the space of 
legitimacy. In her view what she and other women do in the Assembly 
“legitimizes what we are as women.” However, this kind of personal 
empowerment for Oralia through participation is put into perspective by 
Oralia’s own account of the limitations of the Assembly in getting its message 
across and integrating itself into the lives of people in the community. For 
Oralia the Assembly is the key to overcoming the deep social problems and 
conflicts in Tarso but there is still much work to be done. As she explained,  
 
“I like the Assembly and I support it because it is the only way of getting out of 
this crisis. In Tarso we have been participating for nine years although the 
citizens are still not sure about what the Assembly’s purpose is. Despite the 
fact that everyone knows the Assembly exists there are many who don’t want 
to get involved with it because they consider it to be a movement that was 
designed to overthrow conservatism, liberalism and the old ways of doing 
politics. There are many people who remain tied to that way of doing politics 
and they don’t want to commit themselves to the proposal of the Assembly.” 
 
The problem remains of challenging the dominant political culture. “When the 
electoral period ends you realize that there is a still very big gap between the 
active participation of citizens and the kind of participation that is about 
choosing some representatives. We citizens still think that participating means 
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voting every four years and we forget that participation is something we can do 
at every moment, that it is a genuine right and not something merely on paper. 
I think that is what we are still lacking.”  
I asked Oralia if the Assembly had had any impact: “Yes, for sure. 
We’ve been doing this for nine years now…and the development in the town is 
clear; it now has things that it didn’t before and at least the people claim their 
rights more, they have a greater capacity to get involved.” Oralia says that 
people in Tarso now have a wider perspective and that the resources that 
come their way are producing results. According to Oralia, through the 
Assembly’s administrative body (CEPACT) and the project in the rural 
community of La Arboleda the investment there is really doing something, 
although it is slow. “The social impact is still weak and it’s not how one wishes 
it would be.” I asked Oralia how she wished it could be: “My dream is that this 
and other municipalities in Colombia be dignified places to live, where people 
have at least their basic needs satisfied: food, health, housing, education, and 
where the environment is more pleasant and allows us to live well.” I then 
asked Oralia why these things were not being achieved: “I don’t know, perhaps 
because of corruption, because of not keeping an eye on the resources that 
come into the municipality which end up being administered by less than ideal 
people. Perhaps our own lack of knowledge means that many things happen 
that we’d rather not happen.” Oralia here makes oblique reference to moral 
character as part of the explanation for the corruption and social deprivation in 
Tarso.  
For Oralia what time has revealed is which people are genuinely 
committed to the Assembly process and the community: 
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“At the beginning of the process everything looked marvellous, but with the 
passing of time you realize who are the ones really committed to the process, 
who are halfhearted and who are definitely not interested. Perhaps the 
landowners are interested in the Assembly because it guarantees them 
adequate conditions in terms of public order, because it’s a peace territory 
their farms have greater security, but they don’t participate much in the 
process.” 
 
This suggests serious limitations to the process and calls into question the 
notion that Tarso is constructing a new politics and social reality based on the 
common good. However, it is significant that someone of a Conservative 
political orientation like Oralia has a perspicacious critique of the landowners. 
For Oralia, the material, productive part of the process is important: 
 
“We have tried to form alliances with those people who have resources and 
land in order to develop enterprises and employment, and some have 
committed themselves to it. Tarso has an economy that depends on coffee but 
unfortunately the coffee harvest is only a short period, so what happens to 
people the rest of the time? The idea is to create alliances- some have 
accepted and committed themselves to working with us and the local 
government to help generate alternative sources of income for the citizens of 
Tarso and the poorest people. On that side of things there has been some 
success.” 
 
I then asked Oralia about the issue of overcoming the traditional sectarianism 
associated with politics in Colombia, which has been historically linked to the 
treatment of peasants and the politics of land:  
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“I don’t know what others have told you but it has been difficult to deal with. In 
fact those of us here in the Assembly belong to different political groups and 
we all work together. Sadly, however, when the electoral season arrives we 
leave that ideal behind of working collectively to build citizenship through a 
more participatory democracy and we relapse into the old ways of doing 
politics of the traditional parties where if I want to gain power I need to offer 
citizens what they want: money or other things.” 
 
What is needed to combat this, in Oralia’s view, is better organisation. “We still 
haven’t learnt to organize ourselves. In the Assembly there is a diversity of 
political viewpoints and we work well together, but when the elections come 
around the differences begin to surface. It’s complicated trying to deal with 
that.”  
 In Oralia’s view the current government administration does not look 
favourably upon the process:  
 
“They are from a traditional clientelist political viewpoint and want to gain all 
the power and put their whole family in the same political posts at the national, 
departmental and municipal levels. That’s an old way of doing politics because 
it’s about concentrating power in one family. After nine years of this process of 
a group of citizens working together on this we are asking ourselves why we 
have a mayor who doesn’t support the Assembly and follow its line.” 
 
I asked Oralia what in her view was the answer to this old political problem: 
“Educating our young people in what democracy is about would be one of the 
ways of ending that problem. It’s not about telling them that when they reach 
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eighteen they’ll find someone to vote for who gives them some money for 
supporting their campaign. The idea is to generate consciousness in them 
about what democracy really is and how we have to build it in this country.” But 
allied to this is an emphasis on addressing some of the material dimensions of 
the problem: “On the other side, it’s about creating productive projects that 
positively impact on people, helping them to earn more, especially women. 
The population of Tarso is mainly rural, agricultural and we live basically from 
our crops and cattle. The idea therefore is to create projects that are more 
profitable for people.” Oralia made the connection between this emphasis on 
the productive/material side of democracy building and the clientelist problem- 
economically vulnerable people are easily tempted to sell their votes for short 
term gain. “People feel vulnerable because they don’t have a job, access to 
health or to higher education and then a politician comes along and says he 
will give them a certain amount of cash to work on his campaign, which means 
he buys people. I think the most adequate way of dealing with this is to make 
sure that people have these needs met and to have them provided for locally.”  
Oralia then spoke about the differences in vision between the Tarso 
process and the national government: 
 
“There is a very big difference. For example, the current government of 
President Uribe is investing more in war than in social and economic 
development. I am a strong critic of the Free Trade Agreement52 because this 
country has so much potential and if we do not support the countryside then 
                                                 
52 The so-called Free Trade Agreements with the United States and the European Union are 
resisted by all the trade union federations as well as by social movements and many civil 
society organizations. 
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other producers will flood our markets and we won’t be able to compete and to 
produce in a dignified way what we can if we don’t have economic support.” 
 
Oralia expressed her indignation with the government “that invests in things 
that don’t favour the majority of people. We Colombians are more poor than 
rich. It would be good to have a technologically developed country but first we 
must think about rural development.”  
Oralia’s position certainly appears to challenge the “standpoint of civil 
society” that the national political parties are locked into and is strongly 
influenced by her connection to Tarso as a local community. To illustrate an 
important contrast, one of Colombia’s most important civil society 
organizations, the Bogotá-based think tank known as Corporación Nuevo Arco 
Iris, is supportive of the Free Trade Agreements on the basis that these will 
supposedly improve “human rights” in the country. The position taken by this 
civil society organization is based entirely on abstract moral argument and the 
“standpoint of civil society” which, on a MacIntyrean view, revolves around an 
unquestioned acceptance of the modern ethos.  
 
I now turn to Eucaris. She described her arrival in Tarso: “When I arrived in 
Tarso I was a hopeless person- lonely, withdrawn. I hadn’t even finished my 
secondary schooling, I did that here at night school. Then I got the chance to 
work at the local radio station and through that I got to know people. I was also 
working for a local Christian foundation. Through that I got to know many 
people, their stories, how they lived, what their experiences were, their 
needs…The aim was to look for ways of helping people in need… Then 
someone suggested I try to become a local councillor.” Eucaris’s candidacy 
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coincided with the beginnings of the Assembly process. Alirio approached her 
and asked her to get involved. However, “when we had the first meeting I didn’t 
believe in the process much. I said that if it continued the way it seemed to be 
then I’d have to think again because it didn’t convince me.” At first Eucaris 
thought it was merely another form of clientelism when she saw that some 
people were simply telling people at the Assembly meetings who to vote for in 
terms of local candidates for councillors and the mayor. “I objected to that and 
they intervened to stop it. Those who were involved left the process. I carried 
on going to the meetings and became enamoured with the process because I 
saw that things were going in a different direction to what I’d thought.” 
Eucaris’s experiences as a councillor shaped her outlook. She was 
shocked by the lack of integrity of some of her fellow councillors and was 
disillusioned to discover that debate on local issues was foreclosed by those 
who conformed a majority in league with the political orientation of the 
incumbent mayor.  
 
“We used to have council meetings, say, on a Friday evening but a couple of 
hours before that the councillors who were of the same political side as the 
mayor would meet in his office and when they went to the official council 
meeting everything was already decided. In the session they simply read the 
protocols, registered attendance, put forward the proposals, called to vote and 
that was that. There was no debate because everything had already been 
decided…That impacted on me a lot because to come to discover that there 
were councillors who didn’t attend meetings but who simply said to their 
colleagues not to worry, that although they hadn’t been present they supported 
whatever was decided, that to me was the last straw.”  
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However, raising questions about this historically rooted political practice was 
not easy: “If I questioned anything they simply said I was ‘politicking’, which 
hurt. But I carried on with the Assembly process because the idea of being part 
of a community has always attracted me; what one can do for and learn from 
children, youths, adults and the elderly.” I asked Eucaris about her perception 
of the Assembly process and how she understood its purpose:  
 
“The Assembly process is about that encounter and engagement with the 
community, to get to know directly through contact with people their 
experiences, to share those experiences and to put yourself in the shoes of 
others... I have always enjoyed working with children and women. In terms of 
the latter, we’ve tried to organize them from the point of view of feeling able to 
do things differently, in terms of self-esteem, loving oneself and the person 
you live with. I would say that the work has been more on the personal level 
because that’s the basis on which to address many issues.” 
 
This is a far cry from traditional conceptions and modes of political practice. In 
Eucaris’s perspective, the Assembly brings social issues of day-to-day life and 
culture under the deliberative lens of political enquiry and also encourages a 
more solidaritous form of social coexistence. Politics is not seen as some 
separate compartmentalized sphere in which decision-making is carried out in 
abstraction from social realities. In Eucaris’s perspective, the actual face-to-
face encounters in the Assembly were what enabled people to begin to 
overcome social and political differences and distances. An example of how 
this process has potentially radical social and cultural implications is the 
awareness of domestic abuse as a real problem in Tarso, which is 
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acknowledged to be a “taboo” issue in Colombia, especially in rural areas. This 
issue was brought up by Eucaris and a diverse range of people in Tarso, some 
of whom I would not have expected to have discussed or even considered it. 
This is at least suggestive of the power of the practice of the Assembly to raise 
culturally sensitive issues and generate some form of consensus.   
Eucaris also raised the issue of the “culture of dependence” in Tarso. 
The expectation many people seem to have that the Assembly should 
personally benefit them economically or in some other way is recurrent. “That’s 
what I’d like people in the municipality to understand about the Assembly 
process- that the Assembly wants the community to show us their economic 
reality, not the economic reality of “who’s going to bring us money?” but in 
terms of how our children, youths and adults are. It seems to me that we are 
still not solidaritous, we need more support from each individual.” In Eucaris’s 
view this lack of solidarity is also related to a lack of tolerance, which has 
negative implications for deepening the community’s social and political 
process: 
 
“If we had the consciousness that we need others we could more easily create 
businesses, associations, whether it’s just a reading group, a “tertulia” or 
whatever. The problem is a lack of tolerance. We women have a difficulty that I 
think is ridiculous but it’s that if you don’t like me, if you don’t really get on with 
me then you don’t go to the meeting just because I’m there; and that’s not the 
spirit. If we were more assertive, if we had greater respect for difference and 
other people we could find ways of resolving our conflicts. But our failure to 
deal with them respectfully and constructively means we remain in conflict, we 
are enemies and that’s just the way it is.” 
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Eucaris points out how this cultural issue of individualism is taken advantage of 
by the status quo of the traditional clientelist-populist system: 
 
“There are people who take advantage of that through the same ‘welfarism.’ I’ll 
help you and give you certain things but there’s a hidden interest there 
because I need you for a particular time. Let’s say that in an electoral 
campaign I offer to buy your shopping for a month but afterwards I give you 
nothing. But then the next election comes around and I offer to mend the wall 
in your house. Those things break solidarity.”  
 
This negatively affects the community and the Assembly’s wider transformative 
agenda. People often don’t believe in the process simply because it doesn’t 
operate in a clientelist fashion, which is of course part of the problem that the 
process aims to transform. “For example, one lady got annoyed with us 
because we didn’t build her a house, but that’s not the philosophy of the 
Constituent Assembly. Let’s build that house, but between us all. And how do 
we build that house? With a change of attitude and the realisation that the 
Assembly doesn’t give away houses or money. Yes, it manages resources but 
in a way that all can benefit.”  
For Eucaris the Assembly has made people conscious of a sense of 
community and given them an awareness of being able to achieve things 
together. Women have consulted the Assembly about claiming their rights in 
the form of official legal demands (“la tutela”) and have been empowered 
through participation. Eucaris also pointed out how it is the rural communities 
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who are the most active in terms of participation and community organization 
and spoke of the concrete, day-to-day obstacles to participation:  
 
“The urban sector of the community has not been as participative, they seem 
quite sceptical about the process, many because they don’t leave their 
houses, they’re too distracted with TV soap operas that clash with meeting 
times, others don’t like meetings or because when one talks about public 
politics people take it as if it were merely yet another electoral campaign. They 
are unfamiliar with the concepts and the dynamics of the meetings. The 
people who live in the urban areas are different to those who live in the 
countryside who like to participate out of curiosity or whatever. The other thing 
is that people from the urban zone work in the countryside so they arrive home 
late and tired, which you have to take into account. Getting people together for 
political meetings on weekends is understandably difficult when it’s many 
people’s only time off.” 
 
But Eucaris also relates these obstacles to participation and the attitudinal 
problems she highlights with the more structural issue of unemployment: “The 
other thing is also that because there are no stable jobs in the municipality, 
when you talk about processes like the Assembly people think you’re telling 
them you’re going to give them a job.”  
For Eucaris one of the principal changes needed is a change in attitude 
at the local political level: “While people carry on thinking of their own good 
before everyone else nothing is going to change.” Eucaris points out that this is 
still the pattern in local politics: 
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“A woman came up to me to tell me that someone had proposed that she 
became a councillor and she wanted to know what I thought. The only thing I 
told her was that if she was convinced, if she liked working for the community 
and seeking proposals then she should do it. She told me that the people who 
were motivating her to do it had promised her they would give her money and 
help her run her campaign. I said to her that that was not what being a 
councillor meant and I suggested she attend the leadership training school 
that the Assembly ran so she could think about whether she really wanted to 
be a councillor or not, because the idea that someone should run a campaign 
for you is not ethical. If you are an honest person you cannot allow someone to 
pay your shopping bills in order to persuade you to join the council. That would 
make you as corrupt as them. The sad thing is that all of them were like that. 
The current president of the council got there on the back of doing some 
housing improvements and building some new houses. People didn’t look at 
those benefits as the result of a public policy but as a favour from the 
‘honourable president’ who took care to ensure the improvements were done 
because the elections were coming.” 
 
In Eucaris’s view, the question is how to get councillors to understand what the 
Assembly process is about and not to think about what they can get out of it in 
terms of serving as a springboard for their own political agendas in future 
elections, “which is what we can’t allow but is what happened with Oscar 
[Hurtado- former mayor] when he aspired to the national congress.” The 
tension between the local council and the Assembly and the future mode of 
their relationship is an ongoing issue. “It’s horrible because you see that 
distrust and rivalry between the Assembly and the Council. However, we have 
tried to find concrete points on which to agree. The idea is that they come to 
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recognise the Assembly process for what it is, not as an instrument for 
strengthening any political group but to develop that social and political unity in 
the municipality. In order to achieve that we have to rid ourselves of a lot of 
things.” This shows the inherent problems of building an alternative political 
culture and a genuine politics of the common good. After ten years of the 
Assembly process in this small municipality there are still deep-seated 
clientelist and individualist attitudes.  
 I asked Eucaris how in the Assembly it was possible to reach 
agreements on certain public issues given the varied ideological and ethical-
political standpoints within it: “Although we have our own political affiliations 
we are not so addicted to the political, but rather to the social. That’s what 
leads us to sacrifice many things although we have to fight it out in the good 
sense of the term; I give you my arguments, I listen to yours.” I asked her how 
participation in this space had helped people to discover certain social values, 
something beyond party politics that is shared: 
 
“It’s that we don’t focus on the political party issue as such. If it happens to be 
the case that at any given moment in Tarso there are many liberals and few 
conservatives or vice versa, at the moment of evaluating a proposal that is 
oriented towards the development of the municipality as such, the idea is that 
we all pull together to achieve a project independently of political colour or 
banner.” 
 
This suggests that it is the participatory process of common deliberation and 
the virtues required to carry out joint community projects that engender a 
sense of shared purpose and common criteria for evaluating social priorities 
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and tasks. Despite the fact that the projects such as building the hospital, 
school and housing were based on compartmentalization- different “experts” 
were brought in as consultants- the participatory nature of the planning and 
overseeing involved appears to have prevented a lapse into the dominant 
corrupt practice of such projects being constructed merely with a view to 
benefiting certain private and political interests. According to local people I 
spoke to, the transparency and the encouragement of participation and local 
monitoring ensured that the projects were carried out according to people’s 
needs. This participation also empowered people and gave them a sense of 
working towards commonly agreed upon objectives for a wider good. 
Like Oralia, Eucaris referred to the concept of “dignity” as the criterion 
for development when I asked her about reaching consensus on this. In her 
view, “We can’t understand human dignity only in terms of employment. The 
majority think that dignity is only about a well paid job. Human dignity 
encompasses many things, it’s about the integrality of everything.” As Eucaris 
put it, “It’s about saying to the peasants that above all it’s they who rule, they 
who must tell us what we need to do because we don’t know, we don’t live in 
the countryside where as they, on the other hand, know what their specific 
needs are in the rural areas.” Again this suggests an implicit rejection of the 
standpoint of civil society’s modern ethos and also implies a radical position in 
relation to external consultants and experts who proffer local and national 
policy prescriptions. It is plausible to suggest that inclusive public participation 
and deliberation in the Assembly has encouraged the kind of solidarity and 
epistemological humility that Eucaris expresses. 
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Conclusion 
This first section has focused on four of the Assembly’s founder members. In 
their view the Assembly has provided an important space for the development 
of an alternative form of politics, whilst also contributing to the development of 
the municipality. Both Oralia and Eucaris highlight the importance of 
addressing the development situation in the rural areas, which is perhaps the 
most urgent national issue facing Colombia today. It is to this issue that I now 
turn in the following chapter where I expound the perspective of a leading 
peasant militant, who was also a founder member of the Assembly, as well as 
the perspectives of some of his colleagues and family.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Conflict, resistance and coexistence in a Colombian 
municipality: voices from a microcosm of the 
conflict. 
Part 2: From peasant militancy to the public sphere 
 
“You’ve got to begin with the masses”: peasant militancy and the 
struggle for justice 
There are several important voices yet to be heard and I now turn to the 
perspective of another founder member of the Assembly who was a militant 
peasant leader during the years of open class conflict between peasants and 
landowners. Albeiro López is 58 years old, married with four daughters and 
works as a day labourer on local farms in the municipality. Between 1995 and 
1997 Albeiro was also on the local council in Tarso, hence he is well placed to 
discuss issues of politics, conflict and social change. For 27 years he worked 
as a farmhand on the farm of Gabriel Jaime Gómez, a landowner who was 
kidnapped by the ELN in 1991 (allegedly involving Alirio and William) and who 
took part in the early negotiations leading up to the Assembly. Our interview 
began with Albeiro recounting his experiences of peasant resistance and 
activism. We can immediately perceive how Albeiro’s personal experience has 
shaped his sense of justice: 
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“I worked for 27 years on the farm of Gabriel Jaime Gómez, starting in 1975. 
They never paid me the minimum wage during all those years. I also worked 
on a farm of Gabriel Jaime’s grandfather. It was a farm of 1200 hectares, with 
cattle and coffee. There were 200 workers. I worked there for 12 years. The 
owner died but the farm stayed in the family.”  
 
This initiated a struggle with the workers when the family wanted to end their 
employment. Albeiro told me of his encounter with the priest Ignacio Betancur 
who was Albeiro’s primary school teacher:   
 
“There was a priest in Pueblo Rico called Ignacio Betancur who they called a 
revolutionary but who for us was an advisor who defended our rights and was 
against injustice. We met with him and then the idea was born of forming a 
trade union with the objective of not letting the family throw us off the farm. We 
were affiliated to Sintagro- the banana workers union. Our demand was that 
they would have to retire us with full social and health benefits that we were 
legally entitled to. The inheritors started to negotiate with the workers and 
members of the union, offering them money to leave...The union was 
strong…Eventually we took the farm but the police threw us off it…In the end 
some left of their own accord because of threats and the general difficulty of 
the struggle, so we lost strength.”  
 
The immediate inheritor was prepared to negotiate with the peasants but “his 
three brothers were against the other guy working with us; they were hardcore 
capitalists and started a struggle against us.” 
 Albeiro and other people in the community began a series of land 
occupations and “recoveries” because of their desperate situation. They lived 
 296
in “rotation”, staying on the “recovered” farms at different moments and 
cultivating the land at night. They couldn’t hold all 1200 hectares so they 
eventually settled on just 63 hectares. They would enter the farmhouse and 
during the night they would put barbed wire around the land. The police would 
arrive the next day with the owners and take it down but Albeiro and the others 
would simply re-erect it. Eventually only seven families remained in the 
struggle. “We had many difficulties because everyday people would turn up 
claiming the land and try to throw us off. We would always ask to see the 
proof, the papers. Then we started to seek help from NGOs, in this case the 
IPC53 where there were lawyers and people who worked as advisors to people 
like us. We were working for the common good- for our families and the 
village.”  
In 1979 a wealthy man from Urabá arrived in the area and offered 
Albeiro 10 million pesos54 to cease organising land struggles and to persuade 
people to leave. Albeiro refused. All this led to further problems. “In the region 
they stopped giving us work because we were deemed troublemakers, 
revolutionaries. We had no support from the local administration, we were 
totally discriminated against because of our struggle for land.” Eventually in 
1990 a court judgment was emitted that classified the land as unowned and 
therefore entitled to be claimed by the peasants. Finally in 1994 they received 
land titles and the land was officially handed to them with no outstanding 
claims.  They started to work the land but 9 hectares were stolen from them by 
a landowner. They remained with 54 hectares and sowed it all overnight in 
                                                 
53 Instituto Popular de Capacitación. A Medellín-based NGO. 
54 On today’s exchange rate this would be roughly £3500 
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plantain. They divided the 54 hectares up amongst 15 families with three 
community plots. Albeiro still has 5 hectares. 
During these years Albeiro and other peasants had been involved in 
literacy campaigns and political conscientization programs. This involved legal 
NGOs as well as clandestine groups linked to the guerrilla organizations. 
Albeiro was one of the peasants who helped organize these programmes 
amongst the local rural population. As he put it, whilst they were learning to 
read they also learnt to “read reality” at the same time. Their involvement with 
the ELN was ambiguous. Albeiro was understandably a bit cagey about this 
but he eventually clarified that he had been part of a militia group with an 
indirect connection to the guerrillas that aimed to conscientize local peasants 
and to defend the land they were occupying. The ELN frequently passed 
through their rural area and Albeiro and others would give them food and 
water. However, Albeiro stated that he did not personally want to go down the 
route of clandestine military action. He preferred to make claims the legal way 
and did this in his capacity as president of the local trade union branch. In 
1995, as president of the trade union he went to the headquarters in Fredonia 
to ask for an investigation into working conditions. As Albeiro put it, there was 
a “tremendous injustice by the rich against the poor.” Between 1995 and 1997 
Albeiro was also a local councillor. 
Between 1990-1996 the ELN engaged in the kidnapping and killing of 
landowners in the area. The police called Albeiro to a meeting in which he was 
accused of being a guerrilla and of helping them. Albeiro admitted that they 
passed through his area and that they gave them provisions but he denied 
being a guerrilla. Gabriel Jaime was kidnapped in 1991, “supposedly by Alirio 
and William, but they deny it. I was working on the farm when it happened and 
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people accused me of being involved in it. People started looking for me. I had 
to go into hiding for a couple of months- not sleeping in the house but in the 
mountains. I was signalled as a guerrilla.” In 1996 he was ordered by the 
paramilitaries to resign his post as president of the union. “I was not a guerrilla. 
I shared, I still share, some ideals of the guerrillas. Today they have lost a bit 
of their ideological direction, but not completely though.” He fled to Medellín 
but came back to find the paramilitaries all over the area. He went up to his 
rural neighbourhood where there was a checkpoint manned by the 
paramilitaries. He approached them openly and introduced himself to the 
commander of the paramilitaries. He gave his version of events to them and 
they let him go. There the immediate problem for Albeiro ended. 
 In 1999 Alirio called on Albeiro to get involved in the Assembly process 
that was proposed. When Alirio explained that the idea was to sit down to 
discuss things with people like Gabriel Jaime and other landowners Albeiro 
was unsure due to the mutual antagonism and distrust between the peasants 
and landowners. But Alirio assured him that “he is as afraid of you as you are 
of him.” Albeiro told me that he felt Gabriel and others like him got involved in 
the process out of a sense of self-preservation as much as anything, although 
Gabriel had recognised the injustices visited on the peasant classes. And so 
the first meeting with over 300 people was convened and the process took its 
first steps.  
My interview with Albeiro took place almost ten years on from the 
commencement of the Assembly and so offered an invaluable insight into the 
ethics and politics of struggle, the ups and downs and the prospects for an 
alternative ethical-political project that it appeared to aspire to be. I began by 
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asking Albeiro about what drove him on throughout all his years of hard social 
struggle:  
 
“I have exercised leadership for 35 years without seeking to gain anything for 
myself but only with the desire to organize, to live united with others so that 
this injustice doesn’t overpower us like it has been doing. That’s been my 
philosophy. I got involved in the Assembly as a leader to contribute my 
knowledge and seeking some kind of progress against social injustice, 
discrimination, unemployment, unjust pay, for health and education. With that 
objective I joined the Assembly.” 
 
Albeiro recounted that he was a founder member of the Assembly and part of 
its steering committee. His role was to convoke the rural population and so he 
brought the communal action committees into it (neighbourhood citizens’ 
committees). For 15 years Albeiro was a president of his local communal 
action committee, which gave him credibility and helped him to get other local 
committees to work together. He informed people that the committees were 
protected in law and were deemed credible at the government level. However, 
after a few years he began to have differences with certain goings on in the 
Assembly: 
 
“I told them ‘friends, you’ve lost your direction’; the original philosophy of the 
Assembly has been lost because the Assembly focuses on working with three 
or four people in the urban centre. I say things honestly but emphatically and 
that has caused much controversy. The Assembly is no longer the Municipal 
Constituent Assembly of Tarso. For me it is the Municipal Constituent 
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Assembly of the Urban Centre of Tarso. The rural area is not touched on, it 
has not been addressed.” 
 
Albeiro sees the Assembly as another form of “politiquería” because it has 
followed the logic of the clientelist electoral system. He was put in charge of 
“conscientizing” the rural neighbourhoods about the Assembly, of organizing 
people into local action committees and getting people to formulate proposals 
for development and so forth. However, in the middle of doing this  
 
“a political campaign for mayor of Tarso began and Alirio, William and two or 
three others from the Assembly followed the path of this candidate [Oscar 
Hurtado]. Alirio said to me, “Albeiro, the ‘contract’ has finished because we’re 
now in political campaign”, so he removes me from there and takes over 
himself with the candidates for the Council and goes into the rural 
communities to campaign. What he did was to completely break up the work I 
had been doing for a general good, for a philosophy of the Assembly, and they 
totally changed it. Politics got changed for politicking, which is bad.”  
 
Albeiro is critical of the form of participation in relation to the Development 
Plan: “Today we are mourning, look at where we’re going, look at this current 
administration. Yesterday we saw it with the Development Plan which was 
really poor…We are politically at zero.” 
Albeiro’s criticism centres on the lack of attention to the rural areas and 
a failure to deepen the actual meaning and practice of participation. For 
example, in his view: “The Assembly has concerned itself with- that’s fine- 
making contacts with those in social sectors like education; so with the local 
rector, for example. But do they talk to the kids at the local school, with the 
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parents? No sir, just with the rector and the teachers.” He summed up his 
general feeling: “Sadly the reading I have of the Assembly- I say it with great 
sadness because I was one its founders- is it’s been going for nine years but 
the marginalised communities, the rural areas, have not seen any benefits.”  
Recently Albeiro had been contacted by Alirio to get more closely 
involved with the Assembly but Albeiro remained sceptical: 
 
“I said to them ‘put your boots on’. I said to Alirio, “You used to wear them but 
when you did that was to go fighting. Now you have to put them on and go out 
without your gun and get down in the mud, help us to sow beans, corn, 
manioc. That’s what it’s about! With diaries, sandals and mobile phones you’re 
not going to solve the problem, not in the square. That’s why I’ve been a critic. 
I’m involved again today because they asked me but I said ‘compañeros, 
thanks for asking me, I love the Assembly but until you guys change mentality 
I’m not getting any deeper involved.’” 
 
In Albeiro’s view there is a problem in terms of the profile of the leaders of the 
Assembly:  
 
“I’ve told them some of the leaders of the Assembly don’t have a profile for 
leadership, because a leader needs many qualities and many of them don’t 
have them. Besides the fact they are not much loved in Tarso, they don’t know 
the soil, the communities, reality. I’ve told Julián, who is the local director, 
earns a million and a half pesos a month and never leaves the office. And it’s 
like that successively. I admire some of them, for example Carmen Lucía, 
she’s a teacher, really committed, that woman was part of a political group, 
she’s more on the left than the right. She has a wide vision.” 
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This clearly points to social and political tensions within the Assembly. For 
Albeiro the problem remains of a distance between the peasant classes and 
others. He gives another example: 
 
“There was a girl who used to work on domestic violence issues. When she 
arrived Alirio introduced her to me and I invited her to a meeting of the local 
action committee in my rural neighbourhood, but the first thing she said was 
‘but we don’t have a car’. I said, ‘no problem, the road is paved and it doesn’t 
take long to get there on foot…The local action committee has 70 people, it’s 
an important space.’ ‘Ok’ she says. I went to meet her as we’d arranged to 
take her up there but she was in another meeting with the rector, the head of 
the police, the manager of the hospital and the candidate for mayor. That 
made me realize she had other interests that weren’t those of the 
communities. But you’ve got to begin with the masses.” 
 
Albeiro told me how the initial executive group of the committee had effectively 
split: “I don’t really understand why it is that these issues are not addressed. In 
the executive committee of the Assembly there were thirteen of us but six of us 
were pushed to one side because we were the ones who fought for the people 
as a whole, not only to do little things around the square. I’ve told them in no 
uncertain terms, being the peasant I am, that they’ve lost their humanitarian 
sense, they lost that common interest and started to create personal interests- 
money.” This was the strongest hint that, in MacIntyrean terms, an emphasis 
on “external goods” had replaced the focus on “internal goods” related to 
participation and working for a common good, which can eventually only lead 
to the damaging of social relationships.  
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Albeiro then put his view of the Assembly in more stark, ethical terms. 
“It’s like a trade unionist fighting for the rights of workers and owners at the 
same time, terrible. Where will that lead?” It became clear that there was an 
increasingly damaging division between Albeiro, the peasants he felt able to 
represent and the current Assembly leaders: 
 
I said to them recently that if the Assembly didn’t change direction I would be 
the first one to start to bring it down because I’m going to convene all the 
heads of the communal action committees, twelve of us, and we’re going to 
conform a group that could be an associative work group for carrying out 
public works, I’m not sure yet.” 
 
I asked Albeiro what the needs of these communities were from his 
perspective: “Government support. We are abandoned. We have to begin from 
the fact that the local government just mouths words and promises that never 
materialise into anything…They have to invest in the countryside…We have to 
create associative work enterprises in our communities, community industries, 
associational groups. A project is easily created. Get five women or men and 
get them to work on producing onions, tomatoes, etc. We need cooperatives 
and a farmers’ exchange.” This reveals how state presence and involvement is 
seen as necessary. Arguably, the reality in Colombia is that the social 
problems are so intense that only the state is capable of addressing them. The 
state is both part of the problem and the solution on this view. However, it can 
be asked whether historical patterns of dependence on the state and the 
deeply rooted “patrimonial” culture prevent local communities from taking the 
initiative themselves. Continuing to demand state presence and hoping that 
 304
the state will change and benevolently recognise its “responsibilities” is, on an 
anarchist view of social change, to remain trapped in a “politics of demand” 
that politically and psychologically blocks people from conceiving and 
implementing more radical, autonomous forms of social change (see Day 
2005). The Assembly’s model of social change aims to circumnavigate the 
state by seeking external resources that are to be administered directly by the 
community, whilst also aiming to transform the state slowly from within by 
putting its own people within it. In this the Assembly project is closer to a 
MacIntyrean rather than an anarchist politics. It is also a concrete Utopian 
politics in that it is guided by Utopian standards but recognises the need to 
engage with existing structures.  
 Clearly, from Albeiro’s perspective the problem boils down to a failure to 
communicate across the class divide: “Last week there was a meeting of the 
executive of the Assembly and I said to them that they had dedicated 
themselves to working with the middle and upper classes, that they had 
abandoned the popular classes, which is where the potential lies.” But it is also 
a problem related to the very structure of the Assembly: “I said that four or five 
of them were going to continue having the say and deciding for all the 
Assembly members, and that’s not the way. They communicate with the 
people when everything has already been decided. For that reason I say 
there’s been a lack of communication.” 
 
Land, poverty and development 
I then asked Albeiro to talk about his views on development issues in Tarso.  
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“When they say that in seven years Tarso has seen greater development, I 
disagree. To me it’s the opposite. Here in Tarso there are two barrios in which 
the local government built houses for the people…they saw that the landowners 
were knocking houses down and that concerned them so they got some 
resources together to provide houses, but now those people are forgotten. 
They brought some to the urban area and now they have a house but still 
suffer hunger and now pollution. If you go back to those rural communities 
that’s where the poverty is. At the least they could plant some crops to subsist 
on, there was some work on the land but now there’s no work. That’s the 
problem.” 
 
Albeiro immediately linked this to the issue of local clientelist politics: “When 
the mayor built the houses he didn’t do it thinking about the priorities; they 
were built without any prior study. What he looked at was how many votes he 
could get.”  
Albeiro then pointed out the statistics on land concentration. According 
to him there is one landowner with seven farms totalling more than 5000 
hectares. These farms are dedicated mainly to coffee and cattle. For Albeiro a 
better model would be to focus on smallholders producing for the local and 
internal markets. “We need an agrarian economy based on food security and 
when those needs are met we can think about producing for export.” There has 
been some attempt at diversification into citrus fruits which requires more 
labour, “but once production starts they will need less workers. They are also 
considering using machines to harvest the fruit, which is a gain for the owner 
but…” This again signals a shift from the “standpoint of civil society” that was 
also evident in Oralia’s position. 
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 The problems in Tarso are also linked to the wider economic dynamics 
of the national level conflict, for example in relation to the illegal drugs 
economy. According to Albeiro, “Narco money is also coming to these large 
farms- capitalism; they’ve already started building tourist cabins. Today in 
Tarso in some areas a hectare of land costs 60 – 70 million pesos. The owner 
builds a beautiful farm with a swimming pool and that’s it. That’s all very good 
for him, and Tarso will look really pretty with all those enclosed developments, 
but we peasants will be in the same situation as before.” Albeiro is also worried 
he will be forced to sell the plot he has. According to him there is talk by one 
aspiring local politician about building another urban barrio for those 
economically displaced in his rural community. “That’s when I think ‘and what’s 
the Assembly for?’ We’ve got all this international support but let’s not keep 
lying to Europe and let’s stop lying to ourselves…There’s a son of a bitch in 
Tarso with 5000 hectares of land, Gustavo Adolfo, he’s young, the guerrillas 
killed his father. Why don’t the Assembly, the municipality and three or four 
people form an alliance to start a big project?” Albeiro suggested that land 
could be donated by those with large land holdings. The municipality or the 
departmental or national state could buy land to help address these problems. 
He pointed out that Gabriel Jaime leased 70 hectares for free for 6-10 years. 
“That’s the priority. Otherwise this place will be a paradise for the rich and we 
will disappear, we will be displaced to Medellín to live in the ‘comunas’.” The 
problems Albeiro highlights are directly embedded in his own daily life:  
 
“I am currently working on a farm- in construction- building a swimming pool, 
digging and carrying, carting cement from 6.30am to 6.30pm for 25,000 
pesos…I’ve only got work for two weeks and then I don’t know what I’ll do. 
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These rich folks only hire you when they need you to avoid paying insurance 
and health entitlements…Why do I have to do day labour when I have five 
hectares of land? Because I don’t have resources to make it work and the 
Assembly has not proposed to form a project with me…It prefers to maintain 
relations with Federico the owner of the flower company; he has nine of 
them.”55 
 
I asked Albeiro whether he thought that the common good was being built in 
Tarso: “No. We are not building a common good here. Some individuals’ good 
is being constructed.” Albeiro then linked this to the notion of peace: “There is 
supposed to be an administration that talks about development and peace. No 
sirs, peace is more than a name, peace has many ingredients…here there are 
families dying of hunger, families with nowhere to live, without education, here 
there is tremendous domestic violence.”  
 Clearly, the political relationship between the local mayor and the 
Assembly remains a challenge in Albeiro’s view: 
 
“This corrupt mayor that we have in Tarso promised in his campaign to build a 
road and a bridge, which will cost 15,000 million pesos. Today the Assembly is 
thinking of putting money towards that and I asked William if the Assembly 
was going to carry on paying for the political favours of others. Where are we 
going to get with that? The mayor promised the road and the bridge but 
because it’s not possible for the administration to do so on its own and it 
realizes the Assembly has money, the idea seems to be for the Assembly to 
                                                 
55 Unfortunately I was not able to get an interview with Federico. His would be an important 
perspective to capture in terms of his conceptions of justice, development and the Assembly 
process. 
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help out. Who will get all the plaudits? The mayor of course who in four years 
will come back to try to get voted in again. That’s it plain and simple.” 
 
Albeiro points to clear economic problems and inequalities that on a 
MacIntyrean view must hinder the development of a genuine politics of the 
common good. The fairly clear implication coming through was that the 
Assembly is becoming another exclusionary political space in which the 
interests of those who run it have moved away from the common good to the 
external goods of money, influence and power. The internal clashes about the 
best way to achieve what is broadly referred to as the common good also 
reflect different assessments of the strategic possibilities for and nature of 
economic development. But these internal differences arguably reflect the fact 
that the municipality as a whole arguably does not have a shared conception 
of the common good. There remain deeply entrenched interests that mean the 
Assembly in its internal deliberations very likely has to take “pragmatic” 
decisions. 
 
Perspectives from political power and landowners 
I now turn to the perspectives of those with political power, the former and 
current Mayors of Tarso, Ignacio Castaños and Fredy Hurtado.  
  Fredy Hurtado Pérez is the current mayor of Tarso. He is from a large 
political family (14 brothers and sisters) that is traditionally Liberal. Fredy 
studied law in Medellín and went on to be the human rights ombudsman 
(personero) in neighbouring Pueblo Rico. Two of his brothers have also been 
mayors in Tarso including the first mayor to work with the Assembly, Oscar 
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Hurtado. We began by discussing the origins of the Assembly and the financial 
and administrative crisis that threatened to subsume Tarso into the 
municipality of neighbouring Jericó. In Fredy’s view this was not down to 
corruption or clientelism but “disorder”- a different explanation to that provided 
by Alirio, William and Oralia. Fredy then talked about the illegal armed groups 
in the region and began his narrative by highlighting the killing of three 
landowners by the ELN.  “Because of them we suffered the deaths of whom 
we might say were the three wealthiest people in the municipality, very 
honourable farmers who generated a lot of employment; they were a 
tremendous loss to us.” Fredy then recounted the appearance of the 
paramilitaries: “And then the other group appears, the paramilitaries who did 
us a lot of harm with their selective killings…In Pueblo Rico 250 people were 
killed in three or 4 years, which left a big hole in our community…Here we 
suffered a lot as well.”  
The armed groups generated problems for the community in different 
ways in terms of security, the economy and politics. Fredy described the 
Assembly process as establishing “a barrier against the armed groups. In 
terms of security and the socio-economic side of things the Assembly helped a 
lot and got people to support it.” Fredy then pointed out that the Assembly and 
the local government had to work together for both of them to achieve their 
goals. “If the Assembly didn’t work in tandem with the municipal administration 
it would not have the success it enjoys…The same goes for the administration, 
we need each other.” He told me how his position required him to 
“communicate with everyone”. Interestingly perhaps, Fredy described the initial 
meetings between the local administration and the Assembly as having 
established “a gentlemen’s agreement about the projects we would carry out 
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and how they had to be for the benefit of the whole community.” In his view it 
doesn’t matter who “contributes to the community” as long as it is a 
contribution; “Their political views don’t matter”.  
Fredy then put it to me that the common good was the central notion 
guiding the joint process: “Thinking about the common good was the basis of 
everything we did here. We had to detach ourselves from personal interests.” 
He pointed out that despite the seriousness of Tarso’s financial and political 
crisis, the mayor at the time could still “have done his own thing” because he 
had the legal power to restructure the local administration. However, “he 
recognised that he needed the support of everyone.” 
 I asked Fredy about how disagreements between the Assembly and the 
local administration might be handled: 
 
“If the day comes when differences arise between the Assembly and the 
administration and our proposals are not in agreement, then with a lot of 
respect and courtesy and through dialogue we will have to think hard about 
what to do. I think the differences will be when we don’t think in terms of the 
community, in the common good as we call it. When the proposals put to us 
are not oriented to the common good the administration won’t support them.” 
  
Fredy says things have advanced in terms of development in Tarso but 
recognises that much still needs to be done. In particular he mentioned health 
coverage and the need to make sure employers register their workers on the 
national government system and pay their legal entitlements, etc. He said he 
had spoken to the business community and that they were committed to 
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helping in this respect and wanted to work with the community and the 
administration.  
Although Fredy recognises that land is in the hands of a few and says 
there is a need to help peasants to legalize their land, especially in the historic 
areas of land struggles, he argues that the landowners have provided work for 
people. He has a different perspective to Albeiro on the recreational farms that 
are being built: 
 
“Now we see the phenomenon of the recreational farms that have greatly 
increased the value of land in the municipality, which is an essential part of the 
municipality’s income generation due to the land taxes. Here a hectare of land 
is worth ten times what it used to be ten years ago, it’s incredible. But I see 
advantages in that because at the end of the day it gives the municipality more 
status, people want to invest in Tarso.” 
 
Fredy then tried to sum up the conflict in Tarso. In his view it is based on “a 
lack of a sense of belonging, intolerance, domestic violence. These are 
attitudes that don’t contribute to peace…We want to substitute these practices 
for principles of dignity, solidarity, and participation. We want to declare peace 
in that sense. We want all of us from Tarso to feel an inner peace, peace in the 
family and in the community.” In Fredy’s view, “We are a model of citizen 
participation. This administration wants to support that and make sure it is 
realized and that it continues. We know that through the Constitution we have 
shifted from a representative model to a participatory model, we understand 
that very clearly.”  
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 Whilst Fredy touched on some of the central themes of the process that 
my other interviewees also mentioned, which suggests that a more or less 
shared discursive framework has developed that can better enable conflict to 
be rationally addressed, there are clearly significant differences about what the 
common good implies in terms of economic development. For example, Fredy 
sees the issue of the increasing land prices and recreational farms very 
differently to how Albeiro and others see it, which is central to the common 
good. The depth of the apparent discursive consensus can only be evaluated 
in the future as the community faces up to the challenges that currently 
threaten to unravel the gains made. As we have seen, the process is fraying 
and the important issue is whether it has managed to develop the moral and 
cultural resources necessary to overcome differences in a rational way. 
 
Ignacio Castaños was the second Mayor of Tarso under the aegis of the 
Assembly. He is a landowner himself and defined his political views as 
“uribista”56. We began by talking about the causes of the conflict. Ignacio put it 
to me that the historic injustices in relation to land and the concentration of 
wealth had played a huge part and that “If private business does not help with 
this problem, there will never be peace here.”  
Ignacio then linked the national scenario with the local context in Tarso: 
“Tarso has traditionally been a municipality of latifundios. 95% of the land has 
been in the hands of 5% of the population, in the hands of a few.” He told me 
about the land struggles:  “There were social movements that wanted to take 
land by force, for example in La Linda, La Arboleda, Patio Bonito where there 
were confrontations with major landowners.” He then stated that the 
                                                 
56 I.e. a supporter of the former president Álvaro Uribe Vélez. 
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landowners made a mistake “when they shut themselves away and looked out 
only for themselves. They didn’t provide much employment, made themselves 
richer. There was a huge gulf between the rich and the poor.” He then narrated 
the story of the Assembly and how it emerged within this polarized context. “So 
what happened? Some guys turned up, who came from certain movements 
like William and Alirio, and ‘Tarso towards a new millenium’ was created. 
People said how could some ‘fanatics’, ‘lunatics’, ‘useful idiots’, ‘romantics’  as 
they were called, how could we change all of this? How could we save the 
municipality?” Ignacio at first withdrew from the process.  “I withdrew from the 
process at the start because I thought it was just another political movement of 
the usual sort, but then I went back.” Oscar Hurtado was then elected as 
mayor as the ‘Assembly candidate’ and Ignacio followed in 2003 with the 
highest vote for a candidate in Tarso’s history (over 2500 votes). “In my first 
term as mayor I worked a lot with the communities. I was the first mayor to 
speak of revoking the mandate of mayors; according to article 40 of the 
Constitution the people can do that; there are four or five mechanisms of 
citizen participation through which this can be done if the mayor doesn’t serve 
you.” He added, “I always worked hand in hand with the Assembly. I never 
spoke in the name of the Castaños but in the name of the Assembly.” I asked 
Ignacio if there had been any clashes between the Assembly and the 
administration: “Here something curious happened because there was a 
‘confrontation’ between the legal and the legitimate. There were seven 
councillors against the idea of the Assembly and one in favour (which was 
William in any case). They never participated or wanted anything to do with the 
Assembly. Nonetheless the Development Plan was unanimously approved.” 
This again highlights the serious political resistance that the Assembly faced 
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but also arguably signals the “curious fact” of the persuasive power of 
concerted, collective, participatory political action.  
I then asked Ignacio about how the Assembly and his administration 
approached issues of justice and land distribution with the landowners in 
Tarso. The approach made appeal to historic practices rather than to abstract 
moral principles: “In my first term I wanted to try to bring them together. I met 
with several wealthy landowners and I said to them ‘look, in the past in Tarso 
the wealthy landowners used to give the workers a plot of land for them to 
grow food: corn, beans, chickens, they even used to give them a milk cow. As 
a result of the badly named agrarian reform of 1968-1970 the rich said ‘no 
more land.’ That’s when the differences began between the rich and the poor. 
We lost all of that…I said to them that what we needed was to return to the 
1970s and give the poor what they were given then.” Some agreed yet some 
went as far as to threaten Ignacio. However, as Ignacio sees it the Assembly 
brought real changes in favour of a “social pact” between the rich and the poor, 
which Ignacio put down to a different social and political context. Nevertheless 
Ignacio pointed out that today “Land distribution remains the same. What has 
changed is the use of land.” The reasons for landowners changing their 
attitudes and agreeing to form a social pact were mixed, according to Ignacio - 
it was a combination of self-interest, fear and some kind of recognition that it 
was a requirement of justice. The fact that the Assembly was based on a 
rejection of all armed groups no doubt helped to persuade landowners that 
certain changes were necessary to maintain this. “The Assembly was a 
dissuasive factor, it made people realize that there was no space here for that 
radicalism.” 
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However, this is hardly a picture of moral persuasion based on 
determinate, shared criteria and reasoning in light of the common good. 
Nevertheless, it is what there is to build on. The problem for Tarso and the 
process is ultimately one of building a social consensus on the need for much 
more radical change in land distribution and use. This has to be a consensus 
across the whole community and institutional structure- between the Assembly 
and the local government. But how likely is this? The current mayor, as we 
have seen, sees the buying up of land by rich people from outside Tarso for 
the construction of recreational farms as positive, whilst Albeiro and other 
people in the countryside I spoke to, as well as other members of the 
Assembly, see it as extremely harmful to the community. There are clearly 
different interests and conceptions of interests and goods at play here. As 
another interviewee pointed out, from the perspective of the local 
administration the greater land taxes paid by the wealthy landowners in 
contrast to peasant smallholders are much more attractive and immediately 
useful. Their interest would therefore be to encourage these and to facilitate 
these “developments”. However, in the bigger picture and from the perspective 
of the common good, it has to be seriously called into question. The very fact 
of this perceptual difference might be taken as evidence against the view that 
Tarso is in fact engaged in a politics of the common good. However, given that 
there is also evidence to support the view that the Assembly process has to 
some extent been based on a politics of the common good, this particular 
issue emphasizes the difficulties faced by any politics of local community for 
achieving social transformation in such contexts. 
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Gabriel Jaime Gómez is one of the original landowners involved in the first 
Assembly meetings. I visited him at his farm where instead of a formal 
interview we had a lengthy informal conversation. Gabriel was extremely open 
but my lack of in depth knowledge about the process and the personal 
histories involved made it difficult for me to understand Gabriel’s position.  
Gabriel was kidnapped by the ELN in 1991, which allegedly involved 
Alirio and William although this is based on unconfirmed, though widely known 
anecdotal information. Prior to the Assembly Gabriel told me he was involved 
in supporting local agricultural projects for local workers; he served as a 
guarantor to get loans for them and helped assess them on various aspects of 
the projects. He also donated land towards these. Gabriel did not elaborate on 
his reasons for deciding to do this (nor on his experience of being kidnapped) 
but made general remarks about the “need for things to change” in Tarso and 
to address its conflicts.  
He was generally extremely critical about the process, but particularly 
about William and Alirio. He spoke about the initial projects that centred on 
local, smallholder agriculture and remarked that in this respect there had been 
very little done, despite the projects in Alirio’s rural neighbourhood. In his view 
this aspect suffered from distorted priorities:  
 
“I think the resources went on the salaries of the directors…At the start it was a 
process with a high level of credibility and organisational impetus but now it 
doesn’t function…They talk about youth formation and the youth constituents 
but they’ve gone with the cheapest and easiest option. The project was initially 
supposed to support productive projects but now there are no small productive 
family plots.” 
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He told me how William and Alirio had effectively “erased the memory of social 
struggle in Tarso” through buying the defunct trade union offices. However, if 
there had been so much opposition to this why would the owners, who were 
mainly local peasant workers, have accepted their offer? It seemed to me that 
Gabriel was placing blame unfairly on just two individuals, William and Alirio, 
and exaggerating their “control” of the Assembly. In my view, if Gabriel’s 
version was correct I would have expected to find a much greater degree of 
resentment from other Assembly members and also to have heard much more 
about this episode from the peasant militants I spoke with. 
Gabriel pointed to money as a corrupting influence on the process. “I 
was a collegiate president of the Constituent Assembly but that was as far as 
my accompaniment went because I didn’t perceive in them collective interests 
and I told them in no uncertain terms that they were more interested in the 
bank balance than in the social projects for which the money from abroad was 
for.” He then went on to criticise the lack of participation: 
 
“There is no process of participation now. Back then people really participated, 
their instinct for participation was at the fore, people participated in the urban 
and rural areas. Proof of what I’m saying is the number of members that have 
dissociated themselves from the Assembly. Basically the only ones left from 
the beginning are Alirio and William because the rest of us left…What I see is a 
lot of envy and underhand work for particular interests. It worked well before 
we had the money. Then they went to Medellín and got consultants, 
accountants and secretaries and it became more of a façade than a 
representative entity.” 
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Again, despite the undoubted elements of truth, this account needs to be 
looked at with a critical eye as it is simply not the case that the “only ones left” 
are William and Alirio. In Gabriel’s view, important sectors of the population 
were lost to the process because they saw that it was just “more of the same.” 
He finished by speaking about how the Assembly had been used by local 
politicians: “Oscar Hurtado got involved in the Assembly because he saw how 
strong it had become. But even he was an enemy of the Assembly…The 
Assembly had its headquarters in the Casa de Cultura and Oscar sent a letter 
to the Assembly in which he told them to vacate the building.” For Gabriel, the 
current mayor Fredy Hurtado is “more of the same, with his own people and 
his exclusions.” 
 Clearly, Gabriel has a very critical take on the whole process and local 
politics, which borders on cynicism. However, perhaps Gabriel can afford to be 
so critical because, despite his espoused concern for rural development and 
politics, he is a well-off landowner. When I interviewed him he had just finished 
constructing a small hotel on his land for tourists from Medellín. His views on 
the corrupting influence of money within the Assembly process also strike an 
ironic note coming from someone who is relatively extremely well off and has 
enjoyed the fruits of economic exploitation for many years. I could not help 
thinking that perhaps Gabriel was projecting on to William and Alirio what 
plausibly might have been his own prior (and possibly current) rationalizations 
about his own position as a wealthy landowner who economically exploited his 
workforce. By insinuating that supposed radicals like William and Alirio have 
been corrupted by money, does this not serve as a way of implying that his 
own earlier prioritization of “external goods” like money and power is simply 
part of corrupt human nature, thereby exonerating himself? His personal 
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differences with William and Alirio also need to be placed in the context of their 
previously antagonistic relationship and sense of mutual victimization (the 
guerrillas felt landowners victimized the poor, the landowners felt victimized by 
the guerrillas).  
Gabriel gave the impression of being content to criticize without getting 
involved to improve things. This points to the weakness of political and 
community solidarity caused by large material inequalities. In contrast to 
Gabriel, Albeiro and other peasant day labourers and farmers cannot afford to 
be passively critical. Earning 25,000 pesos a day for building a swimming pool 
on somebody’s recreational farm is a stark contrast to Gabriel’s position and 
can only lead to increasing social and class antagonism. As we shall see, this 
needs to be addressed to prevent the re-emergence of feelings that only 
violence can bring much needed social and economic change. 
 
Perspectives of the powerless: ambiguities of hope 
I then went to speak with a group of peasants in the rural community of La 
Linda. Elías Parra and Joaquín Jaramillo are peasant militants from the days of 
the land struggles in Tarso. Elías told me how he had originally viewed the 
Assembly process: “With the Assembly we saw the possibility for a better 
future; in organization, participation, administration. We saw a possibility that 
all of us in the municipality, including all social classes- youths, women, 
children- could construct a new future relating to land reform and working 
organizations and projects.” But as Joaquín pointed out, “No mayor has ever 
mentioned land reform…I have been a critic of all the administrations here but 
the one I have totally not supported is this one. All the candidates for the 
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council and the local government come around every four years to our rural 
communities to get votes but they have never spoken to us about land reform. 
That’s been a serious problem.” Elías commented that this was because of the 
shared interests of the administration and the landowning classes. As he put it, 
“they look out for each other, capital works with capital but we’re left aside by 
the administrations.” Elías and Joaquín then spoke about the need for 
organization amongst the peasants and workers and how this had been 
broken by the threats and violence against them: 
 
“We in La Linda have been characterized by our unity and organization, for 
being militants in the struggle, but we have been intimidated by the security 
forces as well as by the landowners, which has held us back. We had a union 
called the Municipal Association of Agricultural Workers of Tarso but we 
received threats from the public administration. There have been mayors and 
councillors who have called us land thieves, so farmers have not wanted to 
give us work on that pretext, so that too has held us back.” 
 
Despite this, Elías and Joaquín believe there is potential amongst them to 
achieve the changes they desire: 
 
“I think we have great potential because we are a community with a lot of 
knowledge and we have a Constituent Assembly. In my view, the Assembly 
has to get involved in the countryside, the directors should be there working 
with us. We want to transform the vice of mendicity, we don’t want to live 
thinking everything will fall from the sky to us, that the mayor will solve all our 
problems. No, we want to be autonomous but to achieve that we need first to 
organize ourselves as a community. If we push the Assembly we can make 
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alliances with other organizations like the administration, the coffee cultivators’ 
committee, the Agrarian Bank, etc. That is what has been missing.” 
 
I asked them how they could form alliances with landowners who ostensibly 
have completely contrary interests to them: 
 
“It’s been difficult because Tarso is in the hands of four or five landowners. 
However, although we have suffered because of the war, they have also. 
There was a time when there was a huge amount of discrimination, when we 
went after the landowners and they refused to recognise us as well. But an 
achievement of the Assembly was reconciliation. In that sense we have to 
thank the Assembly as well as our own organization. There was a moment 
when we and the landowners got together and they proposed to let us use 
portions of their land. One landowner let us use 200 hectares of his 1000 
hectare farm. Gabriél Jaime Gómez had a farm of 78 hectares and he let us 
use it all. At that time we had a governor called Guillermo Gaviria who said he 
would donate two months of his salary every year to the Assembly for 
productive projects; but because the Assembly lost its way, because some of 
the directors deviated from the philosophy, the opportunity was lost. The 
landowners didn’t hear from the Assembly again and we didn’t continue with 
the opportunity of uniting with them, of forming an alliance.” 
 
The Assembly continued to operate although it gradually began to lose 
influence. However, “Because of that history I think we have the possibility of 
re-instigating this, because now thanks to the Assembly, the administration 
and ourselves it is not as bad anymore. We have the possibility to reconcile, to 
approach them and to start that joint work together.” This certainly suggests 
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that there is a more or less shared language and set of terms with which to 
approach the difficult issues of “constructing together” in the midst of radically 
different perspectives based on material inequalities and class antagonism. 
Through the practice of deliberation in the Assembly the community has, from 
the perspective of these peasant militants, made serious headway in bridging 
the social divide and trying to work together. Whilst under no illusions about 
the prospects for radical change, it is important that these individuals feel there 
is some common discursive, moral and cultural ground on which to build. 
They spoke amongst themselves about creating an Assembly of the 
communal action committees arguing that they have the potential and the 
autonomy for creating and proposing projects. They pointed out that there is a 
culture of participation throughout Tarso and were sure that this augured well 
for such a proposal: “if we were to propose a union of communal action 
committees we would get a positive response because everyone in the 
municipality has that culture.” 
 
I then got another perspective from a peasant farm worker and trade unionist 
called Jairo Flores. He began by enunciating a general ethical principle: “One 
mustn’t think about the individual but about other people, in the most needy 
because we know that those who already have do not need anything”, which 
strongly resonates with the liberationist language of the “preferential option” for 
the rights of the poor. This discourse is also shared by Albeiro, Elías and 
Joaquín although there are some important differences in view, as we shall 
see. Jairo outlined his perception of the Assembly’s function and purpose: 
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“We could say that the Assembly is there to carry out many activities and to 
deal with many issues, to solve problems that arise in the town; there are 
many economic necessities. As we all know, this is a wealthy municipality but 
it is in the power of three or four landowners that don’t want to do anything for 
the poor. Therefore, we the poor are the ones who have to rise up and claim 
our rights, to demand justice, which is what this country needs- justice for the 
poor, social justice.” 
 
However, for Jairo this cannot be achieved through armed struggle: 
 
“I don’t agree with any armed group. Why? Before there was an armed sector 
that stood up for the poor and claimed rights on their behalf but today it’s all a 
business. What rules today is the justice of money. All those armed groups 
only fight for their own economic interests, they don’t give a damn about the 
poor, the same as the president we have doesn’t give a damn. Why do I say 
this? Because he is privatizing companies…It is a tragedy that a country as rich 
in natural resources as ours lives in misery because the president wants to sell 
everything to the United States at the lowest price.” 
 
I asked Jairo about his conception of a just community: “To have a just country 
in which we all work, in which we all contribute our little bit and where we look 
at each other like brothers, because my God didn’t give us a world divided by 
fences. We want partiality for everyone…let’s stop looking at each other as 
enemies.” He elaborated further his views on justice: “We know that here in 
Colombia there is no justice. There is justice but ‘para los de ruana’ [lit. “for 
those of the ruana”. A ruana is the typical shawl like garment worn by people in 
the countryside.] If we have laws and the president rules this country and it’s 
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supposed to be strictly complied with, why don’t they enforce the law about the 
minimum wage? That’s an injustice.” In Jairo’s view, “here in Tarso the rich 
abuse the poor a lot.”  
He then spoke about his experiences as a trade unionist: “Many of us 
who have passed through the ranks of the unions have had the conception that 
what we have learned is not just for ourselves but has to be passed on to the 
people so that they form consciousness and demand their rights. We are in a 
country of free rights and we have to bring attention to all the abuses that the 
bourgeoisie commit against us.” I then asked Jairo whether the common good 
was being constructed here: “Yes, as long as we carry on as we are. We need 
to plan, we need a strategy, a rigorous plan of action that is consequential. We 
need full contact with the community.” Jairo expressed hope that the process 
could work through communication and dialogue with the mayor, who would 
have to listen to dissenting views. Speaking after the Assembly meeting for the 
Development Plan he pointed out, “If we see that in six months the results are 
not good, then again we will have to draw attention to it and meet with the 
mayor.”  
Was there a feeling amongst these different sectors of a shared project, 
I wondered? Was there a genuine sense of community or was there something 
still lacking? “There is still much to do. For example, we have to stop thinking 
about our individual interests and to start thinking about the common good. It’s 
a long term work plan that depends on our continuity, on the attention we give 
to these initiatives that are really important, not just for oneself but for the most 
needy in the community.” Jairo, like Elías above, then pointed out the 
connection between the local government and the wealthy in Tarso in more 
concrete terms: 
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“The rich side with the local administrations and they ensure that they don’t 
have to pay the minimum wage. The rich are taking land away from the people 
with the connivance of the administrations, the mayor…Here they buy up farms 
and build fences around them that block off municipal paths and roads. The 
first thing they do is to put a sign at the entrance which says ‘Keep out. 
Private.’ That’s something the mayor should deal with, take back those 
municipal paths, recover them.”  
 
However, despite Jairo’s cynicism about the mayor and the administration, he 
thinks the mayor is prepared to listen to the Assembly: “It’s serious 
participation because we accompany this administration and one of the best 
things we see is that the mayor takes the community into account when he 
does things. Because he doesn’t rule on his own, we rule the administration 
because we put him there.” This is a notably different view of the current mayor 
to that expressed by Albeiro from someone with a very similar radical 
perspective.  
 Despite Jairo’s burning sense of injustice, his realist class analysis, and 
his view that traditionally the political and economic elites (“capitalists”) have 
colluded in the oppression and abuse of the poor, the Assembly had clearly 
given Jairo some hope that serious social change could occur through 
dialogue, argument and working together as a community, despite.  
 
From the academy to community 
María Teresa Toros is a 53 year old single mother from the nearby municipality 
of Concordia. She is a secondary school teacher of Spanish and Literature and 
before moving to Tarso she taught at public universities in Medellín. As we 
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shall see, in this university context María Teresa has important experience as 
someone engaged with and affected by the conflict. Her decision to leave 
Medellín and move to Tarso is directly related to this experience.  
María links a critique of the workings of university institutions in 
Colombia to the conflict and her hopes for the process in Tarso: 
 
“I think Colombia is a country with much social exclusion where there are 
really big conflicts. One of the principal conflicts has to do with the structure of 
power, with corruption. Pointing that out is not looked upon well by the public 
universities. When I was working at a university in Medellín I realized I was 
looked on suspiciously so before things got out of hand, before I became more 
persecuted or things turned sinister with a disappearance or an assassination I 
decided to go into a kind of personal exile in the countryside to continue 
struggling in a different way and context. Besides, I always liked Tarso 
because it’s more peaceful here. Here you can talk about democracy and 
participation and the Constitution and you don’t have a boss on top of you 
saying no, that this is a country without conflict, where there are no exclusions, 
that teachers are called to teach and not make comments in relation to the 
conflict.”  
 
Here María Teresa makes clear how the academy is inherently involved in the 
conflict. In her view, the university as a public institution cannot avoid taking a 
stance in relation to the conflict despite ideological pretensions to value 
neutrality.  It says something important that in María Teresa’s view there is an 
opportunity to discuss social, political and moral issues in relation to the 
conflict in a small, local community like Tarso rather than in the supposedly 
liberal world of the modern, urban university. 
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María gave an example of the kind of ruling mentality in operation at the 
university level: 
 
“The persecution against me took a nasty turn because at a state university 
where I was working we were discussing in a teachers’ meeting the issue of 
corruption and we were asked if we had any views. I raised my hand and said I 
thought it was a problem that in education in Colombia at the university level 
we basically limited ourselves to the purely academic side of things and almost 
never took a position in respect of the problematic in the country. I said that 
one of the most serious problems was administrative corruption. It was then 
that the Dean decided to try to get me out of the university because she 
thought my ideology was dangerous. I added that an educator should prepare 
young people for a difficult life, which is what it is in Colombia, so that when 
they left university they wouldn’t become victims trapped in the conflict and 
would have the morals and courage to deal with it.” 
 
María points to the real dangers and ethical dilemmas of challenging dominant 
practices and ideologies in the Colombian context. “After she made the 
decision to remove me I told her I would go public with my concerns and urge 
an open debate about what we should be doing in terms of getting the 
university in touch with the truths about this country and how we could educate 
for a society in conflict and war.” María convoked a meeting of teachers and 
administrators and they organized a demonstration. Her boss called the police 
who took over the university, which María and her colleagues were completely 
against; they demanded an investigation into this criminalization. In her view, 
the aim was to suppress dissent and curtail free discussion on socially 
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important issues. As it turned out this backfired on her boss when it was 
discovered that she had been engaged in corruption. 
 This shows the real dangers and obstacles in trying to build an 
alternative ethical-political ethos in a country in which many people are locked 
into a defence of the status quo by their own direct or indirect involvement with 
corrupt and often authoritarian, exclusionary practices. To confront these 
issues even in a respectful, non-aggressive way can be risky. It also requires a 
strong ethical sense. As María put it, “Some of us have the courage to confront 
others and ask them to discuss things, to inquire into what is happening. It’s a 
country where we can all fit.” 
 María then talked about the challenges for education in the context of 
the conflict and told me how there are many young people who feel there is no 
alternative to armed struggle as a solution to the country’s social injustices. 
Processes like the one in Tarso need to address the material realities of 
inequality and poverty if they are to maintain credibility: 
 
“Look, a society like Tarso has engaged in a lot of democratic debate, it’s got 
together with the community, it has placed a lot of importance on participation, 
in managing conflicts peacefully. But if you don’t add to that a way of helping 
people to subsist, if people don’t see an alternative possibility in the 
countryside for example, if we don’t integrate productive issues with it, if we 
don’t integrate production with democratic pedagogy then it is very 
complicated because people cannot be expected to participate if they are 
struggling economically, if they don’t have enough to feed themselves and 
their families. Students come up to me and say ‘teacher, we don’t have 
enough to eat well for more than half the week.’ I understand that, I really do. I 
know that’s the disconnect in Tarso. There’s a lot of poverty, believe me it’s 
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not about people feeling sorry for themselves, it’s about lack of 
opportunities…I’ve said to Alirio that the situation worries me, I am worried 
about the constituent process in Tarso because if people don’t find a way of 
getting out of this productive chaos I think they will love this process more 
outside than here itself.” 
 
I asked María what lay at the root of the productive problems she highlighted: 
“There is a productive problem because the land is in the hands of very few 
people, very, very wealthy people. They give work to the people they need, but 
they are a mere handful. There is no just distribution of land; basically there is 
a serious agrarian problem here, though not just in Tarso but across the whole 
country.”  
As María points out, people expect the Assembly to find a solution to 
their material needs. Open and participatory discussion ultimately lacks 
meaning without an integral material/economic dimension. As María put it, “If 
we don’t have land, if we don’t have jobs, if there is no way out, how can you 
sustain a debate?” In her view, “It always goes back to the same theme, a few 
rich people have land to do what they want with it. The state doesn’t get 
involved. The state is all talk; it won’t come here and instigate a land reform 
with three or four farms. It has never come here to do studies with the 
community about that possibility.”  
Nevertheless, for María if the Assembly didn’t exist they would not have 
made the gains in terms of debate and social rapprochement that they have 
done in Tarso. “The businessmen, traders, landowners would not have got as 
close to this society to look at its needs; I think it would have been much more 
difficult and we would have waited another 10 to 15 years to even begin to 
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make that effort. I think that Tarso is consolidating a firm foundation; I have 
heard people speak in meetings and you get a sense of hope, that it is more 
than just discourse and words.” 
I asked María to sum up the ethical position of the Assembly: “It’s about 
unity; the position they take is one of reconciliation, an emphatic no to war, a 
no to exclusion; it is about giving people opportunities for them to regain their 
dignity. That’s how I would sum it up.”  
 
“But then the ELN left and everything changed”: not bridging the 
class divide 
Sandra Milena López is a 26 year old housewife and mother who was involved 
in the Assembly in its early days. She is the daughter of Albeiro López and has 
a radical left wing political orientation. She has since become very critical of 
the Assembly. Sandra began by telling me about her initial involvement with 
the process: 
 
“They delegated the youth part of the Assembly to me. We formed a group of 
young people and we went into the rural communities to tell people about how 
good the Assembly was…But we came to realize that the Assembly was not 
about the people as they had led us to believe, but about five or six 
individuals. That’s when the Assembly started to fail…They only wanted us for 
the photographs to make it look good. People came from Spain and they’d get 
150 delegates together, give them lunch, take a few photos and that was all 
there was to it. They paid attention to us only for that, to cover holes.” 
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According to Sandra, the rest of the delegates were no longer deemed 
necessary when the organizational structure of president and executive 
committee was formed. Secretaries were then employed and they earned a 
wage. There was little participation in terms of projects; people were merely 
informed about what had already been decided, what was working and what 
wasn’t. 
For Sandra, the Assembly “is not anchored in reality” and needs to start 
from scratch. However, “Those who are running it and benefit from it don’t 
think the same.” In her view social justice and development have not improved: 
“I think it’s the same as before…For me it is like the local administration. I 
thought the Assembly was going to be transparent, about a shift in attitude, but 
it isn’t the case…If you speak to the director, he does well out of it. For me it’s 
still about who you know, ‘la rosca’…People are chosen not for ability or 
sincerity but because they are friends.”  
We then spoke about Sandra’s perspective on rural issues: “The local 
politicians don’t show any interest in the rural population except the day of the 
elections. The people in the countryside tell them and show them their needs 
and they say ‘yes, yes, we’ll get it sorted, we’ll look at this and that’ but you 
never see any results. They look at peasants as if they were lesser, they don’t 
give them resources or help to better their situation so they can carry out 
projects…The peasant is really isolated.” In Sandra’s view there is an almost 
insurmountable divide between the business and landowning classes and the 
peasants “because they are not compatible ideas…They are not interested in 
paying a just wage for the poor; they always look to exploit them, to use them. I 
think the rich, the landowners look down on the poor.”  
 332
In Sandra’s view, the encounters between the landowners and the ex-
guerrillas in the early moments of the Assembly process were merely 
pragmatic: 
 
“In my opinion the negotiation between Gabriel Jaime…and Alirio was based 
on fear. It wasn’t because he wanted to unite with the Assembly but rather 
because he was scared, so he sought a spokesperson and that was my father. 
In order to get the people fully on side Alirio had to negotiate with Gabriel 
because he was the one who allegedly kidnapped him, so of course Gabriel 
looked on him with fear. Alirio needed to win Gabriel over.” 
 
Sandra pointed to the problems of reconciliation in such a divided society: “The 
poor, we are never going to unite with a paramilitary. It’s like the rich and the 
poor. Supposedly the poor person is left wing and the rich person is on the 
right.” It was clear that for Sandra despite the Assembly those divisions still 
existed. “How are we going to be on the same side as a rich person, how can 
we tell them our needs and talk like I’m talking to you? Here, never. We’re 
never going to be in that position here. I think it’s impossible.” This pessimistic 
view emphasizes the reality and potential dangers of failing to overcome 
radical, historically entrenched social divisions, which can lead to the re-
emergence of polarized positions that see no other way but the historically 
recurrent one of resorting to violence: 
 
“If in Tarso we had the guerrillas who favour the poor; well, for me that’s what 
is needed because during the time the ELN were here and the FARC we didn’t 
feel as if we were poor…and I thought it was just. Then the rich were not so 
unjust and brazen towards the poor. They stuck to the normal working hours, 
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they paid the minimum wage, everything was normal. But then the ELN left 
and everything changed. The rich treat the poor how they want, they pay them 
what they want and if we don’t like it, tough. Some people out of sheer need 
work for as little as 8000 pesos a day.” 
 
Sandra then spoke about the differences she perceived between the guerrillas 
and the paramilitaries:  
 
“In my view, the guerrillas, whether they are criminals and terrorists like they 
say…well in my experience the guerrillas didn’t do anything to suggest they 
were terrorists. I imagine that for the rich they are terrorists. For me the 
guerrillas are not terrorists, they are forced to do what they do…But 
paramilitarism is the main force of the rich, for those with power…Uribe 
unleashed them to combat the guerrillas, and fighting the guerrillas is to fight 
against the poor…For me the state is like an immense paramilitary.” 
 
Sandra acknowledged that the guerrillas did things that were difficult to justify 
but she insisted on a strong distinction between them and the paramilitaries: 
 
“The guerrillas do things that bother me and that I find troubling but in general 
the guerrillas have been the best…Maybe I’m deluded but…For me the 
guerrillas are not the same as the paramilitaries, although they kidnap and use 
landmines they haven’t got mass graves with 2000 or 3000 people in, there 
are paramilitary chiefs responsible for 2000-3000 deaths. The guerrillas will 
never be as bad as the paramilitaries…They have killed people with 
chainsaws.” 
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I asked Sandra what she thought was needed to bring peace to Colombia: “We 
need a government that isn’t on one side or the other. A government that cares 
about the countryside, that knows something about it and knows poverty. In 
order for the country to change we need a government that knows about 
poverty.” In Sandra’s view there is no peace in Tarso because those who 
invented the motto are “terrorists and politickers who cheat people and buy 
votes…Here one family controls Tarso and they will continue to do so. One 
family, because the people in Tarso do not have consciousness…We in Tarso 
are mendicants, masochists. They can make and break us in four years. Two 
or three days before the election they give people 20,000 pesos57 and that’s 
enough for people to forget all that’s gone before.” However, despite her 
pessimism Sandra suggested that there was hope “amongst the young” and 
through a radical reorganization of the Assembly so that it “takes the people 
into account.”  
 
“What the government wants is to manage the masses” 
Wilson Ríos is 45 years old and was born in Tarso. He started secondary 
school in Tarso and finished in Medellín before moving to the US for 8 years. 
He is an artist and runs the “Casa de Cultura” in Tarso that gives classes in 
various arts to local people, puts on exhibitions and runs workshops. For 
Wilson, as for others, there is a strong sense that any alternative political 
process has to have a strong moral dimension in terms of integrity- ideals and 
actual practice have to coincide. I asked Wilson about the concept of 
                                                 
57 On current exchange rates this is roughly £7.  
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development that the national government had and how it fitted with Tarso’s 
aims: 
 
“The government has an interest in not wanting people to be too intelligent or 
educated because it is more difficult to manipulate creative and intelligent 
people, so therefore the government in one way or another devises strategies 
to ensure that the rich get richer and the poor poorer. If we in the municipalities 
and communities do not form our own government we are not going to move 
forward. What the government wants is to manage the masses; it doesn’t want 
to talk about qualities, only quantities…The solution therefore lies in local 
participation. If a town like Tarso with 8300 people gets organized it is a lot 
easier to arrive at an agreement and a consensus about the direction we want 
to go in than if we link up to a whole nation.” 
 
This is essentially a MacIntyrean position, demonstrating an acute awareness 
of the failings and limitations of the state and the practical necessity of small-
scale, local politics.  
 We then moved on to talk about the way the Assembly was trying to 
transform the political and economic culture and structures in the municipality. 
Wilson appeared perplexed as to what was required. He acknowledged the 
long term aims of the Assembly in terms of its efforts to transform political-
ethical subjectivities and through this the institutions and mode of politics, 
while at the same time critiquing this long term vision in light of the 
shortcomings perceived with immediate projects and issues. 
 
“I know that the Assembly is aiming at the well-being of everyone and not just 
a few, but I ask myself why they are so interested in creating governors with a 
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better consciousness, which is a long term issue. What about now? Are we 
going to keep on doing projects in La Arboleda? Is it about going to other 
countries to seek resources for projects that don’t work? What about the 
community? Is it about having an office and thinking like a corporation and not 
an Assembly?” 
 
Wilson then linked the problems in Tarso to “culture”: 
 
“In Tarso there’s no culture of anything, there’s no culture of loving your 
neighbour, of giving a little of what I have, of sharing. There’s no culture of 
theatre, of education, of socialization, nothing. We have many things but in the 
shallowest way, there’s no depth. It makes me ask if we already have the 
ideals, what are we really doing with them? Is it really by continuing to cultivate 
sugar cane in La Arboleda that we are going to get people out of poverty in 
Tarso? With an Assembly of five employees, four of them in Medellín and only 
one in Tarso can we carry on telling people that what we are doing is 
enough?” 
 
The public sphere 
Wilson made an interesting connection between his view of culture and the 
concept of the public sphere: 
 
“One of the errors we have committed here is not to have educated people 
about the public sphere. The streets are public but they have never taught me 
that they are also mine more than anyone’s or that the schools are mine 
before they are anyone else’s. One always looks at the public sphere as if it 
belonged only to others.” 
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Wilson links this failure of the public sphere to the social problems in Tarso: 
“Why are the people here in such difficult conditions? Precisely because we 
don’t have a culture of anything, because we don’t have a governor or leaders 
who can educate people in all areas, we are not educating our children in 
values…We don’t have a concept of what is mine, yours and ours.” 
However, there has been a positive element to the Assembly that has 
left its mark and which can serve to inspire people to transform things: 
 
“I think that now people understand concepts that when I arrived from the US 
were new; concepts like socialization, participation, being more democratic, 
inclusiveness. These terms and concepts have remained with us thanks to the 
Assembly. When people hear these terms they know what they refer to and 
they can relate them to other situations. But unfortunately the heads of the 
process made some errors and from the perspective of many people on the 
street the process therefore failed…From listening to beautiful words and 
romantic notions people began to vulgarize them.” 
 
Wilson also thought that the leaders of the Assembly got distracted by 
promoting the idea to other municipalities: 
 
“I also asked them why they were promoting Assemblies elsewhere in other 
municipalities when the one here was still a long way from being complete. I 
thought it was irresponsible to try to give to others what we didn’t properly 
have here and I still think that way…I think the Assembly committed a big 
mistake when it wanted to get itself known around the world without having 
first grown sufficiently in Tarso because the results were not being felt still. 
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They were just full of ideals and the world has enough of those; what we need 
at this point are results.” 
 
This is another hazard that is exacerbated by modern political assumptions. 
The desire to become a “movement”, wanting to achieve social change “all at 
once”, espousing abstract ideals and so forth are based on the modern ethos 
and the “standpoint of civil society” (cf. Day 2005).  
 Finally, I spoke with the human rights ombudsman, Alex Ocampo, who 
summed up well the achievements of the process. One of the most important 
was undermining the logic of friend-enemy: 
 
“It was about making it clear that one could go to the Assembly to speak and 
propose things. People understood that there was no need to fight and in any 
case, because of the difficult moment the town was going through when it was 
threatened with disappearing as its own municipality, people united around the 
idea of “we unite or we die together”. People asked themselves why they 
should carry on fighting in terms of their ideologies if it wasn’t leading to 
anything.” 
 
Members of the Assembly continued to get involved in local politics but on 
different terms to the hegemonic sectarian model. In Alex’s view, the practice 
of the Assembly process has helped to shift subjectivities and to weaken the 
hold of sectarian political identities: 
 
“Many of us have got involved in politics on our own political group’s platform 
but people now have the knowledge that they are going to act in conformity 
with the ideas that have emerged through this participatory space that is the 
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Assembly and not on the basis of the radical ideology of their party…Politics 
has changed here, not in its entirety, we aren’t perfect because Tarso has 
been quite complicated politically, but we have advanced a lot and left behind 
a lot of the conflicts we had and were able to elect a consensus mayor…The 
old way of engaging in political dirty tricks campaigning that often implied or 
led to violence has changed through the Assembly working on pacts of non-
aggression and transparency…Things have also changed because we have 
some leaders who have the mentality of participation and who have managed 
to get into the political sphere.” 
 
Conclusion 
The perspectives I have presented reveal how Tarso’s Municipal Constituent 
Assembly has represented a serious attempt to address the issues of conflict, 
civil resistance, coexistence and social change. Certainly in the early days of 
the process there appeared to be great optimism about the potential for 
overcoming political clientelism, sectarianism, and the inertia of the status quo 
in respect of development and life opportunities. However, as the process has 
worn on, there is a feeling that it has failed to live up to its promises of 
inclusion and participation. In particular, the poorest sectors from the rural 
areas feel short-changed in terms of transforming their material situation. 
Despite the ostensible consensus on the worth and dignity of the peasantry, 
the facts of increasing land concentration and lack of economic opportunity 
speak for themselves. The deeply entrenched class divisions have not been 
overcome, in fact they have apparently worsened, revealing the limits to this 
kind of politics of local community, which despite some resonances is perhaps 
not very MacIntyrean. Perhaps the social and economic divisions are too wide, 
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which MacIntyre points out must necessarily compromise any attempt at 
constructing a politics of the common good (MacIntyre 2006f, p. 39). In the 
following and final chapter I take stock of these problems through an analysis 
the fieldwork and present my conclusions to the overall thesis.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions 
I have attempted in this thesis to explore the moral dimensions of the 
Colombian conflict in terms of Alasdair MacIntyre’s complex philosophical 
account of morality, social science, and the nature of contemporary moral and 
political disagreements. I have argued that MacIntyre’s work illuminates 
particular aspects of the Colombian “moral crisis”, including the theoretical 
problem of conducting social scientific study and analysis of the conflict that 
also seeks to transform and bring about a “just, sustainable, and peaceful 
coexistence” (García Durán 2008, p. 359). MacIntyre’s emphasis on how 
morality is inextricably socially and institutionally embodied both illuminates 
better than liberal approaches the moral dimensions of conflict, resistance and 
coexistence in Colombia, as well as providing a more coherent account of 
ongoing social, moral and political conflict and how it might eventually be 
overcome. MacIntyre’s account of the links between morality and social 
science also throws important light on how investigation of the conflict has 
become another arena of conflict, which is entirely missing from moral 
philosophical analyses of the Colombian conflict. 
Following MacIntyre’s argument that it can only be in relatively small 
local communities where rational discussion and debate can occur, and 
therefore where a morally rational political community can be constructed, I set 
out to study a particular embodiment of the politics of local community that 
MacIntyre endorses in terms of what I refer to as a “MacIntyrean moral 
ethnography”. Through in-depth interviews with members of a Municipal 
Constituent Assembly, I sought to understand the nature of a contemporary 
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social and political experiment at coexistence and resistance to dominant 
political practices and modes of social change associated with the armed 
struggle. I posited the relevance of MacIntyre’s philosophy and politics to the 
Colombian context despite the fact that at first appearance the minimal 
conditions for any form of MacIntyrean politics and resistance are lacking. In 
Tarso, I perceived that certain institutional and social aspects of the community 
and its Assembly process would either already implicitly embody MacIntyrean 
assumptions or that these would have been implicitly ‘discovered’ through the 
workings of community participation and deliberation.   
What comes across strongly in the interviews is a consensus on the 
initial purpose and meaning of the Municipal Constituent Assembly process as 
well as a tension bordering on schism in relation to perceptions of the condition 
and adequacy of the process today. The narratives highlight what I consider to 
be a remarkable level of moral-political consciousness about the problematic 
nature of dominant modes of political practice in Tarso and Colombia 
generally. The Assembly appears to have provided both an initial language 
and framework for critiquing clientelism, corruption, and injustice, and also a 
space for the development of further, independently developed critiques. Of 
course, the Assembly also drew upon and gathered into one space the 
different moral-political experiences and discourses within Tarso. One of the 
strongest of these was the discourse of peasant militancy that had emerged 
through over two decades of conflictual political and social struggle with 
landowners. Other perspectives included those of ex-guerrillas, landowners, 
business people, and different ideological standpoints associated with the 
traditional political parties.  
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Given Tarso’s conflictual past and the sheer extent of social division 
and class conflict, the fact that the Assembly still exists is itself evidence of 
strong political and moral virtues amongst its principal protagonists as well as 
within the wider community. The narratives show how argument and 
deliberation within the smaller group of Assembly “collegiate members” is 
understood as a healthy process. It is clear from the fact that different 
ideological standpoints still coexist within the process that it has managed to 
constructively deal with internal conflict, which certainly substantiates 
participant claims that through participation Assembly members have 
discovered shared values, criteria, and virtues that transcend political 
sectarianism and polarizing moral-political discourses. Despite the different 
motivations for engaging in the Assembly, the interviews reveal a shared 
concern that Tarso would have ceased to exist as an independent municipality 
had things remained as they were. The term “community” is repeated 
throughout the narratives and it does seem to be the case that the possibility of 
losing municipal status aroused a certain sense of shared community identity 
that provided the impetus for the Assembly’s vibrancy in its early days.  
There is a strong sense of shared implied self-critique about the 
sectarian nature of prevailing politics, which can possibly provide the basis for 
future critique and community mobilization. However, there is also a strong 
degree of disaffection with the process based on a perception that it has 
become what it originally aimed to combat- i.e. another political clique with its 
own “interests”. In MacIntyrean terms, there is a perception expressed in 
several of the narratives that concern for external goods has partly corrupted 
the process and the Assembly as an institution. However, this needs to be put 
into perspective as a distorted picture of the Assembly and its “leaders” risks 
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being propagated. My own observations of the principal Assembly members 
were that they were working extremely hard on often quite tedious work for 
what they saw as the good of the community. Long hours working on the finer 
details of the Development Plan in a dingy office in Medellín, and frequent four 
hour trips to Tarso for meetings, hardly evinces an image of self-serving 
individuals out for their own gain on the back of Assembly resources. Despite 
undoubted human failings, I suggest that the fact that the Assembly persists 
and that it elicits hostility from traditional political quarters is strong testimony 
to its radical nature and its ongoing potential. However, it must also be recalled 
that some of the strongest criticisms have come from peasants that have been 
closely involved in the process.  
The narratives provide evidence of a deeply ingrained sense of an 
alternative, ethical practice of politics. There is a strong sense of what politics 
should be like and what it needs to avoid. This in itself suggests that the kind of 
participatory practice no doubt imperfectly embodied in the Assembly has 
played a significant role in generating a common understanding of good 
political practice, which goes beyond the bureaucratic banalities of neoliberal 
“good governance” (see Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, p.3 and p. 246).  
In terms of the kind of criticisms levelled at the process and in particular 
against its “leaders”, we need to take into account the socio-cultural nature of 
small rural communities in Colombia in which rumour and gossip are rife, 
magnifying and distorting when not outright fabricating things. Entrenched 
attitudes connected to the nature of clientelist politics, and the atomizing 
tendencies and social distrust this has created, remain a deep cultural and 
moral-political problem that will take years to transform. As Eucaris and Wilson 
both remarked, there is a culturally rooted tendency to perceive others as 
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“enemies” that can stem from mere personal differences, which are then 
exacerbated by failure to communicate and the propagation of rumour. One 
community committee leader I spoke with, not recorded in the narratives 
presented, evinced a rancorous attitude against the Assembly that was based 
heavily on ad hominem attacks, amongst more rational criticisms relating to 
specific problems in her neighbourhood. This individual, however, admitted 
that she had not raised her complaints directly with the Assembly and was 
instead working with a local councillor to implement an alternative political 
proposal that would circumvent the Assembly, which highlighted the way 
conflictual dynamics can simmer and eventually find expression through the 
traditional channels of instrumental clientelism. This suggests there are 
profound challenges for constructing alternative identities and moral-political 
culture in small rural municipalities like Tarso in which for decades political 
identities and moral attitudes have been structured by the sectarian influence 
of the traditional parties. 
The Assembly process has to be viewed in this light. Tarso’s efforts at 
building a public political culture are arguably revolutionary in the Colombian 
context. As Wilson Rios observed, the public sphere is often conceived as 
belonging only to others. This neatly encapsulates the problem of the public 
sphere in Colombia as a whole, which has been privatized by capitalism, 
symbolically subsumed within the political parties, controlled by armed actors, 
and ultimately led to a perception that there is no common public realm 
independent of those who claim it for themselves by the threat or actual use of 
violence. This has its analogue in the emotivist nature of moral and political 
discourses in which exclusionary rhetorics reinforce sectarian political 
identities (see Biesecker-Mast 1997). As I have argued, this has been 
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exacerbated by the philosophically problematic nature of modern moral 
discourse in which human rights have been instrumentalised and the Weberian 
ethics of conviction and responsibility have represented the polarized 
dichotomies of moral expression in Colombian politics (Giraldo 2003; Uribe 
and López 2006). Convinced of their rival conceptions of justice, both the 
paramilitaries and the guerrillas have acted on the so-called ethics of 
conviction whereby the perceived goodness of the ends sought has justified 
their violent and frequently brutal means. Conversely, those who have called 
for an ethics of responsibility, that is, for an eschewal of violence given its 
consequences for the civilian population, have equally failed to rationally 
ground their position and to convince the different armed actors or those who 
see the armed struggle as part of a “just war” (cf. Tovar 2002). Whilst the 
Assembly in Tarso has not directly confronted these particular moral 
questions, it has indirectly addressed them as well as others. There is a 
general consensus that political violence as a mode of seeking social change 
is not acceptable, as well as a generally shared view that the question of land 
injustice is one of the main roots of conflict. The emphasis on dialogue also 
implies the recognition of the minimal standards of objectivity and 
unconditional respect for the lives of others that MacIntyre (2006a) argues are 
central to any shared enquiry and community practice. 
Despite its undoubted limitations, the Assembly process has 
emphasized the importance and facilitated the emergence of human agency in 
political affairs and social change. In a context in which political and moral 
agency have been impeded or overridden by prevailing social structures, 
political practices and institutions, and by the impositions of various armed 
actors, the Assembly process took a revolutionary leap into the unknown by 
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attempting to construct an alternative form of participatory political practice and 
a rival institution that encouraged agency. The Assembly process has been 
Tarso’s first conscious attempt as a community to reflect on the basic 
presuppositions of social and political coexistence, which has meant having to 
address the inherent moral dimensions of politics and social change. It has 
provided a space for reflection on, and the formation of, moral identity, which in 
the Colombian political context has historically been subsumed within the 
sectarian identities of the Liberal and Conservative parties.  
Again despite its limitations, the Assembly has arguably embodied the 
notion of politics as a practice in the MacIntyrean sense as opposed to its 
being an instrument for the mere furtherance of sectarian and sectoral 
interests (based on the priority of external over internal goods) through the 
dominant institutional political forms. It is arguably this, no doubt partial, 
understanding of politics as a practice that has enabled the formation of the 
virtues necessary to sustain the process. As MacIntyre has written, “the 
essential function of the virtues is clear. Without them, without justice, courage 
and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupting power of institutions” 
(MacIntyre 1985a, p. 194). The process in Tarso does not embody a complete 
harmony of interests or the existence of a shared moral identity, but it does 
embody the attempt to move towards such harmony and identity by “cultivating 
the process of agreeing” (Cox 1986, p. 12). From being a community only in 
name in which sedimented sectoral, class, and political interests were 
predominant and where “traditional” conceptions of order veiled these interests 
through an ideological appeal to “community” (Vélez 2003), Tarso has slowly 
moved towards the construction of a more plural and critical understanding of 
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community that evades, or at least attempts to evade, the abstractions of 
modern citizenship and the corruptions of state normativity.  
However, what the process has not evaded is conflict. Rather, it has 
attempted to channel it rationally through engagement and encounter in social 
and political practices that have provided criteria and generated virtues for 
addressing conflict by other means. As Kelvin Knight points out, the virtues 
that are exemplified in cooperative resistance to institutional power MacIntyre 
calls “goods of conflict” (Knight 2007, p. 186). MacIntyre writes, “To be good…is 
to be engaged in struggle and a perfected life is one perfected in key part in 
and through conflicts” such as, on the one hand: 
 
those engaged in by members of some rank and file trade union movements, 
of some tenants’ associations, of the disability movement, of a variety of 
farming, fishing, and trading cooperatives, and by some feminist groups, and 
on the other by those who are at work within schools, hospitals, a variety of 
industrial and financial workplaces, laboratories, theaters, and universities in 
order to make of these, so far as possible, scenes of resistance to the 
dominant ideology and the dominant social order. (Cited in Knight 2007, pp. 
186-187)  
 
The Assembly is currently at an important crossroads in which it risks 
capitulating to the dominant ideology through the pressures of external political 
institutions- the local council and departmental government- as well as 
possibly succumbing internally to the influence of external over internal goods, 
which is the hallmark of dominant institutionality. It remains to be seen how the 
community faces up to these particular threats and challenges.  
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In terms of cultivating agreement and addressing radical disagreement, 
the Assembly has apparently led to a recognition that land distribution in the 
municipality is unjust, which arguably has come about as a result of closer 
community interaction and engagement. The small scale of the community and 
the closer contact between people has possibly forced people into a more 
empathic engagement with the views of others, in particular with peasants. 
However, the inertia of land injustice remains and the fact of an apparent 
consensus within the Assembly that also extends into the local state has done 
nothing to actually lead to social change in this respect. There remains implicit 
radical disagreement between important sectors of the community- the 
landowning classes and the increasingly impoverished rural population. 
Ultimately this boils down to the kind of class conflict highlighted by Camilo 
Torres (1964), although the participatory space of the Assembly and the closer 
engagement amongst the community has arguably helped to bridge a little the 
linguistic, conceptual and cultural divides that Torres diagnosed.  
The moral idiom of the Assembly makes reference to rights, 
responsibilities and the notion of the common good. Within the Assembly there 
is a dialectic of informing people about their rights based on the Constitution, 
encouraging people to make demands for things they are entitled to, but also 
getting people to understand that rights only make sense in the reciprocal form 
of social and political responsibility. Without this, claims to rights often take on 
an emotivist form, clashing with other moral claims with no standard by which 
to evaluate and weigh up rival claims. For example, rights to housing and 
employment have been claimed by those who expect the Assembly to provide 
these, which clashes with the more Aristotelian conception of contributing 
collectively to have these needs and rights eventually met. The practice of 
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deliberation and contribution to shared projects arguably serves to mitigate the 
incommensurable modern, liberal appeals to rights and utility, which are 
instrumentalised by those who remain tied to clientelist practices. The conflict 
brewing in relation to the local state’s access to Assembly financial resources 
might also be framed in terms of an appeal to rights or utility by those within 
the state, but the Assembly’s alternative form of practice can hopefully provide 
rationally justifiable criteria for subverting such abstract claims and cementing 
a shared conviction that the state must be resisted in this case. The concept of 
responsibility within the overarching framework and practice of the Assembly 
arguably helps to generate some notion of shared criteria with which to help 
guide and resolve conflicts when they arise, to help people put their own 
interests (often couched in terms of rights) into a wider social perspective by 
encouraging self-reflection and concern for others in terms of the common 
good. The insistence by many of the Assembly core members that a change in 
attitude is required is in essence a call to take an ethical approach to politics, 
one based on what many referred to as a sense of the common good and an 
understanding that one’s own good is ultimately tied to the overall good of the 
community.  
What the narratives also show is an important awareness of the long-
term nature of the process in terms of its attempts to construct a new political 
culture. As William made clear, he viewed the process in Tarso as completely 
at odds with what he perceived the guerrillas’ notion of social change to be, 
which was seen as coming “all at once” with the taking of state power. This is 
the classic view of social change based on hegemony that Richard Day (2005) 
so cogently critiques. William adds to this an ethical concern, which was also 
Marx’s insight: those who seek to educate and transform the “masses” and to 
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eventually take power need to educate themselves. The ideology of 
bureaucratic authority tries to evade this but can only lead to arbitrary 
impositions. William clearly espoused MacIntyrean notions of the importance 
of building new political subjectivities with the required kinds of character 
through political practice, which is a complete break with the notion of politics 
as a domain for professionals and experts.  
However, there is a concern that the actual development of alternative 
political subjects with the required kind of integral character is hindered by the 
structure of the Assembly. Ten years down the line it remains the case that 
Alirio and William are still “in charge” (although it must be pointed out that they 
are voted in to their posts). The awareness that the Assembly process would 
“lose its essence” if it were to become an NGO, in MacIntyrean terms another 
compartmentalized institution characteristic of liberal politics, is important, but 
there is evidence of its increasing resemblance to an NGO. Those who had 
strong criticisms implicitly pointed out how the Assembly has tended to lapse 
into the logic of an NGO where it becomes a vector of resources outside the 
state apparatus, but which is increasingly seen to employ participation as a 
technique of mere “socialization” of what has already been decided. Further, 
there were criticisms to the effect that empowering positions (and paid 
positions- an important source of resentment and misunderstanding) were 
monopolized by a few and not offered on the basis of merit but according to 
friendship and favours.  
Nearly everybody agreed that there had been a regression in terms of 
community participation and involvement in the elaboration of the most recent 
Development Plan. This is concerning and points to the kinds of challenges 
that the community will inevitably face. Tarso as a community has taken some 
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important steps in generating a more or less shared moral-political language 
and framework that can hopefully provide the moral resources for preventing 
too deep lapses into old ways and practices. But this can only be known 
through a follow up study of the community.  
Arguably a more clear limitation to the kind of participation and politics 
of the Assembly in Tarso is indeed its focus on the Development Plans, which 
are elaborated entirely within the parameters set by the national level 
ideological framework. The initial discussions in relation to the Plan were 
based on the assumption of compartmentalized knowledge; the Assembly was 
divided up into different working groups who had particular “expertise” in the 
areas of “rural development”, “housing”, “democracy”, “budgeting” and so forth, 
which reflects the fragmentation of knowledge and assumes the pre-given 
aims in terms of which, for example, “development” is understood within a 
neoliberal, capitalist framework. However, an essential difference to dominant 
modes of politics was the way priorities for social spending within the terms of 
the Development Plan were established with the active participation of 
community members. Although resources for development were allocated by 
the departmental and central governments, which meant, for example, that the 
community could not shift resources aimed at health to other areas it deemed 
more needy, there is no doubt that participatory involvement had provided, 
through its transparency and democracy, a greater sense of legitimacy and 
empowerment. It is not implausible to suggest that community work on 
different projects aimed at local development, despite inevitable weaknesses 
and problems, has contributed to the emergence of virtues and shared criteria 
that challenge the dominant political ethos and subvert the individualistic 
postures and attitudes that have often prevailed (Marulanda 2004). 
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What was also clear in the narratives was a consciousness of the 
problems with the neoliberal conception of “development”. This was evident in 
the numerous references about the need to develop a local agrarian economy 
and in the unanimous recognition of the injustice of land concentration. In this 
respect, I suggest that the process embodies a radical conception of 
development that goes against what MacIntyre refers to as the standpoint of 
civil society. The focus on local agricultural production in the context of an 
exclusionary national agro-export economy (Moncayo et al. 2008) goes 
against what are perceived to be the requisites of modern development and 
the good.  
The inherent connection between participation-deliberation and the 
need for a solid economic base was highlighted in several of the narratives. 
María Toros forcefully made the point that unless people had their basic 
material needs met “how could you sustain a debate?” This resonates exactly 
with Enrique Dussel’s critique of Apelian and Habermasian discourse ethics 
(Dussel 1999). But this point also raises questions about the relevance of 
MacIntyre’s politics, which are arguably open to the charge of a certain 
circularity: rationally justifiable, morally grounded politics require and 
presuppose a more or less just economic order in terms of the distribution of 
wealth and power (MacIntyre 2006f, p. 39; 2001, p. 144). Yet neoliberalism 
has had devastating effects on societies like Colombia, aggravating social and 
economic inequalities. Therefore, it might be asked how a genuinely 
MacIntyrean politics can get off the ground outside of the somewhat idealized 
spaces of “fishing crews”, “Mayan towns”, “farming co-operatives”, etc. that 
MacIntyre highlights? However, my research suggests that it is possible for at 
least the outlines of such a politics to get off the ground in a real life, imperfect 
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and highly conflictual social context. In the Assembly’s early days the issue of 
economic and material inequalities was addressed (making progress in 
relative not absolute terms), which is surely what contributed to its success 
and the general optimism around it. Failure to maintain this impetus appears to 
be causing fractures, as MacIntyre says must be the case if large inequalities 
are allowed to persist (MacIntyre 2006f, p. 39).  
Despite ten years of an alternative local community politics in Tarso, the 
fact remains that massive inequalities in land and wealth distribution militate 
against the possibility of any serious politics of the common good developing. 
However, according to the narratives there is an important sense in which the 
politics of local community in Tarso is to some extent a politics of the common 
good, however imperfect. Those involved in the process have had to 
subordinate some of their individual interests to the collective interest of the 
Assembly and wider community. Even if only rhetorically (although in my view 
it is more than this), there is a recognition of the need to address the 
predominance of “particular interests” over common interests, something 
highlighted by both the current mayor and the militant peasant workers in the 
village. In the historical Colombian context of acute political and social 
polarization in which individual interests have imposed themselves, the 
recognition of this as a shared problem is not insignificant, even if prevailing 
social and economic structures tend to conceal the prevalence of powerful 
individual interests. MacIntyre cautions us to bear in mind that “institutionalized 
networks of giving and receiving are also always structures of unequal 
distributions of power, structures well-designed both to mask and to protect 
those same distributions. So there are always possibilities and often actualities 
of victimization and exploitation bound up with participation in such networks. If 
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we are not adequately aware of this, our practical judgments and reasoning 
will go badly astray” (MacIntyre 1999, p. 102). This is one of the biggest threats 
and challenges to the ongoing viability of Tarso as a community and social-
political process of coexistence and change. Arguably, a limitation of the 
politics of local community is the risk that these power relations remain 
obscured precisely by the focus on the micro level at the expense of the 
macro. Such a critique resonates with the Marxist view I critiqued in chapter 
four: that the macro relations of power and exploitation at the national level are 
what drive local, micro relations of unequal power and exploitation, therefore 
what is required is a national project of emancipation such as that embodied, 
according to some, in the armed struggle of the FARC. However, I have 
already highlighted the ethical problems with this view and practice. As I argue 
below, the response is not an “either-or” in respect of local vs. macro or “local 
development versus social movements” (Petras and Veltmeyer 2005, p. 221), 
which boils down to the “reform or revolution” dichotomy, but lies rather in 
mediating the kind of necessary national-level politics through the participatory 
politics of local community. Without such mediation the macro politics as 
embodied in various Marxist insurgent movements ultimately degenerates into 
manipulative power over those they claim to fight for. The insights provided by 
both the former insurgents I interviewed and some of those who witnessed first 
hand the modus operandi of the guerrilla movements attest to this 
degeneration and the way such action impedes the rational self-determination 
of individuals and communities. 
 The Assembly has attempted to encourage such rational self-
determination. The experience of participation in the Assembly has provided 
criteria for internal and wider political evaluation, and there is no doubt that the 
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degree of “social reconciliation” achieved thus far, despite its limitations, has 
been facilitated by the participatory politics of the Assembly. However, the 
danger is that the gains achieved will unravel because of the structural risks to 
any form of participatory community created by large material inequalities. In 
the Colombian context this has potentially serious implications for sustainable 
peace. We saw how Sandra López expressed her exasperation with the failure 
to address the agrarian question and implicitly suggested that she could be 
persuaded to support possibly violent modalities of social change should 
things remain the same. Given the history of Colombia’s polarized political 
landscape and the combination of material need and the search for dignity, this 
is a potentially explosive combination. If young people from the countryside 
like Sandra are to feel that they have a future, that they are valued by society, 
then something drastic will need to happen in terms of land distribution so that 
viable life opportunities become available. In Sandra’s case she felt that the 
divide between rich and poor was as great as ever, if not worse, both in terms 
of social and material inequalities but also culturally, both of which are surely 
central to sustainable, peaceful coexistence. Sandra recounted how when the 
guerrillas operated in Tarso things were not so bad. However, when they left 
“everything changed” and the injustices and indignities returned. Is it really the 
case that those with the most power and privilege, the landowners and their 
political allies, can only be persuaded to enact a modicum of social justice by 
the threat of violence and the use of force?  
The land issue reinforces class antagonism, which is the antithesis of a 
politics of the common good. Sandra represents the pessimistic view, Jairo, 
Elías and Albeiro (despite his scathing criticisms) the more optimistic outlook. 
Despite the discouraging realities of entrenched class division, Elías and 
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others think that the Assembly has managed to achieve an important degree of 
social reconciliation, which was most evident to them through the land 
donations of certain landowners. They were also positive about the impact the 
Assembly had had on the wider political-ethical culture. The fact that the huge 
chasm between the rich and poor is recognised in all the narratives is arguably 
significant as it points to a consensus and can possibly provide the basis for 
making inroads into this huge obstacle to social transformation.  
However, the fact that land concentration has worsened in Tarso over 
the last ten years shows the urgency of linking up to or building a national 
movement for land reform that bypasses clientelist networks and avoids the 
armed option, which has not led to any improvements in land justice for the 
mass of the rural population. Whilst the guerrillas’ discourse is consistent on 
land reform, their militaristic approach has only achieved a hardening of 
attitudes in the ruling class, while severely debilitating independent civil society 
and social movements’ ability to shift the polarized discursive formations in the 
country and develop their own programmes capable of addressing land 
injustice. Guerrilla presence in many rural areas is not necessarily the cause of 
repression of social movements- this would undoubtedly occur anyway- but 
they serve to muddy the waters and to inadvertently (but perhaps also 
purposefully and instrumentally) draw independent movements into the hyper-
politicized, dualistic discursive and ideological polarities that serve to 
criminalize social movements and any form of dissent.  
Despite the consensus on the injustice of land distribution and use, and 
a recognition of the central dimension of material and economic structures to 
the sustainability of participatory politics and debate in Tarso, there were few 
clear analyses or proposals as to how to address this beyond “more dialogue”. 
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The peasants I spoke to did have a more political conception of what needed 
to be done, but it ultimately centred on the notion of developing “alliances” with 
landowners who could be persuaded to give a little bit of their land for 
“productive projects”. Of course, the possibility is open that the more militantly 
oriented peasants and those who express a progressive attitude to the 
agrarian question and peasant cultures and economies can agree on a more 
militant strategy of seeking political alliances with wider social movements on 
this issue. The downside to the kind of patient, dialogic approach embodied in 
the politics of the Assembly is the fact that the militant peasant generation is 
getting older, memories of previous struggles are fading, and the inexorable 
logic of neoliberal, agro-export economics is rapidly eroding the social base of 
resistance. It is hard not to sympathize with Chris Harman (2009) and Peter 
Hallward (2005) who both point to the importance in such a barbarous context 
of urgent, principled but militant political action that does not emphasize 
dialogue or consensus, but mobilization, strategy, and correlations of forces 
based on class struggle to force political and social change. Interestingly, none 
of the peasants I interviewed suggested the possibility of returning to the 
militant strategy of land invasions, which might well be due to the sheer 
difficulty and danger that such a strategy entails. But this could also be put 
down to the dampening of militant and revolutionary sentiment by the 
conditioning and hegemony of the consensus approach to politics and social 
change embodied in the Assembly. Perhaps following Peter Hallward’s politics 
of prescription “we” might say that because the cause or, rather, the “axiom” of 
just land distribution is valid, we can prescribe “the organization of a force” to 
undo injustice and redistribute land. 
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However, the question would still remain: whose principles and whose 
militant action? My research highlights the emotivist ethical dimension of 
guerrilla organizations that has led to an arrogant, self-righteous approach to 
radical social transformation. Despite the Communist and Liberal party-linked 
guerrillas’ emergence in the context of flagrant social and land injustice and 
their close relationship to the agrarian social movements, along with their 
tendency to negotiate and combine political and armed strategies (Romero 
and Varela 2007), they were eventually to shift from a peasant-based self-
defence army to a militaristic, authoritarian organization that often imposed 
itself on those it claimed to fight for. Of course, a militant politics of prescription 
does not necessarily imply armed struggle; but the trajectory of militant politics 
towards armed struggle in Colombia reveals the need for a strong ethical 
dimension to movements for social and political change. The danger in not 
taking seriously the moral dimension to radical politics is the tendency to the 
kinds of absolutist claims that embody an emotivist self-certainty and 
arrogance.  
In contrast to this kind of politics, what the local community politics 
exemplified in Tarso arguably represents is the realization and injection of 
moral uncertainty into social struggles for justice and peace. The public sphere 
and public discourse have arguably been “unmoralized” by the practice of 
participation, and at least some minimal recognition of shared community 
interests has emerged as a basis for ongoing moral-political enquiry and 
struggle. Conflict can thus possibly be more rationally dealt with and therefore 
generative of progress and community self-realization instead of violence.  
A rationally grounded moral rejection of the strategy of armed struggle 
based on the common struggles of resistance to capitalism and its 
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representative liberal democratic politics in communities like Tarso can 
hopefully provide the basis for developing a national movement to address the 
egregious injustice of land distribution and use from which stem countless 
other injustices and abuses. Based on the discovery of a stratum of shared 
values by the minimal form of practice embodied in local Constituent 
Assemblies in respect of armed struggle, clientelism, the modern state, 
representative politics, and authoritarianism, perhaps Colombia’s working and 
peasant classes, ideally in alliance with elements of the middle classes, can 
develop an alternative kind of militant, moral politics based on a consensus 
about land and economic justice. What needs to be explored is how the 
multiple constituent assembly processes can and do link up with wider, 
nationally oriented movements whilst still maintaining a circumspect distance 
from the state. This suggests a useful line of further research. 
 Whilst Tarso has consolidated a local peace, the narratives indicate that 
peace is much more than the absence of overt violence. As Romero and 
Varela (2007) point out, peace means different things to different people- it 
depends on the individual subject who formulates a conception of peace (ibid., 
p. 281). “For a capitalist business person, for example, who interprets reality in 
relation to the desire to make profit, peace consists in the absence of conflicts 
between him and his workers…For the latifundista…peace is associated with the 
state recognizing their land as legitimate, irrespective of how it was acquired” 
(ibid., p. 281). This is essentially what has happened with the current counter-
agrarian reform under the Uribe administration. Peace becomes mere 
cessation of hostilities- the “security” provided by the monopoly of state force 
and effective justification of illegitimately gained land and resources, rather 
than serious efforts at challenging the currently even more illegitimate land 
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structure of Colombia. However, in Tarso there is an awareness that peace 
has “many ingredients”, which include addressing the problem of land 
distribution and generating dignified economic opportunities. This is 
recognized across all the interviews, which suggests that the fact of 
participation in a small local community has forged a consensus- such an 
important and obvious problem cannot simply be ignored as it can be in larger, 
non-participatory spaces like the dominant institutions of representative 
democracy. However, sooner or later the Assembly and Tarso as a wider 
community, including those who do not participate in the Assembly, are going 
to have to face serious moral and political questions in relation to how to 
achieve the more radical transformations required in respect of land 
distribution and use.  
Whilst there is evidence that the politics of local community in Tarso 
through the Assembly has engendered a more or less shared discursive, 
moral-political framework for talking about and practising politics, it might be 
argued in light of my empirical data that the politics of local community as a 
site for working out the morally objective thing to do in such cases actually 
serves to muddy the waters rather than to engender a determinate set of 
criteria to rationally guide the struggles of the community. For the bulk of poor, 
vulnerable and under-educated peasant workers in local communities like 
Tarso perhaps the nature of intense, (limited) face-to-face participation within 
the bounds of a small community still based on “patrimonial” and highly 
stratified social relations inhibits the development of an independent moral 
standpoint that might be possible in conjunction with a more ideologically and 
theoretically informed social movement with a national projection. It might even 
be argued that contrary to the individual positions that implied otherwise, the 
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Assembly process as a whole has in fact been too based on the “standpoint of 
civil society”, which has ultimately eroded the importance of working class and 
peasant political militancy and social struggle as essential sites for the 
development of a coherent and consequential moral framework and discourse.  
The fact is that despite evidence that to some extent the participatory 
politics of the Assembly has some of the characteristics of a practice, Tarso, 
as William Rios implicitly pointed out in his critique of the lack of culture in 
Tarso, is arguably not a practice-based community and, therefore, despite the 
limited form of political practice in the Assembly, on MacIntyre’s perspective 
individuals must lack the ability to develop independent, rationally grounded 
moral criteria and therefore to morally resist becoming instruments of mere 
capital formation. It is arguably rather the case that militant, class-based 
politics modelled on previous forms of direct action and solidaritous networks 
of affinity is what can provide adequate moral resources for critique and 
resistance. The tradition of local, rural neighbourhood democracy in the 
communal action committees was what the peasants I spoke to in Tarso 
referred to in terms of overcoming the political limitations of the Assembly 
process, as well as referring to the history of their previous struggles.  
However, there are possible spaces of MacIntyrean practice in the 
hospital and school, which can serve as sites for the development of moral-
political virtues and resistance. One important limitation of my study is that I 
was not able to access these spaces in a systematic way in order to conduct 
MacIntyrean enquiry, something that hopefully future research on the 
community can explore and clarify. 
What those involved appear to have gained from the process is the 
sense that a “civilist” approach to social change is an achievement that is 
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preferable to the polarities of class politics and the vicious circle of violent 
change associated with the guerrillas and their ambiguous and often 
instrumental involvement with autonomous grassroots political organizations. 
Moreover, militant class-centred politics can also tend to romanticize the 
working and peasant classes. Individualism and the culture of paternalism 
within the peasant and working classes are powerful obstacles to rational 
political agency and collective solidarity and therefore to any ethically rational 
politics. Where cultural conditions are not adequate to a revolutionary politics, 
attempts to force the issue through coercion or ideological discourses and 
moral exhortations, on MacIntyre’s view, can only fail- both in terms of 
achieving their goals and also in terms of rational justification. Furthermore, 
militant, class-based political movements arguably tend to become dogmatic 
and blinded by their own militant certainty, whereas the kind of politics of the 
common good outlined by MacIntyre and imperfectly practised in Tarso with its 
emphasis on an alternative, dialogic dynamic is arguably more attuned to the 
importance and the challenges of rational self-determination. 
I suggest that perhaps what is required is a political approach that 
combines militant class politics and the dialogical politics of the common good. 
The Assembly can be pushed to keep it focused on the core problems of land 
and economic justice by concerted peasant militancy that links up with national 
social movements, whilst this kind of national militancy centred on what is 
inevitably a class issue can be checked in terms of emotivist overreach by the 
participatory space of the Assembly. MacIntyre states that any local 
community will have to hook up from time to time with national movements 
involved in the politics of the nation state to defeat large-scale evils such as 
National Socialism or Stalinism (MacIntyre 1998c, p. 252). I contend that 
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neoliberalism underpinned by US imperialism is similarly a large-scale evil, 
which therefore requires communities like Tarso to link up with broader 
movements whose focus is the nation state and even the taking of state power. 
I agree with Paul Blackledge (2008) that, contrary to MacIntyre’s assertion, 
proletarianization does not necessarily lead to a lack of moral resources for 
resistance. As Blackledge argues, one of MacIntyre’s own examples of 
virtuous community resistance- Welsh mining communities- were partly 
enabled and held together by trade union activity, which on MacIntyre’s view 
should have lacked the resources for adequate moral resistance (Blackledge 
2008). The peasant militants I spoke to had been influenced and formed within 
the trade union movement, which had arguably provided them with the 
necessary predispositions and virtues required for community participation in 
the Assembly. I suggest that MacIntyre has it half right in pointing to the 
potential moral weaknesses of the kind of radical political militancy embodied 
in trade unionism and other forms of resistance, which if too divorced from 
concrete communities and their struggles can become abstract and emotivist 
and/or pulled into the ethos of modernity without the critical mediation and 
anchoring of the politics of local community. But likewise, the politics of local 
community could become too insular and accommodated to wider structural 
injustices without the kinds of more militant political subjectivity and character 
often found in more ideologically informed and nationally focused social 
movements. The kind of political space and practice embodied in the 
Constituent Assembly in Tarso is arguably an example of the kind required for 
mediating national, state-centred politics and movements.  
In terms of constructing political community, the Assembly process 
combines elements of Aristotelianism and liberalism. The appeal to the 
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Constitution places it within the bounds of liberal democratic state politics, but 
its attempted embodiment in actual practice reveals how, effectively, the 
Constitution goes beyond liberalism and requires a more participatory, direct 
form of democracy that has Aristotelian/MacIntyrean resonances. Alirio’s 
critique of the municipal council as superfluous in light of the Assembly’s role 
reveals how the process at the level of theory as well as of practice goes 
beyond liberal representative politics with its compartmentalization and its 
often hypocritical adhesion to legal principles. The emphasis on legitimacy 
over legality is politically revolutionary in the Colombian context.  
 
Conflict and social science 
My argument has also highlighted how MacIntyre’s philosophical critique of 
modern morality and the modern social sciences has radical implications for 
academic enquiry generally, but especially it seems for those disciplines that 
seek to develop “expert” knowledge in relation to politics and social change 
that can be put to use by states, corporations or other institutions. I argued that 
in Colombia the social and political sciences are embroiled in the conflict and 
that this is further complicated by MacIntyre’s diagnosis, which affects the 
authoritative status and rational justification of these sciences. Thus social 
scientific analysis and subsequent policy prescriptions in relation to addressing 
the moral-political crisis and other areas of the conflict are based on 
problematic modern philosophical- normative and epistemological- 
assumptions, which means they are effectively arbitrary. I suggested that if the 
social and political sciences are to play a rational role in both understanding 
and helping to transform conflict, then they had to become “moral sciences”. 
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Despite my own uncertainty about this, I proposed that it could only be through 
a radical approach based on committed social practice in particular 
communities that rationally justifiable analyses and prescriptions could be 
generated.  
This has affinities with the radical pedagogic philosophy of Paulo Freire, 
who addressed the question of adequate, ethically committed pedagogical and 
social theories, and the issue of contributing to social change. As I read Freire, 
these two issues are combined in the same way I suggest analysis and 
transformation of conflict is a joint operation. This would mean researchers, 
theorists and analysts- especially those concerned to interpret and to change 
the world- must link their theories to practice. As Freire comments, “Even 
theoretical discourse itself, necessary as it is to critical reflection, must be 
concrete enough to be clearly identifiable with practice. Its epistemological 
‘distance’ from practice as an object of analysis ought to be compensated for 
by an even greater proximity to the object of analysis in terms of lived 
experience” (Freire 2001, p. 44). Certain types of conflict analysis based on 
statistics alone, for example, which issue in generalizations and subsequent 
policy prescriptions have no grounding in concrete reality and simply serve as 
a mask for ideological agendas whilst also contributing to emotivist discursive 
formations that perpetuate conflict (for example, in relation to the need for 
“more state” as the answer to conflict, or for continued emphasis on a military 
“solution” and the importance of securing “investor confidence” and economic 
growth as answers to conflict). In contrast, conflict analysis rooted in the 
conceptual worlds of actual communities, which would take seriously and 
begin with agents’ own self-understandings, can begin to address the 
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normative problematic highlighted by MacIntyre and Freire, and to construct 
theory with tentative aims at making rationally grounded policy prescriptions.  
 This kind of alternative praxis is arguably already imperfectly embodied 
in the community I studied. In the process of public participation and 
deliberation, implicit theories of social change, development, politics, and 
ethics are, in effect, being elaborated. This did not happen out of the blue; as I 
pointed out, the whole “package” of a Constituent Assembly process came 
with a more or less complete moral-political lexicon and conceptual framework 
elaborated within sectors of the peace movement and wider civil society. But 
the process in Tarso, as surely elsewhere, has developed further theoretical 
and conceptual resources in connection with its own specific social and 
cultural context. For example, the emphasis on political rights drawn from the 
Constitution has been supplemented by an awareness of social and economic 
rights. “Participation” is understood to be meaningful and morally valid only if it 
is integrally linked to the satisfaction of material needs. Dominant conceptions 
of political legitimacy have also been challenged, as have prevailing notions of 
power.  
In line with a MacIntyrean and Freirean approach we might propose that 
social scientists work (pace MacIntyrean and Freirean critique) to help- 
dialogically of course!- draw out the theoretical and philosophical assumptions 
of such communities, generating rationally justifiable forms of knowledge and 
policy prescriptions or, rather, social prescriptions. Such knowledge could then 
be more fruitfully put to debate with rival knowledges, theories and 
prescriptions. In terms of specifically moral theory and the debate about an 
appropriate “ethics for better times” in Colombia, such praxis would contribute 
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a rooted theoretical perspective that would present a concrete challenge to 
abstract, free-floating theories.  
Finally, the narratives also provide insights into the way moral-political 
language, concepts and arguments are, in line with MacIntyre’s philosophical 
argument, intricately related to social and institutional contexts. By eliciting 
people’s narrative accounts of their involvement in the process I hope to have 
illuminated to some extent how moral-political language, judgements and 
perceptions relate to a concrete and complex social context. I hope this in 
conjunction with my participant observation gives a sense of how this one local 
community has both fared well and failed at different times, and how the 
community’s moral resources have been shaped by individual and collective 
experiences in social and institutional contexts, how they have been adapted 
and might continue to be adapted to the challenges the community has faced 
and will continue to face.  
This thesis has attempted both to employ the philosophical framework 
of Alasdair MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelianism as an explanatory framework 
for understanding and interpreting the moral dimensions of conflict, resistance 
and coexistence in Colombia- thereby hopefully demonstrating the 
contemporary relevance of MacIntyre’s philosophy- and to subject MacIntyre’s 
politics, which are integrally related to his philosophy, to critical exploration. I 
argue that despite the sheer scale of contemporary social and political 
irrationality, which has pulled us into an abyss of global suffering and injustice 
in the face of which the politics of local community defended by MacIntyre 
might sound utopian and naïve, the form of such politics studied in this thesis, 
which I argue is implicitly based on many MacIntyrean assumptions, 
demonstrates its validity and potential. The politics of local community as 
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practised in Tarso is based on the recognition of the importance of individual 
transformation and the development of ethical subjects, whilst not losing from 
view the centrality of socio-structural change and its dialectical relationship 
both to such individual transformation and wider social-political change.  
I argue that the philosophical and moral assumptions of MacIntyrean 
politics are extremely relevant to radically divided, conflictual societies such as 
Colombia. In terms of conflict analysis and resolution, MacIntyre’s philosophy 
and politics are relevant to the under theorized problem of radical political and 
moral disagreement that underlies many large-scale conflicts. I hope to have 
demonstrated this relevance by way of a critique of prevailing philosophical 
and theoretical assumptions and resources in the Colombian discussion, 
which remains incoherent and sociologically and politically problematic. 
Moreover, rescuing MacIntyre’s philosophy and politics from liberal and 
communitarian misreadings as well as radicals’ misconstruals of MacIntyre as 
a non-revolutionary, conservative philosopher is an important task in the face 
of a lack of adequate philosophical and moral resources for theorizing and 
practising social resistance and transformation. In terms of the field of peace 
studies, what John Paul Lederach (2005) calls the “moral imagination” of 
peacebuilding can be powerfully supplemented by the richness, depth and 
practical relevance of MacIntyre’s philosophy.  
I have hopefully indicated a possible path for further study using 
MacIntyre’s framework in the fields of peace studies, conflict resolution/conflict 
analysis, and the applications of the political and social sciences within these. 
Building up a set of comparative studies of different kinds of communities with 
diverse political processes in the context of conflicts in Colombia and 
elsewhere could yield important insights into the neglected moral dimensions 
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of conflict, resistance and the construction of social and political coexistence. 
My own work on Tarso has not aimed to provide any policy prescription or 
“expert” recommendation in respect of such issues, but rather represents a 
first attempt to undertake the kind of work a MacIntyrean approach calls for; 
namely, an attempt to get inside the conceptual world of social actors who are 
themselves seeking micro and macro forms of social and political change 
through concrete local community contexts. By attempting to work closely with 
such actors, the aim is to get beyond abstract generalizations in relation to the 
requirements and possibilities of social change, which frequently risk making 
false absolutist claims and adopt moral positions that amount to merely 
another form of incommensurable discourse.  
However, it is difficult not to see MacIntyre’s thesis as far more radical 
and difficult than this. If MacIntyre’s diagnosis of the incoherent and 
fragmented state of theoretical enquiry in ethics, politics, philosophy and 
sociology is correct, then is it not the case that before any of us embark on 
social scientific study of the world we need first to adequately organize the rival 
traditions into rival universities? Otherwise, is it not also the case that the 
theoretical and conceptual status of such research is uncertain or at best 
philosophically incoherent, which has to call into question its validity and 
intellectual worth? I happily leave this question to one side for now, but in my 
view this is an issue that requires further philosophical research. 
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